K. Venkitaswamy Naicker vs Ramasami Naicker

Srinivasan, J.—In an application for evicting a tenant under S. 3 (4) (a) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Amendment Act, 1956, the tenant appeared but did not contest the petition. On the date of the hearing he deposited Rs. 500 out of the arrears of Rs. 800 and asked for two months time to deposit the balance. This was agreed to by the landlord''s Counsel, and the Court, the Sub-Collector of Pollachi, directed the balance to be deposited on or before 12th August, 1963. On 17th August, 1963, the tenant appeared and pleading that on account of illness he was unable to make the deposit on or before 12th August 1963, as directed, asked for three days time, and such time was granted. He paid the arrears on 19th August 1963. The question was raised before the learned Sub-Collector that he had no jurisdiction to extend the time, but on a review of certain decisions, the Sub-Collector thought that his discretion is not fettered in any way and more particularly in the circumstances of the case where the default and failure to comply with the directions of the Court was due to the illness of the tenant. He accordingly dismissed the application for eviction. In this civil revision petition filed by the landlord the short contention is that the Sub-Collector had no jurisdiction to extend the time for payment. My attention has been drawn to a decision of Veeraswami J., in V. Kandan Moopan Vs. M. Arumugha Mudaliar, . There the learned Judge set out the relevant section and observed that it "seemed to be manifest" that, where there was a default by non-compliance with a direction to deposit the arrears within the time fixed by the revenue Court, it would be beyond the power of the Revenue Court to extend time. He further observed:

The Sub-Section clearly states that in such an event, namely, failure on the part of the tenant to deposit the arrears within the time fixed, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall pass an order for eviction.

The learned Judge made a distinction between the cases where extension of time was sought before the expiry of the time fixed originally and cases where such a prayer was made after the expiry of the time. This principle was followed in a subsequent decision by Venkatadri J., in Rajagopal Pillai Vs. Somasundaram Pillai, , learned Counsel for the petitioner, has also invited my attention to another decision of Ramachandra Iyer C.J., in Chinnayyan Vs. R. Nagarathinam Pillai, . What was decided therein was that where the Revenue Divisional Officer grants time to the tenant for the payment of the arrears he cannot make a combined order directing that the tenant shall be evicted on his failure to perform the obligation. Such a combined order was held by the learned Chief Justice to be illegal, as in a fit and proper case the Revenue Divisional Officer will have jurisdiction to extend the time where the tenant is prevented by sufficient cause from paying the rent within the time stipulated. It seems to me that this last decision does really give a clue to the underlying intent of the relevant provision. Firstly, no landlord is entitled to evict a tenant even if he is armed with a decree of Court except by making an application to the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Revenue Divisional Officer to whom the application is made is empowered to grant the tenant such time as he considers just and reasonable to deposit the arrears of rent payable. Then follows that part of the provision which states that if the cultivating tenant fails to deposit the same as directed, the Revenue Divisional Officer shall pass an order for eviction. As has been pointed out in the last mentioned decision, if the Revenue Divisional Officer passed a combined order as it were, making a direction that the tenant should pay the arrears within a stipulated period, failing which he would be evicted, by such an order the Revenue Divisional Officer virtually deprives himself of the judicial discretion that vests in him to extend the time in proper circumstances. Such a combined order would work itself out and it would not be open to the Revenue Divisional Officer to vary that order. Having regard to the object of the enactment it is clear that the law empowers the Revenue Divisional Officer to grant a reasonable time to the tenant to pay the arrears in order to avoid eviction. There may be a variety of circumstances by reason of which the tenant might find it difficult to comply with the direction to deposit the arrears by the date fixed. If the date so fixed initially is to be an inflexible and unalterable date, it is bound to work considerable hardships upon the tenants. It would be a mechanical application of the provision of the section for the purpose of eviction. The object of the section is to avoid eviction wherever possible and not insist upon eviction for such reasons as obtain in the case. Though there is no doubt an apparent difference in the line of approach in the cases cited above. I prefer to follow the last mentioned decision, with the principles indicated in which I am in full agreement. It follows that the Revenue Divisional Officer did not exceed his jurisdiction in extending the time. The petition is dismissed.