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285 paragraphs · 5,634 wordsG.M. Akbar Ali, J.—By consent of both sides, the matter has been taken up for final hearing. The petitions are filed seeking a direction to
call for the records in C.C. Nos. 2561, 2560 and 5268 of 2010 on the file of the learned XIII M.M, Edmore, Chennai and IX M.M, Said pet
Chennai and quash the same.
The Petitioner is arrayed as accused number four in a criminal complaint lodged by the Respondent u/s 138 read with Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as ""Act"") before the Court of the learned XIII M.M. and IX M.M at Said pet, Chennai.
The Respondent/complainant is a private limited company having its Office at Chennai. The first accused one, M/s ORG informatics Limited is
also a company incorporated and represented by its Managing Director and other Directors who have been arrayed A.2 to A.6. In pursuant to a
Memorandum of Understanding between the complainant company and the accused company, the accused Company placed purchase orders and
issued various cheques signed by the authorized signatory/A.3. The following are the cheques issued by the accused company which are subject
matters of Section 138 N.I. Act proceedings against which criminal O.P.s are initiated:
Crl. O.P. No. 20185 of 2010
Cheque no. Date
267107 31.8.2009
267111 31.8.2009
267108 31.8.2009
Crl.O.P. No. 20184 of 2010
26710 31.8.200
26710 31.8.200
Crl.O.P. NO. 20489 of 2010
267148 16.8.2009
267147 16.8.2009
174601 16.8.2009
The cheques were drawn on ICICI Bank, New Delhi. The complainant company presented these cheques on various dates with their bankers,
M/s Axis Bank Limited, Mount Road, Madras. The cheques were returned with an endorsements ""payment stopped by the drawer"" and ""account
frozen"". Therefore, the complainant company issued statutory notice on various dates calling upon the accused company and its Directors to pay
the entire cheque amount within 15 days as per the provisions of the Act. The Company and the other Directors received the notice. The Petitioner
sent replies to all these notices stating that he is only a non-executive Director and he was not in-charge and was not responsible to the Company
for conduct of the business and he had no knowledge about the transaction and issuance of cheques and thereby he denied the liability. Since the
payments were not made within the stipulated time, the complainant company has initiated the above said proceedings. Aggrieved by taking
cognizance against the Petitioner, he is before this Court to quash the proceedings invoking the jurisdiction u/s 482 Code of Criminal Procedure.
The points raised in all these petitions are same viz; whether the Petitioner was in-charge and responsible to the conduct of the business of the
Company and whether necessary allegations are made in the complaints to proceed against the Petitioner for an alleged offence u/s 138 read with
Section 141 of the Act.
Since a common point is raised in all these petitions, they are disposed of by a common order.
Mr. Habibullah Badsha, learned senior counsel who appeared for M/s Sivanandaraj and Aparna Mukerjee, would submit that merely being a
Director of the Company would not make a person liable for the dishonor of the cheque issued by the accused Company. The learned senior
counsel pointed out that for launching a prosecution against the Petitioner, there must be specific allegation in the complaint as to the part played by
the Petitioner. In the absence of any such allegation, the liability cannot be fastened on a Director who is designated as non-executive Director. The
learned senior counsel pointed out that in the complaint, a general statement was made that A.2 to A.6 are in charge and responsible for the day-
to-day operation as well as responsible for taking all financial and policy decisions of A.1 company. According to the learned Senior counsel
except this vague allegation, there is no other averments regarding the part played by the Petitioner in the transaction for a vicarious liability. The
learned senior counsel further pointed out that as per Form-32 of Registrars of Company, the Petitioner is designated as non-executive Director
and this fact has also been brought to the notice of the complainant company by way of reply to the statutory notice. The learned senior counsel
further pointed out that in spite of that, the complainant company has chosen to prosecute the Petitioner and such proceedings is an abuse of
process of law which is liable to be quashed.
The learned senior counsel relied on the following case laws in support of his contentions:
N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh and Others,
K. Srikanth Singh v. North East Securities Ltd and Anr. (2007) 12 SCC 788
DCM Financial Services Ltd. Vs. J.N. Sareen and Another,
Ramrajsingh Vs. State of M.P. and Another,
National Small Industries Corp Ltd v. Harmeet Singh Pairtal and Anr. CDJ 2010 SC 153
Per contra, Mr. B. Sriramulu, the learned senior counsel for Mr. A. Sasidharan counsel for the Respondent/complainant would submit that clear
allegations were made to show that the Petitioner is a Director who was in-charge and responsible for the day-to-day operations and also
responsible for taking all financial and policy decisions of the Company. The learned senior counsel further submitted that only during the course of
trial, material evidence could be produced to show that the Petitioner was also in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the
Company and quashing of the proceedings is unwarranted at this stage. He also pointed out that the Petitioner and his family are holding substantial
shares in the accused company, therefore was and is in a position to take financial and policy decision. He further pointed out that having received
the statutory notice the Petitioner has failed to repay the amount and therefore, liable for the criminal prosecution.
The learned senior counsel relied on the following case laws:
N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh and Others,
N. Rangachari Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd.,
Paresh P. Rajda Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another,
Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills Limited v. Virsa Singh Sidhu and Ors. (2008) 17 SCC 147
I have heard and perused the materials available on record.
For the dishonor of various cheques issued on behalf of the accused company, criminal proceedings were initiated against the Company and as
well as against all the Directors u/s 138 and 141 of the Act.
Section 141 of the Act reads as follows:
Offences by Companies - () If the person committing an offence u/s 138 is a Company, every person who, at the time of the offence was
committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company, as well as the Company, shall
be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
Provided that nothing contained in this Sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed
without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a Company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central
Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case
may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a Company and it is proved
that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager,
secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and
shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
The issue whether all the directors of a company is liable to be prosecuted was under the consideration of Hon''ble Supreme Court on many
occasions. There are catena of decisions rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court regarding the liability of the Directors of the Company. It is well
settled that to launch a prosecution for the offence by a Company and its Directors, there must be specific allegation in the complaint as to the part
played by them in the transaction. There should be clear and unambiguous allegations as to how the Directors were in-charge and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the Company.
In the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla and Another, , the Supreme Court held as follows:
...
(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint u/s 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and
responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a
complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) Merely being a director of a Company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141 of the Act. A director in a Company cannot be
deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the Company for conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to
be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time. This has to be averred
as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.
Following the above judgment cited supra, the Apex Court has held in N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh and Others, .
This provision clearly shows that so far as the companies are concerned if any offence is committed by it then every person who is a Director or
employee of the Company is not liable. Only such person would be held liable if at the time when offence is committed he was in charge and was
responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the Company. Merely being a Director of the Company in
the absence of above factors will not make him liable.
To launch a prosecution, therefore, against the alleged Directors there must be a specific allegation in the complaint as to the part played by
them in the transaction. There should be clear and unambiguous allegation as to how the Directors are in-charge and responsible for the conduct of
the business of the Company. The description should be clear. It is true that precise words from the provisions of the Act need not be reproduced
and the court can always come to a conclusion in facts of each case. But still, in the absence of any averment or specific evidence the net result
would be that complaint would not be entertain able.
In the case of (K. Srikanth Singh v. North East Securities Ltd. and Anr.) (2007) 12 SCC 788, the Apex Court has held as follows:
It is not in dispute that for showing a vicarious liability of a Director of a company upon the complaint it is incumbent to plead that the accused
was responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the company. No such allegation having been made in the complaint petition in
our opinion the High Court was not correct in passing the impugned judgment. The allegation contained in the complaint petition was that all the
accused Directors participated in the negotiations for obtaining financial help for Accused 1, which in our opinion, would not give rise to an
inference that the Appellant was responsible for day-today-affairs of the Company ... Every person connected with the Company shall not fall
within the ambit of the provision. It is only those persons who were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the Company at the
time of commission of an offence, who will be liable for criminal action. It follows from this that if a director of a company who was not in charge of
and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will not be liable under the provision. The liability
arises from being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company at the relevant time when the offence was committed and
not on the basis of merely holding a designation or office in a company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or designation in a company
may be liable if he satisfies the main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of a company at the relevant
time....
Negotiation for obtaining financial assistance on behalf of the by its Directors itself is not an ingredient for the purpose of constituting an offence
u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Furthermore, a vicarious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and proved. It cannot be a
subject matter of mere inference.
In DCM Financial Services Ltd. Vs. J.N. Sareen and Another, , which is a case where proceedings were initiated against the accused
company and also against the person who signed the cheque when he was Director of the accused company and later resigned from the accused
company before bouncing of the cheque. The Hon''ble Supreme Court held,
Section 141 of the Act provides for a constructive liability. A legal fiction has been created thereby. The statute being a penal one, should
receive strict construction. It requires strict compliance with the provision. Specific averments in the complaint petition so as to satisfy the
requirements of Section 141 of the Act are imperative. Mere fact that at one point of time some role has been played by the accused may not be
itself by sufficient to attract the constructive liability u/s 141 of the Act.
In Ramrajsingh Vs. State of M.P. and Another, , the Apex court has again followed the principle laid down in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd.
Vs. Neeta Bhalla and Another, and Sabitha Ramamurthy and Another Vs. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya, and held that when there was no
evidence that the Appellant was in-charge and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company, the conviction cannot be
maintained.
In (National Small Industries Corp. Ltd v. Harmeet Singh Pairtal and Anr.) CDJ 2010 SC 153, the Supreme Court held
From the above discussion, the following principles emerge:
(i) The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make specific averments as are required under the law in the complaint so as to make the
accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction.
(ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors liable for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened only on those who, at the time of the
commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the company.
(iii) Vicarious liability can be inferred against a company registered or incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 only if the requisite statements,
which are required to be averred in the complaint/petition, are made so as to make accused therein vicariously liable for offence committed by
company along with averments in the petition containing that accused were in-charge of and responsible for the business of the company and by
virtue of their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
(iv) Vicarious liability on the part of a person must be pleaded and proved and not inferred.
(v) If accused is Managing Director or Joint Managing Director then it is not necessary to make specific averment in the complaint and by virtue of
their position they are liable to be proceeded with.
(vi) If accused is a Director or an Officer of a Company who signed the cheques on behalf of the company then also it is not necessary to make
specific averment in complaint.
(vii) The person sought to be made liable should be in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant
time. This has to be averred as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a Director in such cases.
Placing strong reliance on the above decisions, Mr. Habibullah Badsha, the learned Senior Counsel would submit that the complaint is bereft of
any averments against the Petitioner and merely the Petitioner being a director and that too a non executive director the vicarious liability can not be
fastened against him. According to the Senior counsel the continuance of the proceeding is abuse of process of law.
On the other hand, the line of argument of Mr. Sriramulu, the learned Senior Counsel, for the complainant is that necessary averments have
been made in the complaint to show that the Petitioner was in charge of and responsible to the conduct of the business of the company and only
during the course of the trail the liability could be proved and this Court need not interfere at this stage. The learned Senior Counsel relied on N.K.
Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh and Others, where the Apex Court has held ""it is true that precise words from the provisions of the Act need not be
reproduced and the court can always come to the conclusion on facts of each case"".
In N. Rangachari Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd., , the Apex Court has held
Therefore, a person in the commercial world having a transaction with a company is entitled to presume that the Directors of the company are
in-charge of the affairs of the company. If any restrictions on their powers are placed by the memorandum or articles of the company, it is for the
Directors to establish it at the trial. It is in that context that Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that when the offender is a
company, every person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of
the business of the company, shall also be deemed to be guilty of the offence along with the company. It appears to us that an allegation in the
complaint that the named accused are Directors of the company itself would usher in the element of their acting for and on behalf of the company
and of their being in charge of the company.
In Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills Limited v. Virsa Singh Sidhu and Ors. (2008) 17 SCC 147, the Apex Court held as follows:
We find that the prayers before the courts below essentially were to drop the proceedings on the ground that the allegations would not constitute a
foundation for action in terms of Section 141 of the Act. These questions have to be adjudicated at the trial. Whether a person is in charge of or is
responsible to the company for conduct of business is to be adjudicated on the basis of materials to be placed by the parties. Sub-section (2) of
Section 141 is a deeming provision which as noted supra operates in certain specified circumstances. Whether the requirements for the application
of the deeming provision exist or not is again a matter for adjudication during trial. Similarly, whether the allegations contained are sufficient to
attract culpability is a matter for adjudication at the trial.
In Paresh P. Rajda Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, , the Apex Court has held as follows:
A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs would show that accused 2 is Paresh Rajda, the Chairman of the Company, and as per the impugned
judgment of the High Court, the question of his responsibility for the business of the Company has not been seriously challenged. We, nonetheless,
find clear allegations against both the Appellant-accused to the effect that they were officers and responsible for the affairs of the Company. We
are of the opinion that at a stage where the trial has not yet started, it would be inappropriate to quash the proceedings against them in the light of
the observations of this Court quoted above. We, accordingly, find no merit in the appeals. They are dismissed.
The basic principles to bring an action against the directors of the accused company is well settled. In Sabitha Ramamurthy and Another Vs.
R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya, and Saroj Kumar Poddar Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, , the Supeme court held,
Section 141 raises a legal fiction. By reason of the said provision, a person although is not personally liable for commission of such an offence
would be vicariously liable therefore. Such vicarious liability can be inferred so far as a company registered or incorporated under the Companies
Act, 1956 is concerned only if the requisite statements, which are required to be averred in the complaint petition, are made so as to make the
accused therein vicariously liable for the offence committed by the Company. Before a person can be made vicariously liable, strict compliance
with the statutory requirements would be insisted.
In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs. Neeta Bhalla and Another, , the Apex Court has held that
(a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint u/s 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of,
and responsible for the conduct of business of the Company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a
complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied.
(b) Merely being a director of a Company is not sufficient to make the person liable u/s 141 of the Act. A director in a Company cannot be
deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the Company for conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to
be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company at the relevant time. This has to be averred
as a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases.
In N.K. Wahi Vs. Shekhar Singh and Others, , the Apex Court reiterated the principles laid down in Sabitha Ramamurthi''s case and SMS
Pharmaceutical''s case.
However, there is slight digression in the Judgments in S.V. Mazumdar''s case and N. Rangachari''s case wherein it was held,
a person in the commercial world having a transaction with a company is entitled to presume that the Directors of the company are in-charge of the
affairs of the company. If any restrictions on their powers are placed by the memorandum or articles of the company, it is for the Directors to
establish it at the trial. It is in that context that Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that when the offender is a company, every
person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in-charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of
the company, shall also be deemed to be guilty of the offence along with the company.
In Malwa Cotton and Spinning Mills Limited v. Virsa Singh Sidhu and Ors. (2008) 17 SCC 147, the Hon''ble Supreme Court relied on the
above principles and held ""Whether a person is in charge of or is responsible to the company for conduct of business is to be adjudicated on the
basis of materials to be placed by the parties. Sub-section (2) of Section 141 is a deeming provision which as noted supra operates in certain
specified circumstances. Whether the requirements for the application of the deeming provision exist or not is again a matter for adjudication during
trial."" The judgment was rendered by Hon''ble Justice Arjit Pasayat (as he then was)
However His Lordship, in Ramrajsingh Vs. State of M.P. and Another, while considering the case of an Appellant/Director, who was
convicted, found that there was no evidence that the Appellant was in-charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company and
held that the conviction cannot be maintained. The principles laid down in Sabitha Ramamurthy''s case, SrojKumar Poddar''s case, S.M.S.
Pharmaceutical''s case and N.K. Wahi''s case were applied. According to Mr. B. Sriramulu, the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent, this
decision need not to be followed as it was considered after trail.
(National Small Industries Corp Ltd v. Harmeet Singh Pairtal and Anr.) CDJ 2010 SC 153 is a case where the issue before the Apex Court
was, what should be the averments in the complaint u/s 138 read with Section 141 of the Act against the Director of a Company before he can be
subjected to criminal proceedings (per Para 7 of the Judgment). The Hon''ble Supreme court has referred all the decisions of the Supreme court on
this subject. However the decisions in S.V. Mazumdar''s and Malwa Cotton Mill''s case were not referred. The apex court has laid down seven
principles which are already referred above.
Therefore, while initiating proceeding u/s 138 and 141 of the Act, the complainant shall make specific averments in a complaint that at the time
the offence was committed the person/accused was in-charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the Company. This basic
principle stands unaltered.
In Malwa Cotton Mills ''s case, the Supreme Court held
The three categories of persons covered by Section 141 are as follows:
(1) The company which committed the offence.
(2) Everyone who was in charge of and was responsible for the business of the company
(3) Any other person who is a Director or a manager or a secretary or officer of the company with whose connivance or due to whose neglect the
company has committed the offence.
The decisions referred above would show that there must be specific averments against a Director for a vicarious liability; for fastening the
criminal liability, there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction; once the specific averments are made, it is deemed that
every person who is in-charge and responsible to the company for conduct of the business of the company are guilty of the offence. A person who
establishes that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence is exempted from becoming liable by
operation of proviso under Sub-section 1 of Section 141 of the Act. The burden in this regard has to be discharged by the accused.
Therefore, the questions before this Court are whether specific averments are made against the Petitioner as required under the law in the
complaint and whether the allegations contained are sufficient to attract culpability which calls for an adjudication at the trial.
Malwa''s case was not referred by the subsequent Bench in the case of (National Small Industries Corp Ltd v. Harmeet Singh Pairtal and
Anr.) CDJ 2010 SC 153, where the Division Bench held that there is no presumption that every Director knows about the transaction and Section
141 does not make all the Directors liable for the offence.
In my considered view, the primary responsibility of the complainant is to make specific averment as required u/s 141 of the Act. If the court is
satisfied that it is not made, then the court can and should exercise its power u/s 482 of the Code in quashing the proceedings as otherwise it would
amount to harassment and abuse of process of law. If the court is satisfied that specific averment has been made, then it is deemed that the
accused is guilty of the offence. If such person pleads that the offence was committed without his knowledge or he was not in-charge and was not
responsible for the conduct of the business of the company or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of an offence, then
it is a matter for trial. The court can not and should not exercise its power under 482 of the code.
It is well settled that to constitute an offence u/s 138, the following ingredients are necessary;
That cheque was issued;
the same was presented;
it was dishonored on presentation;
a notice in terms of the provisions was served on the person sought to be made liable and
despite service of notice, neither any payment was made nor other obligations, if any, were complied with within fifteen days from the date of
receipt of the notice.
Issuance of cheque ''per se'' is not an offence. Dishonor of cheque on presentation may be the starting point for an offence. Issuing a statutory
notice is mandatory within the specified time demanding payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice and if the drawer or the
person responsible repays the amount, there ends the matter. If not complied within the stipulated time, the offence is said to be committed.
Section 141 of the Act relates to an offence committed by the Company. As stated earlier, issuance of cheque is not an offence, but the
offence is completed when the Company and every person who is in-charge of and is responsible for the business of the Company failed to
comply with the demand made in the statutory notice. A director, who is in-charge of and is responsible for the business of the Company, is
expected to exercise all due diligence to prevent the commission of an offence.
Any person who is in-charge and is responsible for the business of the Company, may be a person who can direct such payment or make such
payment. If any person pleads that he has no knowledge about the transaction or is not in-charge and is also not responsible for the business of the
Company or has exercised all due diligence to comply the demand made in the statutory notice, has to prove by material evidence and it is a matter
for trial.
That being the legal position, let us see whether the specific or necessary averment as required under the law has been made in the complaint
which is challenged before this Court. In paragraph 2 of the complaint, it is stated ""the 4th and 5th accused are the Directors of the 1st accused
company, the accused 2 to 6 are in-charge and responsible for the day today operations as well as responsible for taking all financial and policy
decisions of the accused company"".
In paragraph-9 of the complaint, the objection raised by the Petitioner in his reply has been produced and it is stated that the information
provided by the Bombay Stock Exchange shows that the key officials of the 1st accused company are 7 persons including the Petitioner and the
Petitioner and his family together hold considerable shares of the 1st accused company. These averments are made in response to the reply issued
by the Petitioner.
In the reply to the statutory notice, the 1st paragraph is devoted to the Petitioner''s reputation and his family back ground and in paragraph No.
2 the Petitioner would state that he is a business man, primarily engaged with various business enterprises and holding various positions in various
companies. In Paragraphs 3 and 4 he would state that he is a non-executive Director of the accused Company and has attended only few board
meetings and never participated in the actual running of the Company and is not responsible for the conduct of the business of the accused
company.
This Court is at a loss to understand that the Petitioner being a reputed personality and engaged in various business enterprises, has not chosen
to exercise due diligence to prevent the commission of an offence. He has not even stated that he made an attempt to contact accused company or
its Managing Director or any other person to verify about the transactions or direct payment to avoid prosecution, when a huge claim of cores of
rupees was demanded in the statutory notices.
As stated earlier, there are specific averments to the effect that the Petitioner is in-charge of and responsible for the day-today operation as
well as responsible for taking all financial and policy decision and he along with his family members are holding substantial share in the accused
company and the contact information provided by the Bombay Stock Exchange in their web site showed that the key officials of the accused
company are seven persons including the Petitioner.
I am satisfied that the above averments are enough for the complainant to presume that the Petitioner was in-charge and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the accused company and since he pleads otherwise, it has to be established by him that he was not in-charge and
responsible and he has no knowledge about the transaction and has exercised due diligence in prevention of commission of the offence.
Therefore, I am of the considered view, that it is a matter for trial.
Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not find any valid and sufficient ground to interfere with the proceedings
pending before the courts below in C.C. Nos. 2561, 2560 and 5268 of 2010.
In the result, the criminal original petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected Mps are closed.