Joginder Singh vs Financial commissioner and Others

A.N. Grover, J.—This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution impugning an order made by the Financial Commissioner on 20th October, 1961, in certain execution proceedings pending between the Petitioner who is tenant and the Respondents who are landlords.

The facts are not in dispute. On 5th June, 1954, the Assistant Collector passed a decree for ejectment against the tenant in favour of the landlords. That decree was confirmed by the Financial Commissioner of the erstwhile State of Pepsu on 7th November, 1955. When the execution proceeding started the tenant sought to seek protection of the provisions contained in the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Although the Collector had held that the decree passed in the suit had to be executed, the Commissioner forwarded the revision petition filed by the Petitioner to the Financial Commissioner recommending that it may be ordered that the decree in the present case could not be, executed owing to the provisions contained in the aforesaid Act. After referring to the relevant provisions the Financial Commissioner has expressed the view that as the decree was passed on 5th June, 1954, the provisions contained in the said Act could not affect its execution.

Mr. Tirath Singh who appears for the Petitioner has invited my attention to Section 7A of the Act according to which no tenancy shall be terminated except in accordance with its provisions or any of the grounds which are specified therein. Section 7A deserves to be reproduced as the Petitioner''s counsel has relied mainly on its provisions:

7A. Additional grounds for termination of tenancy in certain cases. -(1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (2) and (3), a tenancy subsisting at the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, may be terminated on the following grounds in addition to the grounds specified in Section 7, namely:

(a) that the land comprising the tenancy has been reserved by the landowner for his personal cultivation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II;

(b) that the landowner owns thirty standard acres or less of land and the land falls within his permissible limit;

Provided that no tenant shall be ejected under this Sub-section-(i) from any area of land if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant does not exceed five standard acres, or (ii) from an area of five standard acres, if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds five standard acres, until he is allotted by the State Government alternative land of equivalent value in standard acres.

(2) No tenant, who immediately preceding the commencement of the President''s Act has held any land continuously for a period of twelve years or more under the same landowner or his predecessor in title, shall be ejected on the grounds specified in Sub-section (1)-

(a) from any area of land, if the area under

the personal cultivation of the tenant does not exceed fifteen standard acres, or

(b) from an area of fifteen standard acres, if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds fifteen standard acres.

Mr. Tirath Singh maintains that no tenancy could be terminated after the commencement of the Act (that date being 6th March, 1955) except in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But it must be remembered that there was no question of terminating a tenancy after the commencement of the Act in the present case because the tenancy was determined long before 6th March, 1955, and indeed a decree had been made as stated before on 5th June, 1954, by the competent revenue Courts against the Petitioner and in favour of the Respondents. As regards Section 7A, Sub-section (1) makes it quite clear that its provisions would apply only to a tenancy subsisting at the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 (that date being 30th October, 1956). The submission of Mr. Tirath Singh, is that Sub-section (2) has reference not only to those tenancies which were subsisting at the commencement of the Second Amendment Act but also to those where the tenants had been continuously in occupation for a period of twelve years immediately preceding the commencement of the President''s Act. which was in 1953. In other words, although a decree had been made in the present case in 1954 but since the Petitioner could show that he had held the land continuously for a period of twelve years or more under the same landowner immediately preceding the commencement of the President''s Act he could not be ejected. This argument proceeds on the assumption that Sub-section (2) of Section 7A has no reference to the tenancy mentioned in Sub-section (1). The express language of Sub-section (2), however, shows that that Sub-section refers to Sub-section (1) alone. Therefore the provisions of Sub-section (1) have to be kept in view. The scheme of both the Sections 7 and 7A appears to be that after the commencement of the Act no tenancy is to be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of the Act or on the grounds given in Section 7 and the additional grounds given in Section 7A. Sub-section (1) of Section 7A specifies the additional grounds for termination of tenancy and Sub-section (2) contains an exception to Sub-section (1) inasmuch as it provides that no tenant who immediately preceding the commencement of the President''s Act has held any land continuously for a period of twelve years or more under the same landowner or his predecessor in title, shall be ejected on the grounds specified in Sub-section (1) from any area of land, if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant does not exceed fifteen standard acres, or from an area of fifteen standard acres, if the area under personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds fifteen standard acres. Then follow the proviso and explanation which need not be referred to. Section 53 of the Act which has also been noticed by the Financial Commissioner does not contain any such language which would justify the application of the provisions contained in Sections 7 and 7A with retrospective effect.

For these reasons I can find no error apparent in the order of the Financial Commissioner with the result that this petition fails and it is dismissed with costs.