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Judgment
Kailasam, J.—The petitioners in E. P. No. 101 of 1956 in O. S. No. 42 of 1946, who are the Archakas in Sri Subramaniaswami Temple at
Tiruttani, are the appellants in this appeal. They filed the suit O. S. No. 42 of 1946 on the file of the Sub-Court, Chittoor, claiming exclusive right
to the Archana and Arati fees and for a permanent injunction restraining the Executive Officer from introducing the ticket system. The trial Court
decreed the suit holding that the Archakas were entitled to the entire Archana and Arati fees and that the Executive Officer had no right to
introduce the ticket system. On appeal the District Judge, Chittoor, held that the Archakas had the exclusive right to the Archana and Arati fees but
found that the Executive Officer had the right to introduce the ticket system, provided the collections were handed over to the Archakas. The
matter was taken up in second appeal to the Andhra High Court and that Court confirmed the decree of the lower appellate Court. The judgment
of the High Court was delivered on 25th November, 1955. Madras Act XIX of 1951 came into force on 28 th August, 1951. Purporting to act
under S. 50 of that Act, the trustees of the temple passed a resolution fixing the fees for Archana and Arati under Ex. A-7. The fee was increased.
A portion was reserved for the temple and the share due to the Archakas was increased. The Resolution of the trustees was sanctioned by the
Commissioner as provided for in S. 50 of the Act. The E. P. No. 101 of 1956 out of which this appeal arises was filed by the Archakas under O.
21, R. 32, C. P. C., for arrest and detention of the Executive Officer of the Devastanam for disobeying the order of injunction passed by the High
Court in second appeal on 25th November, 1955.
The Courts below held that the Executive Officer was not liable to be punished for contempt and dismissed the execution petition. Hence this
appeal.
In this appeal, Mr. Vedantachari, learned Counsel for the appellants, submitted that the Executive Officer ought to have been committed to
prison for contempt as he ignored the order of injunction and took refuge under S. 50 of Act XIX of 1951, and contrary to the decree of
injunction, fixed the rates of fees for Archana and Arati, appropriating a portion thereof for the temple. He further submitted that on the date when
the judgment in the second appeal was delivered, Madras Act XIX of 1951 had come into force and therefore the decree which was passed after
that Act came into force cannot be modified under S. 50 of the Act. He further submitted that even if S. 50 is construed as empowering the
trustees of the temple to fix the fees for the performance of Archana, it does not in any way empower them to fix the fee regarding Arati.
The suit was filed in the year 1946 by the petitioners, Archakas, claiming their exclusive right to Archana and Arati fees. A decree was granted
to that effect by all the Courts. Though the decree in the second appeal was passed on 25th November, 1955, it actually provided for the relief
asked for in the suit filed in 1946. It was contended by Mr. Vedantachari that as the second appeal was heard after the Act came into force, the
respondents ought to have pleaded that after the said enactment they were entitled to fix the fees according to the provisions in S. 50 of the Act
and having failed to do so, they are bound by the decree. I am unable to accept this contention; for, the relief sought by the Archakas was as on
the date of the suit. Even if the respondents brought to the notice of the High Court the subsequent legislation, it would have been met with the plea
that steps under S. 50 of the Act had not been taken, as no resolution passed by the trustees and approved by the Commissioner. The decree in
the second appeal can only be construed as declaring the rights of parties as on the date of suit, without any reference to S. 50 of Act XIX of
1951. By that enactment, power was conferred on the trustees of the temple to fix the fees for the performance of Archanas and to determine what
portion of such fees shall be paid and to the Archakas or other office-holders or servants of the temple. This is a statutory right conferred on the
trustees and when once the procedure prescribed in S. 50 is followed, the fixing of the fees for Archana cannot be questioned. It is admitted that
when the Commissioner has given his Assent to the fixing of the fees by the trustees. Therefore, the act of the trustees in fixing the fees is in
accordance with the provisions of the statute and would take effect when the Commissioner''s assent was obtained. It cannot be said that as the
decree had been passed by the civil Court with reference to the suit filed long before the Act after the Act came into force, by having resort to S.
50, the order of injunction had been contravened. What the trustees did was only in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by the
Legislature. I am unable to agree with the learned Counsel that there had been any violation of the decree for injunction by fixing the fees for the
performance of Archana according to the provisions of S. 50 of the Act.
It was sought to be contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the power under S. 50 of the Act is confined only to the fixing of
fees for Archana and the apportionment thereof to the Archakas or other officeholders or servants of the temple, and it would not enable the
temple to take any share of the Archana fees. This contention was rejected by a Bench of this Court in Sri Meenakshi Sundareswarar etc.
Devastanam v. Subramania Bhattar [1953] 2 M. L. I. [S. N.] 3. Rajagopala Aiyangar. J., in Senapathi Gurukkal v.. Executive Officer,
Arthaneswarar Temple, Tiruchengode W. P. 847 of 1952, rejected a similar contention holding that the temple had power under S. 50 to take a
share of the Archana fees. This view was followed in K. Somasundara Gurukkal v. Commissioner, H. R. and C. E. W. P. 727 of 1959 by
Ramachandra Iyer, J. (as he then was). Jagadisan, J., in S. R. Thirumalaiswami Iyengar V. Executive Officer, Venkateswarar Perumal Temple,
Mondipalayam W. P. 1221 of 1959, has also taken a similar view. It is therefore futile for the learned Counsel to contend otherwise.
Mr. Vedantachari then submitted that, in any event, the power to fix the fees for the performance of Archana would not include the power to fix
the fees for Arati. Therefore, he submitted that the trustees did not act within their powers in altering the fees fixed for Arati. On the wording of S.
50 this contention appears plausible, but on closer examination, I am unable to accept it.
Archana"" refers to the portion of the prayer in which the God''s name is chanted. It is invariably concluded by Deeparadhana or Arati. No
Archana will be complete without Arati. But Arati can be performed without the performance of Archana. By ""Archana"" it is worship and
Archaka"" is a person appointed to recite the holy names of God in worship at temples. Wilson''s Glossary gives the meaning of ""Arati"" as waving
lights circularly in front of an idol or object of worship, being part of the usual evening ceremonial. In construing the words ""puja"" and ""archana"" it
was held in Amirthaswara Pandithar v. Murugappa Chetti [1915] 2 L.W. 127 that ""puja"" is a general term meaning ceremonial worship, while
Archanai"" is the placing of pure leaves or flowers on the idol during the course of recitation of the God''s (or Goddess''s) names in the ceremonial
worship. I may add that Deeparadhana is part of the Archana, though Deeparadhana or Arati may be performed independently of the Archana.
The question for consideration is, whether the word ""archana"" used in S. 50 was intended to cover Arati also. Though the question did not arise for
consideration in Senapathi Gurukkal v. Executive Officer, Arthaneswarar Temple, Tiruchengode W. P. 847 of 1952 Rajagopala Aiyangar, J.,
proceeded on the basis that under S. 50 of the Act, the trustees had a right to fix the fees for Archana as well as Deeparadhana. It is difficult to
attribute to the Legislature an intention of excluding Arati from the term ""Archana"" for it is most unlikely that while empowering the trustees to fix
the fees for Archana they refrained from conferring such a power on them in respect of Arati, which very often forms part of the Archana. Mr.
Vedantachari submitted that the Legislature could have intended to exclude Arati as it does not require the assistance of others in its performance,
while in the case of Archana the services of other people, for instance, for the collection of flowers etc., are required. I am unable to accept this
contention, for there are temples, in which the priest who performs the Arati is not permitted to give the worshipper the Vibhuti or Prasadham,
which is usually given after Deeparadhana. Learned Counsel relied on S. 57 of Madras Act XXII of 1959 in support of his contention. He stated
that under that Section the trustees of a religious institution is empowered to fix the fees for the performance of any service, ritual or ceremony in
such religious institution, while S. 50 of Act XIX of 1951 empowered the trustee to fix the fees for the performance of Archana alone. From the
difference in phraseology, learned Counsel submitted that while S. 57 of Act XXII of 1959 is wide enough to include Arati, S. 50 of the earlier Act
specifically excluded Arati. This contention cannot be accepted because S. 57 of Act XXII of 1959 does include the fixing of fees not only for
Archana and Arati, but for all kinds of services ritual or ceremony, in such religious institution. In the result, I confirm the decree of the lower
appellate Court, and dismiss the petition of the appellants. This appeal is dismissed. No costs. Leave refused.