Kala @ Kaliya vs State Of Rajasthan

Offence,,Sentences,,Fine,,"Fine Default

sentence",

Section 302 IPC,,Life Imprisonment,,"Rs.5,000/-",,2 Months' R.I.,

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations.",,,,,,,

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be",,,,,,,

present, the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is",,,,,,,

purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.,,,,,,,

The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (at page 468):,,,,,,,

The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such",,,,,,,

an inference, then of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its",,,,,,,

seriousness or intended serious consequences, is neither here or there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he intended to",,,,,,,

inflict the injury in question and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.,,,,,,,

These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh's case (supra) for the applicability of clause ""Thirdly"" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law.",,,,,,,

Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a",,,,,,,

bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.,,,,,,,

It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz., that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.",,,,,,,

Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing",,,,,,,

death, the offence would not be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.",,,,,,,

Clause (c) of Section 299 and Clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding,,,,,,,

clauses. It will be sufficient to say that Clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons -,,,,,,,

being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse",,,,,,,

for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.,,,,,,,

The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each",,,,,,,

other that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.,,,,,,,

The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. MANU/SC/0180/1976 : 1977 CriLJ 1 , Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh",,,,,,,

MANU/SC/0708/2002 :[2002]SUPP1SCR703 , Augustine Saldanhav. State of Karnataka MANU/SC/0638/2003 : 2003 CriLJ 4458, Thangiyav. State of T.N.MANU/SC/1046/2004 : 2005 CriLJ 684 and in Rajinderv. State of Haryana",,,,,,,

MANU/SC/8197/2006 : 2006CriLJ2926.,,,,,,,

Considering the evidence on record in the background of the principles of law, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part II IPC. The conviction is accordingly altered.""",,,,,,,

Admittedly, the incident took place on the spur of the moment after a sudden quarrel between the spouses. The accused did not act in an extremely cruel manner and the blows by lathi were inflicted on the non-vital parts of the body.",,,,,,,

Thus, considering the facts of the case at hand on the anvil of the principles laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Daya Nand (supra), we are of the view that the conviction of the appellant as recorded by the trial court",,,,,,,

for the offence under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be toned down to the offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.,,,,,,,

Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 04.05.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.4, Udaipur in Sessions Case No.92/2014 (363/2014) (C.I.S. No.1181/2014) is set aside. The conviction and sentence of the",,,,,,,

appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is quashed and set aside and instead, he is convicted for the offence under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. Considering the entirety of the facts and circumstances as available on record, we hereby",,,,,,,

sentence the appellant to undergo 7 years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default of payment of fine, to further undergo 2 months' simple imprisonment.",,,,,,,

The appeal is partly allowed in these terms.,,,,,,,

Record be returned to the trial court forthwith.,,,,,,,