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Thomas, J.—Whether the newly put up building of the tenant is reasonably sufficient for his requirement, is essentially a question of fact. If it is answered in the affirmative, it enures to the benefit of the landlord as he can justifiably request the rent control court for a direction to put him in possession of the premises let out to the tenant. Rent control appellate authority answered that question in the affirmative and this revision is in challenge of the same. The tenant in this case is a Co-operative society (for short ''the society"), dealing in milk supply. Landlord approached the rent control court for eviction on different grounds, among which the two which survive now are those envisaged in sections 11 (3) and 11(4) (iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ''the Act''). The rent control court and the appellate authority have concurrently found the latter ground in favour of the landlord.
In this revision we are at first dealing with the ground which found acceptance concurrently by the two authorities, for, eviction on one ground is enough to equip the landlord to get possession of the building. But then a question is raised as to what is the time with reference to which the sufficiency of the new building (for the tenant''s requirement) has to be determined. It is the time of entrustment, or the time of acquisition of the building, or the time of application or the date of order of eviction?
Appellate authority (District Judge) is of the view that the crucial time is the time of entrustment of the tenanted premises. Learned District Judge observed that "it is now trite law that the crucial question to be considered is whether requirements of the tenant as on the date of entrustment of the petition scheduled building could be accommodated in the new building". All the same, learned District Judge proceeded to consider the question as though the crucial time was the date of order for eviction.
Section 11 (4) (iii) of the Act reads thus:
A landlord may apply to the Rent Control court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building.
(iii) if the tenant already has in his possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building, reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village.
The time crucial for each ground''s consideration may be different. In respect of some of the grounds enumerated in section 11 of the Act the decisive time may be the date of filing the application while in the case of some other grounds the date for consideration may be the date of actual eviction or it may be the time of entrustment in some cases. Even as per clause (iii) the crucial time could be different in accordance with circumstances in each case.
Generally, the enquiry is focussed on the question whether the ground exists as on the date of hearing of the petition, (vide Harcount v. Lane 1919 - 35 TLR 255; Burman v. Woods 1948-1 KB 111). It was so held by Venkitadri, J. of the Madras High Court in Petroleum Workers'' Union v. Mohammed AIR 1987 Mads 33. But it is not an in variable rule.
A learned single judge of this Court has considered the above aspect in Puthoor Rawathar v. Devasia Chacko 1980 KLT 555. He cited the following instances : "Suppose a tenant has in his possession a shop room with an area of 500 sq. ft. but instead of doing business from that'' room, he takes out another of the same size on rent from a landlord and starts business". Learned Judge observed that in that context going by the language of the section, the landlord could apply the very next day for eviction on the ground that the tenant had an equally good room in his possession at the time of letting and in such a case what should be noted is the nature and size of the tenant''s business at the time of letting. M.P. Menon (J) then proceeded to consider the alternative question whether the position be different in a case of subsequent acquisition of the building and observed that the time of letting is not the decisive period for consideration in such case.
As the landlord is given the right to apply for eviction on the ground envisaged in section 11 (4) (iii), it is open to the landlord either to apply for eviction or to refrain from so applying or he may wait for some more time thinking that the nature and size of the tenant''s business way dwindle down. So the time of demand for vacant possession has a perceptible nexus with the ground envisaged in the clause. Hence in our view the crucial time with reference to the sufficiency of tenant''s requirement as envisaged in section 11(4) (iii) of the Act is the time when landlord demands vacant possession from his tenant.
The legislative intention in providing a ground such as 11(4)(iii) is to restrict the tenant''s right to continue in the tenanted premises. This restriction is based on public policy. One of the objects of the enactment of this Act was to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenants from rented buildings in places where accommodation problem could not be solved (vide Standard Cashew Industries and Another Vs. N. Krishnan, Yet the Act is so schemed as to disarm a tenant who is not genuinely interested in using the tenanted premises, or one who clings on unreasonably to such premises. The enactment has sought to keep the genuine interest of a tenant within the protected walls of the statute. So when a tenant comes into possession of a building the landlord can inform the tenant to move into that building after vacating his building. In such a case all what the rent control court is to examine is whether that building of the tenant is sufficient for his requirements.
When it is shown that tenant has possession of another building, then the burden is on the tenant to establish that such building is not sufficient for his requirements. A mere plea of insufficiency for his requirements is not enough nor can such a plea be used as a pretext to remain in the tenanted premises. To highlight this aspect the legislature has prefixed the expression "sufficient for his requirement" with a qualification by using the word "reasonably". When can you say that a building is not reasonably sufficient far your requirement? Of course what is reasonably sufficient for one man may not be so for another. Reasonableness should be viewed objectively regard being had to be facts and circumstances of the particular case. Supreme court has observed that it would be unreasonable to expect any exact definition of the word "reasonable". However, their lordships have observed that the word "reasonable" has, in law, the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which a person is called upon to perform his act reasonably (vide Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and Another, ).
In this case it is an admitted fact that the society has put up a three storeyed building very close to (about 150 metres away) the tenanted premises. A commissioner appointed by the rent control court reports after inspecting the new building of the society that it is better and more spacious and even more convenient than the petition schedule building. In the context of this case when the tenant has put another building of such a type, then how that building is not sufficient for his requirements needs satisfactory explanation from the tenant. Learned District Judge has found, on facts, that it is reasonably sufficient for the requirement of the tenant. The contention that the entire ground-floor of the building is needed for some other business of the tenant was not acceptable to the court below. Evidence is not sufficient to satisfy the lower authorities of the aforesaid stand of the tenant. It is not for the revisional court to interfere with the said fact finding so long as the view taken by the two authorities is a reasonably possible view on the evidence in this case. It is therefore unnecessary for us to proceed to the other ground of eviction upheld by the learned District Judge. C.R.P. is accordingly dismissed.