Kartar Singh vs State of H.P. and others

Justice Sanjay Karol, J.—Facts are not in dispute. On 2.8.1995, consequent to registration of F.I.R. No. 148 of 1995 under Sections 302/392, 120-B I.P.C. read with Sections 25/54/59 of the Arms Act, petitioner was placed under suspension. He was convicted by the trial Court. However department did not initiate any separate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. Since petitioner was convicted by the trial Court he was dismissed from service on 26.11.1997. But in an appeal filed by the petitioner against the judgment of conviction, petitioner was acquitted. It is not clear from the record as to whether the judgment of acquittal has attained finality or not. However, the fact of the matter is that petitioner stands reinstated w.e.f. 4.5.2000. It is, therefore, presumed that order of acquittal has attained finality.

It cannot be disputed that petitioner has not worked from 26.11.1997 up to 4.5.2000. It also cannot be disputed that petitioner has received only the suspension allowance and not full salary w.e.f. 2.8.1995 to 26.11.1997.

The Apex Court in Brahma Chandra Gupta Vs. Union of India (UOI), has held as under:-

Mr. R. K. Garg, learned counsel for the appellant wanted us to examine the scope and ambit of Article 193 and Mr. Gujaral learned counsel for the Union of India was equally keen on the other side to do the same thing. We steer clear of both. The appellant was a permanent UDC who had already retired on superannuation and must receive a measure of socio-economic justice. Keeping in view the facts of the case that the appellant was never hauled up for departmental enquiry, that he was prosecuted and has been ultimately acquitted, and on being acquitted he was reinstated and was paid full salary for the period commencing from his acquittal, and further that even for the period in question the concerned authority has not held that the suspension was wholly justified because three-fourth of the salary is ordered to be paid, we are of the opinion that the approach of the trial court was correct and unassailable. The learned trial Judge on appreciation of facts found that this is a case in which full amount of salary should have been paid to the appellant on his reinstatement for the entire period. We accept that as the correct approach. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of first appellate court as well of the High Court and restore the one of trial Court with this modification that the amount decreed shall be paid with 9 per cent interest p.a. from the date of suit till realization with costs throughout.

In the instant case, departmental proceedings even though initiated were dropped and not taken to its logical conclusion. It is not that even after acquittal departmental proceedings were initiated afresh. As such, ratio of law laid down in Brahma Chandra Gupta (supra) shall squarely apply to the instant case also.

Consequently, it is held that petitioner shall be entitled to full salary for the period under which he remained suspended i.e. 2.8.1995 up to 26.11.1997. Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

There shall be a direction to the respondents/state to take all consequential actions including disbursement of monetary benefits in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the judgment. It is clarified that if monetary benefits are not disbursed within the aforesaid period, then thereafter, petitioner shall be entitled to interest @ 9 per cent p.a. which shall be personally recovered from the erring official(s).

Petition stands disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any.