Judit Victor Ignace and Another vs Kothandaraman and Another

Jagadeesan, J.—The plaintiff in O.S.No.1017 of 1993 on the file of District Munsif, Pondicherry is the petitioner in C.R.P. No. 1427 of

1996. He has filed the said suit against the respondents herein seeking for a decree for injunction restraining the first respondent from interfering

with the peaceful possession of the suit properties. Pending the suit, he filed an application I.A. No. 4634 of 1993 for the grant of interim injunction

till the disposal of the suit on the ground that he is in possession of the suit property. The claim of the first respondent that he was a cultivating

tenant had been negatived by the decree of the civil court and as such he cannot interfere with the physical possession and enjoyment of the suit

properties by the petitioner. This application was opposed by the respondents contending that the respondent was declared as cultivating tenant by

the revenue authorities and by virtue of the order dated 10.11.93 in E.A. No. 1 of 1993 in PCTPA. No. 5 of 1983 the respondent was put in

possession of the properties. Since the possession has been restored to the respondent by the revenue authorities, the physical possession and

enjoyment of the suit properties is with the respondent herein and as such the petitioner is not entitled for an order of injunction, since the question

to be decided in the injunction suit is only the physical possession of the party.

However, the trial court has allowed the application filed by the petitioner and granted injunction on the ground that the respondent''s claim that

he was a cultivating tenant had been negatived by the civil court and ultimately confirmed by this Court in S.A.No.6 of 1980. Hence the

subsequent proceedings before the revenue authorities initiated by the respondent herein under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act is without

jurisdiction and as such the orders passed thereunder are null and void. As against this order, the first respondent herein has filed an appeal in

C.M.A.No.17 of 1994 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Pondicherry. The lower appellate court set aside the order of the trial court and

allowed the appeal on the ground that in O.S.No.538 of 1976 filed by the respondent herein, the question whether the first respondent was or not

the cultivating tenant was not decided. Since that question was not decided, the orders passed by the revenue authorities under the Pondicherry

Cultivating Tenants Protection Act is valid, since the question as to whether the respondent is a cultivating tenant or not is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the revenue authorities. Further against the order of redelivery, of the revenue authorities, the petitioner herein has not preferred any

revision to challenge the same. Aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, the petitioner has filed this revision.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent has filed the suit O.S.No.538 of 1976 that he is a cultivating tenant, since

the property has been leased out to him by the defendants therein and sought for a decree for injunction restraining the defendant therein from

interfering with the peaceful possession. Though the suit was decreed by the trial court, on appeal, the decree was set aside on the ground that the

respondent is not a cultivating tenant. On further appeal, this court has confirmed the decree of the lower appellate Court in S.A.No.6 of 1980 and

as such the proceedings initiated by the respondent before the revenue authorities seeking the relief that he is a cultivating tenant under the

Pondichcrry Cultivating Tenants Protection Act is without jurisdiction. The observations of the lower appellate court in the order in the C.M.A. that

the question as to whether the respondent was a cultivating tenant or not has not been decided either by the lower appellate court or this court in

the earlier proceeding is not correct. Equally the statement of the lower appellate court that the petitioners have not challenged the order of the

revenue court by filing any revision is also not correct, since the petitioners have filed the revision C.R.P.No.996 of 1994 as early as 27.12.93.

When, in the earlier proceedings, the civil court has held that the respondent is not a cultivating tenant, the same is binding between the parties and

thereafter it is not open to the respondent to go before the revenue court seeking relief under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. Only in case if

the civil court finds that the respondent is a cultivating tenant, then it is open to him to go before the revenue authorities seeking for the appropriate

relief under the said Act. In this case, as the civil court has given a finding to the effect that the respondent is not a cultivating tenant, the subsequent

proceedings initiated by the respondent before the revenue court in null and void.

The counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner has filed the suit for bare injunction and also sought for an interim injunction

pending the suit. It is the duty of the court to find out who is in possession of the suit property as on the date of filing of the suit. The petitioner after

the proceedings of the revenue court has filed the present suit seeking for injunction and the lower appellate court has found that by virtue of the

proceedings before the revenue court, the respondent is in possession and as such the petitioners are not entitled for an order of injunction. ""The

exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court cannot be ousted by the decision in the earlier proceedings. The judgment of the civil court can be a

piece of evidence that can be looked into by the revenue authorities in deciding the claim of the parties. The lower appellate court had accepted the

proceedings before the revenue authorities and found that pursuant to the order in E.P.No.1 of 1993 the respondent is in possession. When

physically the petitioner is not in possession, the application for injunction has to be dismissed, which was done by the lower appellate court.

I carefully considered the contention of both the counsel. There is no dispute that the respondent herein has filed the suit O.S.No.538 of 1976

on the file of the District Munsif, Pondicherry seeking for an order of injunction against the second respondent and others on the ground that he is

in possession of the suit properties as lessee and the defendants therein arc trying to disturb his possession. The defendants therein contended that

the first respondent is not a lessee but he is only a Arachy or the Account Clerk. Though the said suit was decreed by the trial court, on appeal, the

trial court decree was set aside in A.S.No.50 of 1979 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry by judgment and decree dated

2.1.80. The lower appellate court, after elaborately considering the materials available on record, has found that the plaintiff was not a lessee under

the defendant therein and he was only the arachi or the account clerk of the defendant. The finding of the lower appellate court is as follows:

Ex.A3 (series) the tax receipts show that the plaintiff has paid land tax on behalf of the appellants. D.W.I has stated that the plaintiff gave levy of

paddy on behalf of the appellants under Ex.A7. The possession of those exhibits and others filed by the plaintiff may well be explained by the fact

that the plaintiff was the arachi or account clerk of the appellants for about 5 years. The fact that the plaintiff does not know who were the persons

who executed in his favour the alleged oral lease deed; his erroneous declaration to the revenue authorities about the nature of the lease and the

amount of the lease make the thesis of the plaintiff unbelievable.

On the above finding, the lower appellate court has allowed the appeal and set aside the decree of the trial court. The second appeal preferred by

the first respondent herein, in S.A.No.6 of 3980 was also dismissed by this court. Hence the civil court has categorically given a finding that the

first respondent is not a lessee under the second respondent who is the owner of the land. When he is not a lessee, in respect of the agricultural

lands and he was only an Accountant, looking after the lands of the second respondent on her behalf, then he cannot be said to be a cultivating

tenant. If he is not a cultivating tenant it automatically follows that he will not be entitled for the protection under the Pondicherry Cultivating

Tenants Protection Act. When once it has been declared by the civil court that the first respondent is not a lessee, in that case, he will not be

entitled for any benefit under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act and as such he cannot approach for any relief before the revenue authorities. In

fact is has been held by the Full Bench of this court in the case reported in Periathambi Goundan Vs. The District Revenue Officer, Coimbatore

and Others, as follows:

In all matters which may arise incidental to the determination of the matters mentioned in Section 3(2), the Records Officer or the Appellate or

Revisional Authority cannot be said to have exclusive jurisdiction and with reference to those matters, the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be

said to have been barred or ousted u/s 16-Aof the Act

Before coming to this conclusion, the learned Judges have elaborately discussed the provisions of the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act and the

exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue authorities and the maintainability of the suit before the civil court as follows:

The next aspect to be considered is the as certainment of the ambit, amplitude and the extent of the interdict imposed by Section 16-A of the Act

on the exercise of the jurisdiction by a civil court. We have already extracted Section 16A. Two things are clear from the language of the section.

One is, the interdict is on the jurisdiction of the matters which by or under the Act have to be determined by the Records Officer, the District

Collector or other officer or authority empowered by the Act. The section itself does not enumerate as to what those matters are. The second is,

the interdict is not on any particular proceeding in the civil court, but only on the exercise of the jurisdiction in respect of these matters.

Controversies that come before a Court or a tribunal cannot be either pigeon-holed or put in strait-jackets. They may be of different varieties as

well as different standards. For the purpose of deciding the main controversy, the Court or the Tribunal may have incidentally to decide a number

of subsidiary questions or controversies. Therefore, when the section itself does not enumerate the matters in respect of which the jurisdiction of

the civil court is ousted, one will have to ascertain the said matters with reference to the other provisions of the Act conferring power or jurisdiction

on the authorities functioning under the Act Similarly, a suit or proceeding in a civil Court may involve the determination of several matters, some of

which may be within the jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act and some others outside the jurisdiction. In such a case, the suit or

proceeding as such cannot fail unless it is of such a nature that it can be terminated solely on the determination of the matter falling within the

jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act. Since the section itself does not bar the institution of the suit or a proceeding, it is

unnecessary to labour on the second aspect any further.

We shall now proceed to consider the first aspect of the matter. As far as the first aspect it concerned, as we have pointed out already, we have to

ascertain the matters covered by Section 16A with reference to the other provisions of the Act dealing with the matters to be determined by the

authorities functioning under the Act. Two provisions in the Act which are relevant in this behalf are Section 3 (2) and Section 14(1), which we

have extracted already. Section 3 (2) of the Act refers to the particulars which the record, directed to be prepared under sub- section (1) thereof,

should contain, while Section 14 (I) provides for a certified copy of a record being annexed to an application made in pursuance of the provisions

of the enactments enumerated therein. The object of the Act as well as the provisions contained in Section 3 (2) make it clear that a Record

Officer or the Appellate or Revisional Authority has to determine the following matters- 1 the survey number or sub-division number, extent and

local name, if any, of the land let for cultivation by a tenant; (2), the name and address of the landowner; (3) the name and address of the

intermediary, if any; and (4) the name and address of the tenant cultivating the land. It may be prima facie stated that these arc the four matters

which arc required to be determined by the Record Officer or the Appellate or Revisional Authority under the provisions of the Act. However, the

necessity to determine these questions may occur in the context of different controversies and not purely on a specific dispute with respect to these

particulars alone. Even the determination of the particulars enumerated in Section 3 (2) cannot be in isolation in respect of any one particular matter

but can only be in the context of preparing the approved record showing the particulars in respect of the land and who is the tenant and who is the

landowner. For instance, the statutory requirement for the preparation of a record under the Act is that the land must have been let for cultivation

by a tenant. A controversy may arise whether the land has been let for cultivation by a tenant at all. The question to be considered is, whether the

determination of that controversy is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act so as to bar the jurisdiction of the

civil Court u/s 16A. From the language of Section 3 (2) it cannot be stated that the determination of that controversy is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the Act though the determination of that controversy is basic and fundamental to the exercise of the

jurisdiction by the Record Officer and the other authorities under the Act. The very object of the Act is to provide for the preparation and

maintenance of record of tenancy rights in respect of agricultural lands and therefore if there is no tenancy in respect of a land, there is no question

of any further particulars being determined.

From the above stated judgment of the Full Bench, it is clear that the main question to be considered by the revenue authorities is the name and

address of the tenant cultivating the land, apart from other things. The main controversy to be decided is whether the land has been let out for

cultivation to the tenant at all. From the language of Section 3 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, which is almost identical to

the Pondicherry Cultivating Tenants Protection Act it has been held that it is not the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities functioning under the

Act to decide such controversy even though the same is basic and fundamental to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Record Officer. Only on this

finding the Full Bench held that the suit is maintainable before the civil court and if the civil court comes to the conclusion that the land has been

leased out for cultivation to the tenant, then the civil proceedings has to be interdicted and the matter has to be referred to the revenue authorities to

decide the rights of the parties. Only in case if the civil court comes to the conclusion that there is a tenancy agreement between the parties, then

only the civil court is divested of its jurisdiction to proceed further.

As stated earlier, in the earlier suit filed by the first respondent, it has been held that he is not a tenant i.e., not a lessee under the second

respondent. When once it has been found that the first respondent is not a lessee or a tenant in respect of the agricultural land, then no question of

interdiction of the civil proceedings comes in. Hence the civil court decides the rights of the parties and dispose of the matter on merits and the

findings rendered by the civil court become final between the parties to the proceedings. When the findings of the civil court rendered in the earlier

proceeding between the parties becomes final, then it may not be open to either of the parties to reopen the matter in respect of their rights before

any other forum. Hence PCTPA.No.5 of 1983 filed by the first respondent herein on the file of the first respondent before the Revenue Court,

Pondicherry is not maintainable under law.

In case if in the earlier proceedings a finding has been given by the civil court that the first respondent is a lessee then only to seek the relief as

provided under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, the application filed by the first respondent before the Revenue Court would be

maintainable. When the finding is otherwise, it is not open to the first respondent to re-agitate his right of tenancy before the revenue authorities.

The finding rendered by the civil court becomes conclusive between the parties and the proceedings before the revenue court is barred by res

judicata.

The petitioner has filed C.R.P.No.996 of 1994 challenging the proceedings of the revenue authorities wherein the revenue court has held that the

respondent is a cultivating tenant on the basis of the judgment of the trial court in O.S.No.538 of 1976. The revenue court has totally failed to take

into consideration the judgment of the lower appellate court in A.S.No.50 of 1979 wherein the decree of the trial court was set aside. The said

judgment of the lower appellate court was also confirmed by this court. In view of the civil court decree finding that the first respondent is not a

lessee under the second respondent, the entire proceeding initiated by the first respondent herein before the revenue authorities is without

jurisdiction. When once the proceedings are held without jurisdiction, the orders passed thereunder become null and void and are not in existence

in the eye of law. In that case, the order of the revenue authorities has no relevance to decide the issue in the suit. In view of the above findings, the

judgment in C.M.A.No.17 of 1994 on the file of the District Court, Pondicherry as well as the order in PCTPA.No,5 of 1983 on the file of the

Revenue Court, Pondicherry are liable to be set aside.

Consequently both the civil revision petitions are allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.