Joginder Singh and Others vs Chandigarh Administration and Others

M.M. Kumar, J.—This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution seeks a mandamus to the respondents to issue a notification de-notifying the acquisition proceedings in respect of land measuring 21 Kanals 19 Marias, situated at village Manimajra, U.T. Chandigarh, belonging to the petitioners. A further prayer has been made for setting aside Mutation No. 1771, decided on 13th October, 1963, declaring the Provincial Government as owner of the land in question unlawfully and illegally and to re-enter the petitioners'' names in the column of ownership with continuity after declaring them as owners and in possession without break.

The instant petition has been filed by Sarvshri Joginder Singh and Mehar Singh sons of Shri Sunder Singh, residents of Village Manimajra, U.T., Chandigarh. During the pendency of the petition, Shri Mehar Singh petitioner No. 2 expired and his legal heirs were brought on record vide order dated 29th May, 2003 passed in CM. Nos. 12487 to 12489 of 2003. The claim of the petitioners is that they were owners in possession of the agricultural land comprised in Khasra No. 439, measuring 12 Bighas 5 Biswas, situated in village Manimajra, U.T. Chandigarh, as per the jamabandi for the year 1956-57 (P-1). In the year 1958-59, repartition under the East Punjab Consolidation of Holdings (Prevention of Fragmentation) Act had taken place and the petitioners were allotted land comprised in Killa No. 58/13/2, 14, 15/1, 16/2 and 17, total measuring 21 Kanals 16 Marias, in lieu of the land held by them earlier. They have placed on record jamabandies for the year 1964-1965, 1969-70, 1974-75 and 1979-80 to show that they were in continuous physical possession of the aforementioned land (P-2 to P-5).

Somewhere in the year 1955, the then Capital Project Administration issued a notification for acquisition of the land in question for the public purpose, namely, for the Capital of Punjab. The said notification was followed by another notification dated 29th December, 1955, issued u/s 6 of the Land Acquistion Act, 1894 (for brevity, ''the Act''; [P-6]. The petitioners have claimed that at no point of time any notice, intimation or information for acquiring their land was issued and they were kept unaware of issuance of aforementioned notifications for acquisition of the land. They continued to enjoy peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the land in question. However, on the basis of notification issued u/s 6 of the Act, Mutation No. 1771 was sanctioned in favour of the Provincial Government vide order dated 13th October, 1963 and ownership of the land in question was changed in the name of the Provincial Government. It has been alleged that the said mutation was sanctioned at the back of the petitioners because no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners.

On coming to know about the acquisition and sanctioning of the mutation, the petitioners represented to the authorities to de-notify their action as the land was not required by the Government. On 18th May, 1967, the Estate Officer-cum-Deputy Commisioner-respondent No. 2 directed the Chief Engineer to conduct an enquiry as to whether the land of the petitioners was still required for the brick kilns by their department and in case it was no longer required then to intimate accordingly so that the land could be released from acquisition (P-7). On 7th August, 1967, the Superintending Engineer, Construction Circle, Chandigarh, intimated to respondent No. 2 that the land acquired for running the brick kiln was never used by their department and the same was no more required for that purpose. No objection was also given for de-notifying the land from acquisition (P-8). On 21st October, 1967, respondent No. 2 exercising the power of Land Acquisition Collector sent the matter to the Secretary, Engineering Department, Chandigarh, for de-acquisition of the land in village Manimajra (P-9). On 20th April, 1968 (P-10), the Land Acquisition Collector in response to a letter dated 28th February, 1968 of the Secretary, Chandigarh Administration, Engineering Department, intimated as under :--

(i) No compensation is paid to the owners so far. The amount of compensation have aready been deposited in the Government Treasury when the land was acquired;

(ii) The ownership of the land had since been transferred in the name of Government in the revenue record;

(iii) The land in question may be de-acquired as the same is not needed for the purposes for which it was acquired.

After waiting for some time and believing that de-acquistion notification might have been published in the Gazette, the petitioners filed an application dated 8th May, 1984 before the Tehsildar, Union Territory, Chandigarh, for entering their names in the ownership column and for sanction of the mutation. On 25th June, 1984, the Land Acquistion Officer, U.T., Chandigarh, again sought the information from the Chief Engineer and Secretary, Chandigarh Administration about the action taken in the matter (P-11). On 17th July, 1987, the petitioners made a representation to the Legal Remembrancer, U.T. Chandigarh-respondent No. 4 for intervening in the matter so that their grievances could be redressed (P-12). Thereafter, on 15th April, 1988, the petitioners again field an application to the Naib Tehsildar that they are continuously in possession of the land in dispute and have been regularly paying the Mal Guzari as co-owners and cosharers. It was pointed out that they have not received any compensation for any acquisition. The said application was sent to the concerned Patwari for report. On 15th April, 1998, the Patwari made the following report:

Sir,

It is submitted that according to revenue record i.e. Jamabandi for the years 1964-65 to 1984-85; the land comprised in Khasra No. 58//13/2 (1--3), 14/5 15/1, (3--16) 16/2 (4--8), 17, Total 5 Kilas measuring 21-29 is in the name of Provincial Government, but Joginder Singh, Mehar Singh sons of Sunder Singh village Manjmajra are in its possession as Gair Marusian Bashehra Malkan Bila Malkan Bawaza deacquire in equal share. The revenue of land is Rs. 5.32 P. Ever since of the acquisition of this land, then possession has not been transferred. The land revenue tax has also been paid of this land by the owners Joginder Singh, Mehar Singh sons of Sunder Singh in equal share. Report is submitted.

On receipt of the aforementioned report from the Patwari, the application of the petitioners was simply returned to them by the Naib Tehsildar without taking any action, in the backdrop of above factual position, the petitioners approached this Court by filing the instant petition.

In the written statement filed by the respondents it has been asserted that the land in question was acquired in the year 1956 and possession was taken over by the Government. The amount of compensation was deposited in the Government Treasury but the petitioners have not come forward to receive the same. It has been submitted that the petitioners have managed fake entires in the revenue record regarding possession in connivance with some official of the revenue department, inasmuch as, the entry with regard to possession is not supported by any document. The Chandigarh Administration has never denotified the land in dispute in favour of anybody including the petitioners. The possession of the land is with the Government and it is going to construct a colony there for rehabilitation of slum dwellers uprooted from different parts of the City Beautiful. It has also been pointed out that on 29th December, 195 5 the Government had issued a notification in the official Gazette and acquired the land in question under land acquisition order passed on 7th January, 1956. The physical possession of the entire acquired land measuring 43 Bighas and 18 Biswas was taken over by Shri Lekh Raj, Oversear on 23rd January, 1956 in the presence of Shri Teja Singh, Patwari (Capital), Ajmer Singh, Lambardar and Shri Telu Ram, Defedar, Moreover, the ownership of the entire land has been transferred in the name of the Provincial Government. Except the petitioners, all other persons whose land was acquired vide the same notification, have already accepted the compensation and did not raise any objection to the acquisition proceedings. It has further been submitted that due to price escalation, the petitioners want denotification of their land so as to earn huge profits. In case their prayer is allowed then the public purpose of rehabilitation of the slum dwellers would be frustrated. It is denied that the petitioners were not aware of the acquisition proceedings because the statements of Joginder Singh-petitioner No. 1 and one Jeet Singh regarding the objections to the acquisition proceedings were recorded by the department. The respondents have also sought dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of huge delay and laches because there is a delay of 33 years in filing the present petition since the acquisition of the land in dispute.

Controverting the averments made in the written statement, the petitioners filed a replication reiterating the pleas already raised by them in the writ petition. It has been emphasized that they are in continuous possession of the land in dispute and everything has been done at their back.

On 25th March, 2009, when the matter came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court, after going through the averments made in para 3 of the written statement that the possession of the land was taken by the Government and compensation deposited in the Government treasury and the Government proposes to construct a rehabilitation colony for slum dwellers, a query was put by this Court to the learned counsel for the respondents whether there is a provision for rehabilitating the petitioners and whether award was made before taking the possession, as claimed by the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents was unable to respond. Accordingly, time was granted to get the information.

On 28th July, 2009, an affidavit dated 24th July, 2009, was filed by Ms. Hargunjit Kaur, PCS, Land Acquistion Officer, U.T., Chandigarh, disclosing that out of 9.15 acres of land acquired on 29th December, 1955, a small part is still lying vacant. It has also been mentioned that the Chandigarh Administration has no policy for rehabilitation of those persons whose land have been acquired. The rehabilitation policy has been framed for the construction and providing of dwelling units to the slum dwellers. So far as the land owners whose land have been acquired are concerned, the Chandigarh Administration had notified a policy on 12th January, 1996, namely, ''the Chandigarh Allotment of Dwelling Units to the Oustees of Chandigarh, 1996,'' whereunder provision was made for allotment of dwelling units to the oustees whose land was acquired for the development of Chandigarh and the award of compensation under the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act was made on or after 1st November, 1966 i.e. the date when the Union Territory Chandigarh came into being. On 12th April, 2002, the said policy was further modified and it was provided to allot residential flats by the Chandigarh Housing Board in its various schemes to those oustees whose houses were acquired before, on or after 1st November, 1966 for the purposes of development of Capital of Punjab (Chandigarh). Provision of 5% reservation was made for the oustees in different scheme of the Chandigarh Housing Board. In the said affidavit other details regarding reservation of dewelling units under various schemes have also been furnished.

With regard to the question of making of award before taking possesssion, as was posed by the Division Bench in its order dated 25th March, 2009, in para 2 of the affidavit it has been submitted as under:--

''2. That so far as the information regarding the making of the award before taking possession is concerned, it is submitted that the office of the deponent has made all sorts to search the record, which by now is 54 years old but is able to search out only the Revenue Record pertaining to the land in question wherein it has been mentioned that the land was acquired vide document bearing No. C-1321-55/vi/995, dated 29th December, 1955 and thereafter in the ownership column the ownership of the land was mutated in the name of the Provincial Government on 13th October, 1963. However, as per the documents already placed on the record of the case which the petitioners themselves have attested to be the true copies of the original, it has been gathered that the land was acquired on 29th December, 1955. The possession of the land was taken over by the Provincial Government on 23rd January, 1955 through Shri Lekh Ram Overseer and the compensation of the land was deposited in the Revenue Deposit because of the failure of the right-holder to receive the same. At the relevant time, Collector, Ambala was having the jurisdiction in the matter. The Union Territory of Chandigarh came into being with effect from 1st November. 1966. Initially the land was utilized for Bricks Kilns for setting up the Capital of Punjab and lateron rehabilitation colony was constructed thereupon. In the given situation, the writ petition filed by the petitioners for de-notifying the land and for change of mutation in their favour is not liable to be accepted because of the fact that on the majority of the land which was acquired, rehabilitation colony for the slum dwellers has already been constructed and allotted to the eligible persons. Only a small part out of the total acquired land of 9.15 acre, is lying vacant adjoining the said colony. As such, at this belated stage, the relief sought by the petitioners for de-notifying the land and for change of mutation in their favour is not liable to be accepted.

On 28th July, 2009, the Division Bench of this Court further directed to the Land Acquisition Officer to file an affidavit asserting whether or not the land which was under the ownership of the petitioners prior to the acquisition proceedings is vacant and unutilised at the present juncture. On 4th August, 2009, another affidavit was filed by Shri Ashwani Kumar, HCS, Land Acquisition Officer, U.T. Chandigarh clarifying as under :--

1.....it is clarified that the small part out of the total acquired land which is lying vacant as referred in para No. 2 of the earlier affidavit dated 24th July, 2009, was under the ownership of the petitioners prior to its acquisition. The same was left out at the time of construction of the rehabilitation colony on the acquired land because of the status quo being ordered to be maintained in the present case. Otherwise, the possession of the said part of the land was also taken over by the Provincial Government and mutation in the Revenue Record was also made accordingly in the ownership column. However, some how, the petitioners were managing the fake entries with regard to the possession in the Revenue Record as has been mentioned in the written statement filed on 16th January, 1989 also. In fact, the petitioner No. 2 himself was working as Ziladar and one of the sons of the petitioner No. 1 namely Shri Hardyal Singh is working as Lambardar and were managing the entries in the Revenue Record and the report of the Patwari which otherwise are factually incorrect and the land continued to be abandoned and in possession of the Provincial Government and now with the Chandigarh Administration. The entire adjoining belt of the said part of the land was also acquired subsequently vide Award announced on 5th March 2003. The aforesaid small part of the land left out of 1955 acquisition and the adjoining entire belt of the land known as Pocket No. 8 acquired vide Award dated 5th March, 2003 is planned to be utilized for construction of Government College, Sports Complex Commercial Complex etc. The construction could not take place because of the pendency of a bunch of writ petitions against the Award dated 5th March 2003, which have although been dismissed by this Court but in the Special Leave Petitions filed by the land owners before the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India, status quo have been ordered to be maintained qua the land acquired vide Award dated 5th March, 2003.''

On 8th September, 2009, another affidavit dated 7th September 2009 was filed by the Land Acquisition Collector further clarifying that the entire adjoining belt of the land in dispute was also acquired subsequently vide award announced on 5th March, 2003 and the entire belt including the land in question has been planned by the name known as Pocket No. 8. The site plan showing the planning made in that regard by the concerned branch has been placed on record as Annexure A-1, wherein the entire land in question, which is subject matter of the instant petition, is included.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusal of record with their able assistance, we are of the considered view that the only question which requires determination by this Court is as to whether the acquired land could be de-notified after the award and proceedings for taking possession under the Act has been undertaken. In order to appreciate the controversy raised, it would be appropriate to read Section 48 of the Act, which is as under;--

Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.--(1)

Except in the case provided for in section 36, the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possesssion has not been taken.

(2) Whenever the Government withdraws from any such acquisition, the Collector shall determine the amount of compensation due for the damage suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice or of any proceedings thereunder, and shall pay such amount to the person interested, together with all costs reasonably incurred by him in the prosecution of the proceedings under this Act relating to the said land.

(3) The provisions of Part III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to be determination of the compensation payable under this section.

Aperusal of sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the Act would show that the State Government is at liberty to withdraw from acquisition of any land if possession has not been taken. Therefore, a subsidiary issue, which arise for determination is whether possession was taken or it continued to be with the expatriates. At this stage it is appropriate to consider the provisions of Section 16 of the Act, which reads thus :--

Power to take possession.--When the Collector has made an award u/s 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from the encumbrances.

Apersual of the aforementioned provision shows that after the award u/s 11 of the Act has been announced by the Collector then he can take possession of the land, which is to vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. It has come on record that possession of the land in question was taken over by the Provincial Government on 23rd January, 1955 through Shri Lekh Ram, Overseer and thereafter in the ownership column the ownership of the land was mutated in the name of the Provincial Government on 13th October, 1963. From the bare persual of Section 48(1) of the Act it appears to be plain that after taking possession u/s 16 of the Act, the land vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and it cannot be de-notified. The aforementioned proposition came up for consideration before Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and Others, . The view of Hon''ble the Supreme Court is evident from the concluding portion of para 19 of the judgment, which reads thus :--

19.......This power can be exercised even after the Collector has made the award u/s 11 but before he takes possession u/s 15 (Section 16. ?) Section 48(2) provides for compensation in such a case. The argument that Section 48(1) is the only method in which the Government can withdraw from the acquisition has, therefore, no force because the Government can always cancel the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 by virtue of its power u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act and this power can be exercised before the Government directs the Collector to take action u/s 7. Section 48(1) is a special provision for those cases where proceedings for acquisition have gone beyond the stage of the issue of notice u/s 9(1) and it provides for payment of compensation u/s 48(2) read with Section 48(3). We cannot, therefore, accept the argument that without an order u/s 48(1) the notification u/s 4 must remain outstanding. It can be cancelled at any time by Government u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act and what Section 48(1) shows is that once Government has taken possession it cannot withdraw from the acquisition. Before that it may cancel the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 or it may withdraw from the acquisition u/s 48(1).....

(Emphasis added)

The aforementioned proposition also came up for consideration of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Another Vs. Avinash Sharma, , where placing reliance on the view taken in Vishnu Prasad Sharma''s case (supra), the same view has been reiterated. Interpreting the observations made in para 19, their Lordships'' clarified as under:--

But these observations do not assist the case of the appellant. It is clearly implicit in the observations that after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification u/s 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken u/s 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification.

(Emphasis added)

Similarly, in the case of Bangalore Development Authority and Others Vs. R. Hanumaiah and Others, their Lordships'' while noticing the earlier judgments rendered in the cases of Avinash Sharma (supra); Pratap and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, ; Mohan Singh and Others Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, ; and The Printers (Mysore) Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed and Others, ; has held as under :--

Again in Pratap and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, it was reiterated that once the possession is taken and the land vests in the Government then the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Same view was reiterated by this Court in Mohan Singh and Others Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, , and in The Printers (Mysore) Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed and Others, .

The possession of the land in question was taken in the year 1966 after the passing of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, the land vested in the Government which was then transferred to CITB, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant. After the vesting of the land and taking possession thereof, the notification for acquiring the land could not be withdrawn or cancelled in exercise of powers u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Power u/s 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after vesting of the land statutorily in the State Government.

We are further of the view that the policy of law as reflected in Section 48(1) of the Act cannot be deviated because if the State Government is permitted to de-notify the land after it has vested in the State free from all encumbrances and after taking of its possession then any person whose land has been acquired would be permitted to move the Court for release of his land. It would be negation of the proprietary rights because Section 16 and 17(1) of the Act contemplates that the land is to vest in the Government free from all encumbrances. It is thereafter that the expatriate person would not remain the owner and the proprietary rights are transferred to the State. Such an argument was raised before Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mandir Shree Sitaramji alias Shree Sitaram Bhandar Vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Others, . In para 16 of the judgment, the argument has been rejected by observing as under;--

Even otherwise, we have seen the scheme sought to be relied upon. We find from the scheme that it only applies in respect of persons/agencies who own and possess the land. In this case possession of the land had already been taken. The scheme also categorically states that the scheme would not take away the rights of the Delhi Development Authority to acquire for development Authority to acquire for development of Delhi. Thus the scheme was not applicable to lands of the Appellants. Even u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act once possession is taken the Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition. We thus see no substance in this contention also.

Therefore, consistent with the public policy and the policy of law as implicit in Sections 16, 17(1) and 48(1) of the Act, once the possession has been taken there is no possibility of the respondent State to de-notify the acquisition.

The argument that physical possession of the land has remained with the petitioners would pale into significance because it is well settled that the usual mode of taking possesssion by the Government is by making entry in the Rapat Roznamcha immediately after announcement of award. In the case of Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar Vs. State of Punjab and others, Hon''ble the Supreme Court has considered the aforementioned proposition and in para 4 such an argument was rejected by observing as under :--

It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by 17th April. 1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the Panchanama in the presence of Panches and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possesssion of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession.

(Emphasis added).

The judgment of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Balwant Narayan Bhagde Vs. M.D. Bhagwat and Others, does not come to the rescue of the petitioners because it has been observed that there can be no hard and fast rule laying down that what act would be sufficient to constitute taking possession of the land. On the contrary'' it supports the view taken by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, Amritsar (supra), as is evident from the perusal of the following obsrvations made in paras 1,2,28 and 29 of the judgment in Babvant Narayan Bhagde (supra) :--

We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking ''symbolical'' possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary conditions of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before possession is taken by the authorities, as that would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.

2..........This was plainly erroneous view, for the legal position is clear that even if the appellant entered upon the land and resumed possession of it the very next moment after the land was actually taken possession of and became vested in the Government, such act on the part of the appellant did not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. There can, therefore, be no doubt that actual possession 1770 of 19 acres 16 gunthas of waste and arable land taken by the Tahsildar on 3rd April, 1959 and it became vested in the Government. (Neither the Government nor the Commissioner could thereafter withdraw from the acquisition of any portion of this land u/s 48(1) of the Act.

........It is therefore, clear that taking of possession within the meaning of Sections 16 or 17(1) means of possession on the spot. It is neither a possession on paper nor a "symbolical" possession as generally understood in Civil Law. But the question is what is the mode of taking possession ? The Act is silent on the point. Unless possession is taken by the written agreement of the party concerned the mode of taking possession obviously would be for the authority to go upon the land and to do some act which would indicate that the authority has taken posessession of the land. It may be in the form of a declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a written declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land. The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession is not necessary. No further notice beyond that u/s 9(1) of the Act is required. When possession has been taken the owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed. Once possession has been taken the land vests in the Government.

29............Viewed in the light of the discussion of law I have made above, it would be noticed that possession of the land, in any event, was taken on the spot and it vested in the Government. The appellant''s resuming possession of the land after once it was validly taken by the Government had not the effect of undoing the fact of the vesting of the land in the Government. The Government or the Commissioner was not at liberty to withdraw from the acquisioition of any portion of the land of which possession had been taken, u/s 48(1) of the Act.

(Emphasis added)

When the principles laid down in the aforementioned paras are applied to the facts of the present case it becomes evident that the physical possession of the entire acquired land measuring 43 Bighas and 18 Biswas was taken by Shri Lekh Raj, Overseer on 23rd January, 1956 in the presence of Shri Teja Singh, Patwari (Capital), Ajmer Singh, Lambardar and Telu Ram, Dafedar. Moreover, as has been noticed in the preceding para, the ownership of the entire land has also been trasferred in the name of the Provincial Government. The reoccupation of the land, as claimed by the petitioners, is unlawful and, therefore, mere physical possession would not entitle them to argue that possession as envisaged u/s 48 of the Act has not been taken and the land in question is liable to be de-notified. Acceptance of such an argument would result into violation of the basic principles and the public policy enshrined under Sections 16, 17 and 48 of the Act. It is, thus, evident that the possession of the expatriate or any other person would tantamont to only illegal and unlawful possession.

We are further of the view that the respondents are not barred from utilizing the land for any other purpose than the one for which the land was required. It is well settled principle laid down in s catena of judgments. In the case of Union of India and Others Vs. Jaswant Rai Kochhar and Others, , it has been held that land acquired for public purpose may be used for another purpose. Similar view has been taken in the cases of Ravi Khullar and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal and Others, and Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Others, . Moreover, the respondents have placed on record sufficient material to show that the land is required for construction of the rehabilitation colony.

Even otherwise, there is huge delay on the part of the petitioners to approach this Court. The land in question stood acquired in the year 1955. The amount of compensation, according to the written statement was deposited. It is different matter that the petitioners did not withdraw the same. The present writ petition has been filed after 33 years, which speaks volume about the vigilance over legal rights on the part of the petitioners. It is well settled that law come to the rescue of the vigilant and not to the one who keeps sleeping over his legal rights. Making of repeated represntations cannot confer cause of action, as has been held by a 7-Judge Bench of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, .

The argument of Mr. Amarjeet Markan is that the entry in the revenue record showing the possession of the petitioners cannot be ignored. We are not impressed with the argument. The revenue record would not nullify the acquisition proceedings, especially when the petitioners are alleged to have manipulated entries by taking advantage of their positions of working on the posts of Ziladar and Lamardar, as has been pointed out in the affidavit dated 4th August, 2009, filed by the Land Acquisition Officer, U.T. Chandigarh. Therefore, we do not find any substance in the aforesaid argument and reject the same.

As a sequel to the above discussion, the instant petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.