K. Balakrishnan vs Mohammed Basheer and Others

P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.—This is a petition for condoning the delay of 918 days in filing the appeal. On going through the affidavit in support of this application, we are not satisfied that sufficient grounds are alleged for condoning this long delay. We are therefore not inclined to issue notice on this petition.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that Section 5 of the Limitation Act ought to be liberally construed and the delay in this case may be condoned. A liberal construction of Section 5 only enables the Court to understand the expression ''sufficient cause'' not rigidly or strictly but with some elasticity. This principle was recognised in the decision of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan ILR 13 Mad 269 wherein the Court said:

...the words ''sufficient cause'' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the Appellant.

This statement was approved by the Supreme Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., . A plea for liberal construction of Section 5 of the Limitation Act so as to lead to the jettisoning of the law of limitation itself cannot be accepted. The law of limitation is not an equitable statute. It is a statute of repose. It is enacted pursuant to a public policy that legal rights ought to be enforced through Courts within a time frame and stale cause of action should not be permitted to be agitated. Under the guise of interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court is not entitled to nullify the law of limitation or the public policy behind that statute. The Appellant is bound to explain the delay. As observed in N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, .

Acceptability of explanation for the delay is the sole criterion, length of delay is not relevant.

The Appellant is therefore bound to put forward an acceptable explanation for the delay. The liberal construction can only be of the expression ''sufficient cause'' occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and not the adoption of a course of condoning the delay in all cases even if no cause is shown and whatever be the extent of the delay.

However, liberally we construe Section 5 of the Limitation Act in this case. We cannot find the setting out of a sufficient cause for condoning the inordinate delay in filing the appeal, we therefore refuse to condone the delay and dismiss this petition.