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Judgment
Kondaiah
The petitioner, an employee of M/s Kesoram Cement Company Ltd., has occupied a portion of the building bearing No. 1-4-70 situated at Masab Tank, Hyderabad in July or August, 1972, He is paying a sum of Rs. 150/- per month to his employer, the company, who has taken the entire building on a rent of Rs. 300/- per mensem in May 1967 from the owner Seth Radhakrishna Motilal, father of the 3rd respondent herein Previous to the occupation of the portion of the building by the writ petitioner it was occupied by one Chanak, another employee of M/s. Kesoram Cement Co mpany Ltd. On the information that Chanak was in unauthorised occupation of the premises, a notice u/s 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter called the Act) was issued by the 2nd respondent, i.e., Estate Officer, Hyderabad calling upon him to show cause why he should not be evicted from the premises. By the the time the notice was sought to be served, the writ petitioner was in occupation of the premises. Therefore, it was served on him. In reply to the notice, the petitioner, by his letter dated 31-8-1972, represented that the building was in the occupation of his employer, M/s. Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Limited, Calcutta for the last 6 years, that he had been in its occupation from July or August 1972 and that he did not contravene any of the provisions of the Act. The 3rd respondent had replied that the portions in the house were let out by his late father and he was not aware of the provisions of the Act. Not accepting the plea raised by the petitioner, the Estate Officer, Hyderabad has, by his notice dated 18 10-1972, directed the petitioner to vacate the premises voluntarily and peacefully and hand over its possession either to 4th respondent, the allottee, or to him and also informed him that otherwise he would be summarily dispossessed from the said premises at 10-30 A.M on 26-10-1972 by the Special Deputy Tahsildar. The petitioner approached this Court and obtained interim stay of eviction on 25-10-1972 and he is continuing in that premises by virtue of that interim order. Mr. R. Prasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that there was no vacancy of the building either in July or August 1972 as contemplated by section 3 of the Act, that the employer, M/s. Kesoram Cement Company Ltd., who is the lessee, still retains possession of the building, that there is no contractual relationship between the petitioner and the landlord, the 3rd respondent and that he cannot be evicted as long as his employer continues to be the lessee of the entire building and therefore, the impugned notices are without jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed.
This claim of the petitioner''s opposed by Mr. Ramakrishna representing the Principal Government Pleader contending inter alia that the petitioner is in unauthorised occupation of the premises as his employer and the owner have failed to notify the vacancy the moment a premises fell vacant and there is no merit in this writ petition.
Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act requires every landlord to give notice of the vacancy in writing to the authorised officer within ten days after the building becomes vacant. The vacancy may occur either by the landlord ceasing to occupy it, or by the termination of a tenancy, or by the eviction of the tenent or by release from requisition or otherwise. The use of the word ''shal'' leaves no doubt in my mind that the provisions of section 3 (1) (a) are mandatory. The landlord has a statutory duty and obligation to notify the vacancy to the authorised officer. There are no exceptions to this mandatory rule.
It next falls for consideration whether there was any vacancy of the premises in the year 1972 as contended by the respondents Admittedly, the premises with which we are concerned is only a portion of the building which was taken on lease in the year 1967 from the owner by the petitioner''s employer, M/s. Kesoram Cement Company Ltd. The petitioner''s employer is still occupying the remaining portion of the building. The submission of Mr. Prasad that a vacancy can be said to have been caused only when the entire building falls vacant but not where a portion of the building becomes vacant cannot be acceded to. A complete answer to this submission of the counsel would be found in the definition of ''building'' under the Act. Clause (iii) of section 2 of the Act defines ''building'' as "any house or hut on part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for residental or non-residental purposes," The definition is wide enough to take in the entire house or hut or any part thereof. It is enough if it is let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes. Under the definition, a ''building'' takes in the gardens, grounds, garages and out-houses if any, appurtenant to the house, hut or part of the house or hut. Hence, it must be held that the portion of the building which was occupied by the writ petitioner in the year 1972 is a building within the meaning of the Act.
It was next submitted by Mr. Prasad that it is only a landlord that is obliged under the Act to issue notice of the vacancy of any premises, but his employer, namely M/s. Kesoram Cement Company Ltd., being only a lessee, is not a landlord and therefore is not obliged to notify the vacancy as required by section 3 (1) (a) of the Act.
This contention has no legs to stand. ''Landlord'' is defined under clause (vi) of section 2 of the Act thus:
Landlord means the owner of a building and includes a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another person.......
Explanation to clause (vi) of section 2 is as follows :
A tenant who sub-lets a building shall be deemed to be landlord within the meaning of this Act in relation to the sub-tenant.
The petitioner admittedly pays a sum of Rs. 150/- to his employer, the principal lessee of the building in respect of the premises occupied by him, M/s. Kesoram Cement Company Ltd., which is admittedly the tenant or lessee, shall be deemed to be landlord within the meaning of the Act in relation to the sub-tenant. The petitioner, in the circumstances, can be termed to be a sub-tenant of the principal lessee, the company. Hence, the principal lessee, viz., M/s. Kesoram Cement Company Ltd., is a landlord within the meaning of the Act and has a statutory duty and obligation u/s 3 (1) (a) of the Act to five the authorised officer notice of the vacancy of the premises occupied by the petitioner and also another employee previously. As no notice as contemplated by section 3 (1) (a) of the Act has been given by the owner as well as the landlord, the impugned notices to evict the petitioner must be held to be valid and justified.
The further submission of Mr. Prasad that the authorities cannot split up the tenancy originally entered into between Kesoram Cement Company Ltd. and the owner (father of the 3rd respondent) in the year 1967 is also devoid of any merit. There is no question of the tenancy being split up by the concerned authorities in this case. The original lease was in respect of the entire house. The principal lessee who must be deemed to be the landlord within the meaning of clause (vi) of section 2 of the Act, has failed to issue the notice as required by section 3 (1) (a) of the Act, The owner of the house also has a statutory duty to issue such notice. The decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in N.C. Agarwal Vs. Krishan Lal Mehra and Others, on which strong reliance has been placed by the petitioner''s counsel, is not on point. Therein, on a consideration of the provisions of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, it was held that the power of the District Magistrate under sub-section (2) to section 7 of that Act is restricted to issue orders requiring a landlord to let or not to let to any person any particular accommodation which has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant and he has to consider the entire accommodation as one unit just as it had been a unit of tenancy from before. That case is distinguishable on facts, In the present case, we are governed by the definitions of ''building'' and ''Landlord'' as given in the Act and by the provisions of section 3 (1) of the Act. For all the reasons stated, I have no hesitation to hold that there is no merit in this writ petition.
In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100/-. Lastly, Mr. Prasad requests for granting permission to the petitioner to continue in the premises for a period of 3 months in view of the acute accommodation problem. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is permitted to vacate the premises within one month from today, i.e., by 5-11-1974.