Joginder Kaur vs State of Punjab and Another

S.S. Saron, J.—Affidavit of Sh. Vinod Viyogi (respondent No. 2) filed in Court today is taken on record.

Heard Counsel for the parties.

The present petition has been filed by the petitioner Joginder Kaur who is the sole accused u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of FIR No. 44 dated 18.4.2003 registered at Police Station Lalru, District Patiala for the offences under Sections 406, 420, 465 and 467 Indian Penal Code ("IPC" � for short) in view of the compromise dated 15.12.2009 (Annexure P1).

The application for registration of case was submitted by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner, her son Harvinder Singh and Bir Singh. It is alleged by the complainant/respondent No. 2 that he had agreed to purchase land measuring 12 bighas being 240/628 share of land measuring 31 bighas 8 biswas. An agreement to sell dated 13.9.1998 was entered into between the complainant and the petitioner and son of the petitioner namely Harvinder Singh. The price of purchase of land was agreed at Rs. 12 lacs. The petitioner took responsibility that she would get consent of her son Harvinder Singh on the agreement to sell dated 13.9.1998. The agreement was witnessed by Lachhman Singh and Krishan Lal who also signed the same. The possession of the land was delivered to the complainant at the spot. The time for executing the sale deed was kept open. When the complainant had made payment to the petitioner Joginder Kaur in the presence of witnesses, at that time, Joginder Kaur''s brother namely Bir Singh and her husband''s elder brother (Jeth) namely Baldev Singh were also present. It is alleged that despite asking Joginder Kaur (petitioner) and her son Harvinder Singh time and again to execute the sale deed, they kept on deferring the matter. The complainant/respondent No. 2 came to know that with a view to misappropriate the amount of Rs. 12 lacs given by him as earnest money, Harvinder Singh in connivance with his mother Joginder Kaur (petitioner) and his maternal uncle Bir Singh has executed the sale deed on 18.2.2003 regarding the land in favour of one Avtar Singh son of Sarwan Singh in the presence of witnesses namely Nachhatar Singh and Tarlochan Singh. The sale deed was executed in connivance with Avtar Singh with an intention to cause loss to the complainant/respondent No. 2.

The parties have now settled their differences and they want to live peacefully. A compromise dated 15.12.2009 (Annexure P1) has been entered into between the parties. In view thereof, it is prayed that the FIR may be quashed. In view of the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2, it is stated that he has no objection if the FIR is quashed.

Sh. Vinod Viyogi (respondent No. 2) is present in Court and is identified by his Counsel. It is stated by him that he has amicably settled the dispute with the petitioner and the same has been settled without any kind of pressure or undue influence.

Learned State Counsel has submitted that the accused other than Joginder Kaur (petitioner) have been found innocent during investigation and challan was presented only against Joginder Kaur (petitioner). It is submitted that charges have been framed and two witnesses out of eleven have been examined. It is further submitted that in case parties have amicably resolved their differences, the State would have no serious objection to the quashing of the FIR.

It may be noticed that the dispute between the parties have been amicably resolved and a compromise dated 15.12.2009 (Annexure P1) has been effected between the parties in this regard. Respondent No. 2 who is the complainant has expressed his full satisfaction with the compromise.

In Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, it was observed by the Supreme Court as follows:

We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where by question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.

Besides, a five Judges Bench of this Court in Kulwinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr. 2007 (3) RCR (Crl.) 1052 has observed as follows:

The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorted perceptions and is not a slave to anything, except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the CrPC, or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power u/s 482 of the CrPC.

The Compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power u/s 482 of the CrPC is sued to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is ''finest hour of justice''. Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers u/s 482 of the CrPC in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.

Keeping in view the above facts and circumstances, FIR No. 44 dated 18.4.2003 registered at Police Station Lalru, District Patiala for the offences under Sections 406, 420, 465 and 467 IPC and all consequential proceedings in pursuance thereof shall stand quashed.