Kalu Chand vs State of Rajasthan and Others

R.R. Yadav, J.—By filing the present writ petition, the petitioner questions the legality and validity of the order dated 9.11.1990, Annexure-8, to the writ petition passed by Executive Engineer, Nagar Palika, Jalore, by means of which, construction over the plot in question has been stayed till further order, and the order dated 16.11.1990, Annexure-9 to the writ petition whereby the petitioner was refused a copy of order alleged to have been passed by Collector, Jalore on 9.11.1990 that is now filed as Annexure R-2 to the return. It is prayed by the petitioner that respondents No. 2 and 3 be directed to execute a registered patta in his favour.

The brief facts necessary for disposal of the present writ petition are that on 15.8.89 the petitioner submitted an application before the Administrator, Municipal Board, Jalore for allotment of residential plot in Shivaji Nagar, Jalore, measuring 60'' x 60''. The Executive Engineer, Nagar Palika, Jalore, on 4.11.1989, informed to the petitioner that the Administrator of Municipal Board, Jalore has given sanction on 6.10.1989 for allotment of plot No. All measuring 60'' x 60'' situated near Shivaji Nagar for Rs. 50,400/- at the rate of Rs. 126/- per square meter with certain conditions stipulated therein with regard to mode of payment of Rs. 50,400/- in lieu of allotment. A photo-stat copy whereof is filed and marked as Annexure-1 to the writ petition.

In pursuant to the aforesaid offer/representation dated 4.11.1989, Annexure-1 to the writ petition, the petitioner deposited Rs. 50,400/- on 7.11.1989, a photo-stat copy of receipt is filed along with writ petition and marked as Annexure-2.

The petitioner deposited Rs. 50,400/- in the office of Municipal Board, Jalore and then thereafter an allotment order dated 18.1.90 Annexure-3 to the writ petition was issued to him with stipulation that his allotment shall be valid for 99 years and he was made entitled to raise construction over the disputed plot within two years according to the bye-laws of the Municipal Board, Jalore. It was made clear vide Annexure-3 that the petitioner, after construction of his house over the plot in question will not be entitled to alienate the house so constructed to someone else for a period of ten years. Possession of the plot in question was delivered to him oh 18.1.1990. A photostat copy of the terms and conditions of allotment together with delivery of possession to the petitioner is filed and marked as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. 5. The petitioner after obtaining possession over the plot in question, moved an application for water connection. The Municipal Board, Jalore issued a road cutting certificate on 31.1.1990 Annexure-4 to the writ petition and he was given water connection.

The petitioner submitted a map and sought permission for construction over the plot in question. His map was sanctioned vide sanction letter dated 7.3.1990 which is filed and marked as Annexure-6 to the writ petition.

The petitioner averred in the writ petition that in pursuant to sanctioned map he raised 2/3 construction over the plot in question.

The petitioner applied for electric connection and no objection certificate was issued by the Municipal Board, Jalore on 1.2.1990. On the basis of no objection certificate issued by Municipal Board, Jalore electric connection was installed over the plot in question. A photostat copy of no objection certificate for installation of electric connection over the plot in question on 1.2.1990 is filed and marked and Annexure-5 to the writ petition.

The petitioner wrote a letter to the competent authority of Municipal Board on 20.4.1990 and informed that since he has completed 2/3 of his construction therefore, now, as per rules, registered patta be executed in his favour for which he expressed his readiness and willingness to produce necessary stamp duty. A Photostat copy of letter dated 21.4.1990 is filed and marked as Annexure-7 to the writ petition.

It is also averred in parapraph No. 9 of the writ petition that in levelling of the plot in question, the petitioner has incurred expenses amounting to Rs. 40,000/- and invested Rs. 50,000/- in construction of the house as per sanctioned map by Municipal Board, Jalore, According to the averments made in paragraph No. 9 of the writ petition, construction materials worth Rs. 30,000/- were lying on the spot.

It is amazing to note that when the petitioner sent the aforesaid letter dated 21.4.1990 Annexure-7 to the Municipal Board, Jalore for execution of registered lease deed and expressed his readiness and willingness to furnish necessary stamp duty, the Board remained silent for more than six months but abruptly by impugned order dated 9.11.1990, Annex. 8 to the writ petition informed to the petitioner to stop construction till further order.

It was informed by the Board to the petitioner that the permission to raise construction over the plot in question has been rejected on the basis of order dated 9.11.1990 passed by Collector, Jalore.

The petitioner applied for obtaining a certified copy of the order passed by Collector on 9.11.1990 on the basis of which he was restrained from raising construction but the authorities refused to furnish a copy of the said order vide Annexure-9 to the writ petition.

A joint return has been filed on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3, almost admitting the facts averred in the writ petition. In the additional pleas respondents No. 2 and 3 averred that petitioner was allotted plot in question in disregard of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Disposal of Urban Land) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1974). It is further averred that the petitioner has been restrained from raising construction on the basis of order passed by Collector on 9.11.1990. A copy whereof has been filed and marked as Annexure-R2 to the return.

Respondents No. 1 and 4 have also filed separate return denying the averments made in the writ petition. The writ petition is being opposed by respondents No. 1 and 4 on the ground inter alia that the allotment order Annexure-3 was issued by Nagar Palika, Jalore with prior approval of Administrator, Nagar Palika, Jalore without complying with the Rules of 1974.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.

It is contended by learned Counsel Mr. K.N. Joshi, appearing on behalf of petitioner that the petitioner on the representation of Municipal Board, Jalore evidenced by Annexure-1 deposited Rs. 50,400/-in its office after complying with terms and conditions stipulated therein. The petitioner also submitted map for raising construction which was sanctioned according to the bye-laws of the Municipal Board, Jalore and in pursuant to sanctioned map the petitioner stalled to raise construction over the plot in question and thereafter the construction was stopped vide impugned Annexure-8 purported to have been passed on the basis of Collector''s order dated 9.11.1990 Annexure-R2 to the reply. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Municipal Board, Jalore falls within the ambit of "other authority" under Article 12 of the Constitution and as such cannot be allowed to commit breach of solemn undertaking on the basis of which the petitioner has acted. According to Shri Joshi, in the present case, doctrine of promissory estoppel is clearly attracted, therefore, the representation made by Municipal Board, Jalore can be enforced by a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to perform its statutory duty by executing a registered patta in his favour and impugned orders Annexures 8, 9 and R2 may be quashed. In support of his aforesaid contention Shri Joshi placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others,

Learned Counsel Shri J.M. Bhandari, appealing on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 argued with equal vehemence that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be reduced to a rule of thumb. It is streneously urged by Shri Bhandari that, in the present facts and circumstances of the case, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not attracted. The learned Dy. Govt. Advocate adopted the argument of Shri Bhandari.

I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar.

From perusal of Annexures 1 to 6, it is evident on the face of record that the respondents" No. 2 and 3 by their words and conduct made to the petitioner a clear and unequivocal representation which was intended to create legal relationship between them in respect of the plot in question knowing and intending fully well that it would be acted upon by him. In such a situation this Court is called upon to adjudicate as to whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel is attracted in the present case.

For better understanding of the controversy involved in the present case is would be expedient to discuss some land mark and classic decisions rendered by the Apex Court on the point of promissory estoppel. The discussion made hereinbelow would indicate gradual evolution of the concept of promissory estoppel evolved by Hon''ble Supreme Court in this country which would be helpful in deciding the case on hand.

The concept of promissory estoppel found its eloquent origin in Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd. AIR 1968 SC 718 which is crystalised in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) as furnising a cause of action to a citizen enforceable in a court of law against Government or its officials acting in course of their authority. Particularly speaking, the Apex Court in Moti Lal Padampat Sugar Mills (supra) ruled that doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also be available as a cause of action. Its principles are applicable against the Government in the exercise of its Government, public or executive functions. Its principles can be extended in all administrative functioning of the Government and plea of executive necessity is not available to State provided the court is objectively satisfied that an official or officials who made a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee and in fact the promisee acting in reliance of it altered his position. In such a situation the promisor cannot be allowed to go back from his promise. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered, it need not to make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the promisee giving an opportunity to a promisee to alter his position relying upon it. If it is proved to the satisfaction of the court by Government that if Government is compelled to fulfil the promise, public interest would be prejudiced then in such a situation the court would have to balance public interest and has to decide whether the Government is entitled to be exempted from the rule of promissory estoppel. If the court is objectively satisfied that it is not possible to put back the promisee to his position ante the promise would become final and irrevocable. However, the Government cannot be prevented from acting in discharge of its statutory duty only a rigour of strict law can be reduced by the court on equitable grounds.

I am of the view that the aforesaid salient features of promissory estoppel laid down in case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) were departed by a Co-ordinate Bench of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, which were restored to its original prestige in subsequent decision rendered by a larger Bench of Hon''ble Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.,

The aforesaid question of promissory estoppel again came up for consideration in State of Himachcd Pradesh and Ors. v. Ganesh Wood Products 1995 AIR SCW 3847 before Supreme Court wherein after surveying its previous decisions, Hon''ble Two Judges ruled that doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now Well-recognised in this country even so it was held by their Lordships after quoting with approval the observations of Lord Viscount Hailsham made in Woodhouse Ltd. v. Nigerian Produce Ltd. 1972 AC 741 that the whole sequence of cases based upon promissory estoppel since the war,, beginning with Central London Property v. High Trees House Ltd. 1947 (1) K.B. 130 need to be reviewed and reduced to a coherent body of doctrine by the courts. In paragraph 55 Hon''ble B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. speaking for the court ruled, which reads thus:

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The divergence in approach adopted in Shri Bakul Oil Industries and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, and Pournami Oil Mills and Others Vs. State of Kerala and Another, is another instance. The fact that the recent decision in Kasinka Trading and another, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and another, is being reconsidered by larger Bench is yet another affirmation of the need stressed by Lord Hailsham for enunciating a coherent body of doctrine by the courts.''

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The aforesaid doctrine of promissory estoppel again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in D.C.M. Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, wherein it is ruled that doctrine of promissory estoppel represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. It is further held that promissory estoppel is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. It is ruled by Supreme Court in case of D.C.M. Ltd. (supra) that basis of this doctrine is the inter-position of equity which stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law.

In my humble opinion, the preponderance of the decisions rendered by the Apex Court until date is that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is meant to keep the scale of justice even by courts of law and to do effective and complete justice between the parties, mitigating the rigour of strict law. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine evolved by courts of law. therefore, it can be moulded by courts, making it suitable to the facts and circumstances of each case. In those cases where the court is objectively satisfied that equity demands that the promisor can be allowed to resile from his/its promise or representation and the promisee can be adequately compensated in such cases, ordinarily, the court can decline to extend the applicability of doctrine of promissory estoppel looking into public interest whereas on the other hand if it is objectively satisfied that it cannot be made possible to relegate the promisee to his original position ante then the promise so made should be declared final and irrevocable ignoring the plea of executive necessity of State.

Now, I propose to examine the applicability of rule of promissory estoppel to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is evident on the face of record that on the solemn representation made by respondents No. 2 and 3, evidence from Annexure-1 dated 4.11.1989 the petitioner deposited a huge amount of Rs. 50,400/-in its office on 7.11.1989 vide .Annexure-2 which is not being disputed by any of the respondents. It is also evidenced from Annexures--4, 5 and 6 on record that the petitioner was persuaded by respondents No. 2 and 3 to suffer further liabilities in installation of water connection, electric connection and raising construction over the plot in question in accordance with the plan sanctioned by the Board. In such a situation the Board being "other authority" under Article 11 of the Constitution cannot be allowed to resile from its representation made by its words and conduct. In the present case it is not possible for this Court to relegate the petitioner to his original position ante, therefore, equity demands that respondents No. 2 and 3 be directed to execute a registered patta in favour of the petitioner.

There is yet another reason to arrive at the aforesaid conclusion. Now, the courts of law have evolved another equitable principle popularly known as theory of legitimate expectation which is akin to the principle of promissory estoppel. Now, it is well settled that doctrine of legitimate expectation and rule of promissory estoppel are invoked in those cases where one expects profits pecuniary or other advantages of the like nature. In the backdrop of the case on hand the petitioner is also entitled to get the benefit of rule of legitimate expectation from respondents.

It is next contended by learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3, Shri Bhandari, that in view of Annexure-R2, dated 9.11.1990, passed by Collector, Jalorc, the petitioner is not entitled to get the benefit of either rule of promissory estoppel or doctrine of legitimate expectation. In support of his contention he invited my attention to Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1959) which provides that the State Government or any Officer authorised by it in this behalf may for the purpose of satisfying as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any proposal to lease, sale or transfer of any Government land made by or on behalf of a Board or by any member, Chairman, or Officer of a Board call for the relevant record and may while doing so direct that pending the examination of the matter the proposal to lease, sale or transfer of the Government land shall remain in abeyance and no action in furtherance thereof shall be taken till the decision of the State Government or of the authorised officer under Sub-section (2)(b). It goes without saying that Annexure-R2 dated 9.11.1990 has been passed by Collector, Jalorc in exercise of his purported power under Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1959. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, while refuting the aforesaid argument invited my attention to Clause (b) of sub- section (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1959.

It is admitted by learned Counsel for the parties that Annexure-R2 has been passed by Collector, Jalore without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner which has civil consequences.

In view of what has been stated at the Bar it is ciystal clear that the impugned order Annexure-R2 which has civil consequences has been passed by Collector, Jalore against principle of natural justice and fair play. Therefore, such order is not sustainable in eye of law by any stretch of imagination. I do not propose to burden this judgment by referring catena of judgments of court of records on the point except the decision rendered by Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, holding that law must now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding which involves civil consequences the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party will be heard. However in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1959 there are positive words used by the State Legislature providing an opportunity of hearing before passing any order yet the Collector, Jalore has not afforded an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

Apart from the aforesaid fact the argument of learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 about interpretation of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1950 is fallacious for the simple reason that for pressing into service the aforesaid clauses it is to be established that the plot in question which is leased out to the petitioner is of Government land. In the return filed by respondents No. 1 and 4, they have rightly not taken the plea of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1959. From the silence of respondents No. l and 4 it must be presumed that the plot in question which is leased out to the petitioner vide Annexure-3 is not Government land. It is also to be noticed that respondents No. 2 and 3 have also not taken this plea in their original reply filed by them. Respondents No. 2 and 3 have taken this plea in their amended reply that too without making any foundation that land allotted by respondents No. 2 and 3 to the petitioner is a Government land. No evidence is produced that the plot in question is Government land.-

A conjoined reading of Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1959 reveal that Section 80 deals with provisions relating to transfer of property and contracts of any movable or immovable property belonging to a Board including its land as also any Government land. Sub-section (1) provides that every board shall be competent subject to the prescribed restrictions and conditions to lease, sale or otherwise transfer any movable or immovable property belonging to it, including municipal land as also any Government land. Proviso (i) of sub- Section (1) of Section 80 provides that no such lease, sale, transfer and contract shall be binding on a Board unless it is in conformity with the provisions of the Act of 1959 and the rules made thereunder, whereas proviso (ii) provides that no lease, sale, transfer of or any other contract respecting any Government land shall be valid unless it is confirmed by the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner and on the prescribed conditions. In the explanation added to Sub-section (1) the expression "Government land" has been defined which means any land which has become vested in a board under Clause (e) of sub- Section (2) of Section 92 or which is a Nazul land as defined in Section 3 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 or which may be placed at the disposal of the municipality by the State Government.

In my considered opinion unless foundation is laid by respondents No. 2 and 3 in their amended reply that the plot in question which is allotted to the petitioner vide Annexure 3 by Board falls within any of the category of the Government land either under explanations (a), (b) or (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 80 of the Act of 1959, they are not entitled to argue the applicability of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of the said Act. I have no hesitation in holding that the aforesaid Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1959 can be pressed into service only when the Government land is transferred by a Board or its officer by lease or sale. Since in the present case respondents) No. 2 and 3 utterly failed to establish that the plot in question which is allotted vide Annexure 3 to the petitioner by Board is a Government land, therefore, the question of extending the applicability of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 80 of Act of 1959 do not arise.

Lastly it is contended by learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 Shri Bhandari that the petitioner is not entitled to get a registered patta of the plot in question due to violation of Rule 17 and Rule 30 of Rules of 1974. Indisputably under the Rules of 1974 there are two modes of transfer of residential plots i.e. one by public auction and other by special allotment under Rule 17 for low income group people or for others who are enumerated under Sub-rule (2) of Rules of 1974.

Learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 streneously urged that as the income of the petitioner is disclosed by him to be Rs. 16,000/- in his affidavit Annexure-R4 to the return filed by respondents No. 1 to 4, therefore, he does not fall within the category of low income group, whose income should not exceed Rs. 800/- per month at the time of allotment under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of Rules of 1974.

It is to be imbibed that Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of Rules of 1974 provides four categories of income groups who are entitled for special allotment of residential plots at concessional rates on priority basis in form of largesse. For special allotment under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1974 the monthly income of low income group people should not exceed Rs. 800/- per month at the time of allotment whereas for Rajasthan State Government servants including employees of local authorities and statutory bodies of the State--income should not exceed Rs. 2,000/- per month at the time of allotment.

The aforesaid provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1974 are arbitrary having no reasonable nexus as to why a low income group of citizen''s income should be fixed by Rule making authority to be Rs. 800/- per month for special allotment of residential plots whereas for acquiring same largesse for State Government employees including employees of local authorities and statutory bodies of the State the Rule making authority prescribed Rs. 2,000/- per month income.

In penultimate analysis both group of people are citizens of Indian. Being Government employees or employees of local bodies or statutory bodies the rule making authorities cannot be allowed to practice hostile discrimination against the doctrine of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution as purchasing capacity of a Rupee in the hands of a low income group people will remain the same as in the hands of Government employees or local bodies employees or employees of statutory body of Government. This Court cannot afford to allow the Rule making authority or State Government to remain free as an individual in selecting the recipients for its largesse such as making allotment of residential plots on concessional rates. In distributing largesses to citizens or among its employees all Government activities after making the Rules or without making Rules the criterion of eligibility to its recipients should be such which can be said to be non-arbitrary as arbitraryness is antithesis to the concept of equality. Such criterion of eligibility formulated by Government for distribution of largesses to its recipients is subject to judicial review by High Courts. Unreasonableness vitiates the law and procedure alike. It is, therefore, essential that the law and procedure both should conform to the norms of justice and fair-play in distribution of largesses by Government or its instrumentality amongst its recipients in a democratic country like ours.

This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that aforesaid monthly income not exceeding Rs. 800/- per month was fixed for low income group people of Rajasthan in the year 1982, while the allotment was made in favour of the petitioner in the year 1989. It is matter of common knowledge that between this period railway fares, air fares and bus fares are enhanced many times but the Rule making authority has no time left to look into the maximum limit of Rs. 800/- monthly income prescribed for making special allotment of residential plots on concessional rates in favour of low income group people of Rajasthan at the time of allotment.

It is further to be noticed that from the year 1982 to 1989 the country has suffered inflationary trend of Indian money value leading to undue increase in quantity, in proportion to its buying capacity. To my mind it is unreasonable to fix Rs. 800/- monthly income for low income group people of Rajasthan for purchasing a plot under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of Rules of 1974 on concessional rates in form of largesse. If the income of a low income group people of Rajasthan is calculated from the standard of a labourer as daily wage earner doing domestic services or working on the road as daily wager, his income in the year 1989 cannot be said to be less than 60 Rs. per day which is increasing day by day. Thus even if the income of low income group people of Rajasthan is calculated from the standard of a Labourer for granting the aforesaid largesse it cannot be less than Rs. 1800/- per month not 800/- as prescribed under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of Rules of 1974.

It is shocking to note that even in the year 1997 for special allotment of residential plots on concessional rates in form of largesse for low income group people of Rajasthan the monthly income continued to be prescribed Rs. 800/- only at the time of allotment which is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and deserve immediate attention of Rule making authority to make necessary amendments making monthly income of low income group people to be reasonable under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of the Rules of 1974 having nexus with inflationary trend of Indian money value leading to undue increase in quantity in proportion to its buying capacity.

The second limb of argument of learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 in this regard is about violation of Rule 30 of the Rules of 1974 which provides that for every sale or disposal of urban land under the Rules of 1974, prior sanction is to be obtained. In this view of the matter, learned Counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 Shri Bhandari urged that transfer of plot in question in favour of the petitioner without prior sanction of Director of Local Bodies, Rajasthan is not permissible.

Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Shri K.N. Joshi, refuted the aforesaid argument of Shri Bhandari and urged that validity of allotment of plot in question vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition by Board cannot be questioned on the basis of Rule 30 of the Rules of 1974. In support of his contention he placed reliance on a decision rendered by Privy Council in case of Montreal Street Railway Co. v. Normadin AIR 1917 P.C. 142.

I am of the view that argument raised on behalf of the petitioner has substance. Suffice it to say in this regard that under the provisions of Rule 30 of the Rules of 1974 in respect of prior approval of Director of Local Bodies, Rajasthan, holding the present transfer of plot in question in favour of the petitioner to be null and void, acts done in negligence of the provisions of Rule 30 of Rules of 1974 by residents No. 2 and 3 leading to serious injustice to the petitioner who has no control over the authorities will make compliance of the aforesaid rule only directory although the authorities who acted in violation of Rule 30 are liable to be punished. Acts and omissions of the official in not complying with Rule 30 of the Rules of 1974 will not affect the validity of the transfer made in favour of petitioner who has no control over them in making compliance of the said rule.

An identical question came up for consideration before Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Co. (Supra) where it was ruled which reads thus:

When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done.

Learned Counsel Shri Bhandari, appearing on behalf of respondents No. 2 and 3 is not able to bring any decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court where the view taken by Privy Council in case of Montreal Street Railway Co. (supra) was either departed or over-ruled. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances this Court has no alternative except to accept the ratio decidendi laid down by Privy Council in case of Montreal Street Railway Co. (supra) as enshrined under Article 372 of the Constitution. I am of the view that decision rendered by Privy Council will be taken to be existing law of the land on the date of enforcement of the Constitution and such decisions rendered by Privy Council should occupy the field unless it is departed or over-ruled by Hon''ble Supreme Court.

As a result of aforementioned discussion the present writ petition is allowed with no order as to costs and Annexures-8, 9 and R2 are hereby quashed. The respondents No. 2 and 3 and its officials are directed to execute a registered patta in respect of the plot in question in favour of the petitioner within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, provided the petitioner furnishes requisite stamp duty for execution of registered patta in his favour when called upon to do so within the aforesaid period of two months. The petitioner would be at liberty to raise further construction as sanctioned by Board vide its sanction letter dated 7.3.1990, Annexure-6 to the writ petition.