Kailash Chandra and others vs State of M. P. and others

K.N. Shukla, J.—Appellants had brought a suit against the respondent State of Madhaya Pradesh for declaration that order dated 8-1-1968 passed by Collector, Shajapur exercising his revisional jurisdiction u/s 50 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code was illegal and without jurisdiction and also seeking permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with their possession.

The lands described in the plaint had been allotted to the plaintiffs-appellants by Tahsildar Shajapur in Bhumiswami rights vide order dated 13-2-1964 u/s 162 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code (the Code hereafter). However, the Pattas granted to the appellants conferring Bhumiswami rights on them u/s 162 of the Code were cancelled by the Collector vide dated 8-1-1968 exercising his powers of revision u/s 50 of the Code. Appeal and revision against the order of the Collector dated 8-1-1968 before the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue were dismissed. Appellants, therefore, instituted a suit claiming a declaration that the order of the Collector cancelling the grants was without jurisdiction and the State be restrained from interfering with appellants'' possession.

Respondent State of Madhya Pradesh, in its written statement, denied appellants'' claim under the said Pattas. It was pleaded that the Collector had power to revise the order of the Tahsildar granting Pattas in conferral of Bhumiswami rights to the appellants. It was denied that appellants were ever put in possession or had any right to claim declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the respondent from interfering with each possession A further plea was raised that the suit plea was not competent in view of section 257 of the Code.

Both the Courts below held that the order passed by the Collector cancelling the grants was valid and legal and the same could not be challenged in this suit. It was further held that the suit was barred u/s 257 of the Code. The Court below found that the appellant were never put in possession of the suit lands. Appellants'' claim, therefore, was dismissed by the trial and the first appellate Court,

The two questions of law on which this second appeal has been admitted are :

(i) Whether the rights conferred by allotment of land by competent officer could be deprived by the Collector in exercise of suo motu jurisdiction ? and

(ii) Whether the Collector could exercise revisional jurisdiction when on the date of allotment he had no power to entertain a revision petition ?

Learned counsel for the appellants urged that on the date of the order of allotment, i.e., 13-2-1964 the Collector had no jurisdiction to revise the said order in exercise of the revisional powers u/s 50 of the Code. Section 50 was amended w.e.f. 23rd April, 1964 by M. P. Act No. 25 of 1964 and the Collector was also empowered to revise any order passed by any officer subordinate to him. Learned counsel contended that on the date of the passing of the impugned order, section 50 of the Code empowered only the Revenue Board, the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner to exercise powers of revision. Since on that date Collector was not so empowered, he had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Tahsildar granting Bhumiswami Pattas to the appellants in exercise of his revisional jurisdiction u/s 50 of the Code. According to the learned counsel, the powers given u/s 50 of the Code could not be given retrospective effect so as to empower the Collector to revise an order passed by a subordinate revenue authority before the amendment of section 50 with effect from 23rd April, 1964. In support of this argument, learned counsel relied on AIR 1927 242 (Privy Council) , Dafedar Niranjan Singh and Another Vs. Custodian, Evacuee Property (PB.) and Another, and Sitaram and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, . Before referring to these authorities and the principle of law stated therein, it will be useful to consider the provision itself.

Section 50 of the Code as it stood on 13-2-1964, the date of the order passed by the Tahsildar provided for a revision against any order passed by a subordinate Revenue Officer. u/s 50 as it stood before its amendment by M.P. Act 25 of 964 with effect from 23rd April, 1964, the Revenue Board or the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner had been empowered to examine the legality or the propriety of any order passed by a subordinate Revenue officer and pass such order in reference there to as it the thought fit. After M.P. Act No. 25 of 1964, section 50 was amended and in addition to the authorities already mentioned, powers of revision were conferred on the Collector or the Settlement Officer also.

The question, therefore, is whether the Collector had jurisdiction to exercise powers u/s 50 of the Code to revise an order which was passed by his subordinate Revenue Officer before coming into force of the amendment giving him the powers of revision.

It is clear that the order passed by a Revenue Officer was not a final order because there was a statutory power of revision conferred on a higher forum. It was not disputed that u/s 50 of the Code the Board or the Commissioner or the Settlement Commissioner had The power to revise the order dated 13-2-1964. It was not a case where the order passed by the Tahsildar had become final and the statute did not provide for any appeal or revision against the said order. In the present case, the power of revision being already present, an additional forum was created to exercise the same power. This new forum in addition to the existing ones had acquired jurisdiction to exercise the power of revision. This was only a procedural change providing for a change in authority to exercise a particular jurisdiction and, therefore, it had to be distinguished from a case where an order had attained finality because there was no provision in the statute on the date of the order which provided for an appeal or a revision against the said order. A party has no vested right to have his appeal heard by a specified number of Judges of that Court and a change in law in that matter will be regarded merely as a change in procedure and, therefore, retrospective, ( Ittavira Mathai Vs. Varkey Varkey and Another, . Following comments in Craise On Statute Law'' Sixth Edition page 400 may be useful:--

But there is an exception to this rule, namely, where enactments merely affect procedure and do not extend to rights of action, for it is perfectly settled that if the legislature forms a new procedure, that, instead of proceeding in this form or that, you should proceed in another and a different way, clearly these bygone transactions are to be sued for and enforced according to the new form of procedure. Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be.

In the instant case as already seen, the order of the Tahsildar granting Bhumiswami Pattas was not final as it was subject to the revisional jurisdiction of a higher Tribunal u/s 50 of the Code. Within the period of limitation in which this jurisdiction could be exercised, there was a change in law providing for an additional Tribunal to exercise the same power. It was not a case where a right had vested in the appellants and the same was being adversely affected by the change in the personal of the higher Tribunal Thus there being no adverse effect on any substantive right of the appellants, the amendment seeking to provide for an additional forum of revision was only a procedural amendment not affecting any vested right of the appellants and, therefore, was retrospective in the sense that the Collector who was added as a revising authority u/s 50 could entertain a revision and pass an appropriate order u/s 50 of the Code.

Now the cases relied on for the appellants. In Delhi Cloth Mills case (supra) certain orders were made in January, 1926 by the Lahore High Court on a reference to it u/s 66 (2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, At that time there was no provision for appeal to the Privy Council against such orders. However, in April, 1926 the Act was amended and a right of appeal to the Privy Council was provided. When the assessee filed a petition for a special leave against the order made in January, 1926, the Privy Council held that the said order had become final and the amending Act which came into force on a subsequent date and was not specifically made retrospective, did not confer a right of appeal against such an order.

The distinction with the case before us is obvious. The order of the High Court u/s 66 (2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 had become final as no appeal or revision had been provided against such an order. In view of this finality, the subsequent amendment without a specific provision for retrospective effect could not create a right of appeal in respect of such an order.

In Niranjan Singh''s case also facts were similar inasmuch as the order of the Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance had become final and the Court held that the Act of 1950 could not effect the order so as to deprive it of its finality. Sitaram''s case decided by the Madhaya Pradesh High Court dealt with an entirely different situation. The Stamp Act was amended in 1975 and section 47-A was introduced which empowered the registering Officer to refer the documents to the Collector for determination of the market value of the property covered by the instrument. This power of reference stemmed from statute and it could not be made retroactive so as to apply to the instruments which had already been registered before the amending provision cams into force.

Thus I find that the cases cited by the learned counsel for appellants are not apposite to the questions raised in this appeal and no assistance can be sought from them. On the contrary, I am of the view that addition of one more forum or Tribunal u/s 50 empowered to revise the order of a subordinate Revenue Officer was entirely a procedural matter and the Collector had the necessary jurisdiction to revise an order passed by a subordinate authority even though such an order was passed before the Collector was added as a revising authority u/s 50 of the Code.

For reasons stated above, the contention of the appellants as regards the Collector''s jurisdiction in hearing the revision cannot be accepted. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsels''s fee, according to scale.