Kailash Suyal vs Boby Ray (Deceased)

Lok Pal Singh, J

By means of present writ petition, moved under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner is seeking quashing of the impugned judgment and order dated 29.06.2012 passed by the Additional District Judge/III Fast Track Court, Nainital in Rent Control Appeal No. 8 of 2011, Kailash Suyal Vs. Boby Ray as well as judgment and order dated 05.07.2011 passed by Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division) Nainital, in Rent Control Case No. 7 of 2005, Boby Ray Vs. Kailash Suyal.

Facts, in brief, are that respondent filed release application under section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred as the Act 1972) for release of property in dispute/house along with land appurtenant thereto stating therein that applicant /respondent is the landlord-owner of the house, known as Apple Grove Cottage with land appurtenant thereto (hereinafter referred as property in dispute), being one of the parts of Dugai Estate, Bhowali, Tehsil & District Nainital. In January 1975, the house was let out to the father of the petitioner, namely, Late Dhani Ram Suyal. As there was no electricity connection in the house, Late Dhani Ram Suyal requested the landlord through his handwritten letter dated 16.08.1985 to permit him to install electricity connection in the property in dispute. Permission was granted by the landlord to Late Dhani Ram Suyal. Late Dhani Ram Suyal was living with the petitioner, however, his other sons build their independent houses in the same municipality area of Bhowali and were staying there separately. After death of Dhani Ram Suyal, rent was paid by the petitioner to the respondent/landlord. Being old aged person, landlord requested the tenant/petitioner to vacate the property in dispute and deliver the possession to the landlord, as he is having bonafide need of the property in dispute. It is stated that due to old age and ill health, the respondent/landlord is unable to use his existing house, and the property in dispute, which is adjacent to right side of road, is more suitable for the landlord and his family members.

The petitioner/ tenant filed his written statement denying the ownership of the respondent/landlord and contend that just to grab the property in dispute dishonestly, release application has been filed. It is further stated that father of the petitioner was himself owner of the property in dispute and there was no question of letting out the property in dispute. It is further contended that the electricity connection in the property in dispute is in the name of the petitioner and there was no occasion to seek permission from the respondent. It is further contended that he along with his brothers, namely, Sri Nandan Suyal, and Sri Anand Suyal were residing with his father i.e. Late Dhani Ram Suyal in the property in dispute at the time of death of his father. It is further contended that applicant has no right , title or interest on Khasra No. 674-A, measuring 6 Muthi, Khasra No. 675-A, measuring 9 Muthi; Khasra No. 676-A, measuring 11 Muthi and 677-A, measuring 1 Nali 1 Muthi of Khata No. 115 and Khasra No. 674-Ba, measuring 6 muthi, Khasra no. 675-Ba measuring 9 Muthi; Khasra No. 676-Ba measuring 12 Muthi and 677-Ba measuring 1 Nali of Khata No. 118 of Village Kahalkweera Pargana Chakhata, Tehsil and District Nainital are in exclusive ownership and possession of the petitioner along with the building in dispute and a cowshed, constructed on Khasra No. 677 from the time of his father Late Sri Dhani Ram Suyal. Petitioner has denied the fact that property in dispute is situated in the compound of the applicant's residence. It is further stated that land of aforesaid khata no. 115 and 118, including the property in dispute constructed on Khasra No. 677 thereof, is a separate, compact and consolidated area bounded by the public road and bridle road in the south-east, east and east-north and by the ravine (gadhera) in the north-west, west and south-west and the said land with the property in dispute and cowshed constructed thereon are in exclusive possession of the petitioner from the time of his father. It is further stated that aforementioned Khasra numbers of village Kahalkweera, ParganaChakhata, Tehsil and District Nainital were in the exclusive ownership and possession of Col. Mathura Lal Sah and he had his house constructed on aforesaid Khasra No. 677 and as Col. Mathura Lal Sah was in Indian Army, when his children grown up, his family left the aforesaid property and the building constructed on aforesaid Khasra no. 677 became dilapidated and father of the petitioner Late Dhani Ram Suyal obtained the aforesaid property from Col. Mathura Lal Sah for his occupation. It is further stated that after occupying said property in the year 1972, father of the petitioner constructed the present building on Khasra No. 677 in place of the old ruined building and the cow shed and his father was the exclusive and sole owner of the aforesaid property including the property in dispute.

Documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the respondent. He filed affidavit in evidence of Leslie Ray, Veronica Grewal, Dennis Ray and Jagdish Ram. Petitioner had also filed affidavits of Bhola Dutt, Yogeshwar Singh, Kailash Suyal, Rama Devi, Suresh Chandra Joshi and Sunderlal in evidence.

An affidavit has been filed by Leslie Ray stating therein that the entire property known as Dugai Estate situated at Bhowali mainly comprised of three portions know as Apple Grove Cottage, Alma Lodge and third one known as Douglas Cottage with huge land appurtenant, inherited from his mother Late Mrs. Lusy, was owned by his father Boby Ray and one part known as Apple Grove Cottage was let out on rent to Late Shri Dhani Ram Suyal, father of the petitioner in January 1975. It is further stated that Late Shri Dhani Ram Suyal in his lifetime used to pay rent of the disputed property to Boby Ray and thereafter petitioner also paid rent to Boby Ray.

Dennis Ray in his affidavit has stated that Apple Grove Cottage was let out on rent to Late Shri Dhani Ram Suyal, father of the petitioner in January 1975.

Jagdish Ram, who is the witness of the fact of letting the premise in question to the father of the petitioner, also filed his affidavit in evidence stating therein that he is residing in Duggai Estate Bhowali since last 40 years. He knew Late Dhani Ram son of Late Motiram very well and he was the mediator between Late Dhani Ram and Boby Ray to let out the property in dispute. It is further stated that Boby Ray is the owner and landlord of the Apple Grove Cottage which is part of Duggai Estate Bhowali. Father of the petitioner was tenant in the property in dispute and after his death, petitioner has become the tenant of the applicant-respondent. It is further stated that applicant had let out Apple Grove Cottage to the father of petitioner i.e. Dhani Ram Suyal in his presence @ 250/- per annum in the year 1975. It is further stated that when the property in dispute was let out to the father of the petitioner, it was not having electricity connection.

Kailash Suyal filed his affidavit stating therein that letter dated 07.01.1975 is a forged document and same was not written by his father. It is further contended that applicant has included the land of Khata No. 115 and 118 in the release application, the land of aforesaid Khata is well within the territory of notified area of Bhowali which has , later on, become Nagar Palika Bhowali. Since, house and the land of the aforesaid Khata No. 115 and 118 is situated within the area of Nagar Palika Bhowali, therefore, provisions of U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act 1950 are not applicable and if applicant is succeeds to get his name recorded in the revenue records, same is not binding upon the petitioner.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record.

Before further discussion it is apt to mention that sole respondent died on 02.10.2013, during the pendency of the writ petition and his legal heirs were brought on record as respondent nos. 1/1 to 5/1.

Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that, in fact, house in question belongs to one Col. Mathura Lal Sah who was serving in army and left the house abandoned, thereafter, father of the petitioner in the year 1972 obtained the aforesaid property from Col. Mathura Lal Sah, constructed a building thereon and started residing there with his family. It is further stated that building in question i.e. Apple Grove Cottage came to be recorded in the name of Mathura Lal Sah in Nagar Palika, Bhowali, and respondent/ applicant is not the owner/landlord of the demise property and the letter in the name of Late Dhani Ram Suyal is a fabricated document. It is further contended that the plea raised by the respondent that he is in bona fide hard-pressed need of the house in dispute is not tenable, as respondent-applicant has sufficient accommodation available with him in Duglas Cottage and Alma Cottage for his need and accommodation as well as of that all his family members. It is further stated that both the courts below have committed illegality in holding that there is landlord and tenant relationship between the petitioner and the respondent and respondent has bonafide and genuine need of the premise in dispute. It is argued that besides property in dispute, in the guise of appurtenant land, respondent-applicant has included the land adjoining to khasra numbers mentioned above, which cannot be treated appurtenant land of the property in dispute. It is further submitted that both the courts below have failed to consider the prominent use of the adjoining land, therefore, land shown as appurtenant land is not part and parcel of the property in dispute. It is further contended that petitioner is in possession of the adjoining land, which cannot form part of the demise property thus Prescribed Authority as well as lower appellate court have failed to notice this valuable aspect of the matter and committed illegality in allowing the release application in regard to the demise property as well as the agricultural land adjoining to demise property which is not appurtenant land of the house and is a separate agricultural land.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the legal heirs of the respondent-Boby Ray would contend that house in dispute was originally let out by the landlord Boby Ray (since deceased) to the father of the tenant/petitioner in the year 1975. It is further contended that petitioner-tenant tried to include the other adjoining land belonging to the landlord within the purview of the release application and contend that he is in possession of the said land, however, it is admitted to him that the property in dispute with land appurtenant thereto was a compact unit. It is further contended that respondent filed a suit under section (229-B) in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class against Sri Mathura Lal Sah and vide order dated 16.08.2001 name of the respondent was recorded in the revenue records. It is further contended that relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and respondent has been proved, as memorandum of rent note as well as the letter seeking permission to obtain electricity connection written by the father of the petitioner has been proved by respondent and petitioner could not prove contrary to it.

During the course of the argument learned counsel for the petitioner would emphasize that plot nos. 675B, 676A, 677A and 678A of Village Kahalkweera Pargana Chakhata, Tehsil and District Nainital are part of Dugai Estate and are agricultural land and respondent applicant has wrongly included agricultural land, which cannot be considered as appurtenant land of the property in dispute and the release application could not be allowed in regard to the agricultural land and same is barred by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.

To this, learned counsel for the respondent applicant supplied certified copy of the judgment and order dated 21.06.2013 passed by Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Nainital in Civil Suit No. 80 of 2006, Boby Ray vs. Kailash Suyal, wherein decree of prohibitory injunction has been passed in favour of the respondent applicant and petitioner was directed not to interfere in the peaceful possession of the respondent over the plot nos. 675B, 676A, 677A and 678A of Village Kahalkweera Pargana Chakhata, Tehsil and District Nainital. Against said order, petitioner also preferred Civil Appeal No. 23 of 2013, Kailash Suyal vs. Boby Ray and others, said appeal has also been decided in favour of the respondent applicant vide judgment and order dated 14.09.2018.

In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and others vs. L.J. Johnson and others (1983) 4SCC 110

I have gone through the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner. The Hon'ble Apex Court while having considered the definition of 'appurtenant or other land' as used in Section 4(9) and section 2(g)(ii) of the Urban land (Ceiling Regulation) Act 1976 (hereinafter referred as 1976 Act) has held that provisions of the Act 1976 is a beneficial statute. Thus, having considered the nature of the 1976 Act, being a beneficial statute, it has been held that definition of appurtenance should be construed in the light of beneficial statute so as to suppress the mischief and advancement against its object. The purpose of the enactment of the 1976 Act was that in the guise of the appurtenant land, a building owner may not retain a huge chunk of land, claimed appurtenant land of the building. The ratio of the judgment is not applicable in regard to a building which has its appurtenant land. Thus ratio of the judgment is not applicable in the present case.

Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suryakumar Govindjee vs. Krishnammal and others (1990) 4SCC 313. The Hon'ble Apex Court having considered appurtenant land in view of Section 2(2) of T.N Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960, used the word 'Kaichalai' though exact definition could not made available to the Hon'ble Apex Court but Hon'ble Apex Court has derived definition of word "Kaichalai' as a hut or roofed structure. Paragraph 17 of the judgment. Same is extracted hereunder:-

"17. Before concluding, we may touch upon two more relevant aspects. The first is the use of the word "separately" in s. 2(2). This, however, does not affect our above construction of the section. That word is intended to emphasise that, for purposes of the Act, a building means any unit comprising the whole or part of a building that is separately let out. It does not mean--it cannot mean--that composite leases of land and building would not be covered by it. That would be clearly contrary to the language of the whole clause which specifically talks of joint letting of land and building. The second is the restriction of the applicability of s. 2(2) to cases of letting of building and appurtenant lands only. It may be suggested that the lands here are not "appurtenant" except perhaps to the extent required for providing access to the Kaichalai. This argument is not very helpful to the appellants. At best, it can mean that the Kaichalai and only a part of land needed for its enjoyment or use would be governed by the Rent Control Act. But this was not the contention of the appellant and no attempt has been made to ascertain what the extent of such "appurtenant" land could be. That apart, we are inclined to think that the word "appurtenant" has, in the context, a much wider meaning. It is not just restricted to land which, on a consideration of the circumstances, a court may consider necessary or imperative for its enjoyment. It should be construed as comprehending the land which the parties considered appropriate to let along with the building. To hold to the contrary may give rise to practical difficulties. Suppose there is, in the middle of a metropolis, a bungalow with a vast extent of land surrounding it such as for e.g. in the Larsen & Toubro case and this is let out to a tenant. If a very strict and narrow interpretation is given to the word "appurtenant", it is arguable that a considerable part of the surrounding land is surplus to the requirements of the lessee of the building. But, we think, no argument is needed to say that such a lease would be a lease of building for the purposes of the Rent Control Act. Where a person leases a building together with land, it seems impermissible in the absence of clear intention spelt out in the deed, to dissect the lease as (a) of building and appurtenant land covered by the Rent Control Act and (b) of land alone governed by other relevant statutory provisions. What the parties have joined, one would think, the court cannot tear as under. In fact, we may point out that a wider meaning for this word was canvassed in J.H. Irani v. T.S.Pl.P. Chidambaram Chettiar, which the court had no necessity to go into in the view taken by it on the interpretation of the lease deed. In this case also no contention has been raised in regard to this aspect and so we shall also leave open the precise connotation of the word except to say that it may warrant a wide meaning in the context".

The Hon'ble Apex Court having considered the provisions of Section 2(2) T.N Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 has used the word 'separately' and held that composite leases of land and building would not be covered by provisions of Section 2(2) T.N Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 and held that the Kaichalai and only a part of land needed for its enjoyment or use would be governed by the Rent Control Act.

Perusal of the judgment Suryakumar Govindjee (supra) would reveal that case before the Hon'ble Apex Court was entirely different from the case in hand. Here, respondent-applicant has filed the release application seeking bona fide release of the boundaries of the house in dispute known as Apple Grove Cottage: east property of the applicant, west house of Shri Nandan Suyal (brother of the petitioner), north nala and south road and appurtenant land thereto and agricultural land as stated by the petitioner in his written statement does not form part of the property in dispute.

Learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his submissions, placed reliance upon the following judgments: Indu Bhusan Bose vs. Rama Suhari Debi AIR 1970 SC 228, Mohd. Ibrhim vs. Mohd. Ahmed (2007) 1 AWC 368, Jyoti Ram Vs. District Judge, Saharanpur 1995 RD 99 (Allahabad), and K.C. Goverdhan vs. N. Krishna Rao 1986 (1) Kar LJ 297 (Karnataka High Court).

Description of the property in dispute, mentioned at the bottom of the release application would reveal that applicant-respondent nowhere has claimed possession of the agricultural land from the petitioner. Petitioner has tried to mix the issues. Firstly, it is stated that respondent-applicant is not the landlord of the property in dispute and secondly it is stated that Khasra numbers as stated in paragraph no. 27 of the written statement of the petitioner, which has already been adverted to, is not appurtenant land rather the same is an agricultural land. Respondent -applicant has proved its case that he is the owner of the property in dispute, which was in the ownership of Col. Mathura Lal Sah and his name has been mutated in the revenue records as well as fact that property in dispute was let out by the applicant to the father of the petitioner in the month of January 1975 in the presence of Jagdish Ram at the rate of Rs. 250/-per annum has also been proved, and, further father of the petitioner made request to the respondent applicant that he may be permitted to get electricity connection which has been proved by producing documentary evidence and affidavit of independent witness Jagdish Ram.

Petitioner also tried to make out a case that his father Late Dhani Ram Suyal was the owner of the property in dispute and property in dispute was never let out to him. He also adduced the affidavit of the witnesses and claimed adverse possession against Col. Mathura Lal Sah. Further, petitioner has also taken a plea in its affidavit that name of Col. Mathura Lal Sah is recorded in the record of Nagar Palika Bhowali and property in dispute falls within municipal area Bhowali and provisions of U.P.Z.A.L.R. Act 1950 are not applicable in the property in dispute and if applicant/respondent succeeds to get his name recorded in the revenue records, same is not binding upon the petitioner. This plea, taken by the petitioner in his affidavit was not taken in his written statement. From a bare reading of the written statement and evidence adduced by the petitioner, it seems that petitioner has tried his level best to deny the ownership/landlordship of the respondents but could not prove that property in dispute was not let out to his father by the applicant.

Learned Prescribed Authority as well as lower Appellate Court have recorded categorical finding on the evidence adduced by the parties and held that respondent-applicant is the owner of the demise property and had acquired the same from Col. Mathura Lal Sah and his name has been recorded in the revenue records; also property in dispute was let out by the respondent applicant to the father of the petitioner in the month of January 1975 at the rate of Rs. 250/- per annum. Further, finding has been recorded that relationship of landlord and tenant is established between the petitioner and the respondent. Further, both the courts below have recorded concurrent finding of fact that respondent-applicant is in bona fide hard-pressed need of the property, as mentioned in his release application and has successfully proved the fact that in case property is not released in favour of the respondent-applicant he will suffer comparative hardship.

It is settled position in law that landlord is the best judge of his need. Their Lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Ayub & another vs. Mukesh Chand (2012) 2SCC 155 have held as under:-

It is well settled the landlord's requirement need not be a dire necessity. The court cannot direct the landlord to do a particular business or imagine that he could profitably do a particular business rather than the business he proposes to start. It was wrong on the part of the District Court to hold that the appellants' case that their sons want to start the general merchant business is a pretence because they are dealing in eggs and it is not uncommon for a Muslim family to do the business of non-vegetarian food. It is for the landlord to decide which business he wants to do. The Court cannot advise him.Similarly, length of tenancy of the respondent in the circumstances of the case ought not to have weighed with the courts below.

We also find that the courts below were swayed by the fact that the financial position of the appellants was better than the respondent. The District Court has erroneously gone on to observe that the appellants can buy another building and start business. It has also observed that the appellants had purchased the building to make profit. In this connection we may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court in Bhimanagouda Basanagouda Patil where the District Judge decided the issue of comparative hardship in favour of the tenant solely on the basis of affluence of the parties. This Court observed that if this is the correct approach then an affluent landlord can never get possession of his premises even if he proves all his bona fide requirements. This Court further observed that the fact that a person has the capacity to purchase the property cannot be the sole ground against him while deciding the question of comparative hardship. If the purchase is pursuant to a genuine need of the landlord the said purchase has to be given due weightage unless, of course, the purchase is actuated by collateral consideration. This Court rejected the High Court's finding that the landlord had secured the premises apparently in a game of speculation. Somewhat similar observations are made in this case by the District Court which in our opinion are totally unsubstantiated.

Having heard learned counsel for the parties, after perusal of the material available on record, and concurrent findings recorded by the both courts below, this Court is of the view that respondent applicant has proved his landlorship and ownership over the property in dispute and also proved the fact that he is in dire necessity of the property in dispute. It is also proved that original tenant was Late Dhani Ram Suyal and petitioner has inherited tenancy over the property in dispute from his father. It is admitted case of the petitioner that the petitioner and his brothers have acquired residential building within the same municipality, as such, Section 21 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 prohibits the petitioner to contest the release application filed by the respondent applicant.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78, has held that where both expressions "appeal" and "revision" are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression "revision" is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression "appeal". The use of two expressions "appeal" and "revision" when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, is not without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an "appeal" and so also of a "revision". If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial court or the subordinate tribunal which is never the case.

The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is a limited jurisdiction. In Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath (2015) 5SCC 423, it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution are not original but only supervisory. Power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.

A Division Bench of this Court while deciding Review Application MCC No. 1276 /2018, arising out of Writ Petition No. 438 (S/B) of 2016, Tara Nath Pandey vs.Union of India & others, decided on 17.06.2019, has relied upon the principle of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others, AIR 1964 SC 1344) and observed that the scope of interference in certiorari proceedings is extremely limited. The relevant paragraphs of said judgment are excepted hereunder:

"3. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction such as in cases where the order is passed without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction or where, in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence, and the inference of fact to be drawn therefrom, cannot be agitated in certiorari proceedings (Syed Yakoob4 ) as it is in the province of a court of appeal.

If the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or has erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, or if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, it would be an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Where the conclusion of law by the Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions, or in ignorance of it or even in disregard of it or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Whether or not an error is an error of law, and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and upon the nature and scope of the legal provisions which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened. (Syed Yakoob4 ).

Unlike an appellate authority which can reappreciate the evidence on record, the High Court, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, would not substitute its views for that of the Tribunal, nor would it re-appreciate the evidence on record to arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Tribunal whose order is impugned before it. Even if two views are possible, and the Tribunal has taken one of the possible views, the High Court would not interfere, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, even if it were to be satisfied that the other possible view, canvassed before it, is more attractive. A finding of fact reached, on the appreciation of evidence, cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings save a finding of fact which is either perverse or is based on no evidence. If a provision is reasonably capable of two constructions, and one construction has been adopted by the authority, its conclusion may not always be open to correction in writ proceedings. (Syed Yakoob4 ).

A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior tribunals. A writ can similarly be issued where, in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it, the tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as, for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. (Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot Vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. : (2008) 14 SCC 171 ; Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and others : AIR 1964 SC 1344). A writ of certiorari can be issued in the case of illegal exercise of jurisdiction, and also to correct errors of law apparent on the face of the record, even though they do not go to jurisdiction. It is only errors of law apparent on the face of the record, and not errors of fact though they may be apparent on the face of the record, which can be corrected, (Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Bhatt and Ors : AIR 1961 SC 970 ; Rex vs Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal : (1952) 1 KB 338; and Nagendra Nath Bora and Ors. Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Ors : AIR 1958 SC 398), and not every error either of law or fact which can be corrected by a Court of appeal or revision. (T. Prem Sagar Vs. The Standard Vacuum Oil Company Madras and Ors.: AIR 1965 SC 111; Bachan Singh and Ors. Vs. Gauri Shankar Agarwal and Ors : (1972) 4 SCC 257 ; Nagendra Nath Bora and Ors. Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Ors : AIR 1958 SC 398).

Further an error of law, which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari, must be self-evident. It should not need an elaborate examination of the record (Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. S.B. Bhatt and Ors : AIR 1961 SC 970), or require a detailed examination or an elaborate argument to establish it (Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot Vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. : (2008) 14 SCC 171; Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Respondent:Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. : AIR 1955 SC 233 ; Batuk K. Vyas Vs. Surat Borough Municipality and Ors : AIR 1953 Bom. 133). An error cannot be said to be apparent if one has to travel beyond the record to see whether the judgment is correct or not. It is an error which strikes on the mere looking, and does not need a long-drawn out process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. Such an error would not require any extraneous matter to show its incorrectness. To put it differently, it should be so manifest and clear that no court would permit it to remain on record. (Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot Vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. : (2008) 14 SCC 171 ; Sant Lal Gupta and Ors. Vs. Modern Co-operative 17 Group Housing Society Ltd. and Ors. : (2010) 13 SCC 336).

In the case in the hand, petitioner has failed to convince the Court that the subordinate courts have exercised such a jurisdiction, which was not vested in them and they have not exercised the jurisdiction in accordance with law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised when (i) the subordinate courts have exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it (ii) failed to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or; (iii) have acted in exercising of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

The petitioner could not point out that the subordinate courts have exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it, fail to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it or have acted in exercising of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

The petitioner has failed to prove its case in the parameters above and also failed to prove that orders passed by the courts below has occasioned into grave injustice or failure of justice with the petitioner, so as to compel this Court to exercise such jurisdiction to differ with the reasons and the conclusion arrived at by the courts below, in the opinion of this Court, it is just and proper calling for no interference in the same.

In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. However, having considered the fact that petitioner is tenant in the property in dispute, thus he is granted six months time from today to vacate the property in dispute, provided petitioner shall file an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within 30 days from today that he will vacate the premise in question on or expiry of six months i.e. 1st March 2020 and shall continue to pay rent to the landlord.

No order as to costs.