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Judgment
20 paragraphs · 407 wordsWilliam Ayling, J.—This is a case under the Workman''s Breach of Contrast Act (XIII of 1859). Petitioner contracted With the respondent
a beedi maker on 6th November 1918 to work for him for 10 months and received an advance of Rs. 10-8-0 which was to be recovered by
monthly stoppages of one rupee from his pay. Petitioner ceased to work in April 1919. Respondent on 3rd October 1919 (more than 10 months
after the contract) complained to the Magistrate, who, on 2nd December 1919, directed petitioner to resume work from next day and work out
the balance of Rs. 5-8-0.
Petitioner�s Vakil argued that the order is illegal inasmuch as the work ordered to be performed is not according to the terms of the contrast
which provided only for work within a period of 10 months from its date. If the matter were ''res Integra� I should be disincludad to interfere
with the order, but I find no lass than four decisions of this Court which lend support to the petitioner''s case and nothing on the other side. Two of
them Criminal Revision cases Nos. 777 and 779 of 1833 reported as Chikka Putta In re 1 Weir 704; Matha Goundan; In re 1 Weir 705 might be
distinguished on the ground that the contracts in those cases fixed a terminal date for the conclusion of the period of work but this cannot be said of
Criminal Revision Case No. 183 of 1884, reported on page 706 Kadapanatham Munigadu; In re 1 Weir 706 which is exactly on all fours with the
present case, except that there was a much greater delay in having recourse to the Court. This, however, did not affect the decision. The fourth
case reported is the authorized series. Queen-Empress v. Konda 16 M. 347 is only direst authority for the proposition that re-payment of the
advance can be enforced after expiry of the contract period; but the remarks of the learned Judges certainly imply that they regarded the alternative
remedy as unenforceable.
These rulings have been accepted and followed for so long that I do not feel justified in dissenting from them especially as respondent in the
present, case, who has not appeared to contest the petition, has another remedy.
I would set aside the order of the Magistrate and direct petitioner to re-pay the balance of advance within one moth from this date.
Coutts-Trotter, J.
I agree.
