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Judgment
K. Raviraja Pandian, J.—The writ appeal is filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 12.02.2002 dismissing the writ petition
No. 12938 of 1994 filed by the appellants herein seeking for the writ of certiorarified mandamus calling for the records relating to the notifications
issued u/s 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act in G.O. Ms. No. 3-D No. 630, Adi dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department dated 07.09.1992 and
declaration u/s 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in G.O. Ms. No. 3D No. 894 Adi Dravidar and Tribal Welfare Department dated 20.12.1993,
quash the same and consequently direct the respondents not to acquire the lands and drop the acquisition proceedings in respect of survey No.
218/2 in an extent of 2 acres, Vadakkalur village, Avinashi Taluk, Coimbatore District. The said land is sought to be acquired for the purpose of
providing house sites to Adi dravidars. Notification u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has been issued in G.O. Ms. 3D No. 630 dated
07.09.1992. After following the provisions contemplated under the Act, declaration u/s 6 of the Act has also been made on 09.11.1993. Award
has been passed on 18.07.1994. The appellants filed the writ petition on 21.07.1994 contending that the declaration u/s 6 of the Act made by the
respondent was beyond the period, as provided under the provisions of the Act. That was the solitary ground argued before the learned single
Judge. The learned Judge, after going through the records produced, has recorded a factual finding that the declaration u/s 6 of the Act was made
on 09.11.1993 and that was well within the period of one year and therefore, there was no violation of any procedure as put forth by the
petitioners. In that view of the matter the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition.
Before us, the learned Counsel for the appellants/petitioners reiterated the very same argument by reading out of the provision to Section 6 of
the Land Acquisition Act and contended that the date of publication of the declaration u/s 6 of the Act in the gazette has to be taken for calculating
the period of limitation. On the reading of statutory provisions, we are not able to agree with the learned Counsel for the appellants. Further, the
issue is no longer res integra and it has already been decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Sriniwas Ramnath Khatod v. State of
Maharashtra 2002 (1) CTC 569. In that case the apex Court has held that u/s 4, a notification has to be published in the manner laid down therein.
As against this, u/s 6 a declaration has to be first made and declaration has then to be published in the manner provided u/s 6(2) of the Act. First
proviso does not lay down time limit within which publication of declaration has to be made and that publication cannot take place after the period
prescribed thereunder. First proviso only provides time limit for declaration and not for publication - legislation purpose omitted to use the word
''publication'' or ''declaration'' in the first proviso to Section 6. Declaration must be made within one year from the last publication of notification u/s
Publication u/s 6(1) may take place at later date. Such publication is only ministerial act. Last date prescribed u/s 6(ii) is only for the purpose of
computing limitation u/s 11A.
A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Rangappa v. State of Karnataka (2002) 1 MLJ 105 SC after referring to the
earlier judgment on this issue has held that the words ''publish'' and ''from the date of publication of the notification'' occurring in proviso (ii) to
Section 6(1) of the Act has reference only to Section 4 notification and has no reference to the publication of any notification u/s 6 of the Act. u/s
6, it is only a declaration which is required to be made, the time limit being within one year from the date of publication of Section 4 notification.
Hence, the contention has to fail and is rejected.
Before us, the learned Counsel for the appellants also started to argue that the objections raised by the appellants during 5A enquiry has been
considered by the Land Acquisition Officer and rejected by him and it has been not forwarded to the Collector for his opinion and orders. We are
not able to countenance the argument as this point was not agitated before the learned single Judge. In the absence of any factual materials, in an
appeal, we cannot decide the point in issue.
Further, the Supreme Court, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, has held as
follows:
In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder. This
has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases ( C. Padma and Others Vs. Dy. Secretary to the Govt. of T.N. and
Others, , this Court observed as below:
The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ''the Act'') in GOR No.
1392 Industries, dated 17.10.1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu district in Tamil
Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasiua by Tvl. Rechold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The
acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30.04.1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the
company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General finance Co., which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear
that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership,
was transferred in G.O. Ms. No. 816 Industries, dated 24.03.1971 in favour of another subsidiary company, Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the
5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on
leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in G.O. Ms. No. 439 Industries dated 10.05.1985. In G.O. Ms.
No. 546 Industries dated 30.03.1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original G.O. Ms. No. 1392
Industries, dated 17.10.1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the
appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired
land having already vested in the State, after receipt of compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge
the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
The Division bench of this Court in the case of Ramalingam and Others Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Others, , has held as follows:
It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that no writ petition should be entertained after the award under the Land Acquisition Act has
been passed - vide Tej Kaur and Others, etc. Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ; The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah
Hyder Beig and Others, , Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P. Vs. Suresha Nand Juyal alias Musa Ram (Deceased) by
LR''s and others, , State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnar, (1996) 1 SCC 250 .
Learned Counsel for the appellants started to distinguish the above propositions of law by relying on the decision in the case of R. Ramalingam v.
State of Tamilnadu 2007 3 L.W. 127.
On going through the facts of that case, we are of the view that the judgment is not factually applicable to the facts of the present case. In that
case, the Division Bench has recorded a finding that the award was passed on 21.10.1994 and the writ petition challenging the acquisition
proceedings has been filed well prior to the passing of the award, i.e., on 19.08.1994. In the facts of the present case, as already stated, the award
was passed on 18.07.1994. However, the writ petition came to be filed on 21.07.1994. In the circumstances, the judgment relied on by the
learned Counsel for the appellants does not, in any way, advance the case of the appellants. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.