K. Badri Narayan Patro & Another vs Tapamoy Bhattacharjee, Asst. Director Enforcement Directorate, Govt. Of India, Bhubaneswar

Chittaranjan Dash, J

The legality, propriety, and correctness of the order dated 02.09.2023 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, C.B.I.-I, Bhubaneswar in Crl. Misc. (PMLA) Case No.06 of 2015, has been called in question in this revision. The Petitioners herein are Sri K. Badri Narayan Patro and Smt. Puspanjali Patro.

The background facts of the case, in brief, are that the Inspector of Police, Vigilance, lodged a written report alleging that the Petitioner, namely Sri K. Badri Narayan Patro, Ex-Executive Engineer, R.W. Division, No.1, Ganjam, Berhampur, while serving as a public servant in different capacity during the check period from 01.01.2000 to 29.05.2009 and finally posted as Executive Engineer, had accumulated assets to the tune of Rs.1,09,81,686/-. Pursuant thereto, an investigation was initiated and searches were conducted at his residential house located at Akarapuri Colony, Old Town, Bhubaneswar, his office, official quarters at Berhampur, and other places on the strength of search warrant issued by the learned Special C.J.M.-cum-Vigilance, Bhubaneswar in Misc. Case No. 08 of 2009. During the course of the search, assets worth Rs.97,14,683/- were found to be disproportionate to the known sources of income of the Petitioner. Accordingly, a prima facie case of misconduct was found against the petitioner involving commission of an offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and a charge-sheet was submitted on 19.09.2012. Subsequently, a separate and independent inquiry was conducted under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and a complaint was filed under Section 5(1) of the said Act. The Petitioners, thereafter, filed an application before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, C.B.I.-I, Bhubaneswar under Section 227 Cr.P.C., praying for their discharge from the case. However, the learned court having heard the parties, declined to grant the relief sought and rejected the prayer for discharge in respect of the offences alleged against them vide the impugned order.

Mr. U. C. Patnaik, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioners, submitted that the Petitioners have been falsely implicated in the alleged offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). It was contended that there is no material to demonstrate the existence of “proceeds of crime” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(u) of the Act, nor any act of concealment, possession, acquisition, or use thereof so as to attract the provisions of the PMLA. In absence of such foundational facts, the continuation of the proceeding is stated to be unsustainable. It was further argued that no grave suspicion arises from the materials on record so as to justify framing of charge and that the learned court below erred in rejecting the application for discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel contended that the 2009 amendment to the PMLA, brought into force with effect from 01.06.2009, operates prospectively and cannot be applied to transactions pertaining to the earlier check period. The finding of the learned court that the provisions of the PMLA would apply retrospectively is assailed as erroneous both in law and on facts.

Learned counsel next submitted that compliance with Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. is mandatory before taking cognizance of offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of official duties. According to him, sanction by the competent authority, including the Central Government while initiating proceedings under the PMLA, is a sine qua non, and absence thereof vitiates the proceeding.

On facts, it was contended that the prosecution case rests primarily on documents reflecting income and bank interest accrued from legitimate sources such as agriculture, house rent, and other lawful heads. It was urged that mere attachment or recovery of property in connection with a scheduled offence does not ipso facto render it “proceeds of crime” unless it is shown to have been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to the said offence. In the present case, the Enforcement Directorate is stated to have acted solely on the Vigilance inquiry report and proceeded to seize certain bank accounts and take possession of a residential house at Bhubaneswar, though the transactions were lawful and, in some instances, subsequent to the check period.

It was further submitted that Petitioner No.1, during his entire service career, neither misused his official position nor violated any governmental guideline and had obtained due permission from the competent authority before acquiring properties in his name. Petitioner No.2 has been implicated merely by virtue of her marital relationship with Petitioner No.1, without any independent material against her. Learned counsel also pointed out that Petitioner No.1 derives income from ancestral landed property inherited from his father, Late K. Dolagobinda Patro, who owned approximately 121 acres of land prior to 1960, besides income from house rent and other business activities, and that the Petitioners have been regular income-tax assessees since 1985. On these premises, discharge was sought.

Mr. G. Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, on the other hand, opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioners and supported the impugned order. He took this Court through various decisions, including the order passed by this Court in CRLREV No.119 of 2023 (Trilochan Mishra & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr.), as well as the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2022) 12 SCC 1 besides several other judgments rendered by different High Courts, including a decision of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu i.e. Niket Kansal vs. Union of India through Enforcement Directorate, Jammu, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 475.

Learned Senior Counsel contended that the learned trial court was fully justified in rejecting the prayer for discharge, as the materials on record disclose a prima facie case attracting the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. According to him, the grounds urged by the Petitioners do not fall within the limited scope of consideration at the stage of discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. Dealing specifically with the plea of non-compliance of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C., learned Senior Counsel submitted that the issue is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Directorate of Enforcement vs. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, Etc. reported in (2025) 97 OCR (SC) 189, wherein it has been held that there is no embargo on considering the plea of absence of sanction even after cognizance is taken by the Special Court for offences punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA. It was argued that the Apex Court has clarified that the question of sanction need not necessarily precede cognizance in such cases and can be considered at the appropriate stage.

It was further submitted that where cognizance of the scheduled offence has been taken by a court other than the Special Court, the procedure contemplated under the PMLA permits the authorised authority to file a complaint and seek committal of the case relating to the scheduled offence to the Special Court, which shall thereafter proceed from the stage at which the matter is committed. Thus, according to learned Senior Counsel, the statutory scheme under the PMLA adequately addresses the procedural aspects raised by the Petitioners. In sum and substance, Mr. Agarwal contended that the grounds urged by the Petitioners neither disclose any legal infirmity in the impugned order nor demonstrate absence of prima facie material. The revision petition, therefore, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon perusal of the materials available on record, the point that arise for determination in this Revision is whether the impugned order rejecting the application preferred by the petitioners for their discharge from the offence alleged is legally sustainable.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Directorate of Enforcement vs. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, Etc. reported in (2025) 97 OCR (SC) 189, authoritatively examined the scope and object of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C. and held as follows:

“6. The object of Section 197(1) must be considered here. The object is to protect the public servants from prosecutions. It ensures that the public servants are not prosecuted for anything they do in the discharge of their duties. This provision is for the protection of honest and sincere officers. However, the protection is not unqualified. They can be prosecuted with a previous sanction from the appropriate government.

The expression “to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” has been judicially interpreted. A bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 202, in paragraph no 9, observed thus:

“9………….This protection has certain limits and available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with This protection has certain limits and is available only the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case.”

In the decision of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal and Another (supra), in paragraph 38, this Court held thus:

“38. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and, on the allegations, contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage.”

In the present case, after completing the investigation, the appellant has filed exhaustive complaints under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA. Cognizance has been taken based on the complaints. Therefore, the issue of the absence of sanction will arise at this stage.”

Upon a cumulative reading of the above, it becomes abundantly clear that protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is neither automatic nor absolute. The decisive test is the “quality of the act” and its reasonable nexus with official duty. The Supreme Court has categorically clarified that the requirement of sanction is not to be mechanically invoked at the threshold, nor does its absence necessarily render proceedings void ab initio. The question may arise at any stage and is often dependent upon evidence.

The Hon’ble Apex Court, further, in the matter of Ramsagar vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in 2025 Supreme (Online) (SC) 11814 observed as herein below

“We are of the view that the issue of sanction under Section 197 CrPC can be taken up before the Trial Court at any stage of the proceedings. It would all depend on the nature of the evidence that the prosecution may lead in the course of the trial.”

The ratio emerging from the aforesaid pronouncements is that the plea of absence of sanction is frequently a mixed question of law and fact. Whether the alleged act bears a reasonable nexus to official duty can only be determined upon appreciation of evidence. Thus, at the stage of discharge, such plea cannot ordinarily be treated as a jurisdictional bar unless the absence of nexus is demonstrably clear on the face of record. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, the contention of the Petitioners regarding non-compliance of Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not, at this stage, demolish the prosecution case. The issue, if pressed, can very well be examined during trial in light of the evidence that may emerge.

As far as the contentions of the Petitioners with regard to the applicability of the PMLA prospectively, the decision in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & others vs. Union of India (supra) has been profitably extracted in the matter of Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma vs. Directorate of Enforcement & another, reported in 2025 INSC 349 SLP (CRL) NO.6185 Of 2023, wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:-

“21. A significant ground raised by the appellant pertains to the nature of the alleged offence under the PMLA. The appellant has contended that the alleged acts do not constitute an offence under the PMLA as the same was not in force during the relevant period, or the predicate offences as alleged were not included in the schedule to the PMLA at the relevant time and, therefore, cannot be subject to proceedings under the PMLA. It has also been argued that these instances continuing offences. This contention, however, is untenable. It is well established that offences under the PMLA are of a continuing nature, and the act of money laundering does not conclude with a single instance but extends so long as the proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. The legislative intent behind the PMLA is to combat the menace of money laundering, which by its very nature involves transactions spanning over time.

The concept of a continuing offence under PMLA has been well-settled by judicial precedents. An offence is deemed continuing when the illicit act or its consequences persist over time, thereby extending the liability of the offender. Section 3 of the PMLA defines the offence of money laundering to include direct or indirect attempts to indulge in, knowingly assist, or knowingly be a party to, or actually be involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Such involvement, if prolonged. constitutes a continuing offence.

Even though the issue of retrospective application of the PMLA is pending adjudication before this Court, the reliance by the respondent on the observation of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Chaudhary (Supra) cannot be said to be misplaced. This Court, in its judgment in this case made the following observations regarding the offence of money laundering and its nature as a continuing offence:

“134. From the bare language of Section 3 of the 2002 Act, it is amply clear that the offence of money laundering is independent offence regarding the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime which had been derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to or in relation to a scheduled offence. The process or activity can be in any form be it one of concealment, possession, acquisition, use of proceeds of crime as much as projecting it as untainted property or claiming it to be so. Thus, involvement in any one of such process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime would constitute offence of money laundering. This offence otherwise has nothing to do with the offence criminal activity relating to a scheduled except the proceeds of crime derived or obtained as a result of that crime.

Needless to mention that such process or activity can be indulged in only after the property is derived or obtained result of criminal activity (a scheduled offence). It would be an offence of money laundering to indulge in or to assist or being party to the process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime; and such process or activity in a given fact situation may be continuing offence, irrespective of the date and time of commission of the scheduled offence. In other words, the criminal activity may have been committed before the same had been notified as scheduled offence for the purpose of the 2002 Act, but if a person has indulged in or continues to indulge directly or indirectly in dealing with proceeds of crime, derived or obtained from such criminal activity even after it has been notified as scheduled offence, may be liable to be prosecuted for offence of money laundering under the 2002 Act - for continuing to possess or conceal the proceeds of crime (fully or in part) or retaining possession thereof or uses it in trenches until fully exhausted. The offence of money laundering is not dependent on or linked to the date on may say so, the predicate offence has which the scheduled offence, or if we been committed. The relevant date is the date on which the person indulges in the process or activity connected with such proceeds of crime. These ingredients are intrinsic in the original provision (Section 3, as amended until 2013 and were in force till 31-7-2019); and the same has been merely explained and clarified by way of Explanation vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. Thus understood, inclusion of clause (ii) in the Explanation inserted in 2019 is of no consequence as it does not alter or enlarge the scope of Section 3 at all.”

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“30.The PMLA was enacted with the primary objective of preventing money laundering and confiscating the proceeds of crime, thereby ensuring that such illicit funds do not undermine the financial system. Money laundering has far-reaching consequences, not only in terms of individual acts of corruption but also in causing significant loss to the public exchequer. The laundering of proceeds of crime results in a significant loss to the economy, disrupts lawful financial transactions, and erodes public trust in the system. The alleged offences in the present case have a direct bearing on the economy, as illicit financial transactions deprive the state of legitimate revenue, distort market integrity, and contribute to economic instability. Such acts, when committed by persons in positions of power, erode public confidence in governance and lead to systemic vulnerabilities within financial institutions.

31.The illegal diversion and layering of funds have a cascading effect, leading to revenue losses for the state and depriving legitimate sectors of investment and financial resources. It is settled law that in cases involving serious economic offences, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution, and proceedings should not be quashed in the absence of compelling legal grounds. The respondent has rightly argued that in cases involving allegations of such magnitude, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and to ensure accountability.

The PMLA was enacted to combat the menace of money laundering and to curb the use of proceeds of crime in the formal economy. Given the evolving complexity of financial crimes, courts must adopt a strict approach in matters concerning economic offences to ensure that perpetrators do not exploit procedural loopholes to evade justice.

The present case involves grave and serious allegations of financial misconduct, misuse of position, and involvement in transactions constituting money laundering. The appellant seeks an end to the proceedings at a preliminary stage, effectively preventing the full adjudication of facts and evidence before the competent forum. However, as established in multiple judicial pronouncements, cases involving economic offences necessitate a thorough trial to unearth the complete chain of events, financial transactions, and culpability of the accused.

The material submitted by the respondent, coupled with the broad legislative framework of the PMLA, indicates the necessity of allowing the trial to proceed and not discharging the appellant at the nascent stage of charge framing. The argument that the proceedings are unwarranted is devoid of substance in light of the statutory objectives, the continuing nature of the offence, and the significant financial implications arising from the alleged acts. Discharging the appellant at this stage would be premature and contrary to the principles governing the prosecution in money laundering cases.

Given the severe and grave nature of the allegations against the appellant, it is imperative that he must undergo thorough judicial scrutiny during trial. A proper trial is necessary to unearth the full extent of the offence, to evaluate the evidence produced by the appellant, to analyze the complete chain of final transactions, and find out the veracity of the severe allegations and the amount of proceeds of crime. The legal framework under the PMLA serves as a crucial mechanism to ensure that individuals involved in laundering proceeds of crime are brought to justice and that economic offences do not go unpunished.

In light of the above discussion, it is evident that the appellant has failed to establish any legally sustainable ground warranting interference by this Court at a pre-trial stage. The submissions made in support of the appeal are neither legally untenable nor in the best interest of justice. The offence alleged against the appellant is clearly a continuing offence under the PMLA, and the quantum of proceeds of crime involved far exceeds the statutory threshold and requires proper investigation and judicial scrutiny. The findings of the Courts below are well-reasoned and do not call for interference.”

The emphasis of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is clear and unequivocal: the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is independent and distinct from the scheduled offence, and the determinative date is not the commission of the predicate offence but the point at which a person indulges in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime; whether by concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection as untainted property. Being a continuing offence, liability persists so long as such proceeds are dealt with, even if the scheduled offence predates its notification. Consequently, the plea of retrospective application loses significance where the alleged laundering activity continues beyond the notified date.

The Court has further underscored the grave nature of economic offences, observing that such crimes undermine public confidence and disrupt financial integrity, and therefore discharge at a nascent stage should not be granted lightly in cases involving complex financial transactions. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the Petitioners’ contention that the PMLA is inapplicable on temporal grounds cannot be accepted at the stage of discharge.In view of the above, the matter having been dealt with in a lucid manner as above, this Court finds that further reference to the decision in the matter of Niket Kansal vs. Union of India through Enforcement Directorate, Jammu, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 475 would only be an academical one.

Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law while dealing with a matter on the question of discharge, this Court subscribed its view delving into the matter in Trilochan Mishra (supra) and discussed the law vividly as regards the “proceeds of crime”. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as below:

“The definition of proceeds of crime is intentionally wide, encompassing not only the original tainted property but also its transformed form and equivalent value. The legislative intent is to ensure that illicit wealth, irrespective of its current form or possessor, does not escape the reach of law. The existence of proceeds of crime is therefore a foundational jurisdictional fact for initiating proceedings under the PMLA. The Enforcement Directorate may trace such proceeds through information derived from a police report, a charge sheet, or even an FIR registered for the scheduled offence. Once such information suggests that property has been generated or obtained from a scheduled offence, the ED is empowered to record an Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR), which serves as an internal document analogous to a preliminary record of investigation. While the ECIR may have its genesis in the FIR of the predicate offence, the two are distinct in scope and purpose the FIR records the crime; the ECIR traces its financial consequence.

It is well recognised that the proceeds of crime may not always manifest as direct monetary gains. They may assume the form of immovable properties, valuable securities, or other assets derived from or linked to criminal activity. The identification of such proceeds is essentially a matter of evidence and investigation, to be assessed on a case-to-case basis. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the definition being inclusive, it covers both the tangible and intangible gains of the underlying criminal activity, and the “value of such property” where the actual property is no longer available.

The determination of what constitutes proceeds of crime cannot be made in isolation or at the threshold unless the materials on record clearly demonstrate the absence of any link between the property and the scheduled offence. Where transactions involve large-scale transfers of assets or funds, the presumption under the statute operates in favour of the existence of proceeds of crime until rebutted by the accused through cogent explanation.”

The definition under Section 2(1)(u) is intentionally expansive. It includes not only direct tainted property but also transformed forms and equivalent value. The legislative design is to prevent laundering through layering, conversion, and camouflage.

The existence of “proceeds of crime” is indeed a jurisdictional fact. However, its determination is evidentiary in character. Unless the materials on record clearly exclude any possible nexus between the property and the scheduled offence, the matter must proceed to trial. The presumption under the statute operates in favour of the prosecution at the threshold stage, subject to rebuttal by the accused during trial. Therefore, detailed evaluation of whether the properties are legitimately acquired or ancestral cannot be conclusively undertaken at the stage of Section 227 Cr.P.C.

Coming to the issue in question for determination herein as to whether the learned court below is correct in declining the prayer for discharge at the outset it may be stated that he Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605, observed in para 25 as under:

“25. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. (See: Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi & Ors. Vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja & Ors, (1990) 4 SCC 76).” . Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has further relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan. Vs. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, Criminal appeal No.407 of 2021, para 9.1, 9.2 and 13. He has submitted that probative value of evidence cannot be waived by the Court and once, the material has been collected, it should be presumed that the offence has been committed and the Court cannot become trial Court while exercising the power under Section 227 CrPC. Paragraph 9.1, 9.2 and 11 of the said judgment are quoted below:-

“9.1 In the case of P. Vijayan (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. and held that Melvin Saldanha & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. 63 required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 Cr.P.C., if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

9.2 In the recent decision of this Court in the case of M.R. Hiremath (supra), one of us (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in paragraph 25 as under:

“The High Court ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. Vs. N. Suresh Rajan [ State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)”

... At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.” “

Having considered the reasoning given by the High Court and the grounds which are weighed with the High Court while discharging the accused, we are of the opinion that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction and has acted beyond the scope of Section 227/239 Cr.P.C. While discharging the accused, the High Court has gone into the merits of the case and has considered whether on the basis of the material on record, the accused is likely to be convicted or not. For the aforesaid, the High Court has considered in detail the transcript of the conversation.

The consistent judicial thread running through these authorities is that at the stage of discharge the Court must assume the prosecution material to be true. It must examine whether a prima facie case exists and cannot conduct a mini-trial. It cannot weigh evidence for conviction, and it cannot undertake detailed probative evaluation. The test is of “grave suspicion,” not proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the charge-sheet reflects material alleging disproportionate assets and their alleged projection/possession within the meaning of Section 3 of the PMLA. Whether such material ultimately results in conviction is a matter for trial. At this stage, it suffices that the materials disclose ingredients of the alleged offence.

In the above circumstances, there being material on record to constitute the offence alleged against the Petitioners, as reflected in the Charge Sheet, there is no necessity to further assess whether such material would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. The materials on record are sufficient to bring the matter to trial for adjudication as to whether the Petitioners have amassed property disproportionate to their known sources of income and whether the allegations and materials produced constitute proceeds of crime within the meaning and scope of the PMLA. These are matters to be determined during trial.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, C.B.I.-I, Bhubaneswar in Crl. Misc. (PMLA) Case No.06 of 2015 order dated 02.09.2023 did not travel beyond the scope of the provision enumerated under Section 227 Cr.P.C., and the materials before it being sufficient to frame charge, rightly declined to entertain the prayer of the Petitioners. This Court finds no illegality or impropriety in the impugned order warranting interference.

As a result, the present CRLREV, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.