Kanteti Venkata Seshavatharam and Others vs Chapalamadugu Venkata Rangayya and Others

Patanjali Sastri, J.—One of the questions raised in this appeal is whether the defendants were agriculturists within the meaning of the Madras

Agriculturists'' Relief Act, 1938. The plaintiffs who are the appellants here claimed that the defendants were disqualified from claiming the status of

an agriculturist under the Act by reason of their having been assessed to Income Tax during the period specified in proviso A to Section 3, Clause

(ii) of the Act, that is to say, in either of the two financial years ending 31st March, 1038. It has been held by this Court in Rajoo alias Doraisami

Goundar and Others Vs. Palaniyappa Chettiar and Others, , that the disqualifying assessments must have been made not for the two financial years

mentioned in the proviso, but must have been made in either of those years, as the assessment for any year need not necessarily be made in that

year under the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. In order to establish the disqualification the plaintiffs filed Ex. P-6 a memorandum granted by the

Collector of Kistna u/s 26 of the Madras Agriculturists'' Relief Act to one Rattayya who was also a creditor of the defendants. This memorandum

discloses that Chapalamadugu Rangayya who is admitted to be the manager of the joint family of the defendants was assessed to Income Tax for

1936-37 as representing a Hindu undivided family and was not assessed for 1937-38. The memorandum thus throws no light on the point to be

determined in the case, for as we have pointed out above what is relevant is not assessment to Income Tax for the years 1936-37 and 1937-38

but assessment made in 1936-37 and 1937-38. Ex. P-18 is another memorandum granted by the same officer on the application of the plaintiffs. It

states that Rangayya was not assessed to Income Tax for the two financial years ending 31st March, 1937, and 31st March, 1938. So far as the

financial year ending 31st March, 1937, is concerned, this memorandum flatly contradicts the statement in Ex. P-6 that Rangayya was assessed to

Income Tax for that year. Other similar memoranda granted to the defendants and others have been produced on the defendants'' side, Exs. D-5,

D-6 and D-14 stating that no assessment in 1936-37 and 1937-38 was made on the said person.

It is suggested by Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar appearing for the appellants-plaintiffs that in view of the doubt and confusion in which the

question relating to the assessment for 1936-37 is involved, we should in the exercise of the powers under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC send for the

records of the Income Tax office concerned to clear up the matter. He relies upon the newly introduced Clause (m) of Section 54(3) of the Indian

Income Tax Act as empowering us to call upon the Income Tax department for the production of the records relating to the assessments to

Income Tax made on Rangayya in the years 1936-37 and 1937-38, the two relevant years for the purposes of the Proviso A. It is, however,

urged by Mr. Govindarajachari for the respondents that the expression ""to the appropriate authority"" in Clause (m) covers only the collector acting

u/s 26 of the Madras Agriculturists'' Relief Act or such other officer as may have occasion to ascertain the particulars referred to in the clause for

the purpose of discharging his official duties but not a civil Court, as a ""Civil Court"" is referred to as such in Clause (d) of Section 54(3) and not as

an ""authority."" We are unable to accept this narrow construction of the clause. Obviously the clause contemplates the authority concerned calling

for such particulars in order to enable it to determine whether a person has or has not been assessed to Income Tax in any particular year. Such an

issue arises in the present case and the Court has to determine it one way or the other. The wider term ""authority"" was presumably used with a

view to bring also officers such as a collector acting u/s 26 of the Madras Agriculturists'' Relief Act within the purview of the clause. We cannot

agree that the term excludes the civil Court where it is called upon to determine judicially whether a person has or has not been assessed to Income

Tax in a given year. We are satisfied that the Court below having the duty of determining whether the defendants were assessed to Income Tax in

either of the two relevant years had the power to call upon the Income Tax department to disclose the particulars necessary for determining that

issue, and that we, sitting here in appeal, have also such power.

Mr. Govindarajachari further submitted that in view of the careless conduct of the appellants the Court should not call for additional evidence

from the Income Tax department at this stage in order to assist them to establish their case. As however, we think that it is not satisfactory to

decide the question arising under proviso A in the present state of the record with the two contradictory memoranda Exs. P-6 and P-18 granted

by the same public officer with reference to the same matter, and require the additional material which we propose to call for under Clause (b) of

Rule 27(1) of Order 41 of the CPC in order to clear the doubt in our minds, no question of the parties'' delay or negligence arises. We accordingly

call upon the Income Tax Officer, Masulipatam, to produce the original records relating to the assessment to Income Tax, if any, made in 1936-37

and 1937-38 on the defendants'' family of which Chapalamadugu Rangayya was the manager. The further hearing of this appeal will await the

production of those records.