High Courts

Kartar Kaur (died) Rep. by L. Rs. vs Sarup Singh

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 19 January 1988 · Citation: (1989) 1 CurLJ 483 : (1988) PLJ 582 : (1989) 1 RRR 102

HON’BLE JUDGES
Tejendra Kahanna, F.C.
CASE NUMBER
Miscellaneous Reh. No. 54 of 1986-87
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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 1,026 words

Tejendra Kahanna, F.C.

1.

This petition under Section 15 of the Punjab Package Deal Properties (Disposal) Act, 1976, is directed against the order dated the 12th March, 1986 of the Deputy CommissionercumChief Sales Commissioner, Amritsar, whereby he rejected the appeal of the petitioners.

2.

The facts of the case, in brief, are that urban evacuee property No. 4784/85/9, situated at Gate Hakimawala, Amritsar, was put to auction by the Tehsildar (Sales) Amritsar on the 14th October, 1983 when the petitioner offered the highest bid of Rs. 6700/ against the reserve price of Rs. 6660/. Against this auction, Sarup Singh, respondent, filed an objection petition, which was rejected. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent preferred a revision petition before the Chief Sales Commissioner Punjab, who vide his order dated the 27th September, 1983 accepted it and remanded the case to the Sales Commissioner, Amritsar, for fresh decision. On remand, the Sales Commissioner, Amritsar set aside the auction by his order dated the 29th July, 1985 and directed that the property be reauctioned with the opening bid of Rs. 9000/. This order was callenged by the petitioner before the Deputy CommissionercumChidf Sales Commissioner, Amritsar, who rejected it by his order dated the 12th March, 1986. The last mentioned order has now been impugned before me in the instant petition.

3.

Since the arguments of the counsel for the petitioner had been heard on the 18th August, 1987 in the absence of the counsel for the respondent, the latter was asked to file written arguments by the 1st September, 1987. In the written arguments filed by him on the 26th August, 1987 it was pointed out that Kartar Kaur had died on the 20th May, 1987. The counsel for Kartar Kaur was, therefore, asked to bring her legal representatives on record. The application for the purpsoe moved on the 27th October, 1987 was allowed vide my order dated the 17th November, 1987.

4.

The counsel for the petitioner pleaded that the suction in favour of Kartar Kaur having been conducted after proper publicity, there was no ground to set it aside on oral evidence of the witnesses. In the absence of any documentary evidence, it could not have been held that the auction suffered from any material irregularity. The mere fact that the respondent had subsequently offered a higher price was no ground to set aside the sale. The auction could have only been set aside if it has suffered from any irregularity, but nothing of the kind had been proved by the respondent.

5.

Refuting the above arguments, it was stated by the respondent''s counsel in the written arguments that there is a concurrent finding of fact that the sale in favour of Kartar Kaur had been conducted without proper proclamation. Such a finding cannot be interfered with in the revisional proceedings. Since the proclamation notice does not indicate the time and place of auction, the sale suffered from a material irregularity. Furhter, the narrow margin between the reserve price and the highest bid offered by Kartar Kaur also proves that neither was there any proper proclamation in this case nor was there any competition between the bidders. The fraud in the conduct of the auction was also established from the two different sketch plans of the property prepared by the staff, which do not tally so far as the areas and dimensions are concerned.

6.

I have considered the arguments advanced on both sides and have also gone through the record of the case, I find from the impugned order of the Chief Sales Commissioner dated the 12th March, 1986 that the main ground on which the auction dated the 14th October, 1980 in favour of Kartar Kaur, now deceased, had been set aside was that proper mushtri munadi had not been carried out specifying the time and palce of auction nor had any notice been affixed on a conspicuous part of the property, concerning the programme of the auction. Furthermore, the Chief Sales Commisisoner had also inferred from the fact that the highest bid offered by Kartar Kaur was just Rs. 6700/ as against the reserve price of Rs. 6660/ which was barely Rs. 40/ above the reserve price, that proper proclamation had not been carried out. In the objection petition dated the 20th October, 1986 filed by the respondent a specific plea had been taken that no proper publicity had been made, about the auction of this property and that had such publicity been made he would have been willing to participate and offer a much higher price of Rs. 9000/ for it. The objection petition has been filed within 6 days of the holding of the auction, cannot be considered to have been an afterthough and indicates tha there had been lack of general publicity in the area. As regards the locus standi of the respondent to challenge the auction, it had been argued before me that only a perons whose interests have been adversely affected could assail the auction. A perusal of Rule 92 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules 1955 shows that the sale cannot be set aside unless the officer is satisfied that the person has sustained substantial injury by reason of the irregularity or fraud, as the case may be. In this case, since Sarup Singh respondent had evidently shown his desire to purchase the same property, his inability to participate in the auction on account of the alleged lack of publicity amounted to infliction of a substantial injury both to him as an individual as also to the compensation pool, of which every citizen can rightfully claim to be a custodian in the larger sense of the word. As such, his right to object to the confirmation of the sale cannot be denied to him.

7.

In view of the foregoing reasons, I have reached the conclusion that the imputed order of the Chief Sales Commissioner does not suffer from any infirmity and deserves to be maintained. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.

8.

For the reason recorded in para 3 above, the pronouncement of the order was deffered to 27.10.1987. After further arguments, the judgment has been announced today.