Kalyani Pillai and Others vs Thiruvenkatasami Iyengar and Another

Phillips, J.—Objection is taken by appellants to the execution of a decree of the Privy Council. It is first contended that, as three of the

respondents were dead when the appeal was heard and judgment was pronounced, the decree against them is a nullity. Section 23 of William IV,

Ch. 41, however, cures the defect in the judgment for it enacts that the order shall have full force and effect notwithstanding the death of any of the

parties interested therein. Vide Deonandan Prasad Singh v. Janki Singh (1920) 5 PLJ 314. The deceased respondents must therefore be

considered as parties to the decree notwithstanding their death before it was passed.

It is next urged that the application to bring on record their legal representatives is barred by limitation, being made more than three years after

their death; but Article 181 of the Limitation Act gives three years from the date when the right to apply accrued. The right to implead parties to a

decree cannot arise until the decree is passed. This objection must therefore fail.

The further argument that the Privy Council failed to consider another objection to the execution petition on the score of limitation ignores the

fact that the Privy Council decree orders execution to proceed and the executing Court cannot go behind the decree.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.