Jivanbhai Trikambhai vs Chaturbhai Fakirbhai

N.V. Anjaria, J.—In Tohleram Revaldas Gidwani and another v. Purshottamdas Chhaganlal Shah [1995(2) GLH 1019], the Court posed a question-Should the proof of monetary consideration received by the tenant from his sub-tenant be a sine qua non for an ejectment decree or even in absence thereof, and eviction decree could be legally recorded. In the present revision application, similar question is raised by learned advocate for the applicant, contending, undoubtedly with more emphasis and vehemence, that a valuable consideration is sine qua non for passing the decree of eviction u/s 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 The HRP Suit No. 3891 of 1988 instituted by the respondent-landlord for decree of eviction came to be allowed by Court No. 3 of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad on 24.12.1996. The tenant preferred Civil Appeal No. 32 of 1997 before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad, which was dismissed by judgment and order dated 25.04.2000. The aggrieved tenant has, therefore, filed the present Revision Application u/s 29(2) of the Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'' for short).

In the HRP suit, the grounds originally urged seeking eviction of the tenant were arrears of rent, acquisition of alternative accommodation and sub-letting of the suit premises. The ground u/s 13(1)(e) of unlawful sub-letting of assignment or transfer of interest in the premises survived for consideration before the lower appellate court, the trial court having held against the landlord in respect of the other two grounds.

1.2 it was noticed that HRP suit as originally instituted against two defendants being defendant No. 1-Jivanbhai Vikrambhai and defendant No. 2-Dhanshukbhai Ratilal, being the sub-tenant impleaded. However, in the Appeal before the Appellate Bench as well as in this Revision Application, defendant No. 2 who was omitted from being made party and both the Appeals and the Revision was entertained without original defendant No. 2 being party. In the present order wherever the word original defendant No. 2 occurs, it indicates the original position of the parties.

A profile of facts may be outlined in brief. The suit premises bearing Municipal Census Number 1408/2 and 1408/3 was rented to the defendant at a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-. It was the case of the plaintiff-landlord that premises bearing No. 1408/2 was sub-let by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 one Dhansukh Ratilal and the 1 tenant was thereby profiteering. The plaintiff stated that the said subtenant was in exclusive possession and was illegally occupying the same. The said defendant No. 2, who happened to be the brother-in-law of defendant No. 1, filed his written statement at Exhibit 106.

2.1 The defendants'' case was that defendant No. 2 had come to stay in the premises for having a shelter; that he had his own house situated elsewhere, which was badly damaged due to heavy rains. The defendant No. 2 had therefore come to defendant No. 1''s house for a day only on 03.02.1989 and defendant No. 1 had permitted him to put the goods in his premises, permitting him to stay for short time, until defendant No. 2 repaired his own house. It was contended that defendant No. 2 was neither subtenant nor the tenant had parted with exclusive possession. The case that defendant No. 2 had come for short period and was allowed to keep his goods due to heavy rains which required him to leave his own damaged house, was not believed by the Courts. The decree for eviction resulted and then confirmed by the lower appellate court.

Learned advocate for the applicant Mr. Anshin H. Desai emphatically submitted that for the purpose of proving the ground u/s 13(1)(e), the ingredient of presence of valuable consideration was essential. The nature of possession and the exclusiveness of possession were two other important criteria, he submitted. According to him there was no evidence worth the name to show that defendant No. 1 was receiving any amount from defendant No. 2 and that there was a valuable consideration passing from the alleged sub-tenant. He submitted that once that element was not shown to be present, the ground of sub-letting u/s 13(1)(e) could not have been held proved Therefore, he submitted that the defendant No. 2 in occupation in the room adjoining to tenant''s was not in capacity of sub-tenant and there was no sub-letting. The decree for eviction on that ground could not have been passed, he reiterated.

3.1 Regarding the aspects of exclusiveness of possession and nature of possession, learned advocate for the applicant submitted that defendant No. 2 was brother-in-law of the tenant, who was permitted to use the premises together with the tenant by the tenant. It was submitted that he had come to suit premises in compelling circumstances and the tenant gave shelter to his brother till his own house, the walls of which had fallen down in the rains, got repaired. He submitted that there was no parting of exclusive possession in favour of defendant No. 2 who in fact was staying together. His nature of possession, it was submitted, was purely a permissive one out of family relationship. He submitted that partying with exclusive possession of the premises by the tenant in favour of third party and passing of valuable consideration were the twin basic ingredients and both of them ought to have been simultaneously established to justify decree of eviction.

3.2 Learned advocate for the applicant relied on decision in Dev Kumar (Died) through LRs. Vs. Smt. Swaran Lata and others, in fortification of his contention that parting of possession of the premises by tenant and exclusive possession of sub-tenant were the essential ingredients to be proved. For similar preposition, decision in Gundalapalli Rangamannar Chetty Vs. Desu Rangiah and Others, was relied on and it was submitted that the mere fact that another person is allowed to use the premises while the lessee retains the legal possession would not create a sub-lease. Another Apex Court decision in M/s. Delhi Stationers and Printers Vs. Rajendra Kumar, was relied on for the proposition that mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either subtenancy or parting with possession.

3.3 Reliance was placed on decision in Rameshchandra K. Patwa and Others Vs. Vithaldas Chimanlal and Others, .In that case the court concluded that from mere presence of certificate of the sub-tenant issued by the Sales Tax Department and Authority under the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act with address of the suit premises mentioned therein, in the suit premises, inference of possession of sub-tenant could not be drawn. For assailing the reasoning of the trial court to hold the exclusive possession of defendant No. 2 on the basis of Assessment Registers of the Municipal Corporation, learned advocate for the applicant pressed into service a decision of the Supreme Court in Dnyaneshwar Ranganath Bhandare and Another Vs. Sadhu Dadu Shettigar (Shetty) and Another, . It was submitted on the basis of the said decision that the documents like Assessment Register extract, Electoral Role or remittance of amounts by occupant in bank account of owner could not be relied on to hold that the person was in occupation and possession of the premises.

3.4 On the basis of Nirmal Kanta (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Ashok Kumar and Another, , it was contended that in the facts of the case, since the tenant and alleged sub-tenant were brother-in-law and defendant No. 2 was permitted to stay with defendant No. 1, according to learned advocate for the applicant, main ingredient of sub-tenancy, namely parting with exclusive possession of the tenanted premises was not proved. Decision in Dahiben Lakhabhai and Another Vs. The Administrative Officer and Others, was relied on and from paragraph 10 thereof, it was contended that valuable consideration has to be established. Another decision in Santosh Ajit Sachdeva and Others Vs. Anoopi Shahani, was relied on. Yet another decision in Resham Sing v. Raghbir Sing [ (1991) 7 SCC 263] was relied on for emphasizing that in that case, there was no evidence of exclusive possession. In that case, brother was allowed by the tenant to look after the shop and it was held that it was not a sub-letting.

3.5 Learned advocate, in order to substantiate his contention about the valuable consideration is essential ingredient, relied on decision in Popatlal Premchand Seth v. Dhanjibhai & Sons [1991(4) GLR 71]. Therein it was held that in order to prove subletting, the tenant has to establish two vital facts, namely, transfer of exclusive possession of the rented premises or any part thereof and valuable consideration for such transfer. The Court held that mere permissive user by someone of the rented premises would not amount transfer for the purpose of sub-letting.

3.6 Learned advocate for the respondent submitted that the evidence on record established the case of subletting. The room which the sub-tenant occupying was separate and he was using the same exclusively for his purpose. He was staying there since long, though the case was that it was for short period until his house was repaired, he had come there. He submitted that once the tenant parted with the possession in favour of the third party, no matter he may be relative, the ground u/s 13(1)(e) should establish. He highlighted the circumstances right from the stage of issuance of notice to submit that the defence of the tenant was not believable. Answering the contention that valuable consideration was a must to establish the act of subletting, learned advocate for the respondent submitted that it was only at the best a supplementary requirement and the Court never insist a direct proof thereof as such direct proof was not possible in such cases. He submitted that even without it the ground of eviction was proved in the facts of the case.

3.7 Learned advocate for the respondent relied on the following decisions in support of the various submissions made by him (i) decision in Patel Chhaganbhai Madhubhai (Dhaduk) v. Modi Motilal Mohanlal being Civil Revision Application No. 26 of 2013, decided on 03.04.2013, (ii) decision in Eagle Transport Madras (Pvt) Ltd., Thro J R Aarya v. Shabbirbhai Safkathusein being Civil Revision Application No. 202 of 2012, decided on 07.08.2012, (iii) decision in Kailasbhai Shukaram Tiwari Vs. Jostna Laxmidas Pujara and Another, (iv) decision in Amar Singh Vs. The State of Bihar, (v) decision in Vanrajbhai Jesangbhai Chavda v. Ashokbhai Kalubhai being Civil Revision Application No. 191 of 2008, decided on 07.05.2012, (vi) decision in Bhuneshwar Prasad and Another Vs. United Commercial Bank and Others, , (ix) decision in The State of Maharashtra and Another Vs. Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (x) decision in Aladmiya v. Patel Parshottamdas Shivabhai being Civil Revision Application No. 1131 of 1990, decided on 08.07.1997.

3.8 it transpired that Civil Application No. 7496 of 2011 was filed in the present Revision Application by the defendant under Order XLI Rule 37 of the Code, 1908 which was not granted by the Court but he was permitted to produce the document by filing affidavit Accordingly by filing additional affidavit dated 27.05.2011, the defendant in support of his case, filed documents in the nature of electricity bills, etc.

Section 13(1)(e) of the Act provides for eviction of decree to the landlord if the tenant has unlawful assigned or transferred his interest therein. The Section reads thus,

That the tenant has, since the coming into operation of this Act unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner, his interest therein.

4.1 The acid test to establish sub-tenancy, as is held in several decisions, is that the tenant had parted with exclusive possession in favour of the third party. This law was highlighted in Dev Kumar (Died) through LRs. Vs. Smt. Swaran Lata and others, , it was observed that,

Coming to the second question the expression ''sub-letting'' has not been defined in the Act. The conclusion on the question of sub-letting is a conclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on the materials on record as to the transfer of exclusive possession as to the said transfer of possession being for consideration. As to what is the true meaning of the expression ''sub-letting'', this Court considered the same in the case of Jagdish Prasad Vs. Smt. Angoori Devi, in an eviction proceeding under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. The Court held that merely from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop, sub-letting cannot be presumed and as long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. It was further held that in an application for eviction of a tenant from a, shop which is based on the allegations that the premises has been sub-let, the allegation has to be proved. The question of sub-letting was considered by this Court in the case of Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. Vs. H.C. Sharma and Others, and it was held that in order to construe sub-letting there must be parting of legal possession of the lessee and parting of legal possession means "possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others".

In the case of Rajbir Kaur and Another Vs. S. Chokesiri and Co., this Court considered the question of sub-letting and held that the burden of making a case of sub-letting is on the landlady. It was also held that the transaction of sub-letting in the guise of licences are in their very nature clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the sub-tenant and it would be difficult to get direct evidence on the same. If exclusive possession of the alleged sub-tenant is established then it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with mandatory consideration in mind.

4.2 Similar was the law principle propounded in Nirmal Kanta (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Ashok Kumar and Another,

... it is now well-established that a subtenancy or a sub-letting comes-into existence when the tenant inducts a third-party stranger to the landlord into the tenanted accommodation and parts with possession thereof wholly or in part in favour of such third party and puts him in exclusive possession thereof. The lessor and/or a landlord seeking eviction of a lessee or tenant alleging creation of a sub-tenancy has to prove such allegation by producing proper evidence to that effect. Once it is proved that the lessee and/or tenant has parted with exclusive possession of the demised premises for a monetary consideration, the creation of a subtenancy and/or the allegation of subletting stands established.

About initial burden to be discharged by the landlord, Hon''ble the Apex Court in Ms. Celina Coelho Pereira and Others Vs. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, stating that the proposition laid down in its earlier decisions in Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Delhi Vs. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, and in Smt. Krishnawati Vs. Shri Hans Raj, was the law, reiterated that in case of subletting, the onus lying on the landlord would stand discharged by adducing prima-facie proof of the fact that alleged sub-tenant was in exclusive possession of the premises, and in the language of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant was holding right to enjoy such property.

5.1 This initial burden was discharged by the landlord in this case. The report of the Court Commissioner (Exh.,92) revealed the presence of defendant No. 2 and his family in the suit premises. It indicated that part of the premises used by defendant No. 2 had in it utensils and household communities lying therein. The other evidence taken into account by the courts below record was the copies of the demand register of the Municipal Corporation (Exh. 82 to 84) wherein name of defendant No. 2 was mentioned. On the basis of the record of the Municipal Corporation, a finding could be recorded that defendant No. 2 remained in possession of one room bearing Municipal Census No. 1408/2 in the suit premises from the year 1988-89 onwards till 1992-93. Thus, he was found to be occupying the room for five to six years continuously and even thereafter.

5.2 The above was coupled with the aspect that in the Municipal record itself mentioned that the two rooms were bearing different identification numbers, had separate doors and the door for falling in the gallery. Thus, it was found that the room bearing separate Municipal Census Number 1408/2 and the same was physically separate and in exclusive possession of defendant No. 2. It had separate access. Both the rooms fell in one gallery. In order to go to the said room occupied by defendant No. 2, one was not required to enter or pass through the other part of the premises which was Municipal Census Number 1408/3.

5.3 At the outset certain highlighting aspect of the matter being the circumstances may be noted, which show the intention on the part of the subtenant to occupy the suit premises and stay there and the factum that the sub-tenant was in the premises. The suit notice dated 11.03.1987 (Exh. 76) was received by defendant No. 2 at the address of the suit premises. The suit was filed on 31.08.1988. The summons in the suit was served on defendant No. 2 on 01.09.1989, again at the address of the suit premises. The Court Commissioner''s Panchnama (Exh. 92) was dated 03.02.1989, which was signed by both the defendants. Exhibit 8 application for appointment of Court Commissioner, to which reply (Exh. 27) was filed by defendant No. 1 on 17.01.1990, wherein it was pleaded that on the said day, defendant No. 2 had taken back his goods as his house was repaired. Defendant No. 2, however was found to be in occupation all along and even subsequent to the aforesaid date, falsifying the claim that he had come only for a day or for short period. Defendant No. 1 in his evidence (Exh. 73) stated that defendant No. 2 had no house of his own before he came to stay in the suit premises, which was a contradictory stand in itself. The evidence was silent as to when the house of defendant No. 2 was repaired. All these circumstances and long continuing occupation of defendant No. 2 in the suit premises gave credence to the submission of learned advocate for the respondent that the defendants had created a story to get out from the clutches of Section 13(1)(e).

5.4 Posing to dealing with the decision in Dhyaneshwar Ranganath (supra), relied on by learned advocate for the applicant, it had altogether a different complexion of facts. The question was whether the occupants of the premises were tenant or were trespassers. The tax receipts and the assessment register extracts were relied on by the respondent of that case seeking to establish that they were the evidences showing the tenancy rights. The Supreme Court held in that context that documents of such nature could not prove that the occupants were tenant. Thus, it was with reference to the claim of tenancy, that it was held that tax payment receipts or the assessment register entries and like documents did not suggest existence of tenancy. There can be no gainsaying, however, that for the purpose of showing the occupation and possession of a person of the premises, the property tax register, tax payment receipts, demand notices, etc., could be treated as relevant materials and provide dependable circumstances and evidence. The courts below were entirely right in relying upon them to conclude about the possession in the facts of the case.

5.5 In Popatlal Premchandra (supra), the suit premises was given on rent to a surgeon, and later on a sign board of a company was found in the premises. In the suit for eviction by the landlord, the defence of the tenant was that a partnership was created. The partnership was held to be sham and bogus by the lower court and the suit came to be decreed. This Court in that context, holding that the burden was shifted on tenant to establish as to how a particular person was in possession. Holding further that the tenant had failed to discharge his burden in law, the decree of eviction was set aside by the Court accepting the revision of the tenant. The decision stood true on the facts of that case.

Thus, there was ample and cogent evidence which established that the sub-tenant was in exclusive possession of the premises. The essential elements of exclusive transfer of possession and exercisability of right to include and exclude the others were further fortified in view of the fact that the part of the premises held, occupied and possessed by defendant No. 2 was a separate room bearing separate Municipal Census Number and it being situated, in such a way that it was capable of being accessed independently. It had separate door and entry available. The conclusion of the Courts below was only reasonable and proper that original defendant No. 2-sub-tenant was staying there since long and had been enjoying exclusive possession of the room. Defendant No. 1-tenant had transferred exclusive possession of the part of the premises in favour of defendant No. 2 to the exclusion of himself, was the inescapable conclusion.

6.1 The connotation "transfer in any other manner" occurring in section 13(1)(e) was considered by this Court in Harshachandra Narsinhbhai v. Ibrahimbhai Haji [1984 GLR 965], wherein it was observed that Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rent Act is much wider, and not confined merely to acts of unlawful sub-letting or sub-lease. The mischief of the Section would be attracted even in cases of a transfer made in favour of relative or known person once it is established that the tenant has left the premises and has put the transferee or the relative in exclusive possession thereof.

What was exceedingly emphasized by learned advocate for the applicant that there was no evidence or proof of existence of valuable consideration passing from the alleged sub-tenant to the tenant. This ingredient though important need not be available expressively from the evidence. It is an inferential ingredient not to be required to be invariably shown to be positively present, more particularly when the facts of a case establish exclusive transfer and parting with possession in sub-tenant''s favour. In Tohleram (supra) it was held that once the partying with exclusive possession was proved, the burden would shift on the tenant to show that it was without valuable consideration. The exclusive partying of possession becomes a dominant test which would make Section 13(1)(e) apply and it would be possible to hold that an act of subletting has taken place. As far as the requirement of valuable consideration is concerned, it being a secretive consideration, a direct or positive proof in that regard would be difficult to obtain. The exclusiveness of possession parted with by the tenant in favour of another one would suffice without proof of valuable consideration passing therefor. The valuable consideration in such circumstances has to be presumed.

7.1 it was further held,

Even assuming for the sake of argument that the onus of proof to show want of consideration is discharged by the defendants and sub-tenancy is not proved, then also there will be a clear case of transfer or assignment by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 2 which is also prohibited by section 13(1)(e) read with Section 15 of the Bombay Rent Act and also by Rent Note, Ex. 33.

7.2 In M/s. Bharat Sales Ltd. Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India, it was contended that unless payment of consideration was established as a fact between the tenant and the sub-tenant, the eviction petition u/s 14(1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act cannot be allowed. Rejecting the contention and dismissing the SLP preferred by the tenant, the Apex Court explained the legal position as under:

Sub-tenancy or sub-letting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession over the demised property. It is, the actual, physical and exclusive possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub-tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sub-let had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may have been paid in lump sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sub-let or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sub-let.

7.3 In Rajbir Kaur and Another Vs. S. Chokesiri and Co., it was observed with reference to passing of monetary consideration as under:

The High Court did not deal specifically with the question whether, in the circumstances of the case, an inference that the parting of the exclusive possession was prompted by monetary consideration could be drawn or not. The High Court, did not examine this aspect of the matter, as according to it, one of the essential ingredients, viz., of exclusive possession had not been established. If exclusive possession is established, and the version of the respondent as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the guise of licences are in their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the sub-tenant and there cannot be direct evidence got. It is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference.... In the circumstances of the case, we think, that appellants having been forced by the Courts below to have established exclusive possession of the ice-cream vendor of a part of the demised-premises and the explanation of the transaction offered by the respondent having been found by the Courts below, to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable, it was not impermissible for the Courts to draw an inference, having regard to the ordinary course of human conduct, that the transaction must have been entered into for monetary considerations. There is no explanation forthcoming from the respondent appropriate to the situation as found.

7.4 The principle was once again reiterated in Vinaykishore Punamchand Mundhada and Another Vs. Shri Bhumi Kalpataru and Others, observed that,

It would be impossible for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the arrangement between the tenant and sub-tenant. It would not be possible to establish by direct evidence as to whether the person inducted into possession by the tenant had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Such arrangement which may have been made secretly, cannot be proved by affirmative evidence and in such circumstances, the court is required to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the enquiry. Delivery of exclusive possession by the tenant to a stranger to the landlord and without the prior permission of the landlord is one dominant factor based on which the court could infer as to whether the premises were sub-let.

Both the Courts below concurrently found that it was a subletting. The said finding was arrived and the conclusion was drawn on the basis of evidence properly appreciated. There was no irregularity in law noticed. There was no misreading of evidence. No perversity could be demonstrated in the findings recorded. In the circumstances, given the well settled principles on the scope of exercise of revisional powers u/s 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, set down by the Courts in Irene v. V.S. Venkataraman, [(2010) 15 SCC 711 ] and Helper Girdharbhai Vs. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and Others, . The principle elaborated may be noticed from the following observations in Patel Valmik Himatlal and Others Vs. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai (Dead) Through L.Rs.,

The powers u/s 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act are revisional powers with which the High Court is clothed. It empowers the High Court to correct errors which may make the decision contrary to law and which errors go to the root of the decision but it does not vest the High Court with the power to rehear the matter and reappreciate the evidence. The mere fact that a different view is possible on reappreciation of the evidence cannot be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. The High Court cannot substitute its own findings on a question of fact for the findings recorded by the courts below on reappraisal of evidence.

8.1 While the above principles are noted, the evidence in the present case did not permit any second view to be possible or plausible. The parting of possession exclusively in favour of the sub-tenant was clearly, cogently and convincingly proved establishing the ground u/s 13(1)(e) of the Act inviting liability of eviction for the tenant.

In view of above reasons and discussion, there is no merit in the Revision Application and the same stands dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the Small Causes Court and confirmed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court are not interfered with, except that the date of 31.03.1997 mentioned for handing over of vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises by the tenant shall stand substituted to 31.12.2013. Rule is discharged. Interim relief granted earlier shall stand vacated, subject to aforesaid modification. Record and Proceedings to be sent back to the Court concerned.