AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Mehar Singh, J.—This judgment will dispose of two petitions, Nos. 228 and 248 of 1953,under Article 220 of the Constitution, as in both the cases same question has arisen whether this Court has jurisdiction issue a writunder the said Article to the Assistant Custodian General, whose office is admittedly located at Delhi, and so not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. . '' (2) In, both cases on revision the Assistant Custodian" General at Delhi has cancelled the allotments of lands in favour of the Petitioners. In ''petition No. 228 of 1953 the Petitioner is Joginder Singh and his allotment was cancelled by the Assistant Custodian General at Delhi by his order dated 28-10-1953. In petition No. 24S of 1953 the Petitioner is Inder Singh and Assistant . Custodian General at Delhi cancelled his allotment by the order dated 7-5-1953.
In both the petitions the Assistant Custodian General,at Delhi is one of the Respondents, the other two Respondents being Director of Rural Rehabilitation. at Patiala and the Assistant Commissioner Rehabilitation at Patiala.
The preliminary objection on behalf of the Respondents is that as the office of the Assistant Custodian General is situate at Delhi and apparently not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, so this Court has no jurisdictionunder Article 226of the Constitution to issue a writ to the Assistant Custodian General at Delhi.
The reply on behalf of the Petitioners is that the mere location of the office of the revisional authority at Delhi makes no difference because the sub-ordinate rehabilitation authorities, who are to carry out and give effect to the orders, are residents within the jurisdiction of this Court, and so a writ, issued by this Court will be effective in preventing them from carrying, out the adverse orders of the Assistant Custodian General at Delhi to the detriment of the Petitioners.
Article 226(1) reads:
Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall, have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises juries-'' diction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warren to and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any. of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose."
It Is apparent on plain reading of this Article that two conditions must concur before a writ will issue and the conditions are (a) that the exercise pf the, power to issue writ only extends to the territories In relation to which a High Court exercises jurisdiction and (b) that writ can be issued to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government; within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. If -'' '' one of the two conditions is lacking, the High Court will obviously not have jurisdiction to issue writ.- In the present cases the Assistant Custodian General at Delhi is an authority not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and it follows that this Court has no jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ to such an authority.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioners relies upon a number of authorities to support his contention that mere location of the office, of the. Assis-, tant Custodian General at Delhi does not bar this Court from issuing writ against him.
The first case is In ire ''French India Central Tranbport, Ltd.'' AIR 1948 Mad 497 (A). In this case the Regional Transport Authority, Vellore, had granted permits to the Petitioners to run buses on a certain route. The case went up in appeal to the Central Road Traffic Board '' at Madras; which Board cancelled the order in favour, of the Petitioners. In these circumstances the Petitioners made an application for writ of certiorari for quashing the order o| the Board and the argument was that since the Office of the Board was situate at Madras, the High, Court had the power to issue such a writ. This argument was negatived . following, - AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council)
The. second case is - ''Karuppa Chetty v. Board of Commrs. for H. R. E.'' AIR 1949 Mad 857 (C). In this case the temple was situate outside the Madras Presidency butunder the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board, that had office at Madras, passed an order . against the Petitioner and this followed an application for a /writ of certiorari praying that the order of the Board should be quashed. The argument advanced was that the High Court at Madras had jurisdiction because of the location of the office of the Board at Madras. In this case also this argument failed, because pi'' the decision in - AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council)
The third case is - K. S. RASHID AHMAD Vs. Income Tax INVESTIGATION COMMISSION AND ANOTHER., In this case the Income Tax Investigation Commission was located in Delhi and it: made a.report, adyerse to the, Petitioner who were on the basis of the report liable; to be assessed to income-'' tax; In the Utter Pradesh state. The Petitioners, prayed for writ of certiorari and prohibition quashing the order and the report made by the Commission. The argument, advanced by the opposite, side was that the Punjab High Court had.-no jurisdiction to issue such writs merely because the office '' of the Income Tax Investigation Commission, was located at Delhi, when the Petitioners were to be charged, and assessed to Income Tax ultimately within the territory of the State of Utter Pradesh. This argument found "favor with the learned Judges and again because, of the authority in - AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council)
However, this very case has been overruled by - K.S. Rashid and Son Vs. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., to which reference will presently be made.
The fourth case is - Ebrahim Aboobaker and Another Vs. L. Achhru Ram, in which the prayer was for the issue of writ of certiorari against the order of the Custodian General of Evacuee Property at Delhi in order to quash that order, which concerned evacuee property situate at Bombay.
The same argument was repeated before a Bench consisting of Harnam Singh and Soni JJ. as in the earlier Punjab case upon the reliance of AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) There was difference of opinion in that Son J. accepted the argument, but Harnam Singh J. at length explained that AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) had no application to the case on the ground that the Madras High Court in that case had no jurisdiction over the persons whom the issue of the writ was to affect. He was/therefore, of the opinion that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue the writ in view of the location of the office of the Custodian General at Delhi. But both the learned Judges concurred in dismissing the petition on merits.
judgment in ''AIR 1951 P&H same point having arisen for considexatipri; reference having been made to the opinion oil'' Singh J. in ''AIR 1952 PunJ 1 (F)'', Kapur to his previous opinion in ''AIR 1951 P&H '' (D) and Pointed out that that case was not before the; Bench in Ebrahim Aboobaker and Another Vs. L. Achhru Ram, The sixth case is - M.K. Ranganathan and Others Vs. The Madras Electric Tramways (1904) Ltd. and Another, in which on a certain labour dispute having arisen between the workmen and the Madras Blectric Tramways Authority, the adjudication of the A ideal Madras-Labour Tribunal, was taken in appeal Local Madras Appellate Tribunal of India at Bombay and it was against the order of that Appellate Tribunal that-writ, of certiorari was sought to quash that order following AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) it held that mere location of the Labour Appeal-Tribunal at Bombay did not debar the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court to issue such The act case is - The Madras Electric Tramways Ltd. Vs. M.K. Ranganathan, in . the Bombay High Court took the view that because; the Labour Appellate Tribunal had office in ''Bombay, that High Court had no juries-to issue writ of certiorari against the order AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) s seen that all these authority of AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council)
The case in AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) ( was (Considered by their Lordships of the Supreme ''Court'' in Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and, That is a fease in''which the Petitioner had been elected to'' the, Madras Legislative Assembly and the Election Commission at Delhi had reported to the Speaker of the Madras Legislative Assembly that the Petitioner wasunder a certain disqualification. There upon the Speaker referred the matter to the Gov-of -Madras, who in his turn sought opinion of the Election Commission in the matter. The Election Commission went to Madras where, an opportunity was given to the Petitioner of being Thereafter the Petitioner sought a writ of biotin-.restraining the Election Commission on enquiring into his alleged disqualification and making a report to the Governor of Madras. A single Judge of the Madras High Court accepted petition and ordered issue of such a writ, ....
On appeal to the Supreme Court their Lordships held that''
The High Court of Madras cannot issue any writunder Article 226, the Election Commission having its office permanently located at Delhi.
In this case the decision in AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) was explained and it has been pointed out at page 214 that that
''decision" did not turn on the construction of a statutory provision similar in scope, purpose, or ''wording to Article 226 of the Constitution, and is not of much assistance in the construction of that Article.
It follows, that all the decisions, as cited above, which the learned Counsel for the Petitioners has placed reliance and which were based on the authority of AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) can be of no assistance in the decision of the present cases.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioners urges at p. 214 of Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and, is an obsessions-of HigJgppurts dealing;, with the situation. where the authority claiming" to exercise: juries diction over a matter at ''first instance is located, in one State and the appellate authority is located in Anr. State. It is not necessary for the purposes of,this appeal to decide which High Court would'' pave Jurisdiction in such circums tances to issue prerogative writsunder Article 226
It is contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that in the present cases the authorities exercising jurisdiction in the matter at the first instance are located within the Jurisdiction of this '' High Court and the revisional authority that is,'' the Assistant Custodian General at Delhi, is located in Punjab. State, and that, this precise question, as to where in such circumstances a petitionunder Article 226 is competent, was left open by their Lordships in-the said authority.
But that authority has made one point clear beyond dispute and that is that where the authority against whom writ is sought to be issued is situate beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, that High Court has no jurisdictionunder Article 226 to issue writ against such an authority. The decision in Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and, , has been affirmed in K.S. Rashid and Son Vs. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., This was an appeal against the Division-Bench of the Punjab High Court, to which Kapur J. was a party, as reported in K. S. RASHID AHMAD Vs. Income Tax INVESTIGATION COMMISSION AND ANOTHER., in which, as explained, a view supporting the contention on behalf of the Petitioners had v. found favour.
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court negatived that argument and following the authority in Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and, and distinguishing the case to AIR 1943 164 (Privy Council) held as follows:
While Article 225 of the Constitution preserves to the existing High Courts the powers and jurisdictions which they had previously Article 226 confers, on .all the High Courts new and very wide, powers in the matter of issuing writs which they never possessed before. There are only two limitations, placed upon . the exercise of these powers by a High Court''under Article 226 of the Constitution.: one is that the power is to be exercised ''throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction'', that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs ''must be within those territories'' and this implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. It is with reference to these two conditions thus mentioned that the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue writsunder Article 226 of the Constitution is to be determined.
Their Lordships then explained that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue writ to the Income Tax Investigation Commission in Delhi although the Petitioners were amenable to the original jurisdiction of the Income Tax authorities in Uttar Pradesh State and after the report and order of the Income Tax Investigation Commission the subsequent proceedings would he taken by the Income Tax authorities in that State.
In view of the two authorities of the Supreme Court the position is now absolutely clear that in so far as the present two cases are concerned this High Court has no jurisdiction to issue any writ to the Assistant Custodian General whose office is located at Delhi and thus is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners refers to the uncertified copy of a judgment by Kapur J. ''Civil writ No. 125 of 1953 (Punjl (K)'', between the present parties, before the, Punjab High Court, in which he followed his previous opinions in K. S. RASHID AHMAD Vs. Income Tax INVESTIGATION COMMISSION AND ANOTHER., and Buta Mal Vs. The Financial Commr., Relief and Rehabilitation, Simla and Others, and distinguished the Supreme Court case reported as - Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and, on the ground that the question as raised in the present cases was left open by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. It has already been shown that the decision in - K.S. Rashid and Son Vs. The Income Tax Investigation Commission etc., has overruled the opinion of Kapur J. and therefore this unreported judgment does not advance the case of the Petitioners either.
In the view taken above, the two petitions are dismissed with costs, counsel''s fee in either being Rs. 100/-.
The learned Counsel for the Petitioners at this stage makes a request that in view of the fact that a large number of similar petitions are still, pending in this Court in which the very same point is involved and that the question concerns the interpretation of the Constitution so a certificate be granted to the Petitioner in each one of the two cases permitting him to appeal to a Bench of this Court consisting of two Judges. The learned Counsel for the Respondents opposes this request on .the ground that an oral application cannot be made, in this behalf. I do not agree with him and there, is nothing to bar in Section 52 of Ordinance No. 10 of, 2005 Bk. such an oral application. The certificate is granted accordingly in each case.