High CourtsSingle Bench

Kamlesh Kumar (In Jail) vs State of U.P.

Allahabad High Court · Decided on 16 April 2008 · Citation: (2008) 04 AHC CK 0286

HON’BLE JUDGES
Shiv Shanker, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 3, 4 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 304B, 498A
RESULT
Dismissed
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 847 words

Shiv Shanker, J.—This is second bail application moved on behalf of applicant Kamlesh Kumar son of Chhangoo Lai in Case Crime No. 07 of 2006 under Sections 498A, 304B I.P.C. and 3/4 D.P. Act, P.S. Palari, District Chitrakoot. His first bail application has already been rejected by this Bench vide order dated July 6, 2007 in Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 26689 of 2006 on merit of the case.

2.

I Heard learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant and learned A.G.A.

3.

It is contended by learned Counsel for the applicant that in the earlier filed bail application, much discussion has occurred on the issue that the door of the room, where the deceased was found, was locked from outside or inside. As soon as this incident occurred, the matter reported to the police of P.S. Pahari, District Chitrakoot by the applicant side. A true copy of G.D. entry No. 20 dated 31.01.2006 of P.S. Pahari, District Chitrakoot is on record as Annexure-2. On receiving the information, S.O., Sri K.D. Singh reached at the place of incident and completed the inquest proceeding of the deceased Smt. Chandra Kiran. After completion of the inquest proceeding, he went off and prior to leaving the place of incident, he locked the room from outside. In this regard, a true copy of the G.D. entry dated 01.02.2006 of P.S. Pahari, District Chitrakoot is on record as Annexure-3.

4.

It is further contended when S.O., Sri K.D. Singh left the place, then this place of incident was again visited by CO., who made local inspection of the area, prepared site plan after opening the room and handed over the keys to land lord. A true copy of G.D. entry No. 25 dated 02.02.2006 is also on record as Annexure-4. Therefore, it is crystal clear that when the CO. reached at the place of incident for preparing site plan, he found the room locked outside, which was locked by S.O., Sri D.K. Singh himself and none else outside of the room. Therefore, theory of locking door of room of deceased, where the deceased was burning from outside at the time when incident occurred, is false. The lock found by CO. was actually place there by the S.O. and not by the applicant or any in-laws. It is further contended that the applicant could not get copies of these general diary entries at the time of hearing of first bail application, hence, he could not present the same here before this Court at the time of consideration of first bail application of the applicant. Therefore, no case of dowry death is made out and applicant''s bail application is liable to be allowed.

5.

A.G.A. has urged that there is no fresh ground in the second bail application and it is also liable to be rejected.

6.

In dowry death, homicide and suicide, both come within the category of unnatural death. In such circumstances, there will be no effect either the deceased committed suicide by locking the door inside or was murdered by the accused by burn injuries. The applicant is the husband of the deceased. She has died within seven years of her marriage as unnatural death by burn injury at the house of her husband. She was subjected to cruelty due to non-fulfilment of demand of dowry. Later on, she died due to burn injuries, which is unnatural death. The first bail application of the present applicant has already been rejected by this Court by passing the detailed order. After rejecting the first bail application of the present applicant, there is no fresh and good ground in the second bail application.

7.

It is worthwhile to mention here that when the first bail application has already been rejected by the Court and any ground, which was existed in the first bail application, the same ground cannot be taken in another bail application. Meaning thereby, all the grounds are existed before moving the first bail application of the accused, however, if some grounds were taken and some grounds were not taken in the first bail application, the grounds, which were not taken in the earlier bail application cannot be taken into consideration by filing the second bail application after rejecting his first bail application. After rejecting the first bail application, the new and fresh grounds can only be considered and such bail may be granted. The rejection order passed in the first bail application reveals that the question of locking the door from outside or inside has already been considered. The general diary, as contended by learned Counsel for the applicant, was already in existence at the time of moving the first bail application even then this ground cannot be considered in second bail application, therefore, there is no fresh and good ground after rejecting his first bail application. In such a circumstances, the contention made by the learned Counsel for the applicant has no force and his second bail application is also not liable to be allowed.

8.

Consequently, this second bail application of the present applicant is also hereby regected.