Kartar Kaur and Another vs State of Haryana and Another

S.S. Sodhi, J.—Do the provisions of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure, render immune from attachment and sale, the residential building of a defaulter for recovery of arrears of sales tax and the penalty payable thereon under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973 ? Herein lies the controversy in revision.

M/s. Kartar Singh Ranjit Singh had been held liable for payment of arrears of sales tax and penalty thereon under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. This firm owned shop-cum-flat No. 12 in the New Sabzi Mandi on the Grand Trunk Road, Karnal. The ground floor of this building was with tenants while the first and second floors thereof were, it is said, used as the residence of the defaulters. Apparently, to avoid the sale of this property for recovery of the amounts due to the sales tax authorities, it was transferred in favour of Kartar Kaur, the wife of Kartar Singh, through the agency of a civil court decree granted on 13th February, 1984. It was in this situation that the contention was raised, negatived by both the courts below, that the property being residential was exempt from attachment and sale u/s 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This finding indeed warrants no interference in revision.

It is settled law that the provisions of Section 60 of the CPC do not apply to attachment and sale of property unless the relevant statute expressly makes them applicable to proceedings thereunder. This point arose before the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Another Vs. Dina Nath, . In recovery proceedings for the licence fee of a liquor vend, the defaulter raised the plea that the property sought to be proceeded against was a residential house and could not, therefore, be attached or sold. This was repelled with the observation: "On a plain reading of the said Section 60, it is clear that that section has no application to attachment and sale in any proceedings other than in execution of a decree of a civil court. The provisions of Section 60 of the Code do not apply to an attachment and sale under any other statute unless made expressly applicable thereto." Admittedly, there is no provision in the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, by virtue of which the petitioner can seek to claim the benefit of the provisions of Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Mr. V.K. Bali, counsel for the petitioner, while conceding that the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Another Vs. Dina Nath, was a binding precedent, made a half-hearted attempt to seek to distinguish it by adverting to paragraph 523 of the Punjab Land Administration Manual to contend that as it has been specifically provided therein that the exemptions prescribed by Section 60 of the CPC as regards sales and execution of decrees of courts shall apply, it must be taken to mean that these provisions would apply as they stand at the time of attachment and sale of the property in question, meaning thereby again that Section 60 of the CPC was applicable to the instant case. This is clearly a contention wholly devoid of merit in the face of the clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court that provisions of Section 60 of the CPC cannot apply unless there is a specific provision to this effect in the relevant Act under which the recovery is being made.

Next reference was made to the provisions of Section 88 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. The argument being that as the procedure to be adopted by the revenue courts was to be that as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioners could indeed avail of the benefit of the provisions of Section 60 of the Code. No credence can be given to this contention either as this provision merely provides for the procedure to be adopted by the revenue courts, but it cannot be read to incorporate the provisions of Section 60 of the CPC in all Acts under which recoveries can be effected as an arrear of land revenue.

There can thus be no escape from the conclusion that no immunity from attachment or sale is available in respect of a residential house for recovery of amounts due under the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973.

The impugned order of the lower appellate court is accordingly hereby upheld and affirmed and this revision is consequently dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.