K.A. Achuthan Nair vs M. Kuppa Sah

Rajagopalan, J.—The only question for determination in this application to revise the order of the Appellant Court in proceedings under the

Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. (Act XXV of 1949) is whether S. 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to condone the delay in

the presentation of an appeal preferred under S. 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949 after the expiry of the period of 15 days prescribed by that

statutory provision. That question was answered in the negative by the lower appellate Court which followed the decision of Ramaswami Gounder

J. in P. Murugesan Vs. Hajee M.M.S. Hameed Maracayar, . The main endeavour of the learned Counsel for the petitioner was to obtain a

reference to a Division Bench to reconsider the decision of Ramaswami Gounder J. The answer to the question I have set out above depends on

the scope of 3. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. That Act XXV of 1949 is a special or local law within the meaning of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act,

and that S. 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949 prescribed a period of limitation for the appeal permitted by that provision could not admit of any

doubt. It was equally obvious that no period of limitation was prescribed by Sch. I of the Limitation Act for such an appeal. In In Re: Mittor

Moideen Hajee and Another, , a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Oldfield and Ramesam JJ. observed:

Mr. Kurup... urged that the delay should be excused by this Court. The difficulty is that S. 5 of the Limitation Act under which the Court can

excuse delay is not one of the provisions the application of which is extended by Act X of 1922 to proceedings under special or local law.

The learned Judges treated it as a self-evident proposition. There was no further discussion.

It was the same principle that was reiterated in Chheda Lal Jain Vs. Officer, Commanding Station Meerut Cantonment, . The learned Judges

pointed out:

The expression ''the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply'' in the amended S. 29 (Limitation Act) simply means that they are not to apply

proprio vigore, that is, merely by virtue of the Limitation Act itself, and that if they are to apply, the grounds for supplying them must be found in the

special or local Act itself.

The learned Judges pointed out that the special law they had to consider, the Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act did not provide for the

application of S. 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judges related on the observations of Rankin C.J. in Neelratan Ganguli v. Emperor 60 Cal.

There was a fuller discussion on the scope of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act in The The Canara Bank Ltd. Vs. The Warden Insurance Co.

Ltd., where Chagla C.J. and Gajendragadkar J. held that S. 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to an appeal provided under S. 8 (3) of the

Bombay Land Requisition Act. I find myself in respectful agreement with the reasoning of Chagla C.J. and with his conclusions even as

Ramaswami Gounder J. did in P. Murugesan Vs. Hajee M.M.S. Hameed Maracayar, .

The learned Counsel for the petitioner referred to Putchalapalli Venkata Subbareddi Vs. Duvvuru Papireddi and Another, , the principle laid

down in which was followed by Ramaswami J. in Coimbatore Municipality v. Narayanan 1958 M.W.N. Crl. 43, that S. 5 of the Limitation Act

applied to applications for leave to prefer appeals against acquittals under S. 417 (4) Crl.P.C These decisions were, however, rested mainly on the

basis, that the Criminal Procedure Code was not a special or local law within the meaning of S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. I am unable therefore

to see any scope for extending the principle laid down in these cases to the appeals permitted by S. 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949, which

undoubtedly is a local or special law which prescribes its own period of limitation, and which failed to extend the application of S. 5 of the

Limitation Act to such appeals. No doubt Ramaswami Gounder, J., referred to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in

Venktataramayya v. Venkatasubbayya (1946) 1 M.L.J. 371 = 59 L.W. 202, which was a case dealt with under Madras Act IV of 1938. The

scope of that decision was examined in State Vs. C.N. Raman, . As pointed out by the learned Judges, Act IV of 1938 itself did not prescribe any

period of limitation The statutory provision was that the order appealed against should be deemed to be an order passed under S. 47 C.P.C. That

principle cannot be extended to an appeal preferred under S. 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949.

If I may say so with respect, it was a well settled principle of law that was explained and applied in The The Canara Bank Ltd. Vs. The Warden

Insurance Co. Ltd., , after an elaborate discussion, and I see no justification to refer the question at issue in this revision petition to a Division

Bench. The view taken by the lower appellate Court was correct. This petition is dismissed with costs.