Jogi Ram and Others vs Smt. Kishni and Others

S.D. Anand, J.—It is apparent from the record that though the plea raised by the plaintiff-respondent for ad-interim relief (i.e. for the restraint of the defendants-petitioners from interfering in her possession of the land in suit) did not find favour with the learned Trial Court (which dismissed the stay application vide order dated 23.3.2006-Annexure P-3), she succeeded in appeal which (appeal) was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kaithal, vide order dated 26.7.2007 (Annexure P-4). Vide that order, the defendants-petitioners were "restrained from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff/applicant/appellant in any manner over the suit property till the final decision of the suit."

The plaintiff-respondent filed a plea (Annexure P-5) on 16.7.2008 for the grant of "police help so that sanctity of the orders of the Court may be maintained and the applicant may be able to cultivate the land smoothly without any quarter of hindrance." The plea was twisted by the defendants-petitioners by averring that "plaintiff is not in possession of the suit land" and that "the plaintiff wants to establish/take possession through police help whereas she is not at all in possession of the suit land." It was also the averment that the dispute regarding the possession "is yet to be decided on merits after leading evidence by both the parties" and that "no specific over act has been pleaded or prima facie proved."

On hearing the parties, the learned Trial Court allowed the plea and directed the SHO of Police Station concerned to take steps to ensure that the injunction order was complied with. The defendants-petitioners are in revision. The learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the defendants-petitioners, relied upon Kawaljit Kaur and Anr. v. Gautam Cheema and Ors. 2007 (2) P.L.J. 315 in support of the plea for the invalidation of the impugned order. It was argued that the filing of the plea itself was indicative of the fact that the plaintiff-respondent was not in possession of the land in suit. It was also argued that the grant of the impugned order was inappropriate because the controversy with regard to the possessory title of the suit land was yet to be adjudicated upon at the trial. The plea was resisted by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent by relying upon Ram Singh v. Jaggar Singh 2001 (2) CCC 218, Gram Panchayat, Daroli Jat v. Smt. Lokesh Devi and Ors. 1999 (Supp.) CCC 371 (P&H), Thakur Dass Vs. Harijan Sudhar Samiti, and Smt. Jagannathiya v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2007 (5) RCR 571. The first three judicial pronouncements are by Coordinate Benches of this Court; while last indicated is a judgment of Division Bench of Allahabad High Court.

It is plainly illogical for the defendants-petitioners to keep on insisting that they are in possession of the land in suit. Once the 1st Appellate Court has granted an injunction order in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and the revision filed by the defendant-petitioner against that order had concededly been declined by this Court, it cannot be said with any justification that the defendant-petitioner cannot raise the plea aforementioned with any justification. Of course, the final verdict on point of possessory title shall come about only on the basis of substantive evidence adduced at the trial. Insofar as the principle of law is concerned, the judicial pronouncements relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent are fully supportive of the impugned order. It is apparent, from a perusal thereof, that the Civil Court is competent to pass orders to take steps to ensure that interim orders passed by it are complied with. In all these cases, similar facts were involved and this Court and also the Allahabad High Court ordered that grant of order of police help in the context was appropriate. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court also placed reliance upon certain rulings of the Apex Court in the context.

Insofar as the Single Bench ruling in Kawaljit Kaur''s case (supra) is concerned, it is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case, the Court noticed that the injunction order had been granted in favour of the plaintiffs therein on 21.11.2005 and they moved an application for police help for providing police help for sowing and harvesting the cop on 3.12.2005. That application had otherwise been typed out on 26.11.2005. The plaintiffs also filed subsequent applications dated 5.12.2005, 8.4.2006, 12.4.2006, 18.5.2006, 7.6.2006, 15.6.2006 and 29.9.2006 of similar character. It further noticed that the prayer in all these application was "for directing the police authorities to provide police help either for sowing of the crop or for harvesting the same". Apart therefrom, this Court also noticed that inspite of the Civil Court orders holding the plaintiffs therein to be in possession in certain Khasra Nos. , the facts available on record indicated that "the crop is being harvested by the defendants since November, 2005 which is apparent from the fact that applications are being filed by the plaintiffs for permission to sow the crop under police protection and again harvest the same under police protection." That case was, thus, based upon peculiar circumstances which have no significant with the present case.

The above discussion would indicate that there is plethora of law to uphold the point of view that the grant of police help for enforcement of an injunction order is appropriate. In the present case too, the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 made a precise averment that defendants-petitioners are inclined to interfere in her possession in the land in suit. The defendants-petitioners raised a counter plea by averring that the plaintiff-respondent is not in possession of that land which (land) is in their possession. The insistence on the part of the defendants-petitioners in reiterating their possessory title on the land in suit, even in the face of the finding by the learned 1st Appellate court and also this Court to the contrary is indicative of former''s inclination to interfere in the possession of the plaintiff-respondent of the land in suit. It may be that the learned 1st Appellate court and this Court granted the restraint order in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and against the defendants-respondents on the basis of a prima facie view, it is equally true that the finding upholding the possession of the plaintiff-respondent on the land in suit cannot be wished away in this manner.

In the light of the forgoing discussion, the petition is held to be denuded of merit and is order to be dismissed.