Kamla Yadav vs Shushma Devi and Others

Brijesh Kumar, J.

Before coming to the questions which arise for consideration of this Full Bench, the background, in brief, may be narrated: The opposite parties Nos.1 to 4 filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal as dependents of the deceased. The present revisionist along with opposite party No.5 the State of U.P. seem to be the opposite parties in the claim petition, namely, claim petition No.181 of 1990. The present revisionist who was opposite party No.1 in the claim petition filed a written statement. Later she moved an application for amendment of the written statement which was rejected by order dated 3.9.1992 passed by the XIV Additional District Judge, Lucknow, as Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Aggrieved by order rejecting the application for amendment, opposite party No.1 in the claim petition filed the present revision under Section 115 CPC. The claimantopposite parties, however, took objection as regards the maintainability of the revision under Section 115 CPC. According to the opposite parties the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. Hence, Section 115 CPC cannot be invoked for filing the revision. The revisionist contests the objection.

The learned Single Judge hearing the revision found that the provisions contained in Section 3 CPC and Section 110C(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act were not considered by the Division Bench in Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire & General Assurance Company Ltd, and others. 1979 ALJ 1168, while taking the view that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court and recommended for referring the matter, to a Full Bench but before reference to the Full Bench, the matter was laid before a Division Bench for considering the decision in the case of Afsari Begum (supra). The Division Bench, however, noticed that a view contrary to one taken in the case of Afsari Begum (supra) was expressed by another Division Bench in Om Prakash and another v. Smt. Rukmini Devi and others, 1982(8) ALR 524. It does not seem to have been brought to the notice of the Hon''ble Single Judge. The Division Bench considering the relevant cases and provisions of law opined that the matter be referred to a Full Bench to resolve the conflict between the two Division Bench decisions rendered in the case of Afsari Begum (supra) and Om Prakash (supra). This is how the case has come up before the Full Bench for consideration:

The questions referred for opinion are as follows:

Whether Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a subordinate Civil Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

Whether in view of the provision of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Code only the Courts referred to in Section 3 are the Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court and the District Court as the case may be and no other i.e. the authorities and that Tribunals such as one constituted under Motor Vehicles Act do not come within the frame work of expression "Courts subordinate to High Court for the purpose of 115 of the Code?

Whether the view expressed by the Division Bench in Mussammat Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire & General Assurance Company, reported in (1979 ALJ pare 1168) to the effect that Claims Tribunal constituted under Motor Vehicles Act is a Court subordinate to High Court and its orders are amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Code is in consonance with the letter and spirit of provisions of Section 115 read with Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as provisions of Motor Vehicles Act and in particular Section 110C(2) Motor Vehicles Act, if not, is the present revision maintainable in this Court? If not, is it open to this Court to entertain, hear and dispose of the same under Article 227 of the Constitution?"

The main decision which is relied upon in support of the contention that application under Section 115 CPC would be maintainable is reported in 1979 ALJ 1168, Afsari Begum (supra). In the above noted case also revision application under Section 115 CPC was moved against an order rejecting amendment in the claim petition filed under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The question was referred by a learned Single Judge to a Division Bench, as to whether the Claims Tribunal constituted under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court and an application under Section 115 CPC against an order passed by the Tribunal would be maintainable or not. The Bench took into account the provision contained in section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act by which appellate jurisdiction has been conferred on the High Court against the awards of the Claims Tribunal. It is further observed that it was not in dispute that the Claims Tribunal exercises Civil jurisdiction. Hence, the Tribunal was a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. The Bench in the above noted case in Afsari Begum (supra) placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC1, Shankar Ramchandra Abhayankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat and it had been observed as follows:

"Section 115 CPC circumscribes the limits of the jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute, basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense."

The learned Single Judge has observed that while deciding the case of Afsari Begum (supra), the Bench had not taken into account the provisions as contained under Section 3 of the CPC and Section 110C(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:

"3. Subordination of Courts For the purposes of this Code, the district Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court."

Learned Counsel for the opposite parties submits that the opening sentence of Section 3 CPC clarifies that the subordination of the District Court to the High Court is only for the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure, that is to say, in respect of matters in relation to which orders have been passed in exercise of the powers vested under the Code of Civil Procedure. In the matter of award of compensation, the Tribunal exercises the power under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is further submitted that under Section 9 CPC the Courts are to try all civil suits of civil nature unless the cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Learned counsel for the opposite parties has then referred to Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as under:

"165. Claims Tribunals (1)A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both."

It is submitted that the Claims Tribunal owe their creation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 175 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court where claims tribunals have been constituted. An appeal against award of a Tribunal lies to the High Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is, thus, submitted that the High Court exercies appellate power under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and not under section 96 or Section 100 of the CPC. For the above reason also, it is submitted on behalf of the opposite parties that provisions of Section 115 CPC would not be applicable for revising the order passed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act nor it can be said that power of revision under section 115 CPC is extension of appellate power conferred upon the High Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, under section 3 of the CPC Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal would not be a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court.

Learned Counsel for the opposite parties also submits that the powers of the Tribunal as regards the procedure to be applied in proceedings for compensation has been provided for under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act which is equivalent to Section 110C of Act No.4 of 1939 (Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) reads as follows:

"169. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals

In holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal, may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.

The claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry."

In relation to subsection (1) of Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act quoted above, it is submitted that under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the State Government is authorized to frame rules but so far Civil Courts subordinate to the High court are concerned, Section 122 CPC provides for framing of the Rules by the High Court. So far, subsection (2) of Section 169 is concerned, it confers only limited powers of the Civil Court for the purposes of taking evidence on oath etc. The Claims Tribunal is deemed to be a Civil Court only for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXI of the Cr.P.C. It is submitted that even for the purposes as specified, the Claims Tribunal is only to be "deemed" as Civil Court. The provisions make it clear that except for the specified purposes, Claims Tribunal cannot be treated or even deemed to be a Civil Court. That is to say, for all other purposes it is excluded to be considered or construed as a Civil Court. On the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties as indicated above, it is submitted that Claims Tribunal cannot be held to be a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. It is further submitted that the above provisions of law have not been considered in the case of Afsari Begum (supra).

A perusal of Section 3 CPC, quoted above, would indicate that it was not considered by the Bench in the case of Afsari Begum (supra). It is true, no doubt, that Section 3 has not been specifically mentioned but the Court had observed that the Claims Tribunal exercises Civil Jurisdiction and the High Court had been conferred the appellate power over the awards given by the Tribunal. Section 3 CPC provides hierarchy of subordination of Civil Courts. Therefore, once, in substance, it was found that the Tribunal is a Court exercising civil jurisdiction it could not be validly urged that in Afsari Begum''s case (supra) the Division Bench had not taken into account Section 3 CPC.

The other provisions which have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the opposite parties, e.g., Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not have any material bearing on the merits of the case, since the said provision only provides for creation of Accidents Claims Tribunal for specified areas by the State Government. The real test does not lie in the fact as to whether a Court or Tribunal owes its existence, under the provisions of the CPC or any other statute. A body or Tribunal created by or under a Statute other than CPC may also be a Court depending upon several factors, namely, the composition of the Tribunal, its structure, nature of functions discharged by such Tribunals, procedure and manner in which it has to adjudicate upon the issues brought before it. Similarly, the mere fact that appeal lies to the High Court against award of the Tribunal under the provisions of section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is also not very much material since the High Court has the appellate jurisdiction and in principle as laid down in the case of Shankar Ram Chandra Abhavankat v. Krishnaji Datatraya Bapat (supra), the revisional jurisdiction is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of a superior court. We find that once a Tribunal or a Court is subjected to appellate jurisdiction of any court, the hierarchy is itself established. A court whose judgments and orders are subject to appeal to another Court would only have subordinate status visavis the appellate court. A point or objection raised in revision could always be raised in appeal where appeal lies against the order of a subordinate tribunal or court.

The bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court in the matters of award of compensation in Motor Accidents Claims would also not lead to the conclusion that a Tribunal could not be a Court exercising civil jurisdiction. Before the provisions regarding Accidents Claims Tribunal were added in the Motor Vehicles Act, all such matters were cognizable by the Civil Court and tried as a regular suit. The same jurisdiction was exercised by the Civil Courts established under the CPC. There is, therefore, no doubt about the fact that the Claims Tribunals exercise civil jurisdiction. The change of forum from regular courts to tribunals would not change the nature of jurisdiction in substance. So far Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act is concerned it empowers the Tribunals to adopt such summary procedure as it may think fit for holding any enquiry in the claim. The powers of the Civil Court which would be available in the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal have been specified under subsection (2) of Section 169, that is, it shall have power of Civil Court for the purposes of taking evidence on oath and for enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling discovery and production of documents etc. It further provides that it would be deemed to be a Civil Court for the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure. All that is provided under Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act is about the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal and the limited extent to which it shall have the powers of the Civil Court in the matter of taking evidence on oath etc. during trial. Section 169 does not in any manner curtail the jurisdiction of the appellate court or revisional court in case one appeals against an order of the Tribunal.

Sofar the question raised that Section 122 CPC provides for framing of rules by the High court whereas the State Government is authorised to frame rules under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act also has no material bearing on the question involved. The subordination of tribunals to the High Court is due to the exercise of appellate power by the High Court against the award of the tribunals. It is not by reason of the fact as to who is authorised to frame rules for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. For that matter, it would be pertinent to mention here Article 227 of the Constitution of India which reads as under:

"227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court

(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High court may

(a) call for returns from such courts;

(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and

(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.

(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein;

Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under Clause (2) or Clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces."

Article 227 of the Constitution of India quoted above makes it clear that High Court has power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals in the State. It also has power to prescribe rules or forms etc. for the tribunals and courts. Therefore, the mere contention that the tribunal would not be subordinate to High Court for the reason that the rules are to be framed by the State Government for the tribunals and by the High Court under Section 122 CPC for the subordinate Courts is not sustainable. Subordination of a Court is not dependent only upon rule framing authority. As observed earlier, in the present case it emerged from the appellate jurisdiction which a court exercises against the orders of a Tribunal or Court.

We may now advert to certain decisions which have been relied upon by the respective parties in support of their contentions.

Learned counsel for the opposite parties has placed reliance upon a decision reported in 1971 ACJ 180, Satish Chandra and others v. State of U.P. This case was considered in the case of Afsari Begum (supra) and it was observed that the learned Single Judge making a reference in that case (Afsari Begum) had not agreed with the decision in Satish Chandra''s case (supra). From a perusal of the judgment in the case of Satish Chandra (supra), we find that no reason has been given to hold that the Claims Tribunal is not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 CPC. The discussion only distinguishes the decision of a Full Bench reported in 1964 AWR 141, Chatur Mohan v. Ram Bihari Dixit, where Munsif who was authorised to entertain application under Section 7E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, his orders were held to be revisable under Section 115 CPC as it was held that he was not a persona designate under the scheme of Section 7E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act but a special jurisdiction was conferred upon him. The court then observed that those who can be appointed as Claims Tribunal are, who is or has been a judge of the High Court or who is or has been a District Judge, or who is qualified for appointment as a judge of the High Court. But the main question for not holding the tribunal as court subordinate to the High Court was that a District Judge of one district may be appointed as tribunal for dealing with the cases arising in another district, for example, beyond the limits of one district. An example has been quoted that the Government could appoint the District Judge of Agra to receive claim petition out of the accidents arising within the limits of District Farrukhabad. To our mind, this may have been some reason to distinguish it from the case of Chatur Mohan (supra) but it hardly indicates that for the reason indicated above a tribunal could not be a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. We do not think that the decision in the case of Satish Chandra (supra) is a good law. Another decision relied upon by the opposite parties is Sardar Singh v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and another. 1991 AWC 1201. This case does not relate to exercise of revisional power by the High Court under Section 115 CPC. It has, however, been held that entire provisions of Code of Civil Procedure would not be applicable in the matter of procedure and powers of the claims tribunal. It is held that those provisions as mentioned under Rule 21 of the U.P. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1967 would apply and since it did not provide for application of Ordar 21 CPC to the proceedings before the claims tribunal the same would not be applicable. We feel, it does not in any manner deal with the question involved in the prersent case. Rather, in paragraph9 of the judgment, we find that the court came to the conclusion that in the revision under Section 115 CPC no interference would be made since it was not a case decided nor it could be said that the tribunal had exercised jurisdiction not vested in it nor acted illegally. Hence, there was no scope for interference with the impugned order. In a way, what seems to have been held in the case of Sardar Singh (supra) is that sofar procedure before the Tribunal is concerned, it would be in accordance with Rule 21 of the 1967 Rules but it would not affect the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 CPC. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, therefore, cannot usefully rely upon the above noted decision for the contention that no revision under Section 115 CPC would be maintainable. As a matter of fact, this case makes a reference and follows the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1982 (8) ALR 524, Om Prakash and another v. Smt. Rukmini Devi and others. It was held in Om Prakash (supra) that no appeal under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC would lie against an order passed by the Claims Tribunal in view of the provisions contained under Rule 21 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1967. It was observed that the entire provisions of the CPC do not apply to the proceedings before the tribunal except those as provided under Rule 21 of the 1967 Rules. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition that an appeal would not lie unless there is a specific provision for the same. If there is no provision for appeal against an order it would not lie. It has further been held that the tribunal does not enjoy the status of a Civil Court. We find that except bare observation that the claims tribunals are not civil courts but merely creation of a special statute and does not enjoy the status of a civil court, no other reasoning has been given. It is true that in case Section 104 CPC and Order 43 CPC have not been made applicable and no other provision has been made for appeal against an interlocutory order the appeal would not lie but it does not necessarily lead to the inference that in matters where appellate jurisdiction has been conferred upon a higher court against final awards the courts would not be vested with the revisional jurisdiction merely for the reason that a tribunal is constituted or created under a statute other than CPC. It does not mean that it would in no case be a Civil Court.

The next case to be considered is 1983 Alld. Rent Cases 740, Kalawati Reja v. II Addl. Civil Judge. Prescribed Authority. Kanpur and others. It is a decision by an Hon''ble Single Judge, holding that the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 has not been given full status of court. Its powers are limited to the extent, provided under Section 34(2) of the Act and Rule 22 of the Rules. Therefore, it was held that a suit pending before the Prescribed Authority as a Civil Judge, for specific performance, in its civil jurisdiction, could not be consolidated with an application under Section 21(1) of the Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. From the above it is clear that the question involved was in a different context. Section 34 (2) of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act provided that the prescribed authority would be deemed to be acourt only for the purpose of Sections 345 and 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has been held that once an authority in a person is deemed to be something it implies that it is in reality not that as deemed. It has been observed that a body invested with judicial power gets the status of a court by its being vested with the judicial power of a sovereign character. It is further observed that "the court exercises the normal judicial sovereign power of the State which is unlimited and if limits are to be fixed, the court itself decides the same while a tribunal or a body which is not a court exercises judicial powers in a limited area and for a particular purpose and does not decide its own limits." It has been further held that many tribunals may have jurisdiction to decide a matter finally having some trappings of a court but in the strict sense they cannot be said to be courts exercising judicial power. To be a court it has been held that it must possess sovereign judicial function of pronouncing definitive judgment with all the ancillary powers attached to it. A tribunal is not a court in the sense that the entire inherent judicial powers and functions of a State are not vested in it.

Learned counsel appearing for the revisionist has furnished to us references of certain decisions in support of his contention that the Motor Accedents Claims Tribunal would be a court subordinate to the High Court.

We may first refer to a Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Makhan Lal and others v. Secy. of State. AIR 1934 Allahabad 260. It was held by the Full Bench that the District Judge while dealing with the reference made to it under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, acts as a Court and not as ''persona designata''. While coming to the above conclusion, the Court had taken into consideration the definition of the word ''Court'' as defined under Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act. It has been defined as an expression meaning a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction unless the Local Government appoints a Special Judicial Officer to perform the function of a Court under the Land Acquisition Act. One of the arguments raised before the Full Bench was that the Government had the power to appoint any other officer to perform the functions of the Court. In that event it would not be principal civil Court of the original jurisdiction. The said argument was repelled by the Full Bench that any other Officer who could be appointed would only be a ''Judicial Officer'' in terms of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act and not an executive Officer. The Court was thus to be presided over by a judicial officer. It was also observed that the Land Acquisition Act itself called it a Court. Hence, it could not be said to be a ''persona designata''. On the question as to whether District Judge while performing functions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act would be a Court subordinate to the High Court or not, it has been held that since an appeal against award of the District Judge has been provided, before the High Court, is conclusive of the fact that the Court is subordinate to the High Court.

The above noted case of Makhan Lal (supra) has been followed by another Full Bench in the case of Bal Gopal Das y. Mohan Singh and another, AIR 1964 Allahabad 504. In this case, the Court referred to the tests laid down for a judicial tribunal in the case of Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309, as approved by Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay. AIR 1953 SC 325. The tests as quoted are as follows:

"A true judicial decision presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties and then involves four requisites: (1) The representation (not necessarily orally of their case by the parties to the dispute; (2) If the dispute between them is a question of fact, the ascertainment of the fact by means of evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute and often with the assistance of argument by or on behalf of the parties on the evidence; (3) If the dispute between them is a question of law the submission of legal argument by the parties; and (4) A decision which disposes of the whole matter by a finding upon the facts in dispute and application of the law of the land to the facts so found, including where required a ruling upon any disputed question of law."

It has further been observed that the case of Maqbool Hussain (supra) was followed in AIR 1954 SC 375, S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, and AIR 1956 SC 66, Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain. Subsection (12) of Section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act defines the word ''tribunal'' as any Civil Court specified under Section 4 as having authority to exercise jurisdiction under the Act and Section 4 provides that the State Government may specify any Civil Court or class of Civil Courts as the tribunal having authority to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. Under notification Civil Judges were specified as authorities competent to exercise jurisdiction. The other provisions of the Act provided for the procedure to be adopted and the relief which could be granted in the cases and also that save as otherwise expressly provided the proceedings were to be regulated by provisions contained in the CPC. The Full Bench then observed that the term ''Civil Court'' has not been defined under the Code of Civil Procedure. The term, therefore, will include all courts exercising jurisdiction of a civil nature and governed by Civil Procedure Code. It was further observed that the tribunal was not in the hierarchy of Civil Courts, namely, that of Munsifs, Civil Judges, Judges Small Causes and District Judges. It was held that the courts of Munsifs, Civil Judges, Judges Small Causes and District Judges may not be only the Civil Courts for the purpose of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Then certain decisions were referred to, viz., AIR 1938 Alld. 456, (FB) where U.P. Agriculturists Relief Act, 1934 gave jurisdiction to the court including the Collector was held to be a Civil Court; AIR 1942 Oudh 458, The Assistant Collector empowered under the U.P. Agriculturists'' Relief Act to decide mortgage cases of the value of Rs.500/ or less was held to be a civil court.

Hon''ble G.C. Mathur, J., one of the members of the Full Bench considered the aspect as to whether the tribunal would be a ''persona designata'' or a court and relied upon the observations of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd, v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 606, approving the definition of the word ''persona designata'' in Osborn''s Concise Law Dictionary as "A persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character". The majority view in the above noted Full Bench (Bal Gopal) considering different aspects of the matter held that the tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act is a court subordinate to the High Court. It is, no doubt, true, the provisions of Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act are different and distinguishable, nonetheless, the Full Bench took the view that the Courts other than those mentioned under Section 3 CPC could also be the Civil Courts.

It is to be noticed that in the above noted two Full Bench decisions the fact that the jurisdiction to be exercised by the tribunals was to a limited extent was not considered to be a hurdle to hold such tribunals as Courts nor it was so considered in many other cases referred to in the judgment, a few of which have been indicated above, as against the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the case of Kalawati Reja (supra) that, so as to be a Court it must have all the sovereign powers of the State in the matter of dispensation of justice, though some of it may be curtailed but a tribunal which is constituted to exercise power to a limited extent to deal with only particular kind of cases could not be held to be the Court. The Full Bench decisions have not considered it to be an essential ingredient of a Court, and a tribunal may be considered to be a Civil Court even though it may have been conferred limited jurisdiction to deal with cases of any particular nature. It is not that inherently it must have all possible civil jurisdiction.

Reliance has also been placed upon a decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1555, Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation. Indore, where maintainability of revision under Section 115 CPC was considered against orders passed by the District Judge in appeal from the order of the Municipal Commissioner regarding liability of any land or building to assessment. It was held that the District Judge was subordinate to the High Court. Therefore, revision would lie under Section 115 CPC. In yet another case reported in AIR 1966 Mysore 5, Narayan Nagappa Hegde v. Shankar Narasimha Bhatta, the learned Single Judge held that the Deputy Collector, Assistant Collector etc. constituting the Court of Mamlatdars under the Bombay Mamlatdars'' Courts Act to be a Civil Court looking to nature of functions discharged by them and including that the procedure was quite similar as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. They were to decide the question of possession as well as tenancy rights.

In the case of Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut v. Lakshrni Chand and others. AIR 1963 SC 677, the question for consideration before Hon''ble the Supreme Court was as to whether Conciliation Officer appointed under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act will have the status of a Court or tribunal since under Article 136 of the Constitution an appeal would lie against an order or decision of a Court or tribunal. It has been held that for having status of a Court or tribunal, the expressions as used under Article 136 of the Constitution, apart from the fact that the Court or tribunal should be under obligation to act judicially but besides that it must be invested with the ''judicial power of the State''. It has also been held that a decision arrived at "must be something which conforms to an objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law, and the soundness or otherwise of the determination must be capable of being tested by the same external standard. This is the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it from an administrative function." Three criteria were laid down in the case of Province of Bombay v. K.S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222, have been referred to in the judgment which are as follows:

"(1) it is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of preexisting legal rules:

(2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and

(3) that the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on questions of fact, and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact."

Apart from being under obligation to act judicially so as to be Tribunal or Court, as indicated earlier, it has been held that the authority be a body invested with judicial power of the State. On facts it was found that the powers of the Conciliation Officer under Clause (29) of the order was not a tribunal since it neither had the authority to pronounce any determinative judgment not it had the same powers as the Conciliation Board. In the case of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 SC 188 also it was emphasized that the tribunal must derive authority from sovereign power so as to be tribunal or court and it was observed thus: "The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal within the ambit of Article 136 is that it should be constituted by the State. Again a tribunal would be outside the ambit of Article 136 if it is not invested with any part of the judicial functions of the State but discharges purely administrative or executive duties." In this connection, observation has been made that the Conciliation Officer did not hold that status of Industrial Tribunal in exercising powers under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

It would thus be clear from the decision in Jaswant Sugar Mills (supra) that the authority must be under obligation to act judicially. Its decision should not be subjective but objective and capable of being tested by the objective standards and criteria laid down by law. The decision must be a determinative judgment or order determining or deciding the rights of the citizens. The determination must be based on the investigation made ascertaining the facts by means of evidence and decides the question of law if arises. Over and above, it must also satisfy criteria of being invested with the judicial power of the State. In our view, if a tribunal fulfils the above requirement the body or authority or tribunal as the case may be is to be taken as a Court. In the case of Bharat Bank Ltd, (supra) it has been observed in context with entertaining the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution that for tribunals which may be full fledged judicial tribunal in the strict sense, no hard and fast rules be laid as it would depend upon the structure, character and composition of the adjudicating body as well as the powers and functions which they exercise. Each case may be tested on its own merits.

In the light of what has been held in different cases, we may examine the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act about the structure, composition, powers and functions of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, Chapter XII deals with Claims Tribunals. The Claims Tribunals are constituted by the State Government, under Section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the purposes of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damage to any property of a third party. Subsection (3) of Section 165 lays down the qualifications for a person to be appointed as a member of a Claims Tribunal, as follows:

"Section 165(3). A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he

(a) is, or has been, a Judge of High Court, or

(b) is, or has been, a District Judge, or

(c) is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court or as a District Judge."

Section 166 makes a provision on whose instance an application for claim can be moved. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes the manner in which an application moved for compensation is to be dealt with by the tribunal and provides for making an award determining the amount of compensation. The provision reads as follows:

"Section 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal: (1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be:

Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.

(2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.

(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of annuncing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct."

The procedure and powers of the Tribunals are to be found under Section 169 quoted earlier, interest and costs both can be awarded by the Tribunal. Section 173 provides for an appeal against the award of Claims Tribunal to the High Court. Section 174 provides for issuance of Certificate by the Tribunal for recover/ of the amount of compensation in the same manner as arears of land revenue. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred under Section 175 relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunals.

From a perusal of the above provisions, there is no room to doubt that the Claims Tribunal is under obligation to act judicially as on receipt of an application, the Tribunal has to give notice to the parties who have to be afforded an opportunity of being heaYd. The Tribunal then has to hold an inquiry into the claim before the Tribunal makes an award determining the amount of compensation. It is true that a Tribunal may adopt summary procedure but the provisions regarding notice to the parties and hearing them before making the award cannot be dispensed with. For certain purposes, namely, for taking evidence on oath and enforcing the attendence of witnesses and for compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects, the Tribunal shall have the powers of the Civil Court. That is to say, it can compel attendance of witnesses as well as may compel discovery and production of documents and material objects. Sofar the structure and composition of the Tribunal is concerned, we find that one who is or has been a Judge of a High Court or a District Judge or qualified for appointment as a Judge of High Court or as a District Judge are eligible for appointment under Section 165(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The above provision obviously provides for appointment of a person wellversed with the judicial functioning as well as sufficient experience of working in the courts of law. The provisions of the Act do not permit appointment of any other executive authority as member of the Claims Tribunal. The tribunal has to base its determination or award on the evidence adduced and arguments advanced by the parties. It is not based on subjective opinion but objectively based on material brought before it during the course of the proceedings after investigation and inquiry. The awards can also be tested on the basisof the provisions made under the law as under different provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The amount of compensation to be awarded has also been indicated. In pursuance of the provisions indicated above, Additional District Judges have been appointed as Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in different districts of the State. Not alone that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal acts judicially but it is under obligation to act as such as it has to go through the procedure which is normally adopted in the regular courts of law. A few deviations here and there in the procedure will have no material bearing on the question so long, in substance, it is incumbent upon the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal to issue notice to the parties, hold investigation into the claim and provide opportunity of hearing to the parties. During this process, parties adduce their evidence and it has been empowered to exercise the powers of the Civil Court in examining the witnesses on oath and to compel their attendance as well as production of material documents or objects necessary for determination of the claim. Thus an adjudicating body which is composed of or consists of experienced judicial functionaries and it is under obligation to act judicially can hardly be said to be a body which is not a judicial adjudicating body. Appointment of any member of executive or nonjudicial authority is not envisaged, rather it stands excluded under the provisions of the Act. It has rightly not been disputed before us that the nature of dispute arising in the claim petitions is a dispute of civil nature. It has also not been disputed that prior to constitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals such disputes of claims on account of Motor Accidents were being tried by the Civil Court. It is, thus, clear that it is trial of dispute of civil nature by a Tribunal having a judicial functionary as its member. There is no escape from the conclusion that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has all the trappings of a Civil Court. Additional District Judge is also undoubtedly a Civil Court. The only ingredient which has to be seen is that as to whether it is the State''s judicial power which is being exercised by the tribunal or not. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has been constituted by the State. Its members are appointed by State. It deals with disputes of civil nature which were being earlier dealt with by the regular civil courts. There is no dispute that the civil courts discharge the "States'' judicial functions" part of jurisdiction of which stands transferred to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, composition, character as well as functioning of which, have already been indicated above. There can (not) also be any dispute that Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a court subordinate to the High Court in view of the fact that appeal against an award lies to the High Court which fact has been held to be conclusive on the point.

In view of the discussions held above, we are of the view that the orders of the District Judge/Additional District Judge passed as Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal will be amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 CPC.

Our answer to question No.1 is in affirmative, that a revision lies against an order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. Our answer to question No.2 is that the Courts mentioned in Section 3 CPC are not the only Civil Courts, other Courts and Tribunals can also be Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court, for the purposes of Section 115 CPC. Our answer to question No.3 is that the judgment rendered in the case of Mussammat Afsari Begum v. Oriental Fire & General Assurance Company. 1979 ALJ 1168, has been rightly decided and is approved. Hence, the question of invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not arise.

Let the Paper Book of the Revision be placed before the appropriate Bench, with our opinion, for hearing.

(Reference answered accordingly)