Kartar Singh vs Prem Singh Jagi

Mahajan, J.—This second appeal is directed against the concurrent decisions of the Courts below decreeing the Plaintiff''s suit for possession of the premises in dispute.

The premises in dispute are quarter No. 41/1 to 4, Romesh Nagar. Delhi. It is government built property. The property was sold in open auction on 2nd December, 1956. Plaintiff Prem Singh Jagi was the highest bidder and his bid was accepted and provisional possession of the premises was delivered to him. So far no sale certificate has been issued to the Plaintiff. The Defendant was inducted into the premises in dispute by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has terminated the tenancy by notice and has brought the present suit for possession.

On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:

Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant does not exist between the parties ?

Whether the Defendant was served with the valid notice ?

To what amount of rent is the Plaintiff entitled ?

Relief ?

All these issues were decided against the Defendant with the result that the Plaintiff''s suit was decreed. The Defendant''s appeal to the District Judge, Delhi, also failed. Hence the present second appeal.

Mr. Bhasin learned Counsel for the Appellant has raised two contentions before me. His first contention is that the civil Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the second contention is that the Plaintiff had no right, title and interest in the property, and, therefore, he was not in a position to grant a lease and that being so the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act will not apply.

So far as the first contention is concerned, his argument is twofold, namely, that the Appellant is a tenant and, therefore, in view of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Civil Courts cannot entertain the suit and that in case it is held that the suit is not barred by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, it is still barred by the provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the 1954, Act, and he relies on a number of provisions in that Act in support of his contention.

So far as the first part of the first contention is concerned, the position is now beyond dispute, that a transfer under the 1954 Act is not complete and no title passes till the sale certificate is issued. See in this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries Vs. L.J. Johnson and Others, and the decision of Khosla, C.J. in Harkishan Lal v. Bansi Lal (1962) 64 P.L.R. 55. It is common ground that the sale certifi-cace has not so far been issued. As a matter of fact, the contention of Mr. Bhasin is that the purchaser is intentionally avoiding the grant of the sale certificate in order that the protection afforded by the Rent Control Act does not become available to the tenant, but the fact of the matter is that so far no sale certificate has been granted, and in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the title in the property still vests in the Government. Section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act exempts premises belonging to Government from the operation of the Rent Control Act and, therefore, the Rent Control Act will have no application so far as the present premises are concerned, and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil Courts would not be excluded.

This now brings me to the second part of the first contention. Learned Counsel for the Appellant principally relies on Section 15 of the 1954 Act. The section is headed "exemption of property in compensation pool from process of courts". This section does not bar a suit with regard to the property, but when any process is sought to be directed against that property, then the bar of Section 15 of the 1954 Act may arise, but we are not at that stage and, therefore, it is not necessary to pronounce what would be the effect when the decree for eviction is passed and is sought to be executed vis-a-vis Section 15 of the 1954 Act. Learned Counsel then relied on Sections 16, 17, 19, 20 and 36 and Rule 90(15) of the 1954 Act and the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, respectively for his contention that the combined reading of these provisions shows that all claims respecting property forming part of the compensation pool have to be settled by the Managing Officer. I am, however, inclined to agree with this contention. The first thing to be determined is what is the claim in the case which the Managing Officer is required to settle. The dispute here is between the person who has been put in possession of the property forming part of the compensation pool on the one hand and his tenant on the other. There is no provision in the 1954 Act which authorises the Managing Officer to settle such a dispute. The powers of the Managing Officer to deal with the property are not called in question in the present suit. Therefore, the argument based on the provisions of the 1954 Act to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is wholly unfounded. It is a fundamental rule of law that all civil matters must be settled in civil Courts unless the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is either expressly or by necessary implication taken away. No provision taking away the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in the disputed matters has been pointed out to me. The provisions on which reliance has been placed do not, in any way, take away that jurisdiction. Therefore, this contention also fails.

As regards the second contention, the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act are a complete bar to the consideration of the matter. The tenant cannot question the title of his landlord, that I is, of the Plaintiff, on the ground that at the time when he granted the 1 lease to the Defendant he had no title in him. On the facts the position 1 is that the landlord did possess possessary title but it is in my view not necessary to go into that question because in view of the estoppel that operates between the parties, the argument is not open to the Appellant.

Mr. Bhasin also raised a larger question that by the device that has been adopted by the Plaintiff, the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act as well those of Section 29 of the 1954 Act have been defeated by the Plaintiff. On this all that I wish to add is that if there is a lacuna in the provisions of a statute and that lacuna is taken advantage of, the Courts would naturally be powerless to give the necessary relief, even if the intention of the Acts was that such persons should have been governed by those beneficial provisions, but that is a matter for which the remedy lies with the Legislature. The function of the Courts is not to legislate and to supply the lacuna. Therefore, I have not examined this aspect of the matter more closely.

No other contention has been advanced.

For the reasons given above, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.

A prayer has been made for the grant of a certificate under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. I grant the same.