K. Dasappa vs District Magistrate and Another

Yiswanatha Saatri, J.—This is an applies-tion by a person detained under the Madias Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1917 (Madras Act

I of 1957) to this Court for the issue of a direction in the nature of Jialeas corpus under. Section 431, Criminal P.C. The applicant was arrested on

25th April I9i8 u/s 151, Criminal P.C. by the police authorities and an order for his detention wag passed by the District Magistrate of South

Kanara on 29th April 1948. On 10th June 1948 the applicant received a communication from the Provincial Government containing the grounds

for his detention, He submitted his explanation in due course. The advisory com. mittee considered the matter and we are informed that on 17th

February 1943, the Government o Madras have passed final orders for the detention of the applicant.

Mr. N. S. Mani, the learned Counsel for the applicant, raised four grounds in support of his application. The first contention was that the order

for detention itself showed that the District Magistrate did not satisfy himself with respect to the applicant that he was acting or about to act in a

manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order and that it wag necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from so

doing. Reliance is placed on the form of the order, the relevant portion of which runs in these terms :

WHEREAS I, Setu Rao Kalwar, District Magistrate of South Kanara, am satisfied with respect to Dasappa, Master of Balla village that he is

acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety and maintenance of public order and that with a view to preventing him from so

doing, it is neeeasary to detain him.

The argument is that the order does not state whether the applicant is acting or is about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and that it is

merely a reproduction of the language of Section 2 of the Act. It is contended that the District Magistrate ought to have satisfied himself about one

of two things, namely that the applicant was acting or was about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety and that since he had not dore so,

the requirement of Section 2, Sub-sections (1) was not complied with. We consider this objection to the form of the order to be an unsubstantial

one. We are supported in our opinion by the judgment of the Federal Court in AIR 1943 75 (Federal Court) . The relevant passage in the

judgment of the Chief Justice is as follows :

It has been suggested that (1) the form of the recital indicates by use of the word ''or'' that no final consideration has been given to each case and

that all that the investigating authority has done has been to form a rough conclusion that the case may come within one or other of the reasons

quoted and that (2) the use of a cyclostyled form of order indicates a like lack of careful considnritiou, and that therefore the order is not good ex

facie. I do not accept those arguments. In any judgment the form of recital is one which a layman might reasonably use when he was satisfied that

the casemate come within one or other of the specified categories without being prepared to pledge himsell with legal exactitude to any particular

one or more of the categories.

The objection, therefore, to the form of the order fails.

The'' next contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that as the applicant had been arrested u/s 151, Criminal P.C. on 25th April

1918 and the order of detention was passed on 29th April I9d8, it could not be said that the District Magistrate was satisfied at the time the

petitioner was arrested that he was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or the maintenance of public order. The arrest u/s 151,

Criminal P, C, might have been in respect of a cognisable offence wholly unconnected with public safety or maintenance of public order. The

detention under Madras Act, I [1] of 1947, is in the interests of public safety or maintenance of public order and the scope of 8,151, Criminal P.C.

and Sections 2 to 4, Madras Act I [1] of 1947, are entirely different. We do not consider that simply because a man hag been arrest-ed u/s 151,

Criminal P.C., the powers under Madras Act I [1] of 1947 could not be exercised and the person so arrested could not be detained thereunder.

There is also some authority for this view in the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mool Chand and Others Vs. Emperor, . The head-note of

the case of the Allahabad High Court is in these terms :

The mere fact that certain persons were first arrested under some provisions of the ordinary law and were kier ordered to be detained under the

U, P. Maintenance of Order (Temporary) Act, is not, in itself, proof of mala fides and it is for the person arrested to adduce further oiraurustanees

or evidence to show that the executive authorities acted mala fide.

In the present case, there is no ground for hold-ing that the action under Madras Act I [l] of 1947 wa3 actuated by any ulterior motive or im-

proper purpose and that with a view to attain that object, the previous arrest u/s 151, Criminal P.C. was made. This contention of the petitioner is

unsustainable.

The next contention raised on behalf of the applicant is that the Government had no power to pass a final order in connection with the detention

of the applicant after an application had been made to this Court u/s 491, Criminal P.C. The applicant is unable to refer to any statutory provision

or to any authority in support of his contention. In an application u/s 491, Criminal P.C. this Court is not empowerd to stay a proceeding under

Madras Act I [1] of 1947 and it could not be said that the Provincial Government in fulfilling its statutory duties u/s 3 (5), Madras Act I [1] of

1947, is in any way transgressing any law or any order of this Court. Indeed, it is their duty to deal expeditiously with cases of persons detained

under Madras Act I [1] of 1947, and pass final orders, in order that these persona may get the benefit of release after the expiry of six montha

from the date of the final order.

Lastly, it is contended that the decision of the Full Bench o this Court in Q-. G. Narayanaswami Naidu and Others Vs. The Inspector of Police,

dose not fetter our powers to interfere u/s 491, Criminal P.C. and that the limitations laid down in the Full Bench decision are not now operative in

view of the later events that have happened in this case. The later events referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are (1) the reference

to the Advisory Committee; (2) the subsequent explanation furnished to the Government by the applicant; and (3) the report of the Advisory

Committee. We consider 4hat the power of this Court to interfere with an order of detention passed under Madras Act I [1] of 1947, on an

application u/s 491, Criminal P.C. is confined to the four grounds enumerated by the karned Chief Justice at p. 23 of the Full Bench decision in G.

Narayanaswami Naidu and Others Vs. The Inspector of Police, . It is only when there is lack of bona fides in the order for detention that this

Court can interfere, apart from the other grounds enumerated in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, It may be that, though the initial

detention was bona fide, its continuance may become mala fide by season of the subsequent events such as non-service of the grounds of detention

on the de. tenu for an indefinite period. We are, however, not concerned with such a situation in the present case. All that baa been urged is that

there was lack of bona fides in the initial order of detention. We have examined the grounds of detention served on the petitioner and we are

unable to hold that there are no grounds which would justify detention u/s 2, Madras Act I [1] of 1947. It is clearly stated that the applicant is

interfering with and impeding the work of the police in the matter of detecting crimes and bringing to trial offenders concerned in serious crimes,

like dacoity in the locality. It is also stated that his organisation is indulging in violent and subversive activities. It is well settled that this Court cannot

investigate the sufficiency of the materials or the reasonableness of the grounds upon which the Government or the empowered authority or officer

was satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of public safety and order to detain the petitioner.

For there reasons, we hold that the application faila and we direct that it be dismissed.