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Judgment
P.D. Dinakaran, J.—Heard.
The Petitioner seeks a writ of Mandamus to direct the first Respondent to entertain his representation dated 22.7.1993 and to dispose of the same under Rule 17A of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and consequently, to direct the second Respondent to reinstate the Petitioner in service as P.G. teacher in Tamil with continuity of service and all other attendant benefits under the following facts and circumstances of the case.
The Petitioner has passed M.A in Tamil Literature and M. Ed. Degrees and was appointed as P.G. Assistant in Tamil, in a permanent vacancy, with effect from 1.9.1986, in the second Respondent school, which is admittedly a religious minority institution, entitled for the fundamental right conferred under Article 30 of the Constitution of India and governed under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') and the Rules framed there under.
It is stated that the Petitioner went on medical leave from 21.06.1993 to 20.07.1993; during the same period, another lady teacher, working as English Teaher in the same school, also went on medical leave and on account of the said coincidence, a rumour had spread that they had an affair. It is alleged that the second Respondent Management had obtained a complaint against the Petitioner from the father of the said lady teacher that the Petitioner had eloped with the lady teacher and issued a memo dated 30.06.1993, calling on the Petitioner to submit his explanation for his absence during the relevant period. However, the father of the lady teacher, by his letter dated 9.07.1993, withdrew his earlier complaint against the Petitioner stating that the same was made on account of certain misconceptions. The Petitioner also sent his explanation dated 10.07.1993, denying any affair with the lady teacher. However, it is alleged that the second Respondent Management insisted the Petitioner to tender his resignation and thus had obtained a letter of resignation dated 21.07.1993 from the Petitioner by force, and also accepted the same. Therefore, it is alleged that the Petitioner sent a representation dated 22.07.1993,to the first Respondent herein, and brought to his notice that the second Respondent had obtained the resignation letter dated 21.07.1993 from the Petitioner under duress, and therefore, requested the first Respondent not to approve the said resignation by exercising his powers under Rule 17A of the Rules. But, the first Respondent had not taken any action on the representation of the Petitioner dated 22.07.1993. Hence, the above writ petition.
The first Respondent, in his counter affidavit, had stated that he could not entertain the said representation of the Petitioner dated 22.07.1993 as the second Respondent is a religious minority institution, entitled for the fundamental rights conferred under Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
The second Respondent, in their counter affidavit, has stated that Rule 17-A, inserted by G.O. Ms. No. 586 (Education) dated 12.04.1981, is not applicable to the second Respondent institution, as it would otherwise violate Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, infringing the rights of the administration of the second Respondent school. According to the second Respondent, even though other Petitioner and another lady teacher, working in the second Respondent school, availed medical leave from 21.06.1993 to 20.07.1993, on account of which the father of the lady teacher made a complaint that the Petitioner had eloped with his daughter, which warranted the second Respondent to issue a memo dated 30.06.1993 to the Petitioner to submit his explanation for his absence during the relevant period, to which the Petitioner had also submitted his explanation on 10.07.1993, the second Respondent, further, has stated that the Petitioner, however, had submitted his resignation on 21.07.1993, voluntarily, and therefore, the second Respondent accepted the resignation of the Petitioner, settled his salary dues and relieved him from service. The second Respondent specifically stated that they had not compelled the Petitioner to submit his resignation, and therefore, the allegation that the Petitioner was forced to submit his resignation is false and untenable, which cannot be adjudicated in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the same requires appreciation of evidence. The second Respondent further contends that a Division Bench of this Court had already held that even in the case of wrongful termination passed u/s 22 of the Act, neither the first Respondent have any authority to interfere with such order of termination, nor this Court can interfere with the same under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the second Respondent school is a religious minority institution, protected under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, and therefore, the impugned representation dated 22.7.1993 cannot be considered by the first Respondent under Rule 17-A of the Rules.
Arguments are advanced by Mr. K. Chandra, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner and Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram learned senior counsel for the second Respondent Management for and against respectively, as to the applicability of Rule 17-A of the Rules to the minority institutions that are protected under Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
Article 30 of the Constitution of India and Rule 17-A of the Rule, which was inserted by G.O. Ms. No. 586 (Education) dated 2.4.1981, read as follows:
Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions.(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
(1A) In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in Clause (1) the state shall ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause.
(2) The State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.
Rule 17-A of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974:
17-A. Educational agencies not to obtain compulsorily resignation letter either at the time of appointment or subsequently from the employees in their schools.-(1) Whenever a teacher or other person employed in a private school, tenders his resignation of appointment, he shall Worm the fact of his resignation in writing by registered. Post with acknowledgement due to the District Educational officer, Inspectress of Girls'' School or the Deputy Inspector of Schools concerned.
(2) No teacher or other person employed in a private school shall give to the educational agency at any time undated or predated resignation letter.
(3) No educational agency shall insist or compel any teacher or other person employed in a private school to give at any time undated or predated resignation letter.
(4) No teacher or other person employed in a private school shall be relieved from service on the strength of be (sic) sent to the Chief Educational Officer concerned in respect of teachers and other persons employed in High Schools (Higher Secondary Schools) and Teachers'' Training Institutes and to the District Educational officer concerned in respect of teachers and to the District Educational officer concerned in respect of teachers and other persons employed in pre-primary, primary and Middle schools. The Chief Educational Officer or District Educational Officer concerned shall in turn get the confirmation of the teacher or other person employed, as the case may be, as to the fact of such resignation and then accord his approval to relieve the teacher or other person employed, as the case may be, from service.
(5) Entries regarding the date of acceptance of resignation of appointment shall be made by the Secretary of the School Committee, in the Teachers'' Service Registers of the teacher or in the Service Registers of the other persons employed in a private school under proper attestation and duly countersigned by the District Educational Officer or the Inspectress of Girls'' Schools, as the case may be.
(6) No substitute shall be appointed in the place of a teacher or other person employed in a private school who has been relieved on the basis of the resignation letter tendered by him, without obtaining prior approval of the Chief Educational Officer concerned in respect of the teachers and other persons employed in High Schools (Higher Secondary Schools) and Teachers'' Training Institutes and the District Educational Officers concerned in respect of teachers and other persons employed in pre-primary,. Primary, and middle schools.
Admittedly, a Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 24.9.1976 in W.A. No. 295 of 1975 and W.P. No. 4478 of 1974 etc., The Madras Diocese of the Church of South India v. State of Tamil Nadu, while declaring that Section 8(l)(a), 1 l(l)(b), 12(1), 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21(2), 23, 24, 26, 31, 32, 33, 39(4), 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the Act, are inapplicable to the minority institutions, held as follows:
...the right under each of Articles 28 to 30 is not subjected to any limitation or restriction. The right guaranteed in Article 30(1) is in absolute terms and no abridgement of the substance of the right is therefore permissible. We should think that through the various decision of the Supreme Court as we see them, absolute character of the right has always been kept in view of any erosion on its substance has not been permitted.....
The applicability of Rule 17-A which was inserted by G.O. Ms. No. 586 (Education) dated 2.4.1981 to the minority institution whose rights are secured under Article 30 of the Constitution of India, has arisen for the first time in the above writ petition, even though the applicability of the same to the private schools other than the minority schools was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Grama Committee High School V. Puram v. Arunachalam and Ors. reported in 1998 (I) LLJ 119.
In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the following provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised private Schools (Regulation) Act. 1973.
Section 2(3) "Educational Agency" in relation to -(a) any minority school, means any person who, or body of persons which has established and is administering or proposes to establish and administer such minority school; and (b) any other private school, means person or body of person permitted or deemed to the permitted under this Act to establish and maintain such other private school.
Section 2(6) (a) minority school means a private school of its choice established and administered by any such minority whether based on religion or language as has the right to do so under Clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution.
Section 2(7) "Private School" means a pre-primary, primary, middle or high school or higher secondary school or any other institution imparting education or training, established and administered or maintained by any person or body of persons, and recognised by the competent authority under this Act but does not include a school or an institution:
(a) imparting technical or professional education;
(b) established and administered or maintained by the Central Government or the State Government or any local authority;
(c) maintained or approved by, or affiliated to, any University established by law; or (d) giving, providing or imparting religious instruction alone, but not any other instruction;
Even though Section 4 requires prior permission of the competent authority to established any private school, Sections 5 and 5-A require the educational agency of every private school to make an application for permission to establish such private schools or higher secondary schools, as the case may be, and Section 6 enables the competent authority to consider such permission as well as to communicate the decision and to grant or refuse such permission as well as to communicate to decision to the educational agency, Section 9 expressly makes it clear that any minority, whether based on religion or language, may establish and administer any private school without permission u/s 6 of the Act. In other words, the prior permission of the competent authority required to establish and administer a private school, under Sections, 5, 5-A and 6 of the Act is expressly exempted in the case of the minority school as per Section 9 of the Act.
Mr. K. Chandru, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner, contends that the applicability of Rule 17-A is not expressly exempted to the minority schools under G.O. Ms. No. 586 (Education) dated 2.4.1981, as in the case of permission to establish the schools for minorities, whether based on religion or language, expressly exempted u/s 9 of the Act.
Per contra, Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel for the second Respondent has invited my attention that Sections 22, 23 and 24 of the Act, were by order dated 24.9.1976 of a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 295 of 1975 and W.P. No. 4478 of 2974 etc. (The Madras Diocess of the church of South India v. State of Tamil Nadu), held inapplicable to minority institution. Section 22 deals with the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension. Section 22 deals with the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teacher or other persons employed in private school. Sub-clause (1) to Section 22 requires prior approval from the competent authority before passing such order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. While Section 23 provides an appeal Section 24 provides a second appeal against the orders of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank or otherwise, termination of any teacher or other person employed in the private school.
Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel for the second Respondent further refers to the decision in W.P. No. 5186 of 1981 in The Meston Training College Association Owning Wesley Higher Secondary School, Royapettah Madras v. The Joint Director of School Education and Appellate Authority, Madra-6 and 2 Ors. and if Ethiraj v. State of Tami Nadu reported in 1990 (I) MLJ 284, wherein, it is held that Rule 15 of the Rules, which deals with the procedure to be adopted in the matter of appointments and promotions by the school committee and the remedy by way of an appeal against the decision of the school committee are not applicable to the minority institutions, if the appointments are not made by the school committee. Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram contends that the reasons that weighted the Division Bench in the order dated 24.9.1976 in holding that Sections 22,23 and 24 are not applicable to the minority institutions as well as the reason that were appreciated by Ramanujam. J. and M. Srinivasan, J., (as he then was) in holding that Rule 15 is also not applicable to the minority institution if the appointments are not made by the school committee, squarely govern the case on hand to reject the applicability of Rule 17-A to the minority institution and therefore, there is no need to expressly exempt the applicability of Rule 17- A to the minority institutions. Hence, she contends that the resignation of the Petitioner, having been submitted voluntarily and duly accepted by the second Respondent Management, the first Respondent has no authority to entertain any further representation under Rule 17-A to confirm the facts of the resignation.
I have bestowed my careful consideration to the submission of both sides.
As observed by the Division Bench of this Court in Grama Committee High School, Venkateswarapuram Vs. Arunachalam and Others, the resignation of a teacher working in the private school is governed by two sets of provisions, namely, i) Condition No. 9 of the agreement in Form VII-A referred to Rule 15, wherein the resignation shall be submitted to the School Committee; and ii) Rule 17-A of the Rules, wherein the resignation shall be submitted to the Educational Agency.
Condition No. 9 of the agreement in Form VII-A and Rule 17-A provide two different categories; one cannot be telescoped into the other, as held in Grama Committee High School case.
Admittedly, the provision relating to the School Committee is not applicable to the minority institutions and therefore, Condition No. 9 read with Rule 15 is not applicable to the resignation of the teacher or other person employed in the minority institutions, if their appointments are made by the School Committee. Consequently, the resignation of a teacher employed in the minority institutions is governed by Rule 17-A which requires the teacher to submit his resignation to the Educational Agency. In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the fact that the teacher submitted his resignation to the Educational Agency of the second Respondent, but the controversy arose only as to the bona fides of the resignation, viz., whether it is voluntary or involuntary.
The Division Bench of this Court in Grama Committee High School case reported in Grama Committee High School, Venkateswarapuram Vs. Arunachalam and Others, while explaining the necessity for framing Rule 17-A has observed as follows:
it is only to govern such voluntary resignations, R. 17-A was introduced by G.O. Ms. No. 586 dated 2nd April, 1981. the necessity for framing a specific rule was brought about be the unscrupulous tactics adopted by several educational agencies in obtaining undated resignation letters from teacher even at the time of appointment or predated letters of resignation from them by force and making use of them whenever they liked. When such instances came to light in multitude, the Government thought fit to frame R. 17-A in order to explode the camouflage adopted by the educational agencies for terminating the services of innocent and gullible teachers under the garb of resignation letters which were not in fact voluntary. We have already extract the terms of the rules.
If a teacher wants to terminate his services in accordance with the terms of the contract, he can issue a notice under Clause 9 of the agreement or pay three months salary and allowances to the school committee. Under Clause 9 of the agreement, the relevant authority to whom the teacher must send his notice is the school committee. But under notice is the school committee. But under R. 17-A, the concerned authority is the educational agency. Whenever a teacher wants to terminate his service of his own accord otherwise than under the terms of the contract, he shall resort to R. 17-A and address his resignation letter the educational agency. Thus Clause 9 of the agreement and R. 17-A provide for two different contingencies and the provision of one cannot be telescoped in the other, if the rule making authority had thought that the teacher should always terminate his services only in accordance with the terms of the contract, Rule 17-A would not have been framed. The Very fact that R. 17-A has been introduced shows that there can be resignations of teachers outside the provisions of their contract. We seen already that under Clause 9 of the agreement between the teacher and the school committee, there is no question of acceptance of the part of the school committee as the termination of the services could be effective unilaterally by the teachers by complying with the terms thereof. Under R. 17-A there is not specific provision for express acceptance of resignation tendered by a teacher. Clause (1) thereof enjoins the teacher who tenders the resignation to the District Educational Officer, Inspectress of Girls Schools or the Deputy Inspectress of Schools concerned. It is not clear whether such information should be sent to the District Educational Officer as well as the Inspectress of Girls'' schools or the Deputy Inspector of schools or to any one of the three officials specified in the clause. Whether it is to be seen to one official or two officials, it should be sent in writing by registered post. Normally, it can be presumed that when a teacher sends information to the concerned official or officials as required it should be sent in writing by registred post. Normally, it can be presumed that when a teacher sends information to the concerned official or officials as required by Clause (1) in writing by registered post, it s a voluntary resignation.
As Clauses (2) and (3) of R.17-A specifically refer to the educational agency, it can be taken that teacher who resorts to this rule for resigning his job, should send his resignation letter to educational agency. Clause (4) of the Rule begins by restraining the school from relieving the teacher from service on the strength of the resignation letter. The terms used are relieved from service. The question of relieving from service can only arise after termination of services. They are two distinct and different concepts and are not identical, though the interval of time between the may be insignificant. What is prohibited by the first part of the clause of the rule is only relieving from service and not termination of services or acceptance of resignation.
19: The next part of the clause requires the educational agency to forward the resignation letter to the Chief Educational Officer concerned in respect of teachers employed in High Schools and Teachers-Training Institutes and to the District Education Officer concerned in respect of Pre-primary, Primary and Middle schools. The reason for the dichotomy introduced in this clause is not known. While there is no such division in Cl(l'') to (3) of the rule, CIause (4) alone makes a distinction between High School and Teachers-Training Institutes the one had and Pre-primary (sic) primary and middle schools without any exception have to send information of their resignations to the District Educational Officer and or the Deputy Inspector of Schools or Inspectress of Girls Schools, the educational agencies of High Schools and teachers training institutes should send the resignation letters received by them to the Chief Educational Officer and the other educational agencies should send such resignation letters to the District Educational Officers, while one can appreciate a provision whereby the employees as well as the employers are made to send the information of resignation to the same official so that he could come to a conclusion about the truth of the resignation whenever there is a coalescence of the information sent by the employee with the letter of resignation sent by the employer, the purpose of two different authorities under the two clauses is beyond the reach of our imagination. The last part of CI.(4) requires the Chief Educational Officer or the District Educational Officer concerned to get confirmation as the fact of such resignation. It is not clear whether the confirmation referred to therein is independent of the information sent by the teacher in writing by registered post. In cases where the information is sent under CI. (1) by the teacher to the District Educational officer and the educational agency sends the teacher''s resignation letter to the Chief Educational officer under C1 (4) what is the procedure to be adopted by the latter is he to address the District Educational officer and obtain the information sent by the teacher we are unable to solve the riddles and it is for the rule making authority to consider this aspect of the matter and clarity the position by suitable amendments."
In spite of all the conundrums mentioned above, the last part of C1 (4) of the Rules makes it clear that the educational authority shall accord its approval to relieve the teacher on getting the confirmation of the fact of resignation. The language of this clause is mandatory. When once the fact of resignation is confirmed, the educational authority shall accord its approval to relieve the teacher from service. For the second time the clause uses the words relieve from service. There is also no uncertainty in the function of the concerned official under the clause. What all he has got to do is to get confirmation of the fact of resignation there is no confirmation he shall not give his approval and if there is confirmation, he shall accord his approval.
20a. The issue that arises for my consideration in the above writ petition is whether Rule 17-A which prescribes the procedure to be followed while accepting the resignation of a teacher or any other person employed in a private school and relieving him from service infringes the rights of the minority institutions that are secured under Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
In this connection, I am obliged to refer the. following ratio laid down in Frank Anthony Public School Employees'' Association Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , which reads as follows.
that prescription of conditions of service which would have the effect of attracting better and competent teachers would not be considered violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the constitution.
the excellence of the instruction provided by an institution would depend directly on the excellence of the teaching staff, and in turn, that would depend on the quality and the contenment of the teachers. Conditions of service pertaining to minimum qualifications of teachers, their salaries, allowances and other conditions of services which ensure security, contenment and decent living standards to teachers and which will pupils cannot surely be said to be violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the Constitution.
the management of a minority educational institution cannot be permitted under the guise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 30 (1) of the constitution, to oppress or exploit its employees any more than any other private employee. Oppression or exploitation of the teaching staff of an educational institution is bound to lead, inevitable to discontent and deterioration of the standard of instruction in the institution affecting adversely the object of making the institution an effect vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it.
The management of minority institution cannot complain of invasion of the fundamental right to administer the institution when it denies the members of its staff the opportunity to achieve the very object of Article 30 (1) which is to make the institution an effective vehicle of education.
Similarly, in J.P. Unni Krishnan and Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. reported in 1993 (1) SCC 451, the Apex Court held that the element of public character, necessarily mean a fair conduct in all aspects consistent with the constitutional mandate of Articles 14 and 15.
Again, a Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 6.12.1994. made in W.A. No. 1179 of 1993 etc. (Sundaram v. C.S.I Diocess of Madras and Ors.) held that once a teacher enters into service of the institution, the teacher is entitled to all the benefits available to the teachers under the scheme framed by the State and the minority institution have no right to deny such benefits under the guise of Art 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, it was held that the minority institution are also bound to retain the teacher in service, who attains superannuation during the academic year, till the end of the academic year.
This Court in D. Singarayan and Ors. v. Government of Tamil Nadu rep. by Secretary to Government Education Department, Madras by order dated 5.6.1995 made in W.P. No. 6607 of 1991 held that all the teachers serving in the school, whether Christian or non Christain, who possess the required qualification and fulfils the condition regarding seniority are entitled to be considered for the post and therefore, the appointment of a priest to the post of Headmaster, even when he does not possess the requisite qualification and without considering the cases of others, who are eligible, such appointment, having been made on the strength of an exemption obtained, is not sustainable.
In Association of University Teachers Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, Division Bench of this Court while interpreting Section 19 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private colleges (Regulation) Act, in short referred to as private colleges Act, which is in pari maderia to Section 22 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised private schools (Regulation) Act, held that while Section 10(1) and (2) of the private colleges Act insist upon prior permission or approval, does really encroach the rights of the minority institutions to administer the institutions of their own choice, as repeatedly laid down by the decision of the Apex Court the enforcement of Section 19 (3) (a) & (b) will not constitute an interference with the rights of the minority institutions secured under Rule 30(1) of the Constitution of India as it only requires to hold an enquiry into the gross misconduct, pending against such teacher. In other words, it only contemplates a departmental enquiry to be completed expeditiously. Therefore, the Division Bench has held that Section 19(3)(a) & (b) of the Private Colleges Act do not affect the rights of the management in any way to administer is institution, and no the other hand they ensure fair deal to the teachers and other employees of the private colleges. It is further held that there is not right vested in the minority institution to give a go -by to the basic rules of fair play, while dealing with teachers and other employees, or otherwise, harass them. Hence, the Division Bench has held that there is no justification to exclude the application of Section 19 (3) (a) & (b) of the private colleges Act to the minority institutions. Accordingly the Division Bench held that Section 24(3) of the private colleges Act, insofar as it excludes the provisions of Section 19(3)(a) &(b) of the Private Colleges Act to the minority institutions, are ultra vires Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
In the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court as well as the Division Bench of this Court in (I) Frank Anthony Public School''s case (II) J,P. Unni Krishnan''s case (III) Sundaram ''s case (IV) Singarayan ''s case and (V) Association of University Teachers case I am unable to appreciate the arguments of Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram that Rule 17-A is not applicable to minority institutions. I am of considered opinion that the reasons that weighed with the Division Bench of this Court in order dated 24.9.1976 made in W.A. No. 295 of 1975 and W.P. No. 4478 of 1974 etc. (The Madras Diocese of the Church of South India v. State of Tamil Nadu) in holding Sections 22, 23 and 24 are inapplicable to the minority institutions, as well as the reasons that were estimated by Ramanujam, J. in W.P. No. 5186 of 1981 in the Meston Training College Associations, Owning Wesley Higher Secondary School, Madras v. The Joint Director of School Education and Appellate Authority Madras and Ors. and the reasons that were appreciated by Justice M. Srinivasan (as he then was) in Ethiraj v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1990 (1) MLJ 284 in holding that Rule 15 is not applicable to minority institutions if the appointments and promotions are to made by the School Committee cannot be imported to render Rule 17-A which provides to confirm the fact of resignation of a teacher inapplicable to the minority institutions, inasmuch as the purpose and object in making Rule 17-A is neither to supervise nor to control the management of the private schools nor to interfere with their administration but to confirm the fact of resignation as held in Grama Committee High school Case.
No one can dispute the intention of the legislature behind Section 22, 23 and 24 of the act is to supervise the management of the private schools with regard to their disciplinary control over the teachers and other persons employed in the private schools, which has to be exercised through the school committees of the private schools and to provide remedial measure thereon. It is only under such circumstance, the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 24.9.1976 made in W.A. No. 295 of 1975 and W.P. No. 4478 of 1974 etc. (The Madras Diocese of the Church of South India v. State of Tamil Nadu) held that Sees. 22, 23 and 24 are not applicable to the minority institutions, as the provisions relating to the schools committee are not applicable to the minority institutions, as it would have an interference with the internal administration of the minority institutions which are secured under Article 30 of the constitution of India.
That apart, Rule 15 has to be referred to Section 19 which deals with the qualification and service conditions, such as appointment, promotion and age of the teachers and other persons employed in the private schools etc, Ramanujam, J in The Meston Training College Association owning wesly Higher Secondary School madras v. The joint Director of School Education and Appellate Authority, Madras and others and Justice M. Srinivasan (as he then was) in Ethiraj v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1990 (1) MLJ 284 held that Rule 15 is not applicable to minority institutions, if the appointments are not made by the school committee.
On the other hand, the object behind the framing of Rule 17-A is neither to supervise the disciplinary control of the management nor to provide remedial measure for the aggrieved person in that regard as intended in Sees. 22, 23, and 24 of the Act, nor to interfere with the rights of the minority institutions, in the matter of appointment and promotion with reference to qualification and other conditions of service of the teachers or other persons employed in the private schools; as in exercising the power under Rule 15, but to confirm the fact of resignation of the teachers and other persons employed in private schools.
It is therefore clear that the scope and object of Sees. 22, 23, and 24 and that of Section 19 read with Rule 15 are quite distinct to that of Rule 17-A; in other words Rule 17 -A cannot be traced either to Section 22, 23, and 24 or Rule 15 inasmuch as Rule 17-A is intended to confirm the fact of resignation of teachers of other persons employed in private school in order to safeguard the conditions of service of the teachers.
A careful reading of Rule 17-A in the light of the ratio laid down in Association of University Teachers Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Another, , makes it clear that it only provides, for an enquiry into the matter whether the resignation tendered by the teacher is voluntary to satisfy the basic rules of fairplay. That apart, the provision does not require any outside agency or authority to override the decision of the management of the private school once the resignation is found voluntary. It only intends to test the character of resignation tendered by the teacher whether it is voluntary or involuntary but does not compel the Management to surrender its rights of administration Therefore the apprehension of the second Respondent management that Rule 17-A infringes their right of administration under Article 30 of the Constitution of India is not tenable.
The in-built guidelines provided under Rule 17-A makes it clear that it intends only for the observance of the principles of natural justice and the basic rule of fair play and justice, and not to contravene the same. I do not see any element of interference in the rights of the minority secured under Article 30 of the constitution , nor any veto or blanket power conferred no any outside agency or authority in complying with the procedure contemplated under Rule 17-A to confirm toe fact resignation to relieve the teacher with the approval of the competent authority and therefore Rule 17-A is intended to safeguard the conditions of service of teachers or other persons employed in the private schools including the minority institutions, and the powers of the State to Rule 17-A for such object cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of Article 30 of the Constitution of India.
It is well-settled in law that the object and intention of the legislature behind every provision of the statute should always be honoured while interpreting their scope and purpose, in spirit and substance, but subject to the rule of law, fairness and justness. The reasons for not applying Sees. 22, 23 and Rule 24 shall not be applied mechanically and uniformly to justify the non-application of Rule 17-A to the minority institutions and such a bare application would only render the intention of the legislature a futility.
In the result, I am obliged to hold that Rule 17-A is applicable to minority institutions. The fact of resignation of the teachers and other persons employed in the minority institutions, shall therefore be confirmed by the competent authority under Rule 17-A. Hence I direct the first Respondent to consider the representation of the 1st Respondent dated 22.7.1993 under Rule 17-A and to pass appropriate orders on the same within six months from the date of receipt of copy of this order of course after giving a fair and reasonable opportunity to the Petitioner as well as the second Respondent in compliance of the principles of nature justice. However the consequential relief as prayed for by the Petitioner cannot be granted as the same is subject to the order of the first Respondent in exercise of his powers under Rule 17-A, on the representation of the Petitioner dated 22.7.1993 35. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. Connected W.M.P. are dismissed . No costs.