Johnrose Thangam vs The State of Tamil Nadu

G. Rajasuria, J.—This petition has been filed to call for the records relating to the police report bearing Ref. No. 134/2002/Misc/KK dated

18.06.2003 in Special Case No. 3 of 2005 in Cr. No. 9 of 2002 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Special Judge, Nagercoil,

Kanyakumari District and quash the same.

The facts giving rise to the filing of this petition as stood exposited from the records could be portrayed in a nutshell as under:

The respondent police registered a case in Cr. No. 9 of 2002 and investigated into the matter for the offence punishable under Sections 13(2) read

with 13(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as against the petitioner herein who at the relevant time was working as a Quality Inspector

of Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Konam, Nagercoil. The police after completing the investigation laid the police report as against

the accused, whereupon the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate - cum - Special Judge, took it on file as Special Case No. 3 of 2005.

Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with, the investigation conducted by the police, and the factum of the Court having taken on file the police

report, the accused herein has chosen to file this Criminal Original Petition for quashing the entire proceedings on the following main grounds:

(i) The petitioner inherited his ancestral property. The petitioner''s wife Vimala Johnrose Thangam also inherited properties through her father. She

also runs taxi business ever since the year 1991 in addition to breeding dogs and running a cattle farm and by way of victimising the petitioner due

to political vendetta, the impugned case has been focussed as against him.

(ii) There is no communication as to who gave the information based on which the F.I.R was registered?

(iii) The source of information was not disclosed for the alleged occurrences which took place ranging from 01.05.1984 to 31.03.1995. The F.I.R

was registered on 21.08.2003 by the respondent police.

(iv) The petitioner/accused entered service as a Mill Technician Assistant in the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited with effect from

01.09.1975 and he was promoted to the post of Assistant Quality Inspector on 06.05.1978 and thereafter as Quality Inspector on 07.03.1989.

(v) The police report enclosing as many as seven annexures out of which, the first three were nomenclatured as Annexures and the remaining were

nomeclatured as Statements.

(vi) The respondent police failed to take into consideration the actual income of the petitioner and his wife from all sources including the income

from agricultural properties, rental income from house and the income derived from running taxies. The agricultural income which has been earning

out of banana cultivation and coconut cultivation in the petitioner''s inherited properties of 2 acres and his wife''s property of one acre, was not

considered at all while arriving at the conclusion relating to alleged disproportionate assets. The income derived from the ancestral properties by

the petitioner and his wife were totally ignored. The petitioner''s wife by running two tourist taxies and by breeding dogs earned sufficient income

and those facts were not taken into account by the respondent police.

The sanction for prosecuting the petitioner was given by the Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited,

vide proceedings G4/35402/dated 21.05.2004 is invalid and got vitiated due to non-application of mind and also on the following grounds:

(i) The sanctioning authority simply based on the statement of the police granted sanction.

(ii) The Inspector of Police had obtained from the petitioner an explanation on 30.06.2003 and there is no reference in the order of sanction to the

explanation obtained from the petitioner on 30.06.2003.

(iii) The concerned authority has not applied his mind even to the individual entries to the statement given by the respondent.

(iv) An amount of Rs. 2,42,499.59(Rupees two lakh forty two thousand and four hundred ninety nine and fifty nine paise) has been notionally

added as family expenditure from the period 01.03.1985 to 31.03.1995. Under entries 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, expenses have been added which

is highly exaggerated as this can be done by the family members. An amount of Rs. 61,395/- has been shown for this purpose.

(v) All the expenses pertaining to the tourist taxies of the petitioner''s wife have been added to the petitioner''s expenditure, where no such income

from taxies has been added to the petitioner''s income. Therefore, there has been no application of mind on the part of the authority concerned as

to whether there is any prima facie case worthy of prosecution and relating to the figure arrived at as Rs. 6,48,382.57.

(vi) The alleged occurrence took place between 1984 and 1995 The FIR has been registered in the year 2002 and there is a delay of seven years

from the last occurrence and 18 years delay from the date of occurrence. This is a long delay which remains unexplained. In fact, the stand of the

prosecution is that there is no delay, as per FIR.

(vii) The petitioner has furnished the required details from the year 1986 including the purchase of 2 taxies by his wife, though the business is in no

way connected with him. If there is really anything which would necessitate such prosecution, all the information was there with the employer. The

employer has not filed any complaint, because the very nature of the petitioner''s service, which is quality control wing is such that no illicit money

cannot be made. If there was any such complaint, the employer would have resorted to disciplinary action. The FIR says that the complainant,

namely the Inspector had received credible information, but does not disclose the source of information.

(Viii) The circumstances strongly suggest victimisation of the petitioner because of his role in the trade union and in the federation, which is the

labour wing of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam which was then an opposition party. The long delay in the case in its registration, investigation and

the eventual filing of the police report.

(ix) There is no prima facie case worthy of prosecution and the same has resulted in undue harassment of the petitioner apart from waste of public

money and judicial time.

(x) Accordingly, the petitioner prays for quashing the proceedings.

Gainsaying and denying, disputing and challenging the averments/allegations in the petition, the respondent filed the counter which would inter

alia run thus:

Admittedly, the petitioner inherited some properties of his father which are included as item Nos. 9 and 10 with nil value in Statement No. II

Annexure of the final report. Item No. 12 under the same Statement No. II, is the acquired property by way of gift from his sister, for which also

nil value is specified. The property acquired by his wife by way of gift is also shown in Statement No. I with nil value. The income derived by

running the said two taxies is shown in Statement No. III as income of the petitioner. The petitioner''s wife is not running any kennel for breeding

dogs and she is also not having any cattle farm. The respondent need not disclose the source of information to the petitioner. In the final report in

the Annexures, the quantum of disproportionate wealth is calculated at Rs. 6,48,382.57 which is 111.85% of his total income during the period.

The property statements filed by the petitioner with the authorities in his Department were scrutinised along with his agricultural income also. The

Investigating Officer correctly gathered particulars about the family consumption expenditure and set out in the statement No. IV and L.W.41 in

the charge sheet is the Statistical Inspector, Department of Economics and Statistics, Chennai, who furnished such particulars of family

consumption expenditure. The sanctioning authority applied his mind and granted sanction. After conducting a detailed enquiry, F.I.R was

registered as in matters of this nature, such an approach is only contemplated. There is no victimisation of the petitioner by the police. The

petitioner''s involvement in Union or political movement is having nothing to do with this case. The petitioner could challenge the sanction order

before the trial Court. Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner by drawing the attention of this Court to various parts of the typed set in this petition relating to this case,

would submit that the investigation is a lop-sided one; the sanctioning authority failed to consider the various factual circumstances as found

specified in the grounds in this petition and as such, the learned Counsel for the petitioner highlighted during his arguments those grounds and

prayed for quashment.

The point for consideration is as to whether based on the grounds set out in this petition supra, the entire proceedings relating to the police

report bearing Ref. No. 134/2002/Misc/KK dated 18.06.2003 in Special Case No. 3 of 2005 in Cr. No. 9 of 2002 on the file of the learned

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Special Judge, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District, now pending, are liable to be quashed?

Point:

At the outset itself, I would like to consider the decision of this Court in M.S. Kuppuswami and etc. etc. Vs. The State, , as referred to by the

learned Counsel for the petitioner. An excerpt from the said decision, would run thus:

The sanction to prosecute does contain repetition of the acts, found in the charge-sheet Merely because the narration of facts has been

borrowed from the charge-sheet, it cannot automatically be concluded that there was non-application of mind before the sanction was accorded. It

would certainly be better if, after going through the facts, the sanctioning authority himself, on his understanding of the case, gives a resume of facts

in the order of sanction, without adopting to follow the very phraseology used by the investigating agency. A mere reproduction of words, as far as

the facts of the case are concerned, cannot in all cases indicate lack of open mind. Sanction is not an empty formality but intended to be a

protection to a public servant when prosecuted for an offence which challenges his honesty and integrity. The issue in such a case is not only

between the prosecution and the offender, but the State as well, since it vitally concerned, for it tends to affect the morale of the public services and

also the administrative interest of the State. The purpose of sanction being vested in a departmental authority is to provide an opportunity for

assessment and weighing of the accusation in a dispassionate and responsible manner. Such an approach in the matter of according sanction must

be apparent on the face of the record. It will be appropriate, that the order of sanction reflects the understanding of the facts by the sanctioning

authority in his own way, not being put forth by the investigating agency. Sanction to prosecute must have sanctity attached to it, for the liberty of

the person prosecuted is involved. However, on a perusal of the order of sanction, it is prima facie apparent, that the sanctioning authority had

carefully examined the investigation report, copy of the F.I.R search list, inventory reports, other documents covering the allegations statement of

witnesses, explanations offered by the petitioner placed before him with regard to the allegations and the circumstances of the case before allowing

the prosecution to be instituted. During trial it will be still open for the petitioner to challenge the sanction order, but at this juncture it will not be

possible to conclude on the mere repetition of facts, that there was non-application of mind and as a habitual exercise, sanction had been

accorded.

The aforesaid excerpt and the entire perusal of the said judgment would highlight the fact that the sanctioning authority should in stricto senso

apply his mind and thereafter take a decision to grant sanction or not. If there is any non-application of mind on the sanctioning authority, that

would cut at the validity of the very sanction itself and there is no quarrel with such a proposition.

The copy of the sand sanctioning order is found enclosed in the typed set of papers which discloses the fact that the sanctioning authority

namely, the Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, who is the competent authority, by virtue of his

proceedings in G4/35402/dated 21.05.2004, set out in detail the relevant particulars which would incriminate the accused.

No doubt, there is reproduction of the particulars as furnished by the police. The very cited decision by the learned Counsel for the petitioner

would show that mere reproduction of the particulars furnished by the sanctioning authority in his sanction order, would not lead to the irresistible

conclusion as though the Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, did not apply his mind at all, but he

only echoed the idea of the investigating agency.

It is quite obvious and stark reality that the sanctioning authority should necessarily rely on the data supplied for formulating the opinion relating

to the granting of sanction and in such a case, there is no hard and fast rule that all the particulars furnished by the police should be expressed in a

different language or in different terms than the one found expressed in the records submitted by the police for obtaining sanction. If such a view is

taken, it would be impracticable and unrealistic also.

Let me assume an incident where the authority without applying his mind, simply reframed the sentences and the terms found in the police

records and passes a sanction order, then the question would arise whether such order was blindly passed without applying the mind is valid. The

answer is an emphatic ''No''. The sole test is to find out whether there were sufficient materials found incorporated in the sanction order and

whether based on such materials so incorporated, the sanctioning authority arrived at the conclusion for granting sanction. This Court while

exercising its power u/s 482 Cr.P.C cannot simply assume or presume that there was no application of mind on the part of the sanctioning

authority, because verbatim the data are found reproduced in the proceedings. The sanctioning authority after setting out the annexures/statements

as almost found in the police records, detailed and exemplified his opinion at page No. 64 of the typed set as under:

Whereas it is further alleged that when opportunity was given to Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam to explain, he was unable to account satisfactorily for the

possession of the said quantum of assets found to be disproportionate to his known sources of income.

Whereas the above facts constitute and disclose the offences of criminal misconduct punishable u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(c) of Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1988 against the said Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam.

Whereas the Director, Vigilance and Anti-corruption, Chennai - 28 has sought sanction for the prosecution of the said Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam for

the said offences before a court of law.

Whereas I, Thiru V.Gunalan, I.A.S., Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Head Office, Chennai,

being the competent authority to remove the said Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam, Quality Inspector Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited,

Konam, Nagercoil Detachment. Statement of witnesses and Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam, connected records and the report of the Directorate of

Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Chennai-28 placed before me in regard to the said allegations and circumstances of the case, am satisfied that it is

necessary in the interest of justice to prosecute Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam, Quality Inspector, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited,

Konam, Nagercoil in a court of law for the said offences.

Now, therefore u/s 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, I do hereby accord sanction for the prosecution of R.Johnrose Thangam,

Quality Inspector, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Konam, Nagercoil, now working as Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation

Limited, Thoothukudi District for the said offences and for taking cognizance of the said offences by a court of competent jurisdiction.

It is therefore crystal clear that the sanctioning authority applied his mind and thereafter alone, granted sanction. There is absolutely no material

or circumstances available to show that mechanically, without application of mind, such a sanction order was passed.

Now, the next question arises as to whether the materials considered by them were sufficient enough to arrive at such a conclusion and this

analysis is on a different footing from the analysis undertaken in the aforesaid paragraph. Once, an authority considers the data and in his own

words also states that he was satisfied with those data to grant sanction, this Court while exercising its jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C cannot expect

that he should have written that sanction order like a judgment of the criminal Court discussing each and every relevant fact and the law point

involved in the matter. Hence, in this view of the matter, I hold that the sanction order cannot be found fault with.

Now, the next question arises as to whether such application of mind on the part of the Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil

Supplies Corporation Limited, the sanctioning authority was really on sufficient materials so as to enable him to grant sanction. In this aspect, the

learned Counsel for the petitioner made various submissions touching upon the facts that the sanctioning authority should have taken into account

various pitfalls / deficiencies / defects / lacuna / missing of links, in the case submitted by the police before him. It is one thing to say that sanctioning

authority applied his mind on all relevant matters and yet, it is a different argument to state that the sanctioning authority while applying its mind,

failed to exercise due care and caution correctly in arriving at the conclusion from the available materials.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner would argue by trying to highlight the alleged factual drawbacks in this matter. According to him, in the

F.I.R, it is stated that there was no delay, despite the occurrence had taken place during the period between 01.05.1984 and 31.03.1995 and the

F.I.R was registered on 21.05.2002. In my considered opinion, such an argument fails to carry conviction with this Court for the reason that this is

a case relating to the disproportionate wealth and after receiving the information about such disproportionate wealth of the petitioner and also after

conducting preliminary enquiry, the F.I.R was registered. It is not like any other I.P.C offences relating to commission of any violent crimes. The

grievance of the petitioner that the source of information was not divulged, is neither here nor there for the reason that it is a trait proposition of law

that the police need not disclose the source of information in matters of this nature. However, it is for the police to prove the case beyond all

reasonable doubts in whatever manner they could do it within the framework of law.

Section 125 of the Indian Evidence Act could fruitfully be reproduced here for ready reference:

Information as to commission of offences.- No Magistrate or Police Officer shall be compelled to say whence he got any information as to

the commission of any offence, and no Revenue Officer shall be compelled to say whence he got information as to the commission of any offence

against the public revenue.

Explanation: ""Revenue Officer"" in this section means an officer employed in or about the business of any branch of the public revenue.

The contention of the petitioner falls to the ground and it meets with its waterloo.

The police filed the police report by enclosing with it as many as seven annexures in which first, three were named as ''Annexures'' and

remaining as ""Statements"" and they are as under:

Annexure No. I - Assets that stood to the credit of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam as on 01.05.1984.

Annexure No. II - Assets that stood to the credit of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam as on 31.03.1995.

Annexure No. III - Income of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam during the check period i.e, from 01.05.1984 to 31.03.1995.

Statement No. IV - The expenditure of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam during the check period ie., from 01.05.1984 to 31.03.1995.

Statement No. V

Statement No. VI

Statement No. VII.

As per Annexure No. I - Assets that stood to the credit of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam as on 01.05.1984, which are categorised under 11 items

come to Rs. 25,423-20. Under Annexure No. II - Assets that stood to the credit of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam as on 31.03.1995, the assets of the

petitioner/accused which was detailed under 26 items come to Rs. 8,32,343-14. As such, the police made a compare and contrast between the

assets of the accused on 01.05.1984 with that of the assets as on 31.03.1995. A mere perusal of it would show that there were significant and

marked increase in his assets disproportionate to his income. There were lot of new purchases of both movable and immovable items and it is quite

obvious.

Under Annexure No. III Income of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam during the check period, i.e, from 01.05.1984 to 31.03.1995, is found set out

under 19 items to the tune of Rs. 5,79,696-16 and under Statement No. IV, the expenditure of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam during the check period,

i.e, from 01.05.1984 to 31.03.1995, under 42 items comes to Rs. 4,21,158-79. Under Statement No. V, the difference between Annexure No. I

and Annexure No. II is found highlighted and shown that assets acquired during the check period was Rs. 8,06,919-94. Under Statement No. VI,

the particulars under Statement Nos. III and IV were taken into consideration and the Investigating Officer assessed that the probable savings of

the accused during the check period as Rs. 1,58,537-37. Under Statement No. VII, the Investigating Officer from the above analysis arrived at

the conclusion that the disproportionate assets were to the tune of Rs. 6,48,382-57.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner would attack that such arrival at the figures were not based on the objectivity/objective

reality/reasonableness and probabilities. In support of his argument, he would contend that the Investigating Officer took it for granted as though

the two taxies which were found set out as items 22 and 23 under Annexure No. II, belonged to the accused even though it stands in the name of

his wife.

I would like to highlight that it is the case of the prosecution that those tourist taxies were purchased by the petitioner in the name of his wife.

There is Himalayan difference between the accused''s wife owning a property in her own capacity, from that of the accused owning the property in

the name of his wife. Here, it is the specific case of the prosecution that it was the accused who purchased from ill-gotten wealth such tourist cars

and running in the name of his wife and it is for them to prove during trial and it is premature for the High Court to simply throttle the prosecution

evidence. From the all over circumstances and the facts that would be placed before the trial Court, only it could arrive at a conclusion whether

those tourist cars were purchased by the wife herself or the accused purchased those cars in the name of his wife and runs the business.

In matters of this nature, Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act would also come into play and it is extracted hereunder for ready reference:

Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.- When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving

that fact is upon him.

Illustrations

(a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving

that intention is upon him.

(b) ''A'' is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket. The burden of proving that he has a ticket is on him.

Even though the Inspector of Police gave opportunity to the petitioner/accused to furnish his explanation, yet the petitioner/accused has not

chosen to divulge the entire facts in his explanation dated 30.06.2003 which is niggard and bereft of details about the fact as to the alleged

purchase of the cars by his wife. He has also not given any details about the income derived from those taxies, but on the other hand, he would

contend that the sanctioning authority failed to consider those aspects. The accounts maintained relating to the taxies have not been produced to

show how much income derived. No doubt, the Investigating Officer under the Statement No. IV referred to the expenditure incurred for the

taxies. The Investigating Officer under item Nos. 17 and 18 in Annexure No. III set out the income derived from taxies. While so, it was for the

accused to furnish income accounts maintained relating to those taxies. The tourist taxies cannot be run at random and there are rules and

regulations relating to it. It is not his case that the husband and the wife lived separately due to some problems. Hence, in these circumstances, at

this stage, while this Court is exercising its powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C, simply it cannot find fault with the sanction as well as the investigation

conducted and simply quash it.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner would draw the attention of this Court to various items of agricultural properties including the ancestral

properties of the petitioner and would argue that income from those properties were not at all considered either by the Investigating Officer or by

the sanctioning authority. For the purpose of objectivity, I would like to extract hereunder the agricultural items as set out under Annexure No. I:

Sl. Details Value

No

2 5 cents 300 squire links of House site NIL

in R.S. No. 3320/A3 of Madathuvilagam village

(now Kowdiar Village) Kerala gifted to A.O''s wife

Tmt. Vimala Johnrose by her mother vide in Document

No. 1667/80 dated 27.05.1980 of the Sub Registrar Office

Pottom, Kerala.

3 Value of 80 cents of Punja land in R.S. No. 691/10-32-6 of Rs. 4,800.00

Neendakarai ''A'' village (now Vembanoor village) acquired

in the name of Tmt. Vimala Johnrose as per Document No. 1929/80

dated 04.12.1980 of Sub Registrar Office, Rajakkamangalam.

4 16 1/4 cents of Punja land in R.S. No. 625/5 of Kadiyapattanam NIL

village has been gifted to A.O''s wife Tmt. Vimala Johnrose by

her mother as per Document No. 587/83 dated 20.06.1983 of Sub

Registrar Office, Manavalakurichy.

5 15 1/2 cents of paddy field in R.S. No. 329/8 of Vembanoor village NIL

has been gifted to A.O''s wife Tmt. Vimala Johnrose by her mother

as per Document No. 1109/83 dated 05.09.1983 of the Sub Registrar

Office, Rajakkamangalam.

The aforesaid four items are the properties of the accused as on 01.05.1984 was worth Rs. 4,800.00. Out of that only, the item No. 5

measuring 15 1/2 cents only is termed as paddy field and the remaining items are punja lands of smaller extents. It is quite obvious and it is also

common knowledge that agricultural income would always fluctuate and depend upon various factors including vis majiure and from the said items

of agricultural lands, no one cane be heard to say that the cultivator enjoyed enormous income. He would in his explanation submitted to the

Investigating Officer, state about various crops allegedly cultivated by him and earned income, but no accounts produced, even though those are all

facts with his exclusive knowledge. In fact, the petitioner would go to the extent of stating that the entire income derived from the agricultural

income was utilised for maintaining the family comprised of his wife and two children and such a plea is too big a pill to swallow at this stage. The

Court cannot take the versions of the accused for gospel truth and simply quash the proceedings.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner would argue that the accused was in service ever since 1975 and his income was not considered.

Annexure No. I, would show the accused''s assets as on 01.05.1984. If really, the accused saved wealth by salary income, then it would have got

reflected in the assets as on 01.05.1984 and in the Annexure No. I, the Investigating Officer clearly set out the assets as on 01.05.1984. In such a

case, the contention of the petitioner also falls to the ground.

Under Statement No. I, annexed with the explanation of the accused dated 30.06.2003, he set out as under:

Statement No. I:

The following assets were not considered by you while preparing the statement of assets as on 01.05.1984.

Sl.No Rs. P.

1 Fixed Deposit at Indian Bank Trivandrum being receipts 15,000-00

Nos. 79804/79, 79805/79 and 289389 encashed and the case

was available with me.

2 Saving from salary and share of agricultural income 27,000-00

during the period from the year 1975-1984

3 Marriage gift from family members 20,000-00

62,000-00

This amount was given to mother-in-law family as loan. This amount has to be added in the statement.

Accordingly, the amount as per statement No. I, will be Rs. 87,423-20.

In support of those three items, absolutely there is no prima facie evidence and it is for him to adduce evidence during trial and there is no

embargo. There is nothing to show as to when those Fixed Deposits were made and Fixed Deposit receipts obtained and when they were

encashed and the second item would refer to Rs. 27,000/- as salary savings, for that also there is no account and the third item is the marriage gift

from family members, for that also there are no details. The mere ipsi dixit of the petitioner would not be sufficient to quash the detailed

investigation emerged out of the registration of the F.I.R by the respondent police.

In Statement No. III, under item No. 4 annexed with accused''s explanation, he would contend that for the check period of eleven years, the

petitioner and his wife got income of Rs. 2,20,000-00 (Rupees two lakhs and twenty thousand only) and it is totally an imaginary figure considering

the nature of the land and the extent of land as found set out supra. Furthermore, the matters requiring of proof based on details cannot be

considered at this stage by this Court.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that the Investigating Officer referred to various constructions made during the check

period under Annexure No. II of the Police report, but failed to consider that those were constructed after the check period as per the statement

appended to statement No. II of the petitioner''s explanation and it is extracted hereunder for ready reference:

Statement No. II,

Clause - 7.

In clause number 7, you have taken the cost of construction was Rs. 2,27,840/-. This house constructed after getting permission from the

Department. The plan and estimate approved by the P.W.D was Rs. 99,000/- and Rs. 20,000/- may be added for escalation minor deviating from

the approved plan. Accordingly, the sum of Rs. 1,03,840/- is to be deducted. Also the car shed and an extention was done after the check date.

But, this was accounted for by you.

These are the matters of intricate details which are exclusive within the knowledge of the accused and he ought to have produced the evidence

before the Investigating Officer, when actually such constructions were made by producing relevant agreements, bills, accounts, etc., and this Court

at this stage cannot indulge in conjectures and surmises and simply accept the explanation of the accused which prima facie fails to satisfy the

requirements of law.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner''s wife belonged to reasonably an affluent family and she was in receipt

of financial support from them as well as she has also inherited properties. Once again, without being tautalagous but to the risk of repetition, I

would record that it is for the accused to adduce evidence before the trial Court.

In Annexure No. II, under item No. 11 of the police report, 22 1/2 cents of Punja land is said to have been purchased in the name of the

accused''s wife as per document No. 2209/92 of Rajakkamangalam Sub Registrar Office. It is for the petitioner to show that as to how as on

17.11.1992, his wife had enough source of income to purchase that land for a sum of Rs. 20,250-00 (Rupees twenty thousand and two hundred

fifty only).

Only one Ambassador car was purchased in the name of the wife of the petitioner on 19.08.1991, whereas that land was purchased in her

name on 10.09.1992 and it is obvious that no accounts were produced relating to the income derived from one Ambassador car whereas the

Investigating Officer furnished it as already highlighted. It could also be seen that the said car alleged to have been purchased by availing loan and

there were repayments of instalments of the loan also. In such a case, one cannot jump to the conclusion that at this stage, the case of the police is

totally false.

Under Statment No. IV, in the explanation, the accused stated as under:

Statement No. IV:

Sl. No. 12 to 17 is to be deducted as Cashew, Mango, Jack and other trees in the land was fell down so as to plant coconut. Also plantain and

tapioca were cultivated as inter crop. Again, the cost of planting and maintaining coconut seedlings is high. Hence, this amount to be

deducted.Rs.61,395-00

Accordingly, the amount as per statement No. IV will be as follows:

As estimated by you - Rs. 4,21,158-79

Amount to be deducted - Rs. 61,395-00

----------------

- Rs. 3,59,763-79

----------------

As per his explanation, he would contend that Rs. 61,395/- should be deleted, but the explanation which he gave prima facie is not

satisfactory. If at all, he cultivated various crops as claimed by him, then the Adangal extract would reflect the same and it is for him to produce all

those details and he had not even stated that revenue records would speak about it. It is common knowledge that whenever crops are cultivated in

such lands, the Government periodically serveys and collects statistical data. But, there is no reference even to such revenue records relating to the

details set out by him.

Under Statement No. 3 annexed to the accused''s explanation he would state as follows:

Statement No. III

Loan taken from Mr.Tharachand Jain to purchase TCK.4698 through Mr.Sukumaran is not accounted by you. Rs. 70,000-00

Absolutely, there is no documentary evidence.

In fact, he would also contend that under item No. 3 of his explanation to Statement No. II, the car was purchased for Rs. 90,000/- and not

for Rs. 1,30,000/- as stated by the Investigating Officer, for which also he has not produced any particulars or vouchers and these are all facts

which shall be placed before the trial Court.

The petitioner would claim that he got rental income, but no counterfoil of the receipts were produced to prove it and no lease agreement

relating to it also produced.

By referring to item No. 1 to Statement No. IV of the police report, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would contend that namely, the

expenditure of the accused during the check period was worked out by the Statistical Department to the tune of Rs. 2,04,599-49 (Rupees two

lakhs four thousand and five hundred ninety nine and forty nine paise) merely based on conjectures and surmises and not on realities and such an

argument cannot be countenanced for the reason that what else the Investigating Officer could do except to approach the Statistical Department

which is competent to furnish the proper information about the particular individual''s normal expenditure. Under Statement No. IV, item No. 1 is

extracted hereunder for ready reference:

Family consumption expenditure of Tr.R.Johnrose Thangam(A.O) during the check period i.e, from 1.5.84 to 31.3.95 (Excluding the

expenditure incurred towards the payment of and for Fuel and light Rs. 12,710/- i.e, Education - 23%, Fuel and light 5.61%).

[Rs.2,26,564.64 - 21,965.15 (Rs.9,255.15 + 12,710 = 21,965.15) = Rs. 2,04,599.49)

=Rs.2,04,599.49

In his explanation, the petitioner would apparently and obviously in an unconvincing manner would state as though he and his family members

were staying with his mother and brothers and during the period between 1987 and 1990 and the latter maintained them. The relevant portion of

his explanation is extracted hereunder for ready reference:

Actually upto 1987, I had lived at Pambanvilai with my mother and with my brothers as joint family. Even though I had constructed my house at

Ponnappa Nadar Nager, Nagercoil during 1986, most of the time my family was at Pampanvilai with my mother and brothers. So, the assertion of

my family consumption expenditure and school fees of my children, and fuel and light does not arise upto 1990.

The mere perusal of those versions would show that those are all matters involving proving of facts and it is for the trial Court to believe or not

and the accused should face the trial and convince the Court.

Section 114(3) of the Evidence Act also can be pressed into service in support of the fact that as per the decision of the Honourable Apex

Court, the sanctioning authority in fact applied his mind and it could be presumed that the official act of sanction was granted by the authority in a

regular manner.

Absolutely, there is nothing to doubt that the sanctioning authority had any prejudice or bias as against the petitioner in issuing the order.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner after taking adjournment and verifying the facts would submit before this Court that neither the petitioner

nor his wife was an income tax assessee and that they were not duty bound to submit income tax returns, in those days the Income Tax Act, before

the recent amendments, did not contemplate filing of such returns also. However, from the accused''s side, there is no plausible explanation about

the absence of accounts relating to running of the taxies.

In the additional typed set of papers filed, various returns submitted by the petitioner to his employer periodically are found enclosed, including

the extract from the Service Register about the loan availabled for the purchase of motorcycle by the petitioner. In the written submissions filed, the

learned Counsel for the petitioner reiterated what he orally argued before this Court and which has been discussed supra.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited the following five decisions:

(i) Mahendra Lal Das Vs. State of Bihar and Others, .

(ii) N.P. Lotlikar Vs. C.B.I. and another, .

(iii) Periyasamy Vs. Inspector, Vigilance and Anti-corruption Department, Tiruchirappalli, .

(iv) Mithan Lal Vs. The State, .

(v) Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, .

The first decision, Mahendra Lal Das Vs. State of Bihar and Others, is relating to the fact that despite expiry of over twelve years, the State

has not granted sanction for prosecution of the appellant and the said precedent is having no nexus whatsoever with the case on hand and it is quite

obvious.

The second decision, N.P. Lotlikar v. C.B.I reported in 1993 CRI.L.J. 2051 is one relating to the fact of draft sanction having been put up by

the Investigating Authority with glaring defects. Here, in view of the above discussion, it is clear that the sanctioning authority applied its mind and

hence, this decision is also not germane for adjudicating the lis at hand. Here, the explanations furnished by the accused were taken into

consideration by the sanctioning authority. Hence, the cited decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.

The third decision, Periyasamy Vs. Inspector, Vigilance and Anti-corruption Department, Tiruchirappalli, is relating to the fact that the

sanctioning authority without disclosing how he arrived at his satisfaction for granting sanction, simply issued the sanction order. In the cited case,

the finding of the Court was that the sanction order did not disclose that the sanctioning authority perused the records and applied his mind and

issued the sanction order. But, here the facts and circumstances are entirely different as discussed supra.

The fourth decision, Mithan Lal Vs. The State, is on the point that the sanction order involved in that case is found extracted at page No. 432

and the Court was not satisfied with it. But, here the sanction order as discussed above, contains all the details about the disproportionate wealth

and thereupon, only the authority arrived at the conclusion after applying his mind.

The fifth decision, Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, , the Honourable Apex Court gave a finding to the effect that the

question of sanction arises before the proceedings come to the Court and the question of presumption to be drawn u/s 4 of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, does not arise An excerpt from it would run thus:

It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the Sanctioning Authority after it was satisfied that a case for

sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways; either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself

contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the

Sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. Any case instituted without a proper sanction, it must fail because this being a manifest

defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. What the Court has to see is whether or not the Sanctioning Authority

at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same; any subsequent fact which may

come into existence after the grant of sanction is wholly irrelevant. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a

solemn and sacrosanctact which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied

with before any prosecution can be launched against the public servant concerned. It will not be correct to say that in view of the presumption

which is to be drawn under S.4, even if no facts are mentioned in the Resolution of the Sanctioning Authority it must be presumed that the

Sanctioning Authority was satisfied that the prosecution against the accused should be launched on the basis of the presumption that the accused

had received a bribe. In the first place, there is no question of the presumption being available to the Sanctioning Authority because at that stage

the occasion for drawing a presumption never arises since there is no case in the Court. Secondly, the presumption does not arise automatically but

only on proof of certain circumstances, that it to say, where it is proved by evidence in the Court that the money said to have been paid to the

accused was actually recovered from his possession. It is only then that the Court may presume the amount received would be deemed to be an

illegal gratification. The question of drawing the presumption, therefore, does not arise at this stage. The prosecution cannot be given a chance to

produce the materials in the appeal before the Supreme Court to satisfy that the Sanctioning Authority had duly applied its mind to the facts

constituting the offence.

A mere perusal of the aforesaid excerpt and especially the underlined portion would show that the facts and circumstances involved in the cited

case is entirely different from the case on hand. In the cited decision, virtually relevant materials were not considered by the sanctioning authority

concerned to prove the sanction and that the prosecution relied on Section 4 of the Act to attract presumption, for which the Honourable Apex

Court came heavily upon the prosecution and held that such a procedure could not be countenanced.

In such a case, that procedure cannot be pressed into service in support of the petitioner''s contention here. The ratio decidendi in the fifth

decision is that the Court has to see whether or not the sanctioning authority at that time of granting sanction, applied its mind. Here, applying that

ratio decidendi, it is clear that the sanctioning authority applied his mind and those intricate facts have been discussed supra.

In the written arguments, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would refer to the 161 statement of the said L.W.41, the Statistical Inspector

and comment upon it. Those are factual details gathered by such Statistical Officer in the normal course of discharging their duties and while

exercising jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C, this Court cannot assume or presume that those statistics must be false.

The scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C is well known. The following decisions emerged thereunder could fruitfully be cited, so as to highlight under

what circumstances the High Court could exercise its inherent powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. I would like to refer to the following decisions of the

Honourable Apex Court:

(i) Amar Chand Agarwalla Vs. Shanti Bose and Another, etc., .

(ii) State of Bihar and Another Vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another, .

(iii) Jaysingh Wadhu Singh, (Through His Next Friend In The Family I.E. His Son Pratap Singh) Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, .

The perusal of the aforesaid judgments would clearly show that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C could be exercised only

to prevent the abuse of process of Court. The High Court at this stage cannot sit as an appellate Court over the sanction order issued by the

Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Limited.

The above discussion itself would show as to how the entire case is full of factual details and the petitioner/accused has not approached this

Court with any clear facts to show his innocence ex facie and prima facie. But, on the other hand, the analysis of the grounds which relied upon to

get quashed the proceedings would show that his explanation is ex facie fraught with various infirmities. But, on the other hand, the perusal of the

charge sheet and annexures, would show that they are based on objective facts and figures. The Investigating Agency has chosen to file the charge

sheet on the ground that the disproportionate assets come to Rs. 6,48,382-57, based on various details set out in the annexures to the charge

sheet and other statements attached to it. On the other hand, the statements annexed to the explanation given by the accused mostly contains his

ipsi dixit as on date and if at all, he is having a case, he should put forth at the time of trial before the trial Court.

The disproportionate assets are huge and his explanation as already adverted to supra are far from satisfactory to attract the inherent powers

of this Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C to quash the proceedings.

In view of the above observations, this petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed. Consequently, M.P.Nos. 1 and

2 of 2007 are also dismissed.