K Ashok Kumar Reddy & Ors Bathala Gangamma & Ors

V. Sujatha, J

1) This civil revision petition is filed by the petitioners/defendants under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 24.10.2024 passed in I.A.No.59 of 2022 in O.S.No.426 of 2020 by the III Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kadapa, whereby, the Trial Court dismissed the said interlocutory application filed Under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of Code of Civil Procedure (for short “C.P.C.”) to reject the plaint as it is barred by law.

2) For the sake of convenience, the parties to the revision will hereinafter be referred as petitioners and respondents, as arrayed before the Trial Court in I.A.No.59 of 2022.

3) The brief facts of the case are that respondent No.1 – plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.No.426 of 2020 on the file of the Court of III Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa as against the petitioners and respondent Nos.2 and 3 for the relief of (a) cancellation of a registered sale deed dated 08.12.2010 vide document No.4865/2010, (b) permanent injunction restraining the defendants (petitioners) from interfering with the peaceful possession of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff alleged that she was the original owner of the suit schedule property, having purchased the same on 07.08.1995. The sale deed dated 08.12.2010 executed in favour of the petitioners/defendants is invalid and was based on incomplete or inadequate payment of sale consideration. Respondent No.1 – Plaintiff claimed that despite repeated requests and demands for the payment of alleged balance sale consideration, the petitioners/ defendants did not fulfil their obligations. As the plaintiff filed the said suit for the relief of cancellation of registered sale deed dated 08.12.2010 and the same is barred by limitation, the petitioners/defendant Nos.1 to 3 filed I.A.No.59 of 2022 under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of C.P.C. to reject the plaint filed by the plaintiff. The said application was dismissed by the trial Court vide orders dated 24.10.2024. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners-defendant Nos.1 to 3 preferred the present revision.

4) During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners – defendant Nos.1 to 3 contended that the trial Court grossly erred in refusing to reject the plaint without proper appreciation of material available on record that the plaintiff is having knowledge about the sale deed dated 08.12.2010, and that the limitation ended in 2013. The trial Court failed to observe that the suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation as per Article 58 and Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since suit is filed on 06.08.2020, the same was barred by limitation. Further, the trial Court failed to consider that a registered sale deed carries a presumption of valid execution and payment of consideration under Section 91 and Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As such, learned counsel for the petitioners – defendant Nos.1 to 3 requested this Court to allow the revision and reject the plaint.

5) Learned counsel for respondent No.1 – plaintiff has contended that the suit was filed basing on the sale agreement dated 08.12.2010 and the she undertakes that she has received the total sale consideration from the petitioners – defendants on the date of agreement, and the suit was filed on 06.08.2020 in pursuance of a legal notice issued by the plaintiff to the defendant on 24.08.2019, and the same was returned by the defendants and the limitation would start from the date on which the plaintiff received notice of refusal on the part of the defendants to perform the contract to determine the period and supported the order of the trial Court in all respects, and requested to dismiss the revision.

6) The petitioners/defendant Nos.1 to 3 filed petition under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of C.P.C. to reject the plaint as it is barred by law.

7) Order VII Rule 11 (d) of C.P.C. deals with „rejection of plaint”, which is as follows:

“27. Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC reads as follows :

Rejection of plaint.-- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:--

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate];

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9.”

8) Admittedly, in the present case, the plaintiff filed suit in the year 2020 seeking cancellation of sale deed dated 08.12.2010, on the ground that the defendants have not paid entire sale consideration. In the plaint, the plaintiff admitted about the registration of sale deed. If the contention of the plaintiff that she has not received the entire sale consideration is true, it would mean that she got knowledge about non-payment of entire sale consideration in the year 2010 itself, therefore, the limitation for filing the suit starts from the year 2010 and ends in the year 2013 as per Article 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act.

9) As per Article 58 of Schedule I of Limitation Act, the suit has to be filed within 3 years, which ended in 2013. Therefore, the suit filed on 06.08.2020 is clearly barred by limitation.

10) Even as per Article 59 of Schedule I of Limitation Act, the suit for cancellation of instrument has to be filed within 3 years from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him/her.

11) If the plaintiff wants to get the sale deed dated 08.12.2010 cancelled, she ought to have filed the suit seeking the said relief within three years from the date of the sale deed, but in the present case, admittedly the plaintiff filed the suit in the year 2020. Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff is hopelessly barred by limitation, and the plaint has to be rejected.

12) In “Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust and Ors. Vs. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and Ors. 2025 (2) ALD 246 (SC)” relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners/defendant Nos.1 to 3, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue as to rejection of plaint on the ground of limitation held as follows:

“At this juncture, we wish to observe that we are not unmindful of the position of law that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and the question of rejecting the plaint on that score has to be decided after weighing the evidence on record. However, in cases like this, where it is glaring from the plaint averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, the Courts should not be hesitant in granting the relief and drive the parties back to the trial Court. We again place it on record that this is not a case where any forgery or fabrication is committed which had recently come to the knowledge of the Plaintiff. Rather, the Plaintiff and his predecessors did not take any steps to assert their title and rights in time. The alleged cause of action is also found to be creation of fiction. However, the trial Court erroneously dismissed the application filed by the Appellants Under Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court also erred in affirming the same, keeping the question of limitation open to be considered by the trial Court after considering the evidence along with other issues, without deciding the core issue on the basis of the averments made by the Respondent No. 1 in the Plaint as mandated by Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure. The spirit and intention of Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure is only for the Courts to nip at its bud when any litigation ex facie appears to be a clear abuse of process. The Courts by being reluctant only cause more harm to the Defendants by forcing them to undergo the ordeal of leading evidence. Therefore, we hold that the plaint is liable to be rejected at the threshold.

13) In view of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the plaint must be rejected at threshold without proceeding to trial when it is evident from plaint that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, even though the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. Allowing such suits to proceed would be an abuse of judicial process and would unnecessarily burden the defendants. In the present case, the plaintiff has knowledge about the sale deed dated 08.12.2010 on the date of its registration, but she has filed the suit in the year 2020. However, legal notice was issued on 24.08.2019, but the date on which legal notice was issued cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating limitation in the present case. As discussed above, as per Article 58 of Schedule I of Limitation Act, the suit has to be filed within 3 years, which ended in 2013. Therefore, the plaint filed by the plaintiff in the year 2020 is clearly barred by limitation.

14) Further, plaintiff admitted in the plaint that she has sold the property in favour of defendant Nos.1 to 3 on 08.12.2010 by executing a registered sale deed vide document No.4865/2010 and delivered physical possession of the property. Generally, registered sale deed carries a presumption of valid execution and payment of consideration under Section 91 and Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act is as follows:

“91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions of property reduced to form of document. –– When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.

Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement. –– When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:

Proviso (1). –– Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, 1 [want or failure] of consideration, or mistake in fact or law.

Proviso (2). ––The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document.

Proviso (3). ––The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved.

Proviso (4). ––The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents.

Proviso (5). –– Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved: Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract.

Proviso (6). –– Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts.”

15) In the plaint, the plaintiff admitted that she has executed a regular sale deed on 08.12.2010. Registered sale deed carries a presumption of valid execution and payment of consideration under Section 91 and Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As the plaintiff executed sale deed on 08.12.2010 vide document No.4865 of 2010, she cannot now contend that she has not received entire sale consideration.

16) Article 227 deals with power of superintendence by the High Court over all Subordinate Court and Tribunals. The power of superintendence conferred upon the High Court by Article 227 is not confined to administrative superintendence only, but includes the power of judicial revision also even where no appeal or revision lies to the High Court under the ordinary law, rather power under this Article is wider than that of Article 226 in the sense that it is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction and such power can also be exercised suo motu.

17) It is a well settled principle that the High Court can exercise supervisory power over the subordinate Courts under Article 227 of Constitution of India, as held by the Apex Court in “State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) Vs. Navjot Sandhu@ Afsan Guru.

18) As per the law laid down by the Apex Court, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is to be exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.

19) In view of my foregoing discussion, I find that the order of the trial Court is erroneous as it has failed to exercise discretion properly and such finding is liable to be set aside by exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

20) In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed setting aside the order dated 24.10.2024 in I.A.No.59 of 2022 in O.S.No.426 of 2020 on the file of the III Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kadapa and the matter is remanded to the trial Court for disposal of the said I.A.No.59 of 2022 afresh in view of the observations made supra. No costs.

21) Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.