AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Indira Banerjee, J.—This appeal is against a judgment and award dated 19th February, 2014 made by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Third Court, Krishnagar, Nadia in Motor Accident Claim Case/Suit No. 198 of 2012 being an application filed by the claimant appellants for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on account of the death of one Minati Debnath in an accident in course of use of a motor cycle bearing the registration No. WB-52G/3999.
Under the Motor Vehicles Act, compensation may be claimed under Section 163A and also under Section 166 . There is a major difference between Section 163A and Section 166 . Liability under Section 163A is in the nature of a "no fault liability". Under Section 163A , fault or negligence of the owner or any other person need not be pleaded or proved. In an application under Section 163A , all that is required to be proved is that death or, alternatively the permanent disability, resulted in course of use of a motor vehicle. However, under Section 166 , negligence and/or fault of the motor vehicle has to be established by cogent evidence.
In motor accident claims cases, whether there is death or permanent disability, the courts have sympathy for the victims and/or legal heirs of victims. However, sheer sympathy for a victim coupled with the fact that there is a corporate insurer contesting the claim for compensation, does not, in our view, enable a Tribunal to disregard all evidence, particularly, in an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
A person with a meagre income killed or permanently disabled, might apply for compensation under Section 163A in which case, he need not prove fault or negligence. However, when he opts to claim higher compensation under Section 166 , he is foisted with liability to substantiate his claim with credible evidence.
In the instant case, the learned Tribunal framed the following four issues:
"1. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and law?
Have the claimants any cause of action to file this case?
Are the claimants entitled to get compensation, as prayed for?
To what other relief/reliefs, if any, are the claimants entitled? "
We cannot but comment on the cryptic and casual manner in which the learned Tribunal has disposed of the motor accident claims case. All the four issues were taken up together. There was no specific issue of whether there was any rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle concerned or whether there was any contributory negligence on the part of the victim herself. The only two witnesses, who have deposed on behalf of the claimants, are one of the claimants being the husband of the victim (Kartick Debnath) and an alleged eyewitness, Samaresh Debnath. The husband of the victim was apparently not an eyewitness. The husband stated, by way of affidavit, as follows:
"4. That, on 09.11.11 at about 12 to 12.10 at noon she faced an accident near kalipur Patkaticolony, as a result of which she sustained severe bleeding injury all over the body and subsequently died in Nadia District Hospital.
That, on the fateful day due to the rash and negligent driving of the Motor Cycle bearing No. WB-52G/3999 my wife sustained injury and subsequently died."
Nothing further has been stated. It is repeated that he is not an eyewitness. The second witness, Samaresh Debnath, nephew of the deceased victim, claimed that he had seen the accident. All he said was as follows:
"3. That, one Motor Cycle bearing No. WB-52G/3999 was responsible for this accident.
That, soon after the accident I along with local people took Minati Debnath to Nadia District Hospital. Unfortunately doctor declared Minati Debnath as dead."
This eyewitness did not even say how and in what manner the accident took place. Was the victim riding the motorcycle which was being driven rashly? Was she hit by the motorcycle? Was the motorcycle being driven on the wrong side of the road? Did the motorcycle mount on the pavement? All these questions are not addressed at all. Yet, the learned Tribunal, taking up all the four issues together, apparently for the sake of convenience, arrived at the finding that the offending vehicle was running rashly and negligently and dashed the victim from behind and due to the said accident, the victim expired in the hospital. The evidence has been annexed to the paper book. We do not find any statement of any eyewitness to the effect that the vehicle was running rashly or negligently or had dashed the victim from behind. In fact, none of the witnesses stated that the motorcycle hit the victim from behind. We have extracted the material evidence of Samaresh Debnath filed by way of affidavit. In cross-examination, all he stated was "the victim of this case was my aunt. The distance between my house and the place of occurrence is about 9 K.M. not a fact that I did not see the accident and I have deposed falsely in court today".
It is true that, in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the strict rules of evidence, as contained in the Evidence Act, may not apply. At the same time, a claim has to be established in accordance with principles of natural justice and fair play. Just because the opposite party is an insurer, any amount claimed by way of compensation cannot be awarded. We are at a loss to understand on what basis the learned Tribunal held that the incident took place as the offending vehicle was running rashly and negligently and had dashed the victim from behind.
The learned Tribunal found that the victim was a housewife and she was not connected with any business. However, in the claim application, it is claimed that the victim had an income of Rs. 5,000/- per month. There was no evidence to substantiate her claim to income and there is no evidence that she had any income.
The victim was a housewife. Of course, the heirs of a housewife are also entitled to compensation upon assessment of a notional income. In the case of an application for compensation under Section 163A , the notional income would be one-third the income of the earning spouse (Second Schedule). The notional income of an unemployed person is Rs. 15,000/- per annum.
Since a housewife is also unemployed, in the sense that she does not actually earn money, she may be deemed to be an unemployed person for the purpose of computation of compensation. Her notional income would be Rs. 15,000/- per year, which is the deemed income of an unemployed person under the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. Alternatively, her income would have to be deemed to be one-third of the income of her husband, as provided in the Second Schedule. In our view, the income of a housewife would have to be assessed at one-third her husband''s income or Rs. 15,000/-, whichever is higher.
In this case, there is no pleading nor any proof of the husband''s income. The learned Tribunal has rightly assumed the income of the victim to be Rs. 15,000/- per year, being the notional income of an unemployed person. It is well-settled that the Second Schedule, though not binding, may serve as a reasonable guideline for computation of compensation under Section 166 .
In an application under Section 166 , we might consider the inadequacy of computation of income at a meagre rate of Rs. 15,000/- per annum for an unemployed person, having regard to the fact the 21 years have elapsed, since the schedule was incorporated and in 21 years, there has been no change in the Schedule since its incorporation, notwithstanding the tremendous inflation in the meanwhile. But then, liability on account of negligence on the part of the owner would have to be established.
Be that as it may, if the heirs had applied under Section 163A , they would have been entitled to have the victim''s income assessed at Rs. 15,000/- per year from which one-third would have to be deducted from her personal expenses. The balance would have to be multiplied with the multiplier applicable to the age of 45 years. The applicable multiplier would be "14" in view of the Second Schedule as rectified by the Supreme Court in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, . In this case, the multiplier of "15" has been applied by the learned Tribunal. However, since the insurance company has not appealed, it is only the appeal of the claimants, we do not deem it necessary to reduce the compensation.
The learned Tribunal has awarded interest only in case of default and that too at the rate of 8% per annum.
In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Surti Gupta Vs. United India Insurance Company and Others and Civil Appeal Nos. 348-349 of 2015, arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 4897-4898 of 2014 (Smt. Neeta w/o Kallappa & Ors. etc. v. the Div. Manager, MSRTC, Kolhapur), where the Supreme Court deprecated the High Court and the Tribunal for awarding interest at a rate less than 9% per annum, we deem it appropriate to modify the award by directing that the claimants would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing the claim application till full disbursement to the claimants. The interest shall be computed and deposited in the Tribunal within sixty days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
The appeal and the application are disposed of.
Urgent photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties, subject to compliance of all requisite formalities.
Sahidullah Munshi, J.
I agree.