J.M.Ray vs Surrinder Kumar Sher

(1) This is an application under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure by Mr. J. M. Ray, Principal, Tyndale, Biscoe School. Sheikh

Bagh, Srinagar, praying that the proceedings launched against him under section 500 of the Ranbir Penal Code by the respondent herein in the

Court of the City Magistrate, Srinagar be quashed.

(2) It appears that the respondent who was admittedly working as a technician in the aforesaid school was informed by the petitioner on December

24, 1974, that on the basis of the report submitted by the auditothers of the school and the Interim report of the Committee set up by the Board of

Management of the School, there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was prima facie guilty of fraud, breach of trust and misappropriation

of school funds and that pending inquiry into the charges it had been decided to place him under suspension. This notice was followed up by

delivery of the articles of charges to the respondent on January 20, 1974. A few weeks thereafter, i. e. on March 14, 1975. the respondent put in

his resignation whereupon he was relieved of his charge by the petitioner. Three days thereafter the respondent made a complaint in the court of

the C. J. M. Srinagar, which was transferred by him for disposal according to law to the City Magistrate, Srinagar, who after recording the

preliminary statements of the respondent and the two witnesses produced by him ordered process to be issued against the petitioner herein

Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has made the aforesaid application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to this Court.

(3) Appearing in support of the application Mr. Chowdhry has vehemently contended that the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant

issue of process against his client and that it will entail a great hardships and harassment to him if the aforesaid proceedings are allowed to go on.

(4) Mr. P. L. Kaul, has on the other hand urged that his client was perfectly justified in initiating the aforesaid proceedings as he was placed under

suspension and was chargesheeted by the petitioner with the malicious intention of ousting him from service and harming his reputation.

(5) I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.

(6) It is no doubt true that the inherent 'powers possessed by the High Court to quash (criminal proceedings are to be exercised in exceptional

cases which are outlined in the decision off the Supreme Court in R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, A. I. R I960 SC 866 and my decision in Mangat

Ram v. Babu Ram A. I. R. 1969 JandK 132 but one of the categories of the cases in which the exercise of this power 'has been held to be

justified are those where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged. The present is precisely a case of such a nature. The allegations contained in the complaint filed by

the respondent do not, in my opinion, constitute an offence within the meaning of Section 499 of the Ranbir Penal Code.

(7) The essence of the offence of defamation is the intention or the knowledge that the allegations will harm the reputation of the person against

whom they are made. In the instant case no such intention or knowledge can ba imputed to the petitioner who seems to have acted in good faith in

the bonafide discharge of his duties as the head of an educational institution. If the interpretation sought to be placed on behalf of the respondent on

the scope and purview of section 499 R. P. C. is accepted and taken as correct and the acts of the nature done by the petitioner in the legitimate

discharge of his duties are held to amount to defamation, it would completely cripple the administration and functioning of many public and private

institutions and would render taking of disciplinary proceedings by an employer very hazardous nay impossible.

(8) The view taken by me that the acts of the petitioner which form the subject matter of complaint by the respondent do not constitute an offence

under Section 499 R. P. C. receives support from a decision of the Bombay High Court in Queen Empress v. Sadashiv Atmaram, I. L. R. 18

Bombay, 205, at page 644, where the mere sending of a notice containing a matter of defamatory nature was held not to be equivalent to making

or publishing a defamatory matter intended to harm the reputation of a person.

(9) I also find myself unable to the contention of Mr. P. L. Kaul that the intention of the petitioner to harm the reputation of the respondent is

evident from the fact that he published the aforesaid articles of charges framed by him against the respondent to other members of the staff, There

is nothing in the statement of the respondent or the witnesses produced by him to support this contention.

(10) In view of the foregoing, I consider it just and reasonable to quash the aforesaid proceedings to obviate waste of public time and money and

to prevent the abuse of the process of the court.

(11) Accordingly I quash the proceedings and discharge the petitioner.