Joypal Dhobi vs Mohunt Palukdhari Das

These two appeals arise out of two suits brought by the Plaintiff as proprietor of mouzah Bahadurpur against the Defendant in those suits to recover from them possession of certain lands. The Plaintiff alleged that they were his zerait lands, and that in respect of them the Defendant, during the recent survey of the mouzah, obtained parchas recognizing their right of occupancy in them. The Plaintiff further alleged that after obtaining the parchas the Defendant took forcible possession of the lands. The only question before us is, whether the decision of the Revenue Officer under sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act operates in this case as res judicata between the parties.

The learned Subordinate Judge has held, with reference to the case of Pandit Sardar v. Meajan Mirdha ILR 21 Cal. 378, that the suits are not barred by res judicata.

We think that the learned Subordinate Judge was in error in coming to that conclusion. The case relied upon by him has reference merely to questions decided as between two tenants. In the judgment that case was distinguished from a previous ease, Gokul Shaha v. Jadu Nandan Roy ILR 17 Cal. 721, in which it was held that a question decided by a Revenue Officer under sec. 166 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was res judicata between the same parties in a subsequent suit in the Civil Court. In the case in ILR 17 Cal. 721 the dispute was, as it is in the cases before us, between a landlord and tenant. It is obvious, therefore, that the case relied upon by the learned Subordinate Judge is no authority in the present cases. On the other hand, the case reported in ILR 17 Cal. 721 is an authority, and we agree with the decision in that case.

Under sec. 107 of the Bengal Tenancy Act the decision of a Revenue Officer under sec. 106 has the force of a decree. Under sec. 108 an appeal lies from such a decision to a Special Judge, and there is a second appeal to this Court from the decision of the Special Judge, as if he were a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Chapter 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It would seem, then, that it was intended that questions under sec. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act should be finally decided and not left open to question in a subsequent regular suit. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that these suits are barred by the rule of res judicata, and we allow the appeals and dismiss the claims in both suits with costs in all the Courts.