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Judgment
By way of instant application filed under Section 482 of Cr.PC, permission has been sought to place on record order dated 5.1.2015, passed
by the learned Presiding Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board and for deletion of name of petitioner No.4 namely Pappi.
Averments contained in the application suggest that applicants/petitioners approached this Court by way of instant petition i.e. Cr.MMO No. 3
of 2018, for quashing of FIR No. 110 of 2014, registered against the applicants/petitioners at the behest of respondent No.2. However, at the
time of drafting/filing of the petition, applicants/petitioners inadvertently, failed to mention factum with regard to the acquittal of the
applicant/petitioner No.4 i.e. Pappi, son of Jumaldeen by the learned Presiding Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, at Dharamshala, and as such,
this Court while considering prayer having been made by the applicants/petitioners in the main petition, whereby they sought quashing of FIR,
directed them to place on record the order, if any, passed by the Juvenile Justice Board, acquitting the applicant/petitioner No.4.
Perusal of order dated 12.1.2018, passed by this Court further suggests that statements of parties i.e. respondent No.2-complainant and
accused-petitioner Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 have already been recorded. Accordingly, this Court after having perused averments contained in the
application, which is duly supported by an affidavit and order dated 5.1.2015, passed by the Juvenile Justice Board in case No. 48-I/14, wherein
applicant/petitioner No.4, namely Pappi, has been released by the Juvenile justice Board, on executing bond under Section 15 (e) of the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, by his guardian for a period of two years for good behavior and well being of the juvenile,
undertaking therein that he will be responsible for his good behavior, sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made in the application at hand.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the present application, same is allowed and name of applicant/petitioner No.4 namely Pappi, is ordered
to be deleted from the array of parties. Registry to carry out necessary correction in the memo of parties with red ink. Application stands disposed
of.
Cr.MMO No. 3 of 2018
By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.PC., prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners-accused for quashing of FIR
No. 110/14 dated 8.6.2014, under Sections 451, 323, 341, 382, 147, 149, 504 and 506 of IPC registered at PS Indora, District Kangra, H.P.
and all consequential proceedings arising out the aforesaid FIR.
Learned counsel representing parties while inviting attention of this Court to the compromise arrived inter-se parties (Annexure P-3) contended
that since parties have resolved their dispute amicably inter-se them and as such, aforesaid FIR as well as consequential proceedings arising out of
the same, can be ordered to be quashed and set-aside.
Averments contained in the compromise (Annexure P-3) though suggest that with the intervention of elders of their families, parties have
resolved to settle their dispute amicably and accordingly, entered into a compromise, however, this Court solely with a view to ascertain the
correctness and genuineness of the aforesaid compromise also recorded the statements of the complainant (respondent before this court) as well as
petitioner-accused, wherein both the parties (complainant and accused) categorically stated on oath before this Court that with a view to maintain
cordial relation with each other, they have resolved to live in peace and harmony and accordingly, they have compromised the dispute and as such,
now complainant is no more interested to prosecute the criminal case against the applicants/ petitioners. Complainant further stated before this
Court that he is making this statement of his own free will and volition without there being any external pressure and shall have no objection in case,
FIR as referred herein above, registered against the applicants/petitioners and consequential proceedings arising out of the same, are ordered to be
quashed and set-aside by this Court. Their statement is already on record.
The Hon''ble Apex Court in case titled Narinder Singh and others versus State of Punjab and another (2014)6 SCC 466, has formulated
guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
proceedings. Perusal of judgment referred above clearly depicts that in para 29.1, Hon''ble Apex Court has returned the findings that power
conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under section
320 of the Code. No doubt, under section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised
sparingly and with great caution. Para Nos. 29 to 29.7 of the judgment are reproduced as under:-
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided
in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while
accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal
proceedings:
29.1Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the
criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the
guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High Court is to form an
opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for
offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the
offender.
29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally
treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient
evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High
Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons
used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima
facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later
case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between
the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role.
Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of
the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the
charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in
exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand,
where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court
would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC
is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in
acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and
conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such `a
crime"".
The Hon''ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303, has held that power of the High Court in
quashing of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal
Court for compounding offences under Section 320 Cr.PC. Even in the judgment passed in Narinder Singh''s case, the Hon''ble Apex Court has
held that while exercising inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC the Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its
social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to exercise the power for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity,
murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the Hon''ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through Administrator,
UT, Chandigarh and Ors. (2013) 11 SCC 497 has also held as under:-
In certain decisions of this Court in view of the settlement arrived at by the parties, this Court quashed the FIRs though some of
the offences were non-compoundable. A two Judges'' Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions. Learned
Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had permitted compounding of noncompoundable offences. The said issue was,
therefore, referred to a larger bench.
The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 considered the relevant provisions of the Code and the
judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61)
The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the
power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of
wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power
viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash
the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though
the victim or victim''s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or
personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash
criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and
compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the
interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount
to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to
secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s)
is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."" (emphasis supplied)
In the light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of criminal
proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences showing extreme
depravity nor are they against the society. They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would bring about peace and
amity between the two sides. In the circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26.10.2006 registered under Section 147, 148,
149, 323, 307, 452 and 506 of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings arising there from
including the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges framed by the trial Court are hereby quashed.
Recently, the Hon''ble Apex Court in its latest judgment dated 4th October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016,
reiterated the principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh''s case supra for accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would
be profitable to reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein:
The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of two
learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed
proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by
the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr. Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved
allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled
with the bank would not justify a recourse to thepower under Section 482:
...In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been
defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with
which we are concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye of personal profit
regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has
settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are
not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved.
In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R Vasanthi Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376, the court rejected the submission that
the first respondent was a woman ""who was following the command of her husband"" and had signed certain documents without being
aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that:
... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The
submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and
it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure
relating to exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A
person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or
acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is
gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score...
...A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create
a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the
principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system...
The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject may be summarized in the following propositions:
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is noncompoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family
of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact
upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest
in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the
dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause
oppression and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the
financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
Accordingly, in view of the submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the parties, that the matter has been compromised and
keeping in mind the well settled proposition of law as well as the compromise being genuine, this Court has no inhibition in accepting the
compromise and quashing the FIR as well as proceedings pending in the trial Court.
Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court and this Court,
present petition is allowed and FIR No. 110/14 dated 8.6.2014, under Sections 451, 323, 341, 382, 147, 149, 504 and 506 of IPC registered at
PS Indora, District Kangra, H.P. and all consequential proceedings arising out the aforesaid FIR, are quashed and set- aside. Pending
application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.