K P Sharangadharan vs Radhakrishnan.C

A. Badharudeen, J

This Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as `Cr.P.C' for convenience). Revision petitioner is the sole accused in S.T.No.22/2019 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-IV, Alappuzha. The revision petitioner impugns the judgment dated 13.07.2021 in the above case, which was confirmed by the Sessions Judge, Alappuzha in Crl.Appeal No.86/2021 dated 15.07.2022. He also impugns order dated 15.07.2022 in Crl.R.P.No.12/2021 passed by the appellate court. The 1st respondent is the State of Kerala and the 2nd respondent is original complainant before the trial court.

Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor as well as the the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent.

I shall refer the parties in this Revision Petition as to their status before the trial court as `complainant' and `accused'.

Summary of the case put up by the complainant before the trial court is as under:

The complainant lodged prosecution alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (`N.I Act' for short) when cheque dated 25.09.2017 for Rs.5 lakh, alleged to be issued by the accused to the complainant in discharge of the amount he borrowed from the complainant, got dishonoured.

The trial court ventured the matter and recorded evidence. During trial, PW1 and PW2 examined and Exts.P1 to P7 were marked on the side of the complainant.

Though opportunity was given to the accused to adduce evidence after questioning him under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C, he did not adduce any evidence.

The trial court on evaluation of the evidence found that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I Act and he was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment till rising of the court and to pay fine of Rs.5.3 lakh and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 5 months. The fine amount was ordered to be paid as compensation under Section 357(1) of Cr.P.C.

The appellate court considered the appeal as well as the revision petition together and finally concurred with the conviction imposed by the trial court, while enhancing the compensation by allowing the revision petition filed by the complainant. Thus the appellate court modified the sentence to pay fine of Rs.7,66,250/- instead of Rs.5,30,000/-. While challenging the concurrent verdicts of conviction, the learned counsel for the accused argued that the findings on fact of issuance of cheque by the accused based on the evidence of PW1 and PW2 are incorrect. It is argued that the courts below failed to appreciate the evidence tendered by the accused properly. It is argued that the trial court as well as the appellate court went wrong in granting compensation in excess of the cheque amount.

I have perused the trial court as well as the appellate court judgments. In this matter, the trial court as well as the appellate court relied on the evidence of PW1 and PW2, supported by Exts.P1 to P7, to hold that the complainant discharged his initial burden in the matter of transaction which led to execution of Ext.P1 cheque. In fact, nothing extracted during cross examination of PW1 or PW2 to disbelieve their version. Evidence of PW1 was corroborated by the evidence of PW2, who  witnessed  the  transaction  and  execution  of  the  cheque. Accordingly, the courts below given the benefit of presumptions in favour of the complainant.

In this connection, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], Rangappa v. Sri Mohan. In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I Act and held as under:

“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”

In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under:

“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”

In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6063 : 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker. 855 : 2021 (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT OnLine 1132], Kalamani Tex (M/s.) & anr. v. P.Balasubramanian the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act it was held as under:

“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its  judgment  that  the  Trial  Court  completely  overlooked  the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay.

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Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC

2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:

“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”

Thus  the  law  is  clear  on  the  point  that  when  the complainant discharged the initial burden to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act would come into play. No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of proof of rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities.

It has been settled in law that the accused can either adduce independent evidence or rely on the evidence tendered by the complainant to rebut the presumptions. In this case, no evidence available to rebut the presumption, as rightly found by the courts below. Therefore, the conviction requires no interference.

In this matter, the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the accused is confined to appreciation and re-appreciation of evidence and in fact the power of this Court while exercising revision cannot go to the said extent.

It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5):

“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”

In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135) :

“14. …... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda. Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is non-consideration of any relevant materials or fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available.

In this matter, the courts below rightly appreciated and re-appreciated the evidence and entered into the conviction and the said conviction does not require any interference.

As far as the challenge against the revision against the enhancement of fine from Rs.5.3 lakh to Rs.7,66,250/- is concerned, the same is not prohibited under law.

In the decision reported in [2012 (1) SCC 260 : AIR 2012 SC 528 ], Vijayan R. v. Baby & anr. the Apex Court held in para.16 that in all cases of conviction, uniformly exercise the power to levy fine upto twice the cheque amount (keeping in view the cheque amount and the simple interest thereon at 9% per annum as the reasonable quantum of loss) and direct payment of such amount as compensation. Direction to pay compensation by way of restitution in regard to the loss on account of dishonour of the cheque should be practical and realistic, which would mean not only the payment of the cheque amount but interest thereon at a reasonable rate. Uniformity and consistency in deciding similar cases by different Courts, not only increase the credibility of cheque as a negotiable instrument, but also the credibility of Courts of justice. It was further held that one other solution is a further amendment to the provision of Chap.17 so that in all cases where there is a conviction, there should be a consequential levy of fine of an amount sufficient to cover the cheque amount and interest thereon at a fixed rate of 9% per annum interest, followed by award of such sum as compensation from the fine amount. This would lead to uniformity in decisions, avoid multiplicity of proceedings (one for enforcing civil liability and another for enforcing criminal liability) and achieve the object of Chap.17 of the Act, which is to increase the credibility of the instrument. This is however a matter for the Law Commission of India to consider. So far, no amendment brought into the Statute.

Since imposition of fine twice the cheque amount is provided under Section 138 of the N.I Act, when fine is imposed within the said statutory limit, such imposition the same cannot be held as illegal. This aspect was recognised by the Apex Court in Vijayan R. v. Baby & anr.'s case (supra). As such, no illegality could be found in the matter of enhancement of fine while allowing Crl.R.P.No.12/2021 by the Sessions Court. Thus it appears that the challenge raised by the accused in this Revision Petition cannot sustain. Therefore, the conviction as well as the sentence stand confirmed.

In the result, this Revision Petition stands dismissed.

Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/accused sought for 5 months' time to pay the compensation. Considering the fact that the transaction is of the year 2015 and the fine amount would come to Rs.7,66,250/-, I am inclined to grant 5 months' time from today to pay the compensation. Therefore, the revision petitioner is directed to appear before the trial court on or before 11.04.2023 to undergo the sentence and to pay compensation. In default to do so, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence as per law without fail. The execution of the sentence shall stand deferred till 10.04.2023.