John Cherian vs Central Road Traffic Board and Others

M.S. Menon, J.—The Petitioner challenges the validity of a temporary permit granted to the 2nd Respondent u/s 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for a period of four months from 22-12-1955. The temporary permit authorises the running of his vehicle, T. C. Q. 1993, on the Nccrattupuram - Ttfqttanhagom - Kallooppara - Mallappalli Keruglichal route and the Petitioner being a person who has an overlapping service must be considered as having sufficient interest to sustain this petition.

The application made for the permit does not disclose any temporary need and there is no covering letter or other communication from the Petitioner in the file which indicates such a need. In the office-note dated 22-12-1955 the necessity "for the issue of a temporary permit is dealt with as follows:

A permanent permit was sanctioned to this route by this Board in favour of one Sri Jacob Poulose and the sanction was communicated on 19-12-1955. The actual issue of this permit can be only after 30 days from 19-12-55. The main ground for sanctioning the permit was necessity and heavy overload on buses which covers major portions of this route. The Secretary of this Board and some of the Board members inspected the spot and it is in view of their report that there is absolute necessity for a bus service on this route that a permanent permit mentioned above was sanctioned. Now "that Perunna Exhibition is to be commenced from today. It is likely that existing services will be more overloaded than usual. There is no possibility of granting the permit already sanctioned on this route before 18-1-1956 in the light of M. V. Rules. I 11. 168 (2)

Rule 168 (2) of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1952, referred to in the office-note in following terms:

The actual issue of permits shall be only after expiry of a period of, 30 days from the date of communication of the decision of the Transport Authority granting a permission.

assuming that the existence of this rule considered as creating a temporary need for 30 the case of routes in respect of which a "permanent" permit has been sanctioned, it is impossible to, say that such a need will authorise the, issue of a permit beyond the said period of 30 days. What Section 62 authorises is the grant of a temporary permit co-terminus with the temporary need and not one extending beyond the cessation or satisfaction of that need. The temporary permit granted in this ease is not for a period of 30 days but for four months and should hence be considered as one issued without jurisdiction.

In the order dated 22-12-1955 issued by the Chairman of the Central Road Traffic Board there is no mention of Rule 168 (2) or a need arising as a result of that rule. The order reads as follows:

The application is for a temporary permit for a stage carriage service for 4 months in the inter-District route Neerattupuram - Karugachal. There will be heavy traffic in the route in connection with the ensuing exhibition and celebrations at Chenganacherry and the existing services in the major portion of this route are clearly insufficient to cope even with the normal traffic. As the provision of additional transport facility in this route as a temporary measure is urgently necessary in the public interest, a temporary permit as applied for is sanctioned u/s 62 of the M. V. Act to Sri R. Madhavan Nair, Hindustan Motors, Kayamkulam in respect of his bus TCQ 1993.

There is nothing in the file to show that the exhibition was expected to last for four months or anything like it. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner assured me that the number of days that the exhibition was intended to last was well known and it is not disputed that it did terminate on 12-1-1956.

In paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Road Traffic Board, Trivandrum, it is stated:

''The Exhibition at Chenganacherry was only one of the factors which weighed with the Chairman in issuing the temporary permit. The main reason for the issue of the temporary permit was the insufficiency of service on portions of the route even under normal conditions.

This apparently takes us back to Rule 168 (2) and as, stated already that rule even on the assumption that it postulates a temporary need for a month in all cases where a permanent permit has been sanctioned cannot as observed in paragraph 3 above the issue of a permit for four months from 22-12 1955.

It follows that the Petitioner must sue and that the temporary permit issued should be quashed. Judgment accordingly.

In the view I have taken it is unnecessary for me to consider the contention of the Petitioner that the issue of the permit was not bona fide and I express no opinion on that aspect of the case.

Rule 133 of the Travancore-Cochin Motor Vehicles Rules, 1952, provides:

The Board may for tire prompt and convenient despatch of business by general or special .resolution delegate to the" Chairman or the Secretary the following functions.

and one of the powers delegated is

Power u/s 62 of the Act to grant a temporary permit.

If the delegation was to the Secretary the Chairman an appeal would have be to the Board under Rule 139;

An appeal which shall be in writing shall lie to the Board within thirty day of the date of communication of any decision taken by the Secretary under the powers conferred under Rule 133'''' and this is a lacuna which I think should be rectified without delay.

Mr. Kalathil Velayudhan Nair, who was the Minister-in-charge of these matters at the time the rules were framed, was present in Court when the petition was heard and he told me that to the best of his recollection the omission to provide for an appeal from the orders of the Chairman in exercise of the powers delegated to him under Rule 133 was due to an oversight and not to the existence of any particular reason. He said that, originally the delegation contemplated by R. 133 was only to the Secretary, that the words ''''the Chairman or" were added, subsequently and that somehow, by mistake the consequential amendment was omitted to be incorporated in Rule 139.

The Petitioner has sustained no loss since 31-1-1956 in view of the temporary injunction granted by Kumara Pillai on that day and taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration I think I shall, though with considerable hesitation, desist from making any order as to costs.