K. Prabhakar Reddy vs State of Andhra Pradesh and Others

Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.—The exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is of widest possible amplitude. Public Interest Litigation, the seeds of which were sown in United States more than a century ago has had its due impact in Indian jurisprudence as well, though, however much later and this phenomenon from time to time has had judicial recognition throughout the country and consequently a step forward to sub-serve the ends of justice. The concept of justice ought to be the predominant factor in judicial approach and the law courts in order to do so have been dealing with matters in a manner and in accordance with the doctrine of natural justice to achieve this end. The usual adversorial litigation is a part of our judicial system but the advent of this phenomenon has been received with wide acclamation throughout the country and it is on this count that the Supreme Court right from the beginning however has sounded a caution to the effect that it may not be the act of a busy body or to satisfy individualistic ego or other egoistic social complication. Individual disputes ought not to gain momentum in a Court of law under the coverage of public interest litigation and attempts to that effect ought always to be decided by the law courts and as a matter of fact there should be a positive discouragement to such an individualistic litigation in the garb of a public interest litigation and it is only in the clearest of cases of general affectation of right of the community at large or a wide variety of cross-section of people, the law court would extend its assistance, so as to avoid any social or general mischief having due regard to the concept of justice. The Supreme Court recently in the case of S.P. Anand Vs. H.D. Deve Gowda and others, observed;

".... It is of utmost importance that those who invoke this Court''s jurisdiction seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed. Such a litigant must not succumb to spasmodic sentiments and behave like a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of issues providing publicity. He must remember that as a person seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the Court that he does not rush to Court without undertaking a research, even if he is qualified or competent to raise the issue. Besides, it must be remembered that a good cause can be lost if petitions are filed on half-baked information without proper research or by persons who are not qualified and competent to raise such issues as the rejection of such a petition may affect third parry rights. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind that no one has a right to the waiver of the locus standi rule and the Court should permit it only when it is satisfied that the carriage of proceedings in the competent hands of a person who is genuinely concerned in public interest and is not moved by other extraneous considerations. So also the Court must be careful to ensure that the process of the Court is not sought to be abused by a person who desires to persist with his point of view, almost carrying it to the point of obstinacy, by filing a series of petitions refusing to accept the Court''s earlier decisions as concluding the point. We say this because when we draw the attention of the petitioner to earlier decisions of this Court, he brushed them aside without so much as showing willingness to deal with them and without giving them a second look, as having become stale and irrelevant by passage of time and challenged their correctness on the specious plea that they needed reconsideration he had no answer to the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this Court even by a person well-versed in law would not be countenanced. Instead, as pointed out earlier, he referred to decisions having no bearing on the question, like the decisions on cow slaughter cases, freedom of speech and expression, uniform civil code, etc., we need say no more except to point out that indiscriminate use of this important lever of public interest litigation would blunt the lever itself.''''

It is therefore required that the law Court should use proper circumspection before entertaining an application under Article 226 or passing orders thereon on the plea of a general affectation of the public at large.

Having discussed the law on the subject, let us now at this juncture advert to the factual aspect briefly. The petitioner, questioned the proceedings dated 13-12-1994 passed by the competent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation ) Act, 1976 (for short ''the Act''). The 3rd respondent being one Smt. Kunwar Rani, aged about 70 years, R/o. H.No. 6-3-1216/2, Begumpet, Hyderabad, filed a declaration u/s 6 of the Act. The 2nd respondent being the competent authority within the meaning of the Act by an order dated 7-8-1991 declared the 3rd respondent (Smt. Kunwar Rani) a surplus land-holder to the extent of 14920 Sq.Mtrs. Be noted that in the declaration filed by the 3rd respondent it has been stated that she is having four (4) acres of land at Begumpet and a residential double storeyed building having a covered area of 2500 sq.yds. at the premises in question as noted above. She has also claimed exemption, u/s 19 of the Act, for use of the land as play-ground for school children. Being aggrieved by the order of the competent authority in regard to surplus land, the 3rd respondent, however, preferred an appeal and the same was dismissed on 28-1-1994. Subsequently, a writ petition was filed in this Court and this Court upon consideration of the contextual facts disposed of the same by ajudgment dated 31-10-1994 and remitted the matter back for fresh enquiry before the appropriate authority. The 2nd respondent dealt with the matter on remand from the High Court, but declared the 3rd respondent as a non-surplus holder. It is this order which is under challenge by the writ petitioner as and by way of a public interest litigation.

The learned senior Advocate Mr. M. V. Ramana Reddy, appearing for the appellant contended that in the original declaration filed by the 3rd respondent no structures were shown by her except "Karan Mahal''. Therefore, the competent as well as the appellate authority in the first instance rightly found the 3rd respondent holding an excess quantum of land to the extent of 14920.92 Sq.Mtrs. Be it recorded that the 3rd respondent filed objection to the statement issued by the competent authority and it is on this count that the learned advocate very strongly contended that if there are really construction and other dwelling units, she would not have failed to mention the same in the declaration filed at the first stage u/s 6(1) of the Act As noted above, be it placed on record that after submission of the objections by the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent duly considered Ihe matter and final orders were passed on 13-12-1994 in accordance with the directions of the High Court. The learned single Judge in the order impugned while adverting to the factual score recorded.

"Sri. C. Hanumantha Rao, learned Counsel appearing for Respondents 3 to 6 submits that even in Annexure-A to the declaration submitted u/s 6(1) of the Act. The third respondent stated in column 9 thereof, house with servant quarters etc. He also submits that the printed form does not have sufficient space to mention all the details. Further after the draft statement u/s 8(1) of the Act is served on the third respondent, it would be open to her to point out defects by way of objections within a period of 30 days under sub-section (3) of Section 8 ofthe Act. Even under the compromise memo filed in O.S.No.28 of 1959, it is stated that there is a double storeyed building without houses in this land. In the final decree also it is mentioned that there is a double storeyed building without outhouses and certain portion was occupied by hut dwellers. Even in the plaint in O.S.No.28 of 1959 it is clearly stated that between the years 1929 and 1930 A.D. Raj Bahadur Kundanlal constructed a palatial building bearing House No.6-3-1192 with various apportinenant stables, garages and out-houses and in the plaint it is clearly mentioned at more than one place that there are several out-houses. In A-schedule itself it is stated in item-II that building with eight (8) out-houses were in existence. In B-schedule again number of houses were shown. In fact copies of plaint compromise memo, final decree etc., filed by the petitioner himself, would support the contention of the 3rd respondent that out-houses and other structure were in existence even by the year 1958.

Sri. C. Hanumantha Rao, learned Counsel for the third respondent also submits that the competent authority did check measure the details furnished by the third respondent, and he accordingly, prepared a plan also showing the measurements and olher details of the existing structures. Therefore, it cannot be said that the second respondent has passed the order dated 13-12-1994 in a mechanical way without verifying the physical features. Considering the material placed before me it is not possible for me to come to the conclusion that the second respondent passed orders either mechanically or arbitrarily,'''' and it is on this factual backdrop the learned single judge observed :

"Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner has approached this Court by way of this writ petition purely on extraneous considerations rather than for ventilating public interest. On this ground also this writ petition is not maintainable,

The writ petition is also incompetent for another reason. The disputed questions about the existence of super structures on a particular date and their extents or otherwise cannot be gone into by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, more so, after a long lapse of time. Further ample mechanism is provided under hierarchy of authorities under the Act for redressal of grievances. But the petitioner being an Advocate, who is aware of the alternate remedies available under the Act, has kept quiet for more than two long years, allowed the order to become final, and has come up by way of this writ petition under the guise of public interest litigation, in my view is impermissible.

For all the reasons, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs."

It is on this observation however that the learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal contended that the learned single Judge was clearly in error since Ihe manner in which the matter in its entirety has been dealt with by the authorities, under the Act, cannot but be termed to be totally arbitrary rendering it to an illegal order.

The litigation admittedry pertains to an individual property in question and the Urban Land Ceiling authorities have dealt with the matter as they have deemed fit in terms of the direction of the Court. The Parties in this adversorial litigation have chosen not to come up before the Court. On the contrary, a person having no interest in the matter wants to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in the garb of a public interest litigation. The litigation pertains to the property in question admittedly belonging to a single individual and the matter has been dealt with as noted above, by the Urban Land Ceiling authorities and as such there being an affectation of right covering the entire public at large does not and cannot arise.

On the wake of the factual details as above and on the basis of the law as discussed above we do record our concurrence with Ihe observations of the learned single Judge that the petition cannot be said to be a petition for ventilating public interest. In this context the observation of the Supreme Court in Ihe case of Dr. Nandjee Singh Vs. P.G. Medical Students Association and others, ought also to be noted:

"The facts narrated above would reveal that this was a dispute relating to an individual and turned on the facts. There was no question of law involved in it We have, therefore, not understood how the respondent-Association could convert an individual dispute into a public interest litigation. We are of the view that cases where what is strictly an individual dispute is sought to be convened into a public interest litigation should not be encouraged. The present proceeding is one of the kind."

The observations of the Supreme Court, in the case of Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti Vs. State of U.P. and others, ought also to be noted and very apposite in the contextual facts:

"Article 32 is a great and salutary safeguard for preservation of fundamental rights of the citizens. Every citizen has a fundamental right to have the enjoyment of quality of life and living as contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution. Anything which endangers or impairs by conduct of anybody either in violation or in derogation of laws, that quality of life and living by the people is entitled to be taken recourse of Article 32 of the Constitution. But this can only be done by any person interested genuinely in the protection of the society on behalf of the society or community. This weapon as a safeguard must be utilised and invoked by the Court with great deal of circumspection and caution Where it appears that this is only a cloak to "feed fact ancient grudge" and enmity, this should not only be refused but strongly discouraged. While it is the duty of this Court to enforce fundamental rights, it is also the duty of this Court to ensure that this weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or permitted to be misused creating a bottleneck in the superior Court preventing other genuine violation of fundamental rights being considered by the Court. That would be an act or a conduct which will defeat the very purpose of fundamental rights".

The decisions cited by the learned advocate in support of the appeal, however, do not advance the case any further, neither the same lend any assistance to the contentions raised in the matter, as such we refrain ourselves in dealing with the same in detail except recording that those decisions do not have any application in the facts of the matter under considerations.

In the view as above, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submission of the learned advocate for the appellant and as such the application fails and the appeal is also dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.