Kanhaiyalal vs Keshodas

Shiv Dayal, J.

This revision is directed against an order passed by the Trial Judge holding that the suit was bad for multifariousness. He gave the plaintiff an option to elect one of the two defendants against whom he wanted to continue the suit

The allegations in the plaint were that the plaintiff Kanhaiyalal purchased the suit house in which Keshodas and Badshahmal, the two defendants, had been residing as tenants of the vendor. The plaintiff gave them notices of eviction, but they did not vacate. Paragraph 7 of the plaint deals exclusively with the cause of action against the first defendant while paragraph 8 dealt with the cause of action against the second defendant. The plaintiff admitted that he was unaware of the date of the commencement of their tenancy. Defendant No. 1 was paying Rs. 2/8/- per month and the defendant No. 2, Rs. 10/- per month as rent. Different reliefs were claimed against the two defendants separately.

Shrj Gupta, learned counsel for the plaintiff relies on Order 1, Rule 3 of the CPC and it is urged that this rule when read with Order 2, Rule 3 CPC enables a plaintiff to bring a Civil suit against more than one defendant, if any common question of law or fact is involved. The argument of Shri Gupta is that the fact of the purchase of the house by the plaintiff is common with regard to both the defendants. Similarly, the dispute, whether the plaintiff genuinely requires the house for his own residence is also common. I am unable to accept this contention.

Two conditions must be satisfied before I two or more defendants can be joined in the same (suit:

(1) a right to relief against them arises in respect of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions; and

(2) if separate suits were instituted against the defendants any common question of law or fact I would arise.

Both these conditions must exist together. There must be some nexus or common link. This condition is not fulfilled if the case against each defendant is entirely distinct and separate in its subject matter from that of the other defendants. If no connection or conspiracy is alleged to exist between the various persons joined as defendants, the suit will be bad for multifariousness. Otherwise, if a common suit is permitted against two or more defendants when there is no nexus inter se, it will only lead to obscurity and confusion The policy of the law embodied in these rules is that, on the one hand, needless multiplicity of suits should be avoided but, on the other hand, the trial of a suit should not be embarrassed. The expression "common question of law or fact", does not mean "same Or similar" question ot" law or fact. The distinction is real. See AIR 1945 118 (Privy Council) , and Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia Vs. The State of Hyderabad, : ((S) Pandurang, Tukia and Bhillia Vs. The State of Hyderabad, ).

In the present case, the causes of action against both the defendants are quite different. One defendant has nothing to do with the case against the other. Shri Gupta relies on Purushottam Amrit v. Bhagwansao Tikaramsao AIR 1938 Nag 461, Pyarchand v. Narayan, Madh B LJ 1954 HCR 1233, AIR 1949 78 (Privy Council) . Not one of these cases applies here. The facts were quite different. Suits relating to transactions entered into by a manager of a Hindu Joint family or a Hindu widow, stand on a quite different footing.

In the The Corporation of Calcutta Vs. Radhakrishna Dev and Others, where the corporation had instituted a single suit for the recovery of arrears of rates against the owners of different premises which originally formed single premises, it was held that Order 1, Rule 3 could not be availed of by the plaintiff.

This revision is, therefore, dismissed with costs.