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Judgment
A batch of writ petitions challenging orders passed by
the learned Civil Judges were dismissed by the learned Single
Judge vide order dated 18/05/2015 holding that since the tenancy
was determined before notifications were issued extending the
Rajasthan rent Control Act, 2001 to the towns where the suit
property was situated, the civil courts alone would have
jurisdiction to decide the lis between the landlord and the tenant.
But at the same time, by the last paragraph of the order, noting a
conflicting view taken by other learned Single Judge, reference
was made to the Division Bench to decide the issue. This explains
D.B. Civil Reference No.1/2015 being registered.
The three D.B. Civil Special Appeals challenge the same
impugned order dated 18/05/2015 in so far as S.B. Civil Writ
Petition Nos.3925/2015 and 3926/2015 & 3968/2015 have been
dismissed.
Relevant would it be to note that when the civil suits
seeking ejectment were filed the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001
was not applicable to the concerned municipal areas. On
11/07/2014, notification was issued by the State Government
extending the provisions of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001
to the municipal areas of Kishangarh, Beawar, Bhiwadi, Hindon
City, Gangapur City, Sujangarh, Makrana, Fatehpur, Suratgarh,
Ratangarh, Sardarshahar and Balotra.
A preliminary objection by learned counsel for the
respondents to the maintainability of the above three captioned
writ appeals needs to be noted and decided first. The argument is
that challenge before the learned Single Judge was to an order
dated 23/02/2015 passed by the learned Additional District Judge,
Kishangarh dismissing applications filed by the tenants seeking
amendment in the appeal to bring on record the fact that by a
notification issued in July, 2014 the Rajasthan Rent Control Act,
2001 had been extended to the municipal area of Kishangarh and
thus the tenants could not be evicted by a decree passed by a
Civil Court. It was urged that no appeal would lie against the
impugned order for the reason the writ petition challenged an
order passed by a Civil Court.
Objection has to be overruled for the reason the
learned Single Judge disagreed with an earlier decision passed by
a learned Single Judge on the question of whether the Civil Courts
would lose jurisdiction once a Rent Act was extended to the area
where the suit property was situated. The earlier decision was that
the Civil Courts would lose jurisdiction. After dismissing the writ
petitions, the learned Single Judge has, vide para 20 of the order,
referred the matter to the Chief Justice for being placed before a
Division Bench.
The vexing issue that arises for our consideration
during the course of present proceedings is whether the civil
courts which have been in seisin of lis between landlords and
tenants would now be divested of their jurisdiction to adjudicate
such cases in view of the subsequent notification(s) extending the
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 to the areas in which the suit
property is situated.
On the strength of the recent decision of the Supreme
Court reported as (2017) 4 SCC 202 '' Rajender Bansal & Ors. v.
Bhuru (Dead ) through legal representatives & Ors.''. it has been
fervently contended on behalf of the landlords that the jurisdiction
of the civil courts would remain preserved in pending proceedings
that have been initiated before the issuance of notification(s)
extending the operation of Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 to
the areas in which the suit property is situated.
At the outset, it would thus be apposite to delve into
the mandate of the recent enunciation of law by the Supreme
Court in Rajender Bansal''s case (supra).
A perusal of the said decision evinces that a similar
issue fell for determination of the Supreme Court in the context of
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973. In view
of the notification(s) subsequently extending the applicability of
the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 to the
areas where the leased premises was situated, it had been urged
on behalf of the tenants that the civil courts would cease to have
jurisdiction with regard to eviction/ejectment of tenants even
insofar as pending proceedings were concerned. The plea of the
tenants found favour with the High Court and under such
circumstances the landlords invoked the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.
Upon a comprehensive survey of the long line of
decisions rendered earlier, the Supreme Court proceeded to
concatenate the legal principles emerging therefrom in paragraph
18 of its pronouncement. It would be beneficial for the purpose of
our discussion to reproduce the same hitherto fore:-
"18.1. Rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the law applicable on the date of filing of the suit will continue to apply until suit is disposed of or adjudicated.
18.2. If during the pendency of the suit, Rent Act becomes applicable to the premises in question, that would be of no consequence and it would not take away the jurisdiction of civil court to dispose of a suit validly instituted.
18.3. In order to oust the jurisdiction of civil court, there must be a specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of those cases also which were validly instituted before the date when protection of Rent Act became available in respect of the said area/premises/tenancy.
18.4. In case aforesaid position is not accepted and the protection of the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suit validly instituted prior in point of time when there was no such protection under the Act, it will have the consequence of making the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act becoming applicable to the said area/premises, unexecutable after the application of these Rent Act s in respect of such premises. This would not be in consonance with the legislative intent."
The Supreme Court observed that while evolving the
said legal precepts, the Court had taken cognizance of two pristine
principles of immemorial antiquity viz. ubi jus ibi remedium
(where there exists a right there is a remedy and it can be
excluded only by substantial legislation expressly extinguishing
the said right) and actus curiae neminem gravabit (nobody should
be allowed to suffer because of the act of the Court). The Court
applied the principles stated in earlier cases - (1988) 4 SCC 284
''Atma ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia '', (1992) 1 SCC 751
'' Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge '', (1998) 2 SCC
710 '' Shri Kishan v. Manoj Kumar '' and (2002) 5 SCC 462
'' Mansoor Khan v. Moitram Harebhan Kharat '', wherein, the
Supreme Court had consistently negatived the contention raised
on behalf of the tenants that a suit for eviction instituted during
the moratorium period of ten years was liable to be defeated as
the civil court lost its jurisdiction upon expiry of the said period.
Significantly, before terminating discussion and
drawing the curtains, the Supreme Court added a caveat and
carefully engrafted an exception to its observations comprised in paragraph 18 of its pronouncement. The said exercise was
necessitated in view of two earlier pronouncements of the
Supreme Court on the subject - (1980) 1 SCC 1 '' Mani Subrat Jain
v. Raja Ram Vohra '' and (1985) 1 SCC 270 '' Lakshmi Narayan Guin
& Ors. v. Niranjan Modak ''.
The Court observed that in Mani Subrat Jain''s case
(supra), the Supreme Court had taken into consideration the
provisions of East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, wherein, the
definition of "tenant" contained in Section 2(i) included an ex-
tenant and more importantly the provisions of Section 13 of the
said Act specifically provided that a tenant would not be evicted
even in execution of a decree passed either before or after the
commencement of the Rent Restriction Act, except in accordance
with the provisions of Section 13 or in pursuance of the order
passed under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act. In light of
such statutory provisions, the tenant was granted the benefit of
the Rent Restriction Act and the decree passed by the civil court
was rendered inexecutable.
The Court while examining Lakshmi Narayan Guin''s
case (supra) opined that the relevant provisions of West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 which fell for consideration of the
Supreme Court in the said were of similar nature as noticed in
Mani Subrat Jain''s case (supra) and thus the tenant was afforded
the protection of the Rent Act even though it was extended to the
relevant area during the pendency of the first appeal.
In view of the peculiar provisions comprised in certain
Rent legislations that had been noticed by the Supreme Court in
Mani Subrat Jain''s case (supra) and Lakshmi Narayan Guin''s case
(supra), the Court in paragraph 22 of the report in Rajender
Bansal''s case (supra) thus held:-
"22. ...In case definition of "tenant" and provisions pertaining to eviction of tenants contained in Rent Act s cover even those cases where the tenancy has been terminated (or depending upon the provisions of the rent Act, even when civil Court has passed the decree) the protection provided under such provision would come to the rescue of the tenant even in respect of pending cases. It is because of the reason that such a Rent Act specifically provides for protection of this nature and bars the jurisdiction of civil court even in respect of pending cases. . . ."
The supreme Court allowed the appeal preferred by
the landlords while observing that under the scheme of Haryana
Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 no protection was
afforded to the ex-tenants and there was no provision excluding
the jurisdiction of the civil courts in respect of pending cases,
expressly or impliedly.
It is thus palpable from the decision in Rajender
Bansal''s case (supra), more particularly paragraph 22 of the
report of the said judgment, that the issue whether the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, insofar as pending proceedings are
concerned, would stand ousted by operation of a Rent Control
Legislation or not is to be answered by taking into consideration
the peculiar provisions comprised in such legislations.
We thus embark on the voyage to consider the
relevant provisions comprised in Rajasthan Rent Control Act,
2001.
The first provision that would be worthy of
consideration is the definition of "tenant" as comprised under
Section 2(i) of the said Act:-
"2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless subject or context otherwise requires.- xxx (i) "tenant" means- (i) the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is, or but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any premises to his landlord including the person who is continuing in its possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than by an order or decree for eviction passed under the provisions of this Act; and
xxx
..."
Since we are required to adjudicate the issue of ouster
of jurisdiction of the civil courts, it would also be necessary to take
note of Section 18 of the Act which deals with the jurisdiction of
the Rent Tribunal:-
"18. Jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in the areas to which this Act extends, only the Rent Tribunal and no civil court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitions relating to disputes between landlord and tenant and matters connected therewith and ancillary thereto, filed under the provisions of this Act: xxx ...."
A bare perusal of the relevant statutory provisions
extracted above unequivocally evinces that the definition of
"tenant" as comprised under Section 2(i) of the Rajasthan Rent
Control Act, 2001 enwombs within its fold a person who is
continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy
otherwise than by an order or decree for eviction passed under
the provisions of this Act.
The said provision is somewhat akin to the definition of
"tenant" in the Rent legislations that fell for consideration of their
Lordships in Mani Subrat Jain''s case (supra) and Lakshmi Narayan
Guin''s case (supra), inasmuch as they contemplate "ex-tenants"
to fall within the protective umbrella of the Act.
It would be pertinent to reiterate that the Supreme
Court in paragraph 22 of Rajender Bansal''s case (supra) had
categorically carved out an exception for the cases governed by
Rent legislations, wherein, the definition of "tenant" included even
an "ex-tenant" and it was observed that such provisions would
come to the rescue of the tenant even in respect of pending cases.
The provisions enacted by the legislature are required
to be given full effect and cannot be curtailed by imposing artifices
to defeat legislative mandate owing to perceived hardship
(Reference may be made to (2007) 2 2 SCC 230 '' Raghunath Rai
Bareja v. Punjab National Bank '').
It is a trite proposition of law that ordinarily no part of
a statute, whether it be sentence, clause, phrase or word should
be considered as mere surplusage or as devoid of meaning
(Reference may be made to ''Interpretation of Laws'' - Earl t.
Crawford, Thomas Law Book Company-1940, Page No.348).
The Supreme Court in its decision reported as (1997) 3
SCC 511 '' Mohammad Ali Khan & Ors. v. Commissioner of Wealth
Tax, New Delhi '' held that construction which results in rejection of
words as meaningless has to be avoided.
Further, it assumes significance that Section 18 of
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 confers exclusive jurisdiction
upon the Rent Tribunal to adjudicate disputes under the Act and
imposes a corresponding embargo upon the civil courts to ''hear
and decide'' disputes between the landlord and the tenant.
The statutory intendment to injunct a civil court from
hearing and deciding disputes between landlord and tenant does
not seem to be a bar merely against institution of suits in future
but subsumes in its ambit the proceedings pending before the civil
court. If the legislature intended to bar the jurisdiction of the civil
court prospectively, preserving its jurisdiction to adjudicate
pending proceedings, the expression employed in the provision
would have manifested such an intention. Illustratively speaking,
the provision would have been phrased in the manner described :
"...no suit or proceedings shall be instituted in a civil court with regard to disputes between landlord and tenant..." (Emphasis Supplied).
At this juncture, we may profit from the luminous
observations of Krishna Iyar, J. in Mani Subrat Jain''s case (supra):
"5. It is too platitudinous to preach and too entrenched to shake, the proposition that rent control legislation in a country of terrible accommodation shortage is a beneficial measure whose construction must be liberal enough to fulfill the statutory purpose and not frustrate it. So construed, the benefit of interpretative doubt belongs to the potential evictee unless the language is plain and provides for eviction. That intendment must, by interpretation, be effectuated. This is the essence of rent control jurisprudence. xxxxxxxxxxxx
... The interpretation we have given in s.2(i) is strengthened by our conviction that a beneficial statute intended to quieten a burning issue affecting the economics of the human condition in India should be so interpreted as to subserve the social justice purpose and not to subvert it. Even apart from this value-vision, the construction we have adopted is sustainable."
As highlighted in the preceding paragraphs, the over-
arching and inclusive definition of tenant as comprised under
Section 2(i) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 clearly
enwombs within its fold an "ex-tenant". In conjunction thereof, we
have noticed that under Section 18 of the said Act the legislature
has expressly imposed a clear embargo on civil courts to "hear
and decide" disputes between landlord and tenants.
The twin circumstances bring the present case clearly
within the exception recognised under paragraph 22 of the
decision of the Supreme Court in Rajender Bansal''s case (supra),
wherein, it was observed that rent legislations of this kind would
come to the rescue of tenant even in respect of pending cases.
In view of the conclusion which we have arrived at, it
would be imperative to dwell upon the ambit of ''pending cases'',
inasmuch as, the logical question that would now arise is whether
the benefit of the Act would be required to be extended to cases
wherein a decree has already been passed by the civil court and
the same has been assailed by preferring an appeal.
At this juncture it would be necessary to re-visit of the
observation of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narayan Guin''s case
(supra) in some detail.
As noted by us earlier, the Supreme Court accorded the
benefit of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 to the tenant
even in a case where the said Act was extended to the area in
question where suit property was situated, at the stage of
pendency of the first appeal. The court repelled the contention
that the said Act could not be invoked in a case where trial court
had already decreed the suit under the provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act .
While arriving at the said conclusion, the Supreme
Court pertinently observed that the appeal was in essence a
continuation of the suit and under such circumstance the change
in the law during pendency of an appeal has to be taken into
account. Reference was made to its previous decisions in support
of this principle.
Before proceeding to apply the said judicial dicta, we
pause and take note of the statutory provisions that fell for
consideration of their Lordship''s in Lakshmi Narayan Guin''s case
(supra) and juxtapose them with the position of the Rajasthan
Rent Control Act, 2001 which we have already reproduced in
paragraphs 14 and 15 above.
The relevant portion of Section 13(1) of the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, as noticed by the Supreme
Court in para 5 of its judgment reads:-
"Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds,.........
xxxxxxxxxxxx"
Incidentally, we may also analyse the definition of
"tenant" as per Section 2(h) of the said Act, though the same has
not been noted in the judgment by the Supreme Court. It reads:-
"Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event or such person''s death, such or his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death, but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction." [Emphasis Supplied]
Upon perusal of the definition of "tenant" it is palpable
that persons who have suffered a decree passed by a Court of
competent jurisdiction do not fall within the coverage of the
expression ''tenant'' for the purpose of the said Act.
However, notwithstanding the manner in which the
term "tenant" was defined by the Legislature, in Lakshmi Narayan
Guin''s case (supra) the Supreme Court accorded protection of the
said Act to a litigant who had suffered a decree passed by a court
of competent jurisdiction in view of the fact that the Act was
extended to the area where suit property was situated during the
pendency of the appeal.
Conspicuously, the definition of "tenant" under the
Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 only excludes it from coverage,
the class of persons; though continuing in possession after the
determination of the tenancy but have suffered an order or decree
of eviction passed under the provisions of the said Act. However,
pertinently, as distinguished, if an order or decree of eviction is
passed under ''any other law'' the said circumstance would not
bring them outside the purview of "tenant" for the purpose of the
applicability of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001.
It is evident that the decision of the Supreme Court in
Lakshmi Narayan Guin''s case (supra) applies ''a fortiori'' with
greater force in the context of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act,
2001 as the definition of ''tenant'' under the said Act includes "ex-
tenants" in possession of the demised premises despite the
termination of a tenancy as long as they have not suffered an
order or decree of eviction passed under the provisions of the Act.
The fact that the decree may have passed against them under any
other law would not bring them outside the purview of the term
"tenant" for the purpose of the Act and its applicability would not
be ousted.
The inescapable conclusion emerging from the
conclusion delineated above is that the benefit of the mandate of
the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 would have to be extended
even in those class of cases where a decree has already been
passed by the civil court and the same has been contested by
preferring an appeal.
The reference is accordingly answered in terms of para
31 and 43 above. Meaning thereby, once the Rajasthan Rent
Control Act, 2001 was extended to the municipal areas, the Civil
Courts would lose jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between a
landlord and a tenant. No tenant could be evicted by a Civil Court.
The eviction had to be as per the Rajasthan Rent Control Act,
2001 and on the grounds specified in Section 9 thereof. Even
where decrees of ejectment had been passed by the Civil Courts
and matters were pending consideration in appeal, the civil
proceedings would lapse.
As regards the three D.B. Civil Special Appeals, the
same are disposed of setting aside the order dated 23/02/2015
passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kishangarh
dismissing applications filed by the tenants to amend the memo of
appeal to bring on record the subsequent event of the Rajasthan
Rent Control Act, 2001 being extended to the municipal area of
Kishangarh.