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Judgment
157 paragraphs · 3,177 wordsG. Rajasuria, J.—This second appeal is focused by the second Defendant, animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2009
passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Namakwa in A.S. No. 8 of 2005 reversing the judgment and decree dated 07.03.2005 passed by
the learned Subordinate Judge, Namakwa in O.S. No. 346 of 1996.
The parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court.
Compendiously and concisely, the relevant facts, which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this second appeal would run
thus:
a) The Plaintiff filed the suit O.S. No. 346 of 1996 seeking the following reliefs:
-to pass a decree in favor of the Plaintiff by dividing the suit properties in to two equal shares considering the value, soil, channel facility and cart
track right and allot one such divided share to the Plaintiff and direct the Defendants to put the Plaintiff in possession of such divided share.
-to make a provision for appointment of a Commissioner to divide the suit properties as per the preliminary decree to be passed -and to award
costs of suit. (extracted as such)
b) D1 and D2 filed separate written statements resisting the suit.
c) Whereupon, relevant issues were framed by the trial court.
d) During trial, on the side of the Plaintiff, he examined himself as P.W.1along with P. Ws.2 to 4 and marked Exs.A1 to A14. On the side of the
Defendants, the second Defendant examined himself as D.W.1 along with D. Ws.2 to 4 and markedExs.B1 to B19.
e) Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the suit. As against which, the Plaintiff preferred appeal. Whereupon, the appellate court decreed the suit of
the Plaintiff.
f) Challenging and impugning the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, the second Defendant filed this second appeal on various
grounds, suggesting the following substantial questions of law:
A] By holding that the disputed Will Ex.A13 dated 29.01.1979 is the last Will of the testator, whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is
not in contradiction with the judgment rendered in Civil Appeal Nos. 2915-2916 of 1996, wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held, that the
Will dated 17.01.1979 in favor of the appellate herein is the last Will of the testator?
B] Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is vitiated in that it has sought to believe a Will produced 16 years after the death of the
testator, particularly in a suit filed just immediately after the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 2915-2916 of 1996?
C] Whether the judgment of the lower appellate court is vitiated in that it has held, that, merely because the disputed Will Ex.A13 is not signed on
every page, that, is not a reason to suspect its genuineness?
D] Whether the lower appellate court was correct in comparing the signature of the testator on the disputed Will with his signature on a sale deed
which is not before court?
(extracted as such)
On hearing both sides, I have been of the considered view that the following substantial questions of law should be framed:
Whether the first appellate court was justified in comparing the disputed signature of the testator in Ex.A13, the Will dated 29.01.1979 with that
of his admitted signature in the earlier documents, viz., Exs.B1 dated 16.07.1985 and B5 dated 17.11.1997 and arrive at the conclusion without
taking the assistance of any handwriting expert that the signature found in Ex.A13 Will was that of the genuine signature of the testator?
2.Whether the Appellant/D2 is also entitled to adduce additional evidence as prayed for in M.P. No. 2 of 2009?
Both these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter linked and interwoven, inter-connected and entwined with each other.
The undeniable and the indubitable facts would run thus:
(i) One Karuppanna Gounder happened to be the original owner of the suit properties. According to the Appellant/D2 herein, he during his life
time executed the Will dated 17.01.1979, bequeathing the property in favor of D2herein, who happened to be the grand son through his daughter.
Earlier a litigation emerged; whereupon the said Will was held to be a valid Will. However, in that litigation, the present Plaintiff/R1 herein
Ramamurthi was not a party. The present Plaintiff on coming to know of Ex.A13, the Will dated 29.01.1979purported to have been executed by
the same Karuppana Gounder in his favor filed the suit claiming that he happened to be the beneficiary under the said Will. Ramamurthi is the
maternal grand son of the said Karuppana Gounder. The contention of Ramamurthi was that he was not at all aware of the previous litigation as
well as the previous alleged Will. The trial court dismissed the suit. Whereas the appellate court decreed the suit; as against which, this second
appeal is focused.
(ii) D2 Duraisamy, tooth and nail opposed the alleged Will Ex.A13 on the ground that it was not signed by Karupanna Gounder and the first sheet
of the Will also does not contain the signature of Karuppanna Gounder and the purported signature in the second sheet is not that of Karuppanna
Gounder. He would also submit that no steps have been taken by the Plaintiff/R1 herein to get opinion from any handwriting expert after failing to
get opinion from a private expert in Karnataka, who expressed his inability to compare Tamil signatures.
7.The learned Counsel for D2 also would submit that in Tamil Nadu itself, there is Forensic Department where comparison of disputed signatures
are undertaken and they are conversant with Tamil and in such a case, the inaction on the part of the Plaintiff in getting opinion from the Forensic
Science Department of Tamil Nadu is fatal to his case. He would also submit that his client owing to oversight could not get the certified copy of
the orders and judgments and decrees of the relevant proceedings emerged during the previous proceedings marked, wherefore, wants an
opportunity to adduce additional evidence.
8.Whereas the learned senior counsel for the first Respondent/Plaintiff would set forth and put forth his argument thus:
a] In view of the objection raised by D2, the Plaintiff has chosen to file the present Miscellaneous petition, seeking an order of this Court to get
opinion from the handwriting expert available in Tamil Nadu and that such opportunity might be given to the Plaintiff. The additional evidence
sought to be adduced on the side of D2 is nothing but an after thought and the same cannot be entertained at this stage.
b] The earlier purported Will is not a genuine one and the Plaintiff/R1herein was not a party to those proceedings and only after coming to know
ofEx.A13, he did choose to approach the court to assert his right and the appellate court appropriately and correctly decided the lis, after
comparing the disputed signature in Ex.A13 with that of the admitted signatures. However, by way of abundant caution, his client wanted to get
expert opinion also by filing the aforesaid petition.
9.From the above discussion and narration of facts, what I could understand is that both sides do want some more evidence to be adduced for the
purpose of proper adjudication.
10.I recollect and call-up the following decisions of the Hon''ble Apex Court as well as the decision of this Court:
(i) Thiruvengada Pillai Vs. Navaneethammal and Another, ; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
When there is no doubt that court can compare the disputed handwriting/signature/finger impression with the admitted
handwriting/signature/finger impression, such comparison by court without the assistance of any expert, has always been considered to be
hazardous and risky. When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it
goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger
impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression. The comparison of the two thumb
impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the
admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature
is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb
impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of fingerprints, the court may record a finding on comparison,
even in the absence of an expert''s opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a
guess by a casual perusal.
The decision in Murari Lal and Lalit Popli should not be construed aslaying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and
admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive
denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy
or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and
admitted finger impressions. Further, even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if
necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should should
contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should
avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal.
The trial court had analyzed the evidence properly and had dismissed the suit by giving cogent reasons. The first appellate court reversed it by
wrongly placing onus on the Defendants. Its observation that when the execution of an unregistered document put forth by the Plaintiff was denied
by the Defendants, it was for the Defendants to establish that the document was forged or concocted, is not sound proposition. The first appellate
court proceeded on the basis that it is for the party who asserts something to prove that thing; and as the Defendants alleged that the agreement
was forged, it was for them to prove it. But the first appellate court lost sight of the fact that the party who propounds the document will have to
prove it. In this case the Plaintiff came to court alleging that the first Defendant had executed an agreement of sale in his favor. The first Defendant
having denied it, the burden was on the Plaintiff to prove that the first Defendant had executed the agreement and not on the first Defendant to
prove the negative. The issues also placed the burden on the Plaintiff to prove the document to be true. No doubt, the Plaintiff attempted to
discharge his burden by examining himself as also scribe and one of the attesting witnesses. But the various circumstances enumerated by the trial
court and the High Court referred to earlier, when taken together, rightly create a doubt about the genuineness of the agreement and dislodge the
effect of the evidence of Pws. 1 to 3. We therefore of the view that the decision of the High Court, reversing the decision of the first appellate
Court, does not call for interference.
(ii) The decision of this Court reported in 2008 (3) CTC 470 (Ganapathy Thevar v. Shanmuga Thevar); certain excerpts from it would run thus:
14... The Court cannot assume the role of an expert in comparing the disputed handwriting with that of the admitted ones. No doubt, the Court as
per Section 73 of the Evidence Act, in certain circumstances could exercise its power with caution. In such an event, it is the bounden duty of the
Court to specify clearly as to what are the salient features based on which the finding is arrived at.
It is common knowledge that the science of analyzing the questioned documents contemplates certain principles and theories. Here, both the
Courts below were not objective in analyzing the impugned handwriting.
No carte blanche is given to any Court to simply compare the disputed handwriting with that of the admitted handwritings and arrive at a
subjective satisfaction about the similarities and dissimilarities. There should have been reasons set out for arriving at such conclusion, but here,
both the Courts below have not resorted to such a procedure. The subjective satisfaction of both the Courts below cannot be taken in favor of the
Defendant.
Yet one other precedent is as under:
(iii) The State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Pali Ram,
A bare perusal of those judgments would exemplify and demonstrate that the courts should be reluctant to assume the role of an expert and start
comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature.
11.Here one special feature is involved. Indubitably and unassailably, the said Karuppanna Gounder was not that much educated and it is not in
any way shown that he was dexterous in putting his signature. In such a case, when lack of dexterity is there in a signature of a person, who is not
that much educated, one should be extra ordinarily careful in verifying such signature. More often than not, expert them selves in Handwriting
Science finds it difficult in making comparison of such signatures.
When such is the position, I am at a loss to understand as to how the first appellate court observed as under in para No. 33 of its judgment:
To prove the genuineness of Ex.A13, the Plaintiff has taken steps in I.A. No. 734/01 in the trial court to compare the original signature
contained inEx.A13, along with original signature of Karuppanna Gounder, contained in adocument, dated 12.5.1967 produced in O.S.274/85 on
the file of trial court, whichhas been marked as Ex.B1, in that suit. The said document has been sent from that suit to the present suit in I.A.262/01
to compare the disputed signature in Ex.A13that the admitted signature on 12.5.1967, the original sale deed. Both documents were sent to
Forensic Scientific Laboratory Department on handwriting expert, Government of Karnataka in Bangalore. No report was given by the expert on
the ground that they do not have Tamil knowledge to compare the signature. Once, if expert express their inability, in order to render justice, the
lower court ought to have compared the disputed signature with the admitted signature by using the power given in Section 73 of Evidence Act.
The trial court, even though have empowered to compare the signature contained in Ex.A13 along with the signature contained in document dated
12.5.1967 does not done so. On careful perusal of the original signature of Karuppanna Gounder, contained in document dated 12.5.1967,which
is marked as Ex.B.1 in O.S.274/85 with that of the signature of Karuppanna Gounder contained in Ex.A13. Each word in the signature of each
page is compared in the above deeds and this Court find that both are similar and identical and we can safely conclude that Ex.A13 is a genuine
document. This Court is empowered to compare signature and give opinion u/s 73 of Indian Evidence Act. Further execution of Ex.A13 is clearly
proved by the attestors and scribe, namely P.W.2 to P.W.4. Hence, we can safely conclude that it is a genuine document. Hence, the Plaintiff is
entitled for the relief as sought for in the suit and the points 1 to 3 are answered accordingly
and such a comparison is deprecated in the aforesaid precedents.
Therefore, I could see considerable force in the submission of the learned senior counsel for allowing the petition filed in M.P. No. 1 of 2011
so as to permit the Plaintiff to get the assistance of an handwriting expert to verify the disputed signature found in Ex.A13 with that of admitted
signatures. But counter has been filed on the side of the Appellant/D2. I do not think that such counter has to be countenanced and that the prayer
of the Plaintiff should be discarded.
Even though the Appellant/D2 mostly relies upon the previous proceedings so as to probabilise his defence in this case, yet somehow or other
those documents were not got marked before the courts below for which the learned Counsel for D2 would submit that due to oversight they were
not marked. Therefore, it is clear that both sides do want additional evidence to be placed before the court and for that purpose, the matter has to
be remitted back to the first appellate court after setting aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court with the following direction:
The Plaintiff shall take all endeavors to see that the ante litem motem signatures of Karuppana Gounder are placed before the first appellate court
and preferably such sample signatures should be mostly contemporaneous in nature or somewhat earlier in point of time to the said purported
signature in Ex.A13. Whereupon, an Advocate Commissioner shall be appointed:
(a) To carry the relevant documents in connection with this case personally in a sealed cover;
(b) and produce the same before the Forensic Expert;
(c) leave it in his custody under his acknowledgement for as many days as the Forensic Expert may require;
d) collect the record from the Forensic Expert on the day as may be fixed by him;
(e) bring it back and lodge it with the Court. The Forensic Expert is directed to complete the examination of the records in any event, within 48
hours after the depositing of the same by the Advocate Commissioner with him.
15.The learned Counsel for D2 would submit that the signatures found in the earlier Will dated 17.01.1979 could be taken as sample signature for
which the learned senior counsel for the Plaintiff would raise his objection correctly that it is not an admitted signature by the Plaintiff herein. D2/the
Appellant herein is also given opportunity to get his additional documents filed here, marked in the way known to law before the first appellate
court.
On receipt of expert opinion, the first appellate court shall give due opportunity to both sides to file objections, if any, and it shall also permit
the Plaintiff and D2 to adduce additional oral and documentary evidence in the way known to law. The first appellate court shall decide the matter
and pass appropriate judgment after hearing both sides, within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Both parties shall
appear before the first appellate court on 06.06.2011. It is open for both sides to argue in entirety the case, after adducing additional evidence,
without any restriction whatsoever.
With the above direction, this second appeal is disposed of. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
