K. Narasimhalu Chetti vs R.V. Subramaniam and others

Venkatadri, J.—After the judgment was delivered on 16th November, 1965, the Counsel for the respondents represented to me that some

time might be given to them to prefer an appeal and accordingly I gave them a week''s time, as I was under the impression that an appeal would

automatically lie and that was also the reason why I struck off the words ""leave granted"" and asked the parties to file the appeal in the usual course.

When the respondents attempted to file a Letters Patent Appeal; the office returned the papers saying that leave of Court had to be obtained. At

their request by letter dated 17th November, 1965 to post the petition for being mentioned; I directed that the petition be posted before me; and

thus the application is before me now. Though grant of leave to appeal is the discretion of the Judge, who disposed of the case'' learned Counsel

for the petitioner opposed the application that leave should not be granted, since respondents 1 and 2 have been adjudged contemners and have

not purged their contempt by giving up possession of the premises in question for which they were held liable. He also represented to me that,

since the respondents interfered with the administration of justice, it was a quasi-criminal act, that the order passed by me for punishing them

should be treated as an order in a criminal case and that therefore leave to appeal should be granted only on the well-known principles on which

leave to appeal in criminal case is given. But Mr. Govind Swaminathan, on behalf of the contemners represented that he is entitled to ask for leave,

as the proceedings before me have arisen out of a second appeal, a proceeding of a civil nature, and being a civil contempt, Court can give leave

to appeal. In this connection, he drew my attention to Gundu Venkatalingam Vs. Gundu Mrutyanjayadu, where the learned Judges have observed

thus :

An order committing a party for contempt of Court; in alienating certain properties in breach of an undertaking not to alienate...., is not an order in

a criminal proceeding within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent but one in a civil matter and is appealable.

Learned Counsel also cited Govind Swaminathan In re. [1955] 1 M. L. J. 205, where at page 215 it has been observed :

Contempts have been classified into two categories-which might broadly be designated civil and criminal contempts-the former comprising those

cases where the power of the Court is invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to order of Courts and the latter where the act of the

contemner is calculated to interfere with the course of justice including liable or insults to judges and publications prejudicing the fair conduct of

proceedings in Court. In regard to ''civil'' contempts, Courts have held that being civil in their nature, appeals lie from orders passed in such

cases......

Learned Counsel, therefore, contended that the matter involved before me is in the nature of civil contempt and the respondents would be entitled

to ask the Court to grant leave to prefer an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent.

Still, the question that arises for my consideration is whether the respondents are entitled to leave as a matter of right, or whether it should be

considered as a fit case where leave to appeal should be given. Soon after the argument were closed on this petition on 19th November, 1965, I

asked Mr. Sivamani, learned Counsel for the second respondent, whether his client had handed over possession of the premises to the petitioner,

since I had given a week''s time in my order dated 16th November, 1965, and he definitely expressed that his client would not hand over

possession of the property till the suit filed by her in the City Civil Court is finally disposed of. When such is the defiant attitude, I have to consider

seriously whether leave should be granted, even though the contempt is of civil nature and whether the contemners can be heard in appeal till they

purge their contempt. It is useful, in this connection, to refer to the well-known passage of Lord Atkin in Andre Paul v. Attorney General A. I. R.

1936 P. C. 141:

Every one will recognise the importance of maintaining the authority of the Court; in restraining and punishing interferences with the administration

of justice whether they be interferences in particular civil or criminal cases or take the form of attempts to deprecate the authority of the Courts

themselves. It is sufficient to say that such interferences when they amount to contempt of Courts are quasi-criminal acts, and orders punishing

them should, generally speaking, be treated as orders in criminal cases, and leave to appeal against them should only be granted on, the well-

known principles on which leave to appeal in criminal cases is given.

This was approved by the Privy Council in Yeny S. N. Banerjee v. Kuchwar Lime Co. AIR 1933 P.C. 295 In Pritam Singh Vs. The State, their

Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that in criminal cases leave would be granted only in exceptional and special circumstances where it is

shown that substantial and grave injustice has been done and where there are features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision. The

instant case does not, in my opinion, fulfil, any of these conditions. I am therefore constrained to refuse leave.