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Judgment
31 paragraphs · 693 wordsK. Veemswami, C.J.—The civil revision petitions are placed before us because Kailasam J. was unable to agree with the view in Natesa
Pillai v. Mahalingam Padayachi 1961 (2) M.L.J. 246 as to the scope of Sub-section (5) of Section 4-A of the Madras Cultivating Tenants
Protection Act, 1955. The Petitioner in each of the petitions is a tenant and seeks to revise the order of the concerned Authorised Officer for
resumption of land from the relative cultivating tenant. The question turns on a consideration of the question whether a purchaser from a landlord
subsequent to the date mentioned in Sub-section (4) of Section 4-A will not be hit by the inhibition imposed by Sub-section (5). This precise
matter was considered by one of us in Kothqnda Pillai v. Devaraja Redely 1966 (1) M.L.J. 164. It was there held that subsection (5) fixed not
merely a ceiling in respect of the extent with reference to which right to resume or personal cultivation was given, but also draw a line en time so
that any change subsequent thereto in the circumstances of the landlord was made ineffective to disturb the protection afforded to the cultivating
tenant In expressing that view, support was derived from two earlier cases, Natesa Pillai v. Mahalinga Padayachi 1966 (1) M.L.J. 164 and
Rajadurai v. Kunjurasu Vanniar 1961 (2) M.L.J. 246.
Kailasam J. in stating that he found himself unable to agree with the view in Natesan Pillai v. Mahalinga Padayachi 1966 (1) M.L.J. 164
observed:
With respect, I find myself unable to agree with this view, for this disqualification contemplated in Section 4-A(5) attaches to a person who was
not entitled to resume possession u/s 4-A(4) and not to a landlord, which is made clear by the sub-section itself that ''no person'' who is not
entitled to resume possession would be deemed to do so by reason of any subsequent change in his circumstances the words ''no person'' and
''subsequent change in his circumstances'' would indicate that the sub-section refer to persons who were disqualified u/s 4-A(4) . and not to
landlords, who became purchasers subsequent to the coming into force of the Amendment Act as such purchasers will be landlords under the
definition and there is no disqualification for them from applying for resumption as purchasers subsequent to the date when the Amendment Act
came into force.
We regret out inability to share this view. Sub-section (5) is the only one among the Sub-sections 4-A which uses the word person and this has
been done by the Legislature deliberately. The object is clear. A landlord who suffers from the disability under Sub-section (4) should be unable to
defeat the inhibition by transferring a part of his land reducing his holding at or below the ceiling level, and then enabling the purchaser to claim
resumption. The word person in Sub-section (5), therefore, seems to cover not only a landlord who was not entitled to resume possession under
the section on the date the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act 1956, came into force, but also a person who, not owning
land on that date, but by purchase coming to own land thereafter, will suffer from the same disability. He was not a person entitled to resume on
the relevant date and by subsequent change of circumstances, in this case as a purchaser, he could not cloth himself with the right to resume.
Where a landlord did not suffer from the disability under Sub-section (4), but transferred a part of his holding to another, the transferee not being a
person entitled to resume on the relevant date could not be in a better position because of his purchase. This seems to be literally the effect of Sub-
section (5). No doubt this may work hardship, but it is not for us to depart from the actual language employed. The Act was looking at the matter
from the point of view of the cultivating tenant and the protection to be afforded to him. The protection sought to be afford was as on the date the
Amendment Act of 1956 came into force. That being am, these petitions are allowed. No costs.
