K. Srinivasan vs V. Nandagopal and another

The respondent in R.C.O.P.Nos. 15 of 1993 and 18 of 1993 is the petitioner in these civil revision petitions. The 1st respondent in the Civil

Revision Petition No. 3525 of 2000 filed R.C.O.P.No. 15 of 1993 against the Civil Revision Petitioner before the learned Rent Controller,

Villupuram for fixation of fair rent. The 1st respondent in the Civil Revision Petition No. 3531 of 2000 filed R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1993 for an order

of eviction u/s 10(3)(a)(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent) Control Act, 1960. Pending the above petitions the Civil Revision

Petitioner sold the property in question to the respondents 2 to 7 in R.C.O.P. 15 of 1993 on 3.3.97. An ex parts order of eviction was passed on

5.3.97. The 1st respondent filed I.A.No. 37 of 2000 seeking for a direction to implead the purchasers namely the respondents 2 to 7 in the Civil

Revision Petition in R.C.O.P. under Order 1, Rule 10 read with Section 151, C.P.C. The said I.A. was allowed on 21.8.2000. The respondents

in the Civil Revision Petition also filed I.A.No. 38 of 2000 under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151, C.P.C. for a direction to amend the

petition as set out in the petition in detail in order to determine the real controversy between the parties. The said petition was allowed on

7.9.2000. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner has filed C.R.P.No. 3531 of 2000. The respondents in the Civil Revision Petition also filed

I.A.No. 36 of 2000 under Order 6, Rule 17 read with Section 151, C.P.C. to amend the petition in R.C.O.P.No. 15 of 1993. The said petition

was also allowed by the learned Rent Controller by order dated 7.9.2000. Aggrieved by the said order, C.R.P.No. 3525 of 2000 has been filed.

The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in both the petitions, the details of the amendment has been furnished by the respondents

herein. The amendment has been sought on the ground of new cause of action. The learned counsel submitted that R.C.O.P.No. 18 of 1993 has

been filed for eviction on the ground of owners occupation. Originally, the petition was filed by one V. Nandagopal Chettiar alone on the ground of

owners occupation. The said Nandagopal Chettiar sold the property under two registered sale deeds to Thiru R.S. Mani and Thiru N.K.M.

Jiyavudeen on 3.3.97. The cause of action for eviction being owners occupation which is in the nature of a personal relief cannot be a ground for

the subsequent purchasers to agitate the very same petition. Therefore, the learned Rent Controller was not right in allowing the applications in

I.A.Nos. 36 and 38 of 2000. For the said submission, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in Srinivasan and

another v. Santhana Selvaraj and another, 2000 (3) CTC 537 to contend that subsequent purchaser is not entitled to continue claim for eviction on

the ground of owners occupation which is ""peculiarly personal to erstwhile landlords"". Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that both the

impugned orders are liable to be set aside.

The learned counsel for the respondents in both the petitions on the other hand would contend, that when the application impleading the

respondents 2 to 7 as petitioners in the R.C.O.P. was filed, he has specifically stated in the affidavit in support of the said petition that the

respondent in R.C.O.P. has denied the title of the landlord and the said denial was nothing but a mala fide one and on the said ground the

respondent was liable to be evicted from the premises. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the eviction is only on the ground of owners

occupation but also on the ground of denial of title. This Court in the judgment reported in G. Jayapandian v. P.C. Manickam and another, 1996

(I) MLJ 350 has held that an amendment to a pleading is necessitated to avoid multiplicity of litigation and also to explain the vagueness, if any, in

the pleadings. To decide the real matter in controversy, parties are permitted to amend the pleadings. In certain circumstances, the existing pleading

become insufficient or inappropriate due to subsequent events. If amendment is refused and if the party is directed to file another suit or

proceedings, the very purpose of coming to court will be defeated. The learned counsel would also rely upon another judgment reported in T.K.

Subramania Iyer (Died) and others Vs. C. Natarajan and others, wherein this Court has held, a petition for eviction of tenant, on the ground of

denial of title of landlord during the course of the proceedings, denial of title itself can be a ground for eviction without relegating the landlords for

filing separate proceedings. The learned counsel would also rely upon another judgment reported in Mohamed Gani v. Rajamani, 1996 (I) MLJ

365 to contend that when the tenant denies the title of the landlord, the petition to amend eviction petition to include new grounds of denial of title is

not necessary, and eviction could be ordered on the ground of denial of title without including the said ground if the denial was not bonafide.

Therefore, the learned counsel submitted that when there is a denial of title, it is not necessary that the same should be pleaded in the petition and if

such denial is made even during the course of the proceedings, the same can be a ground for an order of eviction. In this case, even though there is

no such pleading in the petition for eviction, in the affidavit filed in support of the petitions to amend the R.C.O.P. the said ground of denial of title

has been raised and therefore it cannot be contended that the petition for eviction is only on the ground of owners occupation and to further

contend that the said ground cannot be agitated by the subsequent purchasers as per the judgment of this court reported in Srinivasan and another

v. Santhana Selvaraj and another, 2000 (III) CTC 537. The learned counsel in fact would draw my attention to the very same judgment wherein

the learned Judge while considering the right of the subsequent purchasers to proceed with the petition for eviction filed on the ground of owners

occupation by the erstwhile owner has held as follows:-

I find considerable force in the contention of the first respondent in stating that the subsequent purchasers are entitled to continue the claim raised

in the main petition inasmuch as the claim was ""peculiarly personal"" to the erstwhile landlord, when he may made the application for eviction on the

ground of owners occupation, I too feel that unlike the application filed for eviction on the ground of wilful default, or an act of waste or on the

grounds available to the landlord u/s 10(2) of the Act or on the ground of demolition and reconstruction as provided u/s 14, an application filed u/s

10(3) of the Act stands entirely on a different footing which the subsequent purchaser may not be able to insist upon on the ground on which the

relief was originally claimed, even though it may be stated that the landlord might be permitted to continue with the proceedings to its logical

conclusion.

Relying upon the said observation of this court, the learned counsel submitted that the judgment reported in Srinivasan and another v. Santhana

Selvaraj and another, 2000 (III) CTC 537 is applicable only when the petition was filed for owners occupation and not on other grounds.

Therefore, the learned counsel submitted in the present case when the eviction is sought on the ground of denial of title also, the said judgment is

not applicable. Therefore, the learned counsel seeks for the dismissal of the civil revision petitions.

The question that is to be now considered is as to whether the petitioners 2 to 7 in the R.C.O.P. who were subsequently impleaded in the place

of the 1st petitioner who was the erstwhile owner of the premises in question and who has sold the property to the petitioners 2 to 7 are entitled to

proceed with the eviction proceedings initiated by the erstwhile landlord namely the 1st petitioner. In the judgment reported in Srinivasan and

another v. Santhana Selvaraj and another, 2000 (III) CTC 537, it is true that this court has held that the subsequent purchasers are not entitled to

prosecute with the eviction petition filed by the erstwhile landlord when such petition was filed for eviction on the ground of owners occupation.

However, in the very same judgment, the learned Judge has held that subsequent purchasers are entitled to proceed with the eviction petition filed

by the erstwhile landlord other than the grounds of owners occupation thereby meaning such a petition could be agitated by the subsequent

purchasers on the ground of wilful default etc. Coming to the facts of this case, it is to be noted that an eviction petition was filed u/s 10(3)(a)(ii) for

owners occupation by one V. Nandagopal Chettiar. After he has sold the property to the two individuals, a petition for bringing subsequent

purchasers and their legal heirs as petitioners 2 to 7 was filed. In the said petition, V. Nandagopal Chettiar himself has stated that there was a

denial of title on the part of the civil revision petitioner and therefore the civil revision petitioner was liable to be evicted on that ground also. When

a specific pleading has been taken that there was a denial of title, it is to be now considered as to whether the learned Rent Controller can proceed

with the eviction petition on the ground of owners occupation as well as the denial of the title also. This court in the judgment reported in Mohamed

Gani v. Rajamani, 1996 (I) MLJ 364 has held that the amendment was necessitated because of subsequent event after the filing of R.C.O.P.

where the petitioner denied his title of the respondent and in order to avoid the multiplicity of proceedings, and therefore the amendment sought has

to be ordered. The very same view has been taken by this Court in yet another judgment reported in G. Jayapandian v. P.C. Manickam and

another, 19% (I) MLJ 350 wherein this Court has held as follows:-

An amendment to a pleading is necessitated to avoid multiplicity of litigation and also to explain the vagueness, if any, in the pleadings. To decide

the real matter in controversy the parties are permitted to amend the pleadings. In certain circumstances, the existing pleading become insufficient

or inappropriate due to subsequent events. If amendment is refused and if the party is directed to file another suit or proceedings, the very purpose

of coming to court will be defeated. We must understand that both courts and Tribunals are intended to administer justice.

This Court in yet another judgment reported in T.K. Subramania Iyer (Died) and others Vs. C. Natarajan and others, has also held as follows:-

It is settled law that the denial of title need not be antecedent to the proceedings. If from the facts, it is clear that there is a denial of title, that itself

can be a ground for eviction without relegating the landlords for filing separate proceedings.

This court in yet another judgment reported in R. Surendira Kumar v. C. Balagi Singh, 1998 (II) LW 71 has held as follows:-

It is no doubt true that the denial of landlord-tenant relationship in these cases arose as far as the tenant in the third case is concerned both prior to

the Rent Control Petition and during the Rent Control proceedings and as far as the tenant in the other two cases are concerned, it arose during the

rent control proceedings, since the reply notice of the two tenants in the other two cases are not exhibited. The landlord admittedly had not

amended the rent control petitions to include this ground of denial also as a cause of action. On the pleadings and evidence, the Appellate

Authority framed an issue on this aspect and held against the landlord. The question therefore, is whether an order of eviction could be passed on

this ground also without any pleading. The answer is in the affirmative and it is held so in Majati Subbarao Vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by

Lrs., .

In view of the law laid down by this court as stated above, I have no doubt in my mind that even though there are no pleadings in the petition as

to the denial of title by the tenant, if the landlord establishes either by way of subsequent pleadings as in this case in the affidavit filed in support of

the interim applications or in the course of the evidence that the tenant has denied the title, the same could be a ground for eviction. Admittedly, in

this case in the affidavit filed in support of the I.A. Thiru V. Nandagopal Chettiar has specifically stated that the tenant has denied his title and on

thai ground the tenant is liable to be evicted. In my considered view the said averment is sufficient to constitute the pleading for denial of title for

seeking an order of eviction. If that be so, the rent control petition for eviction has to be decided by the learned Rent Controller on the ground to

denial of title. Once I come to this conclusion, as per the judgment of this Court reported in Srinivasan and another v. Santhana Selvaraj and

another, 2000 (III) CTC 537 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the subsequent purchasers are also entitled to prosecute and

proceed with the eviction petition filed by the erstwhile landlord for eviction on the ground of denial of title but not on the ground of owners

occupation since the ground of owners occupation is ""peculiarly personal"" to the petitioners in the R.C.O.P. In that view of the matter, I do not find

any merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners in both the civil revision petitions that the subsequent purchasers namely the

petitioners 2 to 7 in the R.C.O.P. 15 of 1993 are not entitled to proceed with the eviction petition. Accordingly, both the civil revision petitions are

dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.Nos. 18534 and 18539 of 2000 are also dismissed.