Joginder Singh & Others vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioners have filed the present petition under Section 528 of The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) for quashing of F.I.R. No. 0003 of 2025, dated 17.01.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 504 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), at Women Police Station Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. and consequential proceedings arising out of it.

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant Simran Kaur/respondent No.2 was married to the petitioner Arjun Singh on 24.05.2023 as per custom. The informant's husband and her parents-in-law kept her properly for about one month after her marriage. Thereafter, they started harassing her. They asserted that she had not brought sufficient dowry from her parents. They started insulting, taunting and passing sarcastic remarks to the informant for not bringing sufficient dowry. They demanded ₹50,000/- from the informant's parents. The informant's parents transferred ₹9000/- and ₹50,000/- to the bank account of the informant's husband in October 2023 and December 2023. The accused demanded a motorcycle from the informant and her father, and also a car worth ₹ 35 lakhs. When the informant was unable to fulfil this demand, the accused gave beatings to her on 24.06.2024. The informant sustained injuries, but she was not taken to the hospital. The informant's father visited her matrimonial home and took her to the hospital for treatment. The informant made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Chamba, District Chamba, H.P., which was forwarded to the Women Police Station, Chamba, District Chamba. The matter was referred to the District Legal Services Authority, Chamba, but the informant's husband did not appear, and proceedings for mediation could not proceed further. The informant's husband threatened to murder and grievously hurt the informant and her parents. This conversation was recorded by the informant on her mobile phone. The informant reported the matter to the police, but no action was taken. The informant made a complaint to the Court of Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chamba, District Chamba, who forwarded it to the police. The police registered F.I.R. and investigated the matter.

The petitioners/accused have filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR, asserting that the F.I.R. is an abuse of the process of the law because all the family members of the informant's husband have been implicated with no specific allegation and no specific role. Petitioner No.1 is the informant's father-in-law, who has retired from the Indian Army and is not dependent upon his son. Petitioner No.2 is the informant's mother-in-law and is aged about 66 years. She has recently undergone surgery. Petitioner No.3 is the informant's brother-in-law, and he is residing separately. Petitioner No.4 is the sister-in-law of the informant, whose husband had expired on 28.06.2017. She is residing separately with her two children. Petitioner No.5 is a married sister-in-law of the informant, and she is residing at a different place with her family members. Petitioners No. 6 and 7 are residing at a distance of about 25 km from the informant's matrimonial home with their family members. The informant has falsely asserted that money was transferred to her husband's account. The demand for Bullet motorcycle and car is general in nature. The allegations in the F.I.R., even if accepted to be correct, do not constitute the commission of any offence. The Learned Magistrate had passed a non-speaking order in violation of the principle of natural justice. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. be quashed.

I have heard Mr S.K. Chaudhary, Advocate (through Video Conferencing) and Mr Pawan Gautam (present in the Court), learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State.

Mr S.K. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and have been falsely implicated based on the general allegations made in the FIR. These allegations are false, as is evident from the statement of the account of the informant's husband. The learned Magistrate had not passed a speaking order while ordering the investigation under Section 153(3) of Cr.P.C. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and F.I.R and consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R. be quashed.

Mr Ajeet Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the matter is at the initial stage. The police are investigating the matter and will file a cancellation report if no case is made out. It is premature to scuttle the investigation. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given a considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)

Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."

This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to see that particulars of the offences committed by every accused and the role played by the accused in committing the offences are given in the complaint made to the police. It was observed: -

"9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all and end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in committing that offence.

When we see the complaint, it is sadly vague. It does not show which of the accused has committed what offence, and what is the exact role played by these appellants in the commission of the offence. It could be said that something is against Rajesh, as the allegations are made against him more precisely, but he is no more and has already expired. Under such circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process of law to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the basis of a vague and general complaint which is silent about the precise acts of the appellants." (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the tendency of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations, if left unchecked, would result in the misuse of the process of law. It was observed:

"13. Instances of a husband's family members filing a petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty abound on this score. We may now take note of some decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599], this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation where the High Court had refused to quash an FIR registered for various offences, including Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that required determination was whether allegations made against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations which would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court observed that false implications by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law. On the facts of that case, it was found that no specific allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife, and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal, would inflict severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise ought to be discouraged.

In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667], this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It was observed that the Courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the husband's close relations, who were living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided, would add an entirely different complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinised with great care and circumspection.

Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184], this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory provisions and the language thereof for lodging a complaint is not the 'be all and end all' of the matter, as what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the particulars of the offence committed by each and every accused and the role played by each and every accused in the commission of that offence. These observations were made in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving Section 498A IPC." (Emphasis supplied)

13 It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal misconduct amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

"18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet papers indicates that the allegations levelled by the First Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping, specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the other members of the Appellants' family. Thus, we are of the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also the domestic violence case.

If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute." (Emphasis supplied)

It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: -

"32. Many times, the parents, including the close relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill. Instead of salvaging the situation and making every possible endeavour to save the marriage, their action, either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the husband and his family members, brings about the destruction of the marriage over trivial issues. The first thing that comes to mind for the wife, her parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of all evil. No sooner does the matter reach the Police than even if there are fair chances of reconciliation between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other's faults, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in their hearts that they do not think even for a second that if the marriage were to come to an end, then what would be the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the husband and his family members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of holding the husband to ransom so that he could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may cause annoyance to the other may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations and quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to cruelty"

Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2) SCR 252 that the phenomenon of false implication by a general omnibus allegation in the case of a matrimonial dispute is not unknown to the Court. When the allegations are general and omnibus, the prosecution should not be continued. It was observed: -

"14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is significant merit in the submissions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the allegations against the Appellants are wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a case against the Appellants. The material on record neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in the commission of the offences.

The phenomenon of false implication by way of general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were vague and general, lacking any specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that such a situation, if left unchecked, would result in the abuse of the process of law.

xxxx

Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due care and has mechanically permitted the criminal proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on vexatious grounds and even highlighted the commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had a duty to consider the allegations with great care and circumspection so as to protect against the danger of unjust prosecution."

This position was reiterated in Geddam Jhansi v. State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it was observed:

"31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when the specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. The institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, the preservation of family relationships has always been emphasised. Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings, rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious and should allow invocation of the criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials that clearly constitute criminal offences.

We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.

It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in the domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by the public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like the Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with a very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now criminalised, entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping manner.

For a matrimonial relationship that is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment, and such an acrimonious relationship would develop only in the course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts that turn, otherwise, an amicable relationship into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegations of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.

We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who is accused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated on the victim and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence would amount to abuse of the process of law."

It was submitted that the learned Magistrate had not passed a speaking order, and the order is bad. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 585, that a Magistrate is not to adjudicate upon the merits. It was observed:

"52.....It cannot be gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to merely peruse the application filed by the complainant and examine whether the facts disclosed therein prima facie disclose the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences requiring investigation by police. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed, then he would be fully justified in directing the concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with investigation in accordance with law..."

In the present case, the informant had specifically mentioned in the complaint that the accused started insulting, taunting, and passing sarcastic remarks to the informant for bringing insufficient dowry to harass, humiliate, and defame her in the society. They demanded a dowry of ₹50,000/- from the informant and her parents, and the informant's parents had transferred ₹9,000/- and ₹50,000/- to the bank account of the informant's husband in October 2023 and December 2023. They demanded a bullet motorcycle and a car worth ₹35 lakhs. The petitioners 2 to 4 gave beatings to the informant on 24.06.2024, but she was not taken for treatment. These allegations show the specific role of the petitioners.

It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the matter is at the initial stage. The police are investigating the matter, and the truthfulness or otherwise will be determined during investigation/trial. At this stage, the informant has named the present petitioners in her complaint and has made specific allegations against them. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 585, that the Courts should be slow to scuttle the investigation and quash the FIR when the matter has only been referred to the police under Section 156 (3) of the CrPC. It was observed:

This Court has, time and again, emphasised that criminal investigation ought not to be scuttled at the threshold except in cases where the complaint ex facie does not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence or where continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great circumspection, bearing in mind the statutory duty of the investigating agency to inquire into cognizable offences. The said position has been eruditely explained by this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401, wherein it was observed as under:-

"In a given case, there may be allegations of abuse of the process of law by converting a civil dispute into a criminal dispute, only with a view to pressurising the accused. Similarly, in a given case, the complaint itself, on the face of it, can be said to be barred by law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the same time, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs, and the police/investigating agency has a statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizable offences. Therefore, a balance has to be struck between the rights of the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of a cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand and those innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiated, which may be, in a given case, abuse of process of law and the process. However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, the High Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and the High Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further with the investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions of the Code." [Emphasis supplied]

Applying the aforesaid principles to the case at hand, it becomes evident that the High Court has transgressed the well-settled boundaries governing the exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC at the threshold stage. The order impugned before the High Court was one passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of CrPC, whereby the police were merely directed to register an FIR and to undertake an investigation in accordance with law. At such a stage, the Court is only required to ascertain whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the commission of a cognizable offence warranting investigation.

It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are false, and no amount was transferred to the informant's husband's account. This submission cannot be appreciated during these proceedings. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations because it is a matter of investigation and trial. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -

"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

"16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not."

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397:

"17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379].

The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

... As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. ...

... At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider 'whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not'."

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:

"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."

Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C."

Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements of the witnesses, if any, recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which were not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that, on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant, that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event, there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station, and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings".

A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it was observed at page 142:

"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint, as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial."

This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it was held:

All these documents, which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial, but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.

A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:

"63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied).

This position was reiterated in Accamma Sam Jacob v. State of Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 585, wherein it was observed:

The facts in the case at hand manifest that the High Court proceeded to examine documents relied upon by the accused-respondents, including the sale deeds executed in their favour, and treated the same as determinative of the dispute and observed that the sale deeds must be cancelled and delivered up first, before the criminal law could be set into motion. Such an exercise was clearly beyond the permissible scope of scrutiny in a petition for quashing under Section 482 of the CrPC. Consideration of defence material, including sale deeds or other title documents, would necessarily involve adjudication on disputed questions of fact, which fall squarely within the domain of investigation and, if necessary, trial. Any such exercise at the stage of Section 156(3) of CrPC would amount to conducting a mini-trial and would be wholly impermissible. Permitting such defence material to be weighed at the threshold would frustrate and defeat the very purpose of directing an investigation by the police.

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

The observations made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.