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Judgment
The 1st defendant is the appellant. This second appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff to recover possession of the suit property
after the removal of the house standing on it. The appellant obtained the property, which was a vacant site, on lease for erecting a house for
residential purposes. Under the lease deed (Ex. H) he agreed to remove the house at his own expense whenever required by the owner. He now
claims that before he is ejected he is entitled to be paid the value of the house under the Malabar Tenants'' Improvements Act (I of 1900). It is
conceded the ""house"" falls within the meaning of the term ""improvement"" as defined in the Act and, that if the Act applies, the undertaking to
remove it cannot be enforced as it offends against the provisions of Section 19 of the Act. The learned District Judge disallowed the compensation
for the house on the ground that the lease, being not an agricultural one, is governed by the Transfer of Property Act and not by the Malabar
Tenants'' Improvements Act.
The question we have to decide is whether the Malabar Tenants'' Improvements Act applies only to agricultural leases and not to building leases
(i.e., leases of vacant sites for building purposes) as well. On one side, it is argued that there is a statement in Mr. Logan''s Malabar Manual, Vol.
II, App. III (cxc), that under the customary law of Malabar only agricultural tenants were entitled to improvements, that such a statement was
made as to the effect of Act I of 1887 in the Legislative Council, that an unreported decision of this Court, S.A. No. 1445 of 1889, (under Act I
of 1887), held that that was the law, that there is no reason to imagine that the Legislature in passing Act I of 1900 departed from this rule and that
the unreported decision has been followed very recently by Anantakrishna Aiyar, J., in S.A. No. 614 of 1928 which, we may say, was decided
during the time this Second Appeal remained part-heard. On the other side, it is urged that, having regard to the provisions of the present Act (Act
I of 1900) which are clear, the statements made in Mr. Logan''s Malabar Manual and in the Legislative Council should be disregarded, that the Act
clearly applies to building leases and that it was recently held by Jackson, J., in Chathukutty v. Kunhappu ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224,
that ""it has invariably been held in Malabar that the Act applies to agricultural holdings and also to what are known as kudiviruppu, i.e., vacant sites
available for building purposes. . ."" and that Anantakrishna Aiyar, J., does not dissent from the decision in Chathukutty v. Kunhappu ILR (1927)
50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224.
We shall first refer to the provisions of the two Acts to which our attention was drawn. The first Act that was passed by the Madras Legislative
Council to secure to tenants in Malabar compensation for the value of improvements was Act 1 of 1887. Section 2, Clause (1) of this Act defines
tenant"" as follows:
In this Act, unless there is something repugnant to the context of subject-matter ''tenant'' means a person who holds land under another person and
is, or, but for a special custom or contract would be, liable to pay rent for that land to that person.
Section 3, Clause (1) defines ""improvement"" as meaning
any work which adds to the value of the holding which is suitable to the holding and consistent with the purpose for which it was let.
Clause (2) of this section in enumerating what are deemed to be improvements states amongst others that
until the contrary is shown the following shall be presumed to be improvements within the meaning of the Act:
(a) the erection of dwelling houses, buildings appurtenant thereto and farm buildings;
(b) the construction of tanks, wells, channels, dams and other works for the storage or supply of water for agricultural or domestic purposes.
Section 4 states every tenant who is ejected from his holding shall, notwithstanding any custom to the contrary, be entitled to improvements.
As Act I of 1887 failed to achieve its purpose fully, the Legislature amended the law by repealing it and enacting the present Act I of 1900. By
this Act the definition of the term ""tenant"" was thoroughly re-cast and its scope was enlarged to include the claim of a ""squatter"" for compensation
which it was thought did not fall within the definition under the repealed Act. The definition of the term ""improvement"" was also modified by adding
the product of a work"" to the definition under the old Act. By Section 3, Clause (1) of this Act the term ""tenant"" is defined as follows:
Tenant, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes a person who as lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in
good faith believing himself to be lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee of land is in possession thereof, or who, with the bona fide
intention of attorning and paying the customary rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste land, but without the permission of such person,
brings such land under cultivation and is in occupation thereof as cultivator.
Sub-clause (3) of the same section defines ""improvement"" to mean
Any work or product of a work which adds to the value of the holding, is suitable to it, and consistent with the purpose for which the holding was
let, mortgaged or occupied.
Section 4 deals with what are deemed to be ""improvements"" and states amongst other things that the erection of dwelling houses as under the
old Act shall be presumed to be an improvement and Section 5 states that every tenant shall be entitled to compensation on ejectment. It is
nowhere stated in the Act that its operation is limited to agricultural tenancies; on the other hand, such indications as we have of the intention of the
Act show that it would be difficult to restrict its operation to such tenancies. The title and the preamble of the Act show that it applies generally to
all tenants in the Malabar District and if it had been the intention of the Legislature to restrict its operation to agricultural tenancies only, nothing was
easier than to add the qualifying word ""agricultural"" before the word ""tenants"". The first part of the definition of ""tenant"" ending with the word
thereof"" is wide enough to include a person to whom land has been let for building purposes. We cannot accept the plea that the scope of this part
of the definition which stands apart from the rest of the clause should be limited to agricultural tenancies because when referring to quite a different
class of people as tenants in the same Clause (viz., ""squatters"") the words ""cultivation"" and ""cultivator"" are used; on the other hand, it may well be
argued that the absence of such words in the first part of the definition shows that the Legislature deliberately intended to include non-agricultural
tenants, such as lessees holding land for building purposes within its scope. The plea urged before us was rejected by Anantakrishna Aiyar, J.
when it was urged before him in S.A. No. 614 of 1928. Another indication as regards the intention of the Legislature may be found in Section 4 of
the Act which in Clause (a) refers to ""the erection of divelling"" houses as a work which shall be presumed, until the contrary is. shown, to be an
improvement for the purposes of the Act."" Clause (b) of this section refers to certain other works ""for agricultural purposes"". The absence of such
a qualification in Clause (a) lends support to the suggestion that ""dwelling houses"" shall always be deemed to be improvements until the contrary is
shown irrespective of the purpose for which the land on which these stand, may have been leased. The fact that ""dwelling houses"" are grouped
together with ""farm buildings"" in the same clause cannot, in our opinion, be relied on to show that these, to be deemed improvements, should be
appurtenant to a holding for agricultural purposes. If that was the intention of the Legislature appropriate words might have been used to express
that, intention as has been done in the subsequent clause which refers to tanks, wells, channels, etc. Agricultural tenancies of land as distinguished
from other forms of tenancies are well known to law and if the intention of the Legislature was to restrict the operation of the Act to agricultural
tenancies alone, nothing was easier for the Legislature than to state it in the preamble or in the sections of the Act, as was done for example in the
corresponding Act in the N. W. P. (Act XII of 1881 as amended by Act XIV of 1886) which enacted ""Nothing herein contained applies to land
for the time being occupied by dwelling houses or manufactories or appurtenant thereto, so long as such land is not let to agricultural tenants."" In
this connection the observations of Sundara Aiyar, J., in his book on Malabar Law edited by Mr. Sitarama Rao (see page 296) as regards the
scope of the two Acts may be referred to with advantage.
The Act applies not only to the kanomdar but also to all classes of lessees, sub-lessees, mortgagees, sub-mortgagees, in possession and also to
persons who are bona fide in possession with the intention of paying rent to the person entitled to let the waste land but without the permission of
that person. The last is the case of a pure squatter that used to be introduced by the Government to whom reference has already been made. In
Mr. Logan''s Manual, Vol. if, App. III (exe) there is a statement that under the customary law, only agricultural tenants are entitled to
improvements. A similar statement was made as to the effect of the Act of 1887 by Mr. Subramania Aiyar, as he then was, in the Legislative
Council. It is doubtful if this is correct; at any rate, it ''would seem difficult to so restrict the later Act.
(The italics are mine.)
In this connection see also page 345. In our opinion Act 1 of 1900 applies to non-agricultural tenants such as lessees of vacant sites leased for
building purposes.
If the sections of the present Act clearly indicate that its operation is not limited to agricultural tenancies alone, ft is needless to inquire what the
customary law that prevailed prior to the legislation was, and whether the repealed Act I of 1887 applied only to agricultural tenancies; for we
should be guided only by the plain words of the statute. However, as the point was argued, we shall briefly deal with it. Assuming that under the
customary law of Malabar only agricultural tenants were entitled to the value of the improvements, it is not quite clear whether the Courts in
actually administering the law before the Act I of 1887 was passed, ever gave effect to the customary law with strictness, for we find in a well-
known book of Malabar Law entitled ""A Manual of Malabar Law as administered by the Courts"" by Cuddalore Ramachandra Aiyar, Subordinate
Judge of South Malabar, Calicut, published in July, 1883, reference to a decision of this Court, S.A. No. 361 of 1880, to the effect that a lessee of
vacant land let out for building purposes was entitled before ejectment to get compensation for the dwelling house he had erected on it. In Section
301 of the book under the heading, illustration (b), the facts of the case are thus summarised:
Where a house worth Rs. 3,000 had been erected on a waste paramba given by the Karnavan of a Tarwad to his own wife, the High Court
refused to allow the tenant to be disturbed without receiving compensation, though the plaintiff sought to set aside the alienation of the site as
prejudicial to the interests of the Tarwad (see S.A. No. 361 of 1880). On examining the record we find that the plaintiff claimed compensation for
a house built on a vacant site in a crowded locality of residential houses in Kollengode village. The District Munsif granted compensation. The
District Judge thought that the claim was not justified under the customary law but the High Court maintained the Munsif''s decree on the ground
that ''it would be contrary to the rule of good conscience that the plaintiff should recover without compensating the 4th and 5th defendants.
This case shows that a claimant to compensation for improvements in Malabar, even though his title to the holding fails, that, is, even though he
is in the position of a squatter, is not disentitled to claim the value of the dwelling house which he has erected on the vacant site leased to him. It
would thus appear that prior to the Act of 1887 it was usual to give compensation in cases like the present whether the grant was justified by
customary law or not. We may mention that the right to compensation in the above-mentioned case is referred to in Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar''s
book as based on custom. In our view, this right to claim compensation for dwelling houses erected on vacant sites was recognised by Act I of
1887. Section 4 of the Act already quoted states that until the contrary is shown the erection of dwelling houses shall be presumed to be
improvements for the purposes of the Act. In the commentaries of Act I of 1887 reference is made to Section 301 of Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar''s
book. It follows, therefore, that prior to this Act dwelling houses were always considered to be improvements and this has been so, subsequent to
the Act also. We may here refer to S.A. No. 1445 of 1889, the unreported decision relied on by the respondent. It, no doubt, held that the
provisions of the Act of 1887, the repealed Act, do not apply to building leases. This conclusion is based on the following reasoning:
Dwelling houses described in Section 3, Clause (2) of the Act arc grouped together with farm houses, and the term ''improvement'' itself is defined
in the Act as ''a work which adds to the value of the holding''.
In their ordinary sense the words appear to us to refer to dwelling houses appurtenant to a holding for agricultural purposes and not to dwelling
houses within the limits of a town for purposes of residence only. The learned Judges state also that ""dwelling houses for which compensation was
claimed in this suit form admittedly no part of an agricultural holding."" We may observe that they do not refer in their judgment to the definition of
the term ""tenant"" which is very wide and that the word ""holding'''' does not necessarily mean that the land held is agricultural land. The term is not
defined although it is used in several places in the Act. According to the Oxford Dictionary it means ""tenure"" or ""occupation land"" and in the
absence of a definition it may be taken that the word is used in this sense. If the Legislature intended that the word should mean ""agricultural
holding,"" then it would have used ""agricultural"" before the word ""holding"". Legislatures are not unfamiliar with the expression ""agricultural holding
(see, for example, the English Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883). We may also observe that the grouping of ""dwelling house"" along with farm
buildings in enumerating what shall be deemed to be ""improvement"" under the Act either by itself or by combination with ""holding"" is, as we have
already shown, not a sufficient justification to show that dwelling houses in Clause (a) of Section 3 mean dwelling houses appurtenant to a holding
for agricultural purposes. The construction adopted by the learned Judges is opposed to the plain words of the section in enacting which the
Legislature simply gave sanction to the practice followed in Malabar of treating ""dwelling houses"" as improvements for which compensation may be
claimed. It is open to considerable doubt whether the decision in S. A. No. 1445 of 1889, being unreported and presumably unknown, was ever
used in Malabar in preference to the ruling in S.A. No. 361 of 1880, which must have been familiar to those who had to deal with questions of the
kind raised in that case. For these reasons we are of opinion that in spite of the decision in S.A. No. 1445 of 1889 compensation was always
given to lessees who built dwelling houses on vacant sites leased to them for erecting houses for residential purposes whether such houses were
erected in villages or towns and that Act I of 1887 was never understood to stand in the way of awarding compensation in such cases.
The argument that the old Act (Act I of 1887) was intended only to apply to agricultural tenancies and there is no reason why a different
intention should be imputed to the Legislature when it passed the Act I of 1900 does not present to us any difficulty. It may be that it was intended
that the Act of 1887 should apply only to agricultural tenancies as at the time, that is, 1887, the local Legislature under the Indian Councils Act of
1861 could not pass legislation affecting the operation of Transfer of Property Act--an Imperial Act which applied to all tenancies other than
agricultural. But the intention, as we have shown, does not seem to have been carried out effectively in actual practice. As pointed out in Mr.
Justice Sundara Aiyar''s book, it is doubtful if the statement that the repealed Act applied only to agricultural tenancies is correct. But, however that
may be, this disability of the local Legislature to pass Acts affecting the operation of the Imperial Acts was removed by the Statute of 1892, so that
in 1900, when the Improvements Act I of 1900 was passed, it had power with the sanction of the Governor-General in Council to pass legislation
regarding tenancies other than agricultural- The new Act is not a mere repetition of the old Act. Its scope was enlarged and it was modified in
various respects. If the old Act was intended to apply only to agricultural tenancies, there is nothing to show that the intention of the new Act is the
same, having regard to its sections which, as we have already shown, do not restrict its operation to agricultural tenancies. When the Statute is
clear, it cannot be qualified or neutralised by indications of intention gathered from previous legislation on the same subject. (See (1895) L.R. 22
I.A. 107 (Privy Council)
We shall now consider the decisions of this Court under the Act (I of 1900) having a bearing on this point. There are only two decisions
directly bearing on the question, these two being a decision of Jackson, J., in Chathukutty v. Kunhappu ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224,
and a recent decision by Anantakrishna Aiyar, J., in S.A. No. 614 of 1928. Before we discuss these cases attention may be drawn to two other
decisions of this Court, viz., Kallingal Moosa Kutti v. The Secretary of State ILR (1919) 43 M. 65 : 37 M.L.J. 332 and Ullattuthedi Choyi Vs.
The Secretary of State for India in Council, , which, though not useful as direct decisions on the point are yet, in our opinion, very helpful as an
inference may be drawn from them regarding the view generally held as regards the scope of Act I of 1900. The facts of the cases, so far as they
are relevant to the point under consideration, are very similar to the facts of the present case, the only important difference being that in both the
cases the lessor was the Secretary of State for India in Council. In both the eases, the leases were of parambas and in one there was a clear
undertaking on the part of the lessee to pull down and remove all the buildings at the time of surrender without demanding compensation. The
lessees claimed compensation for the value of the dwelling houses; erected by them when they were claimed upon to surrender the lands and it was
held that the provisions of the Malabar Tenants'' Improvements Act as to eviction of tenants on payment of compensation to them for
improvements does not apply to Crown grants which do not provide accordingly (see Ullattuthedi Choyi Vs. The Secretary of State for India in
Council, following Kallingal Moosa Kutti v. The Secretary of State ILR (1919) 43 M. 65 : 37 M.L.J. 332. No attempt was made in either of
those cases to justify the disallowance of compensation on the ground that the Malabar Tenants'' Improvements Act applied only to agricultural
tenancies and not to building leases. The judgments would rather show that it was assumed that the Malabar Tenants'' Improvements Act would
apply but for the provisions of the Crown Grants Act. In this connection attention may be drawn to the following extract from the judgment in
Ullattuthedi Choyi Vs. The Secretary of State for India in Council, :
On (he second point we feel no doubt that the wide language of Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act is conclusive. The Government have specially
armed themselves with powers which they have withheld from private parties, presumably on the ground that they are not likely to misuse them. It
is clear to us that these contracts are not within the mischief of Section 19 of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants.'' Improvements Act.
This would show by implication that the learned Judges were prepared to apply the Tenants'' Improvements Act but would not do so on
account of Section 3 of the Crown Grants Act. In Ullattuthedi Choyi Vs. The Secretary of State for India in Council, the following observations
occur:
It is now said that he cannot be evicted until he has received compensation under the provisions of the Malabar Compensation for Tenants''
Improvements Act. To allow such a provision of that Act to take Effect would prevent the Crown grant in question from taking effect according to
its tenor. We entirely agree with the decision on this point in Kallingal Moosa Kutti v. The Secretary of State for India ILR (1919) 43 M. 65 : 37
M.L.J. 332.
In this case, Ullattuthodi Choyi v. Secretary of State for India ILR (1919) 43 M. 65 : 37 M.L.J. 332, perhaps it may have been possible to
say that the lease was an agricultural one; but the proceedings in the case show that it was throughout treated as a lease of a paramba. Attention
may be drawn to the following observations of the District Munsif, as they refer to the practice followed in Malabar in such cases and also show
that the argument put forward was that the lease being a non-agricultural one the tenant cannot plead Section 19 of the Act.
The more important question is about the buildings in the paramba. One or two of them are useful as dwelling houses .... it has been the usual
practice to allow their value in favour of the tenant. There is hardly any lease in Malabar given for the purpose of building shops or dwelling houses.
Yet it has been the rule to allow the tenant the value of shops and dwelling houses when none of them is inconsistent with the holding. 1 do not
think that Government who are most solicitous about the welfare of the tenant ought to ask the Court to construe the provisions of the Act against
the interests of the tenant.
The District Munsif overruled this argument and allowed compensation. The learned District judge treated the lease as a Crown grant and set aside
the order of the District Munsif. The High Court also, as may be seen from the extract quoted above, proceeded on the same line.
Coming now to the decision under Act I of 1900 which have a direct bearing on the question, we shall first deal with Chaihukutty v. Kunbappu
ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224. The facts in that case were as follows:
The plaintiff let to the defendant a shop in a town in Malabar for 5 years, the tenant agreeing to remove a bakery oven erected by him thereon,
when surrendering the shop at the end of 5 years. At the end of 5 years the plaintiff sued to recover arrears of rent and the land. The defendant
pleaded, inter alia, that he should be paid compensation for the oven....
In support of the plea that the tenant was not entitled to compensation, two arguments were pressed before the learned District judge (Mr. V.
P. Rao), these being (1) that the tenant of a house is not a lessee of land within the meaning of the Act, and (2) that the Act applied only to
agricultural tenancies. The first was disallowed on the ground that the point was taken for the first time in appeal and on the second the learned
District Judge expressed the opinion that the Act (I of 1900) was not confined to agricultural tenancies. On this point he stated ""the Act has been
hitherto applied in practice to kudiyiruppu tenants, i.e., tenants of land for building houses for themselves and they have been awarded
compensation for such houses without any question all these years"". In the result, compensation under the Act was awarded to the tenant. In
second appeal it was held by Jackson, J., that the defendant was not entitled to compensation as the tenant of the house or a shop is not a lessee
within the meaning of the Malabar Tenants'' Improvements Act. On the second point, which is the one we are concerned with in this case, he
agreed with the District Judge and stated thus:
I think it has invariably been held in Malabar that the Act applies to agricultural holdings and also to what are known as kudiyiruppu or vacant sites
available for buildings....
The present case as it relates to a claim for compensation for a house built on a vacant land leased out for erecting buildings, comes literally
within the latter part of this rule and therefore the tenant should be held entitled to claim compensation for the house. This case, i.e., Chathukutty v.
Kunhappu ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224, is referred to in Pathuma Umma v. Aliyammakkanath Moideen (1927) 110 I.C. 752 decided
by Srinivalsa Aiyangar and Reilly, JJ. A perusal of the judgment of Reilly, J., leaves the impression that he was inclined to hold, if necessary, that
even the lessee of a house in Malabar comes within the purview of this Act: but it was not necessary for him to express any opinion on the point as
he found that the house in that case was not an improvement within the meaning of the Act. In the present case the questions whether the tenant of
a house leased to him comes within the. Act or not and whether the scope of the Act is restricted to agricultural lands and vacant sites do not arise
for consideration and we express no opinion on them. On the point we are called upon to decide, that is, whether a lessee of a vacant site is
entitled to compensation under the Act for the house erected by him, both the learned Judges agree with the judgment of Jackson, J., in
Chathukutty v. Kunhappu ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224.
The next case having a somewhat direct bearing on the point is the decision of Anantakrishna Aiyar, J., in S.A. No. 614 of 1928. In that case
the President of the District Board of Malabar leased to the defendant a roadside poramboke. When he was called upon to surrender the site he
claimed compensation under the Act for the house which he had built on it though he had undertaken in the lease deed not to claim compensation
for the improvement that he might make on the property. His claim was disallowed in all the Courts. The judgment in the second appeal is relied on
to show that Act I of 1900 applies only to agricultural tenancies. The learned Judge no doubt refers amongst other things to the unreported
decision, S.A. No. 1445 of 1889 and also to Act I of 1887 and the speech in the Legislative Council, when that Act was introduced,
consideration of which might lead one to think that in his opinion the present Act applies only to agricultural tenancies; but on a careful perusal of
the judgment we can find nowhere in it any such decisive statement. On the other hand, he agrees with the decision in Chathukutty v. Kunhappu
ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224 and distinctly says that he does not think it requires any reconsideration. In his view that decision did not
apply to the case before him because he understood the finding in the case to be that the suit land is a roadside poramboke; in other words, it is
neither an agricultural holding nor a building site available for building purposes. He also held that in the circumstances of the case the house in
question was not an improvement within the meaning of the Act. In our view the decision in S.A. No. 614 of 1928 does not lend any substantial
support to the argument of the respondent. However, if the decision is to be underistood as an authority for the position that the Malabar Tenants''
Improvements Act of 1900 applies only to agricultural tenancies, then, with all deference to the learned judge, we cannot agree with his view. In
passing we may observe that though the facts in S.A. No. 1445 of 1889 are similar to those in Chathukutty v. Kunhappu ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 :
53 M.L.J. 224 having regard to the reasoning in the judgment in that case and the principle on which the judgment was rested, it appears to us that
the question which Jackson, J., had to decide in Chathukutty v. Kunhappu ILR (1927) 50 M. 813 : 53 M.L.J. 224 was res Integra. We may also
say that the decision in S.A. No. 1445 of 1889 was used before us solely for showing that the operation of Act I of 1887 was restricted to
agricultural tenancies and we do not understand the case to have been used for any other purpose in S.A. No. 614 of 1928.
For the above reasons, we are of opinion that the operation of Act I of 1900 is not restricted to agricultural tenancies, that it applies to building
leases as well, that in this view it is unnecessary to consider what the law was prior to 1900 and that even if it is necessary to refer to the prior law
on the ground that the words of the Statute are not very clear, the law administered in Courts without any question for over a century has always
been to the effect that in Malabar the tenant of a vacant site is always entitled to claim compensation for dwelling houses that he may have erected
on the site. We think it is now too late to reconsider the law on the strength of an unreported decision of this Court as old as 1889 and on the
policy of the Act of 1887 which itself is not very clear.
We would, therefore, allow this second appeal and grant the appellant compensation for the value of the house erected on the plaint site. But
as the Lower Courts have not recorded a finding on this point, before we allow the second appeal, we would ask the District Judge to submit a
finding as regards its value; the District Judge is at liberty to send the case to the Sub-Court for the finding. Fresh evidence on this point may be
taken. Two months for the finding and ten days for objections.
On return of the finding the Court delivered the following Judgment.--The finding has been returned that the value of the house in the plaint site is
Rs. 899-6-2. Plaintiff takes objection that the building valued by the Lower Court projects in part beyond the plaint site. It may be so, but the
projection cannot make any real difference to the value since plaintiff himself agreed before the Lower Court on remand that the building now
valued was the building which had to be valued. (Finding Para. 8.)
We accept the finding and set aside the decree of the Lower Appellate Court and modify the decree of the Trial Court by decreeing that after the
word ""shall"" the words ""remove . . . and"" be struck out and the words ""on payment by plaintiff to defendant of Rs. 899-6-2"" be inserted. The
defendant will get his costs here from the plaintiff.