Kailash Chander Sharma vs Commissioner Of Police And Ors

Brief facts giving rise to the present O.A. are that Inspector Rajesh Kumar, applicant-Inspector Kailash Chand, Inspector Sayed AbdulRashid, Inspector Rakesh Kumar, Inspector Ramesh Chand, and Inspector Sudhir Kumar were posted to work as Traffic Inspectors in Pahar Ganj, Darya Ganj, Gandhi Nagar, Khajuri Khas, Delhi Cantonment, IGI Circles respectively during 2013. While perusing the comparative drunken driving prosecution diary up to 31.12.2013, it was noticed that there was sizeable decrease in prosecution figure of drunken driving in the said Circles, the details of which are as follows:

Circles

2012

2013

Decreased

Pahar Ganj

617

418

-199

Darya Ganj

282

119

-163

Gandhi Nagar

526

169

-357

Khajuri Khas

527

338

-189

Delhi Cantt.

140

38

-102

IGI

164

51

-113

The Additional Commissioner of Police, Traffic, Delhi, vide a common show-cause notice dated 8.1.2014 (Annexure A/3) called upon the applicant and other Traffic Inspectors to show cause as to why their conduct should not be censured for the sizeable decrease in prosecution against drunken driving. It was stated in the said show-cause notice that all the Traffic Inspectors were regularly being briefed to intensify prosecution under drunken driving head as it is directly linked with the incidents of fatal accidents. They were provided with advertisements and posters of "Don"t Drink and Drive" and were told to prosecute drunk drivers by launching special drives. But despite all of this, there was sizeable fall in prosecution of drunk drivers in the above mentioned Traffic Circles. This state of affairs clearly showed that they failed to take appropriate action in their Traffic Circles. The applicant, vide his reply (Annexure A/4), without disputing the factum of decrease in the number of prosecution of drunk drivers, explained, inter alia, that he had joined as Traffic Inspector, Darya Ganj Circle, on 27.9.2013 and had supervised the traffic arrangements for different events where different VVIPs had taken participation and had ensured smooth movement of Sbhobha Yatras, Religious Processions, Dharnas, etc. After considering the materials available on record including the replies submitted by the applicant and other Traffic Inspectors, and upon hearing the applicant and other Traffic Inspectors, the Joint Commissioner of Police, Traffic, Delhi, by a common order dated 13.5.2014 (Annexure A-2), did not accept their explanation/submission and confirmed the show-cause notice by censuring their conduct for the lapse pointed out in the show-cause notice. The appeals made by the applicant and Inspector Ramesh Chand were rejected by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, vide order dated 13.1.2016(Annexure A-1). Hence, the present O.A. was filed by the applicant praying for quashing the show cause notice (Annexure A-3) and the orders passed by the Commissioner of Police, and Joint Commissioner of Police Traffic, Delhi, vide Annexure A-1 and Annexure A-2 respectively.

Resisting the O.A., the respondents have filed a counter reply.

The applicant has filed a rejoinder reply thereto.

I have carefully perused the records, and have heard Mr.Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, and Ms. Sumedha Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

It has mainly been contended by Mr.Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel appearing for the applicant that the departmental authorities have failed to consider in proper perspective the pleas raised by the applicant in his reply to the show cause notice as well as in his appeal petition, and in the absence of any mention of corresponding fatal accidents in the show cause notice, the applicant cannot be said to have committed any misconduct. Therefore, the impugned show cause notice and orders are unsustainable and liable to be quashed.

Per contra, it has been submitted by Ms.Sumedha Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the conclusions have been arrived at by the departmental authorities on the basis of materials available on record and, therefore, there is no scope for the Tribunal to interfere with impugned show cause notice and orders passed by the departmental authorities.

It is no more res integra that the power of judicial review does not authorize the Tribunal to sit as a court of appeal either to reappraise the evidence/materials and the basis for imposition of penalty, nor is the Tribunal entitled to substitute its own opinion even if a different view is possible. Judicial intervention is permissible only where (i) the disciplinary actions are initiated and taken by an incompetent authority, (ii) such actions are in violation of the statutory rule or law, (iii) there has been gross violation of the principles of natural justice, (iv) there is proven bias and mala fide, (v) the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence and/or perverse, and (vi) the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached .

In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 484, reiterating the principles of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings, the Hon"ble Apex Court has held as under:

"12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of a misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice be complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent office is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal on its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re - appreciate the evidence and to arrive at the own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry of where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.

In High Court of  Judicature at  Bombay through its Registrar v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416, the Hon"ble Supreme Court has held thus:

"...Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority, (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed before Article 226 of the Constitution."

In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, (2006) 2 SCC 373,  the Hon"ble Apex Court has reiterated the scope of judicial review as confined to correct the errors of law or procedural error if it results in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. In para 7, the Hon'ble Court has held:

"By now it is a well established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an Appellate Authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error if any resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority....."

After  having considered the facts  and circumstances  of the present case, as well  as the findings recorded by the departmental authorities, in the light of the decisions referred to above, I have found no substance in the contention of Mr.Ajesh Luthra, learned counsel appearing for the applicant. The applicant has not disputed the factum of decrease in the number of prosecutions for drunken driving while he was posted to work as Traffic Inspector in Darya Ganj Circle. In his reply to the show cause notice, the applicant has not mentioned a single instance of launching of prosecution against drunken driving during the period from 27.9.2013 to 31.12.2013 during his tenure as Traffic Inspector in Darya Ganj Circle. The Commissioner of Police, Delhi, has clearly observed that the applicant was neither alert nor vigilant in the Circle, and sincere efforts were not made by him to improve the overall prosecutions as well as prosecution against drunken driving. The conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, cannot be said to be perverse or based on no evidence. When the impugned show-cause notice was issued and the orders were passed by the departmental authorities against the applicant on the basis of materials available on record regarding decrease in the number of prosecutions against drunken driving, the non-mentioning of any fatal accident corresponding to any drunken driving would not invalidate the impugned show cause notice issued and orders passed by the departmental authorities, nor can it be said that there was no lapse/misconduct on the part of the applicant.

In the light of what has been discussed above, I have no hesitation in holding that the O.A. is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the O.A. is dismissed. No costs.