K. Rajasekar vs The District Revenue Officer and Another

K.A. Swami, C.J.—This appeal is preferred against the order dated 13.9.1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 14515 of 1993. Learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition. Hence the Petitioner has now come on appeal.

In the writ petition the Petitioner sought for a writ in the nature of a writ of mandamus directing the Respondents viz''., the District Revenue Officer and the District Supply Officers, Virudhunagar, Kamarajar District to release and hand over 46 bags of sugar seized by the second Respondent on 27.7.1993 at Aruppukottai to the Petitioner. Learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition on the ground that the enquiry u/s 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, hereinafter called the Act, has been initiated and a show cause notice u/s 6-B of the Act has been issued and the said enquiry is pending.

The grievance made in this appeal is that without affording an opportunity of hearing the seized bags of sugar have been sold even though they are not subjected to natural decay. Learned Government Pleader, who has been asked to take notice in the writ appeal, argues that the stock was seized on 27.7.1993 and the same was handed over on 28.7.1993 to the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation, that on 27.7.1993 the District Revenue Officer instructed the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation to dispose of the stock. Accordingly the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation disposed of the stock and sent a cheque dated 22.9.1993 for a sum of Rs. 34,472/- to the District Revenue Officer and that the Petitioner has also made an application in the proceedings initiated u/s 6-A of the Act. The enquiry in going on. It is also contended by the Government Pleader that in light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shambu Dayal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal (1990 (3) SCC 649) there is no question of releasing the sugar seized. If at all it is established that the Petitioner is the owner of the 46 bags of sugar and has not committed in contravention of the provisions governing the sale and transporting of sugar, he would be entitled to the value of the said 46 bags of sugar as provided under the provisions of the Act. Of course, the facts stated by the Government Pleader would be sufficient to dismiss the writ appeal, because, the only prayer made in the writ petition is that the seized sugar bags should be released. However, during the course of the arguments it is contended by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant that the District Revenue Officer is not even permitting the Petitioner to establish that he is the owner of the 46 bags of sugar in question and the same are not liable to be confiscated. In the proceedings u/s 6-A of the Act, the persons interested in the seized commodity are not entitled to be given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation as provided u/s 6-B of the Act. Now the question of issuing a show cause notice to the Petitioner does not arise because he himself has made an application to be impleaded in the proceedings. Therefore, it would be sufficient if we direct the District Revenue Officer to disclose the grounds for confiscation and afford the Petitioner Appellant an opportunity of meeting the same and of hearing before he decides the matter.

Before we reach the final portion of the judgment we may also refer to the relevant portion of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shambu Dayal Agarwala''s case (cited supra) on which reliance is placed by the Government Pleader. After considering the provisions contained in Section 3, 6-A, 6-B, 6-C and 7 of the Act and in the light of the object with which the Essential Commodities Act is enacted, the Supreme Court has laid down the law as follows:

... Only a limited power of sale of the commodity in the manner prescribed by Sub-section (2) of Section 6-A is granted. This shows that the Legislature did not intend to confer a power on the Collector to return the essential commodity to the owner or the person from whose possession it Was seized. That is for the obvious reason that it would run counter to the very object and purpose of the enactment. And now to the structural setting and context in which the word ''release'' is used in Section 6-F. While debarring courts, tribunals and other authorities from exercising power in relation to the seized commodity, power is conferred on the Collector or the State Government concerned u/s 6-C, to make orders with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such commodity, etc. This power can be exercised pending confiscation. The power conferred by this Section is unqualified. The word ''release'' is preceded by the words ''possession'', delivery and ''disposal'' and followed by the word ''distribution. The acting and context in which the word ''release'' is used makes it clear that it is not used in the sense of return. In the first place as pointed out earlier it would completely defeat the purpose and object of the Act, if the essential commodity seized for suspected contravention of the order made u/s 3 is returned to the owner or person from whom it was seized even before the confiscation proceedings were completed. Such an intention cannot be described to the Legislature. Secondly, it is not possible to believe that the Legislature would confer unqualified and unrestricted power to return the essential commodity to the owner or the person from whose possession it was seized before a decision whether or not to confiscate the same is taken. As the Section stands if the interpretation put by the counsel for the Appellant is accepted, it would be permissible to the Collector to return or restore the commodity without imposing any condition, pending confiscation proceedings. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the interpretation placed by Mr. Rao on the word ''release''. The scheme of Sections 6-A, 6-B and 6-C makes it clear that after the essential commodity is seized and the same is inspected by the concerned Collector, the latter has to decide, after complying with the procedure set out in Section 6-B, whether or not to confiscate the essential commodity. Since the procedure delineated in Section 6-B is time consuming the Collector has been given special power to sell the essential commodity as stated in Sub-section(2) of Section 6-A if it is subject to speedy and natural decay or it is expedient in public interests so to do. If the Collector decides not to confiscate the commodity and if no prosecution is launched or contemplated, the commodity has to be returned to the owner or person from whom it was seized. If, in the mean time it is sold in exercise of power under Sub-section(2) of Section 6-A, the price of the commodity has to be paid as provided by Sub-section (3) of Section 6-A If the Collector has ordered confiscation but the order is reversed in appeal u/s 6-C and no prosecution is pending, Sub-section (2) of Section 6-C enjoins that the essential commodity should be returned and if that is not possible its price together with reasonable interest. It is pertinent to note that Sub-section (2) of Section 6-C used the words "return the essential commodity seized" and not the words "release the essential commodity seized". It seems to us that having regard to the scheme of the Act, the object and purpose of the statute and the mischief it seeks to guard against the word ''release'' is used in the limited sense of release for sale, etc., so that the same becomes available to the consumer public. There could be no question of releasing the commodity in the sense of returning it to the owner or person from whom it was seized even before the proceeding for confiscation stood completed and before the termination of the prosecution in the acquittal of the offender. Such a view would render Clause (b) of Section 7(1) totally nugatory. It seems to us that Section 6-F is intended to serve a dual purpose, namely (1) to present interference by courts, etc., and (ii) to effectuate the sale of the essential commodity under Sub-section (2) and the return of the animal, vehicle, etc., under the second Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 6-A. In that sense Section 6-F is complementary in nature. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in the ultimate conclusion it reached.

For the reasons stated above, the writ appeal is disposed of in the following terms:

The District Revenue Officer, Virudhunagar, Kamarajar District is directed to disclose, the grounds for confiscation by serving a show cause notice on the Petitioner/Appellant and afford him an opportunity to file his objections to the same and then decide the proceedings in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.